

**A Discourse of Threat?**  
— **A Textual Analysis of the U.S. Report**  
*Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba*

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## 1. Introduction

*"There are no borders in this fight to the death; we cannot be indifferent to what is happening in any part of the world." —Ernesto 'Che' Guevara*

The United States' foreign policy is an important (though not overriding) practice in international politics. As one reads news about the foreign affairs almost anywhere in the world, the United States is frequently mentioned there too. It is a very active country world-wide. This activity has increasingly caused discussion—and the tone has started to sound more and more negative. Why is the United States so active in its foreign policy? What kind of values forms the basis of its policy?

Foreign policies are important practices of security. As the security is dealt with, also the threats enter the discussion. The main concept of this thesis is “threat”, and it establishes the core of the research questions. The main research question is the following: How is Cuba constructed as a threat in the foreign policy rhetoric of the United States? Furthermore, I examine as what kind of threat Cuba is presented. Lastly, I ask why this threat is created.

I find it especially important to analyse the U.S. rhetoric concerning Cuba which has been neglected here in Finland. This neglect is understandable for it seems like nothing new has occurred in the policies between the respective countries. However, I argue that the *Commission for Assistance to a free Cuba* -report<sup>1</sup>, which serves as the research material for this Master's Thesis, is already a diplomatic action between Cuba and the United States that deserves attention.

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<sup>1</sup> The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba –report (2004) is found in the WebPages of the U.S. government: <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/c12237.htm> (2005-10-26).

According to David Campbell (Kuusisto 1998, 18), fear is a common element in the foreign policy of the U.S. government. It is used to convince people of the justification of U.S. actions. Similar threats seem to be employed in the U.S. foreign policy rhetoric all around the world<sup>2</sup>.

However, I do not want to increase the prevalent anti-Americanism in any way<sup>3</sup>, and I would be delighted to find other kinds of results. Maybe the American suggestions are the only realistic ones available. Therefore, I find it very important to try to interpret the U.S. actions in as neutral light as possible without compromising any needed criticism.

I examine—in a similar way that Campbell (1992) did in his book *Writing Security*—the way in which the identity of the United States has been written through foreign policies operating in its name. Instead of asking how United States foreign policy serves the national interest, I study how, through the writing of threat, the U.S. foreign policy helps to produce (and reproduce) the ethical borders of its identity and the territorial boundaries of the state. (Campbell 1992, vii.)

This study examines the United States' foreign policy in respect to Cuba, because—as Scheer and Zeitlin (1964, 9) crystallized it—(1) “the Cuban crisis epitomizes the failure and dangers of much of the United States' foreign policy.” Furthermore, (2) the analysis of the conflict between the respective countries has been neglected since the Cold War ended.

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<sup>2</sup> See about the U.S. foreign policy rhetoric for example the Master's Thesis of Erästö (2005, 16-24).

<sup>3</sup> See about anti-Americanism e.g. International Herald Tribune November 26-27, 2005. Cohen, Robert: *Anti-Americanism is one 'ism' that thrives*, page 2.

Other reasons for choosing Cuba as the research target when examining the rhetoric of the United States in its foreign policy are (3) the long-lasting economical conflict between the island state and the superpower, (4) the underlying potential of a concrete military conflict as the leader of the socialist Cuba—Fidel Castro—passes away, and (5) the world wide media seems presently disinterested in this conflict. Now, however, during a time of peace, one can expect a certain transparency when dealing with the issue<sup>4</sup>. Whereas, during a possible conflict in the future, it will become more difficult to get varied information on the situation.

In addition, if we start to analyse the Cuban social structure and the will of the people when Fidel Castro passes away—as the media will most likely do—it will be less beneficial. Then the United States will probably implement its own agenda in Cuba because it is the only one that is immediately available<sup>5</sup>. I am not saying that the U.S. agenda could not be the most suitable one, but in order to know its relevance, we have to analyse it. As the Albert Einstein Institute<sup>6</sup> declares:

“The need for analyses of non-violent action is great. Conflicts involving non-violent struggle are often severe, the opponents frequently ruthless, the costs at times quite high. However, through better understanding of the particular dynamics of non-violent action, wise planning, and careful strategic judgment, the risks to non-violent resisters can be reduced, and the effectiveness of their actions and chances of success can be dramatically increased.”

I will examine the U.S. foreign policy by studying the argumentation of the United States to the current and future societal structure of Cuba in the report *Commission for Assistance to a*

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<sup>4</sup> See for example Luostarinen (1994) on the availability of information during conflict times.

<sup>5</sup> As we have been able to witness in the case of Iraq starting in 2003.

<sup>6</sup> The Albert Einstein Institution is established to advance the study and use of strategic nonviolent action in conflicts throughout the world. Read more about the institution from their website: <http://www.aeinstein.org/> (2005-12-31).

*free Cuba* (henceforth referred as the “Report” with a possible reference page in parentheses). The research method is, therefore, a textual analysis. This remains as a fairly little studied perspective in the research concerning the conflict between the respective countries. The argumentation is examined, as I already mentioned, by analysing the Report *Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba* prepared by the U.S. government in the summer of 2004.

Why is the United States so keen to intervene in the politics of Cuba? Is it for the good of the Cuban people, as the Report states in the beginning, or is it something else? There are probably as many reasons as there are people involved. The aim of this work, however, is not to find out the main reason for this interest but to understand the logic and values behind the statements in the Report.

In this paper, as I study Cuba as a threat presented by the United States, I analyse the current state of tensions between these two countries, and the reasons behind them. I examine the conflict from a *sociosemiotic* point of view because I am of the opinion that reality just does not come across symbolically but it is maintained, even produced, in discourse. I believe that in its official documents the U.S. produces a certain kind of image of Cuba which reflects the U.S. interests. This image largely reflects the existing standpoints in the U.S. today. By analysing this particular document I wish to find those images and bring them to light.

On the one hand people's images are presented in the official documents and on the other hand the official documents affect people's opinions<sup>7</sup>. Therefore, it is important to critically analyse this image even if we are talking about countries geographically far away from Europe. As the words of Che Guevara in the beginning of this chapter state, “we cannot be indifferent to what is happening in any part of the world” when it comes to saving (or losing, in the case of ignorance) the lives of real human beings.

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<sup>7</sup> Maybe again these images from the U.S. have a more wide-spread influence on the opinion of the democratic countries in the world. Even though at the moment the EU is leading opposing politics in the issues concerning Cuba thanks to the new prime minister Zapatero. See e.g. Similä (27.10.2005) [www.kuuba.org](http://www.kuuba.org) à Cuba Sí à Yhteiskunta & Poliitiikka à Kuuba-Espanja-USA (2005-10-26).

The relationship between reality, discourse, and values is an essential part of the intelligibility of society. The semiotic interpretation takes into careful consideration the fact that in the process of understanding reality (produced in discourse) values are arranged from a certain perspective. We cannot, for example, explain the changes in a particular society without taking into consideration how the values—positive and negative—are arranged in that society. (Sulkunen 1997, 13-18.) In many different arenas there are many differing viewpoints on the reality of Cuba going on. In this study I analyse the American process of understanding the reality in Cuba by studying the Report.

The outline of my thesis is divided into five parts. In the first part, Chapter 2, I link my study to the research done on the United States' foreign policy—especially towards Cuba. I depict some most important observations on the research done on the argumentation of the United States in its foreign policy. Then, in the second part, Chapter 3, I briefly introduce the relationship between the United States and Cuba as much as is needed for understanding the situation today and the U.S. need for depicting Cuba as a threat.

In the third part, Chapter 4, I begin by presenting the Report that serves as the material for the research. Then I introduce the methodological tools which I use in chapters 5 and 6 to analyse the material. Firstly, I introduce Greimas' sociosemiotic analysis which, in Chapter 5, helps me to find the answer to the first research question of this study: as *what* kind of threat Cuba is presented. Secondly, I introduce Perelman's argumentation analysis and Törrönen's pending narrative, both of which I use in Chapter 6 to discover an answer to the second research question: *how* Cuba is created as a threat in the Report (and more broadly, in the foreign policy rhetoric of the United States).

In the fourth part, in chapters 5 and 6, I combine the topics, which I have dealt with separately, and I analyse the material. Finally in the last part of the study, Chapter 7, I briefly discuss the research ethics of this Thesis as well as the criticism. In this chapter, however, the main attempt is to answer the third research question: *why* Cuba is created as a threat.

## 2. The Research on the U.S. Foreign Policy Rhetoric and Cuba

*"The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders are targets of far greater importance than the bodies of his troops." —Mao Tse-Tung*

In Finnish sociological studies neither Cuba nor the U.S. foreign policy has been a very popular topic. Instead, some research on Cuba has been conducted at least in the field of history, literary research (Siltala 1994, 3) and pedagogics (Simola 1984), and a great deal of research on the U.S. foreign policy has been conducted into international politics. Many researches on the rhetoric of the U.S. foreign policy have been conducted as well. For example, Heli Salonen (2005) has written her Master's thesis on the rhetoric of the Presidents Bush and Clinton, whereas, Päivi Nevala (2000) has studied in her thesis the national interests of the United States in its politics concerning China. In her thesis Salonen (2005, 88) concluded that the need for the rhetorical analysis concerning the U.S. foreign policy continues to be great.

This study could be classified to the sociology of international politics. It combines the theoretical tools from semiotic sociology and rhetorical analysis—to which I return in Chapter 4 and 5—and deals with a topic of international politics<sup>8</sup>. This study uses the gained knowledge from both fields and attempts to introduce something new to them as well.

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<sup>8</sup> According to Immanuel Wallerstein (1991) the division between the social sciences should be abandoned. The aim of sociology is to look at the present society (also the “international society”) from the historical perspective because the societies are historically developed and geographically located. Also dividing the society into different spheres of life (economy, state, individuals) is artificial because all of them influence each other. He continues that all the societies are somehow connected to each other and should, therefore, be

## 2.1. Research on the U.S. Foreign Policy—Searching for Stories

Petri Minkkinen (2004), a researcher from the University of Helsinki, deals with the politics of the current President of the United States, George W. Bush in his dissertation (*Kaktus, Bush & Pohjois-Amerikan tulevaisuus. Kriittinen avointen historiallisten kontekstien tutkimus ja muutoksellinen politiikka*). Minkkinen presumes that the government of Bush has tried to create a new world empire with the aid of new liberal politics. He concludes that this policy cannot last for long due to its contradictions and that it would not even benefit the United States if it could. The United States has lost the respect of the other social actors and is now forced to use power and violence to maintain its hegemony. According to Minkkinen, there is no return to the old system. Instead, the U.S. can only choose between new imperialism and emancipatory politics. Would the democratic regionalism, that Minkkinen offers, be the solution in the situation of Cuba? Perhaps, but pondering on that is outside the scope of this thesis. What is important in this work is that it brings out the current identity crisis of the United States.

Another current discussion on the U.S. foreign policy is found in the collection of articles (*Yhdysvaltain hegemonia: Messiaaninen suurvalta ja sen vastavoimat*) written by the team of writers of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) and edited by the senior researcher Henrikki Heikka (2005). These articles were columns written to the national newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* last summer (2005) and addressed the “hegemonial identity” of the United States. In addition to the hegemony of the United States, the series concentrated also on the reactions it has caused in different parts of the world.

According to Joseph Nye the leadership of the United States has been successful due to the desirability of its values and ideals. The U.S. has used its own example—in other words, soft power—to get the others to act according to its wishes. However, during the Bush

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examined as a part of the world system. Last, the change of societies is not necessarily progressive, which is why I want to scrutinize the possible change of Cuban society that the American government is aiming at.

administration the use of force has been more apparent than the ideals. Nye argues that this is the reason for the current dislike directed towards the American hegemony. (Heikka 2005, 6.)

The articles do not, however, discuss the situation of Cuba nor Latin America in general. In a way, this thesis can be seen as a continuation of this series of articles as well, as it addresses the state of the hegemonial identity of the United States. I will come back to the themes brought up in the articles in Chapter 5 and 6 as I analyse the Report.

The centring of the individual is a prominent theme in the foreign policy discourse of the United States (Campbell 1992, 278). Geoffrey Hawthorn (in Campbell 1992, 279) has argued that the United States' conception of self as the individual derives in part from the character of the U.S. revolution. Without the kind of old order that was being attacked in Europe—no equivalent of the European estates or the established church—the U.S. society was “merely individuals, with or without property, and government”.

One important consequence in the politics of the United States was a very special sense of time. For Europeans hope lay in the future and the prospect of a new order. Whereas, for the U.S. public, whose social and political order had begun in a historical vacuum and been secured through a revolution, a concern with space is more central than time. The territorial space—and its expansion—has been privileged over temporal, historical or social relations.

“[The] US identity is constituted geopolitically, through the securing of a particular space in which individuals reside. A geopolitical reading is thus more than an economical means of interpreting the ambiguity of global life. Geopolitical representational practices are practices of statecraft central to the constituting of the United States.” (Campbell 1992, 279.)

Representational practices are highly used to constitute the United States. However, only lately have researchers of international politics started to take these practices seriously and started to enforce semiotic methods in analysing them. It is not for long that the research on international politics has begun to discern foreign policy in terms of storytelling, which again means that much more research is needed. Researchers like David Campbell (1990, 1992), Michael Shapiro (1992), and Hayward Alker (1996) have been the pioneers in this field. They have shown in their studies how, with the help of foreign policy, one creates symbolic boundaries and makes the others foreign, and furthermore legitimates the power relating to domestic policy. (Kuusisto 1998, 13.)

Foreign political stories can vary greatly. When dealing with countries far away, i.e. different cultures and abstract values, only a rare amount of the “great audience” can base their opinions and beliefs on direct observations and personal experiences. In numerous large questions they have to trust the explaining stories of the reliable sources, who they consider to be alike and aware of the situation (Kuusisto 1998, 14).

When a country wants to commit to a certain issue (as the United States has shown its willingness to commit to the helping of Cuban people to regain their independence), it has to first create the events as events that seem somehow threatening, then name and define them and finally connect them to stories that support their reaction options. Choosing a relevant story and marketing it as early as possible is important because all the basic stories have their own plot, own role positions and own natural result. The leaders need convincing stories to back up their actions. (Kuusisto 1998, 16.)

This is exactly what the U.S. has done in the Report. They have chosen a relevant story about Cuba (of all the possible ones that exist) and marketed it early enough (in other words, well before Castro has passed away). Therefore, in this study, I want to continue the semiotic interpretation of international politics by analysing this Report with the help of theorists like Campbell and Shapiro.

## **2.2. The U.S. Foreign Policy Rhetoric: Is Abstract Enmity Necessary?**

To David Campbell, fear, danger and separation are the keywords of foreign policy in general. Dangerous and alien elements are actively created as threats to the other(s) so that the existence of the country and its own people would become justified. (Kuusisto 1998, 14.) Also in Campbell's work the foreign policy is seen as a significant part of the identity creation of a country. He has argued that, for example, the form of international order known as the Cold War was an attempt to discipline the ambiguity of global life so as to secure always-fragile identities (Campbell 1990, 264).

The boundaries of the state have been the result of transferring the differences within society to the differences between societies. During the Cold War the identity of the United States became even more apparent in the external boundaries of the state. The 1930s and 1940s (from the depression to the Cold War) were a critical rupture in the identity of the United States that demanded a considerable effort to reproduce an earlier identity. The Cold War thus needs to be understood as a strategy that was global in scope but national in design. Rather than reacting to an external realm of necessity, the Cold War was connected to the constitution of that external realm. (Campbell 1992, 273.)

The Cold War is over but the identity creation still happens by defining the external realm of the country. The Report is a part of the current discourse, and therefore, a part of this identity construction. As Campbell (1990, 268) continues, the U.S. foreign policy cannot be understood as a fixed entity. It has changed in many ways depending on the given historical circumstances. However, it has also demonstrated certain continuities:

“[I]mportant is the constantly shifting characterization of *the threat*. Despite considerable differences in the order of magnitude of each, US policymakers have so tagged world communism, the economic disintegration of Europe, Red China, North Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya, terrorists, drug smugglers, and so on over the years. None of these sources poses a threat in terms of a traditional calculus of (military)

power, and none can be reduced solely to the Soviet Union. All of them, however, are understood in terms of their location in an anarchic realm. Moreover, an examination of the foreign policy discourse suggests that the absence of order in the international system is considered a basic problem for US foreign policy.” (Italics in the original text, Campbell 1990, 268.)

As said, the Cold War has ended but the need to secure the U.S. identity still exists. According to Campbell this happens with the characterization of the threat, for example, as terrorism<sup>9</sup>. Campbell (1992, 271) has remarked that assessments of threat in foreign policy discourse regularly begin with considerations on culture, ideology, and general reflections on the U.S. society.

“The constant reaffirmation of the character of US society and the individual in foreign policy discourse suggests, according to this argument, that the practices of foreign policy serve to enframe, limit, and domesticate a particular meaning of humanity. The identity thus enframed refers to more than just the characteristics of individuals or national types; it incorporates the form of domestic order, the social relations of production, and the various subjectivities to which they give rise. In the context of the United States, this concept of humanity is circumscribed by the rhetoric associated with freedom of choice for individuals, democratic institutions, and a private enterprise economy.” (Campbell 1992, 272.)

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<sup>9</sup> A definition of terrorism, written by UN's terrorism expert A.P. Schmid:

"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby — in contrast to assassination — the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought." (On Terrorism in Wikipedia: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definition\\_of\\_terrorism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definition_of_terrorism) 2006-04-26)

These considerations serve to reproduce the U.S. practices in the face of contradictory and threatening interpretations of humanity, most obviously, that of a communal humanity whose interests are served by social planning and the public ownership of property (which is the case in Cuba). (Campbell 1992, 272.) But why are these contradictory interpretations of humanity threatening?

As I already mentioned, Campbell (1990, 265) sees that there exists an important relationship between foreign policy and the domestic social order. The construction of the U.S. identity is marked by projecting the differences within the society to the differences between the U.S. and other societies (Campbell 1990, 271). According to Shapiro these identity stories are typically trying to hide the historical breaks and changes, the inner multiplicity, the flexibility of outer boundaries and the similarities between us and the people behind the boundaries. (Kuusisto 1998, 14.) In other words, concentration on the boundaries between us and others hides the inner complexities of an identity.

Shapiro, in his studies on U.S. foreign policy, introduces the concept of abstract enmity that seems to be intrinsic in the foreign policy rhetoric: “For the contemporary United States, for example, the geopolitical world at any given moment is divided into friends and potential foes. Danger is expected more from some quarters than others. And the decision to commence hostilities is based on national (and sometimes international) deliberations.” (Shapiro 1992, 456.) But where does this enmity derive from?

Shapiro (1992, 469) continues that as the United States attempts to re-establish its damaged collective subjectivity as an effective and “virile male entity”, “an Enemy” is in part a product of this process. “In the case of the United States, the damaged collective subjectivity (often called the 'Vietnam syndrome') is a result of the lost war in the recent past” (Shapiro 1992, 469). Now that Saddam Hussein—the archenemy of the U.S.—is finally removed from power, the national desire wants to reproduce “him” in order to work on its damaged

collective subjectivity. And who could possibly be better than the leader of one of the few communist states still existing?

So we should ask what the role of fear is in international politics. Is the fear rational and proportionate or is it rather possible or even over exaggerated? Shapiro (1996, 477-478) has answered to this question in a following way:

“Denial of disorder within the order for the collective body as a whole should lead to an intolerance of an external order that fails to validate, by imitation, the domestic order. Thus a nonimitative order will be interpreted as disordered and, accordingly, as a threat. Moreover, the 'threat' is dissimulated because of the misrecognition involved in the very constitution of the self, a failure to recognize dimensions of incoherence and otherness within the self. Accordingly, the threat is treated as a danger to the general survival of the order rather than as an affront to the order's interpretive coherence.”

### **3. The Relationship between the United States and Cuba—Foes Forever?**

*"For a revolution to break out it is not enough for the 'lower classes to refuse' to live in the old way; it is necessary also that the 'upper classes should be unable' to live in the old way."*  
—Lenin

This chapter is not intended to be an inclusive account on the U.S.—Cuba relations until today. Rather its purpose is to highlight those events in Cuba's history and those relations between the United States and Cuba that led to the development of the U.S. perception of Cuba as a threat.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Jorge I. Domínguez has in a similar way, but in reverse order, divided the political history of Cuba to three parts: (1) From the U.S. occupation in Cuba until the coup d'état by Batista, (2.) from the coup until the escape of Batista, and (3.) from the establishment of the 1959 revolution during the 1960 until today (Domínguez 1978, 2).

### **3.1. The Threat That Used to Be the Apple of the U.S. Eye**

The United States<sup>11</sup> has always taken Cuba<sup>12</sup> into consideration. Firstly, because of its close proximity to the U.S.<sup>13</sup> Geographically Cuba has a very strategic location. It has been considered that the country controlling Cuba controls the Gulf of Mexico. Therefore, not only the U.S. has been interested in it but also Spain, Britain, France and Soviet Union have wanted to control it. (Rabe 2006.)

The 4th of July 1776 the United States gained its independence from Great Britain. In 1801-09 Thomas Jefferson was convinced that the entire Western Hemisphere would eventually be part of the United States. Who could want to resist the expansion of liberty? Cuba was also considered as a “ripe apple” that would fall on the hands of the U.S. when the time would be right. John Quincy Adams continued the same policy on Cuba in 1823. Monroe doctrine the same year was also an example of this policy. According to it no European power should contemplate on taking Cuba because it belongs to the U.S. (Rabe 2006.) At this point Cuba was not portrayed as a threat; the threat was that some European power might try to take Cuba away from the U.S.

In the Ostend manifesto (1854) Southern slaveholders demanded the annexation of Cuba to the U.S. However, the U.S. could not annex another slave state to it; instead it had to wait for the Cuban independence. In Cuba the struggle for independence started in 1868 and lasted for ten years. The result was the abolishing of slavery in Cuba 1886. The Cuban war for independence started 1895 and ended in 1898. (Franklin 1997, 5-9.)

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<sup>11</sup> See on the U.S. for example CIA - The World Factbook (29.03.2006): <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html> (2006-04-18).

<sup>12</sup> See on Cuba for example from Similä, Juhani & Laura (2001), the U.S. Department of State: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm> (2005-12-25), and the European Commission on the EU relations with Cuba: [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/country/country\\_home\\_en.cfm?CID=cu&lng=en&type=home&status=new](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/country/country_home_en.cfm?CID=cu&lng=en&type=home&status=new) (2005-09-15).

The 1880s, when the United States had more or less recovered from the disasters of the civil war, was a time of rapid economical and geographical expansion. Foreign capital was flowing to the country and the population was increasing quickly. In the 1880s the United States shifted from agriculture to heavy industry, commerce and banking. It was the golden time of democracy and capitalism, where the motto was “each man for himself” and the principle was “the survival of the fittest.” The “natural” expansion was also directed towards the South but the expansionism towards Cuba was still patient. This strategically and economically valuable island would be annexed by the United States when the time would be ripe. (Siltala 1992, 24-25.)

After the 300 years of Spanish occupation in Cuba the United States finally gained the control of the island on December 10th 1898 as a conclusion of the war with Spain (that ended on August 12th 1898). Cuba was the last colony of Spain and therefore the battle was fierce. With the Teller Amendment, however, the U.S. Senate rejected annexation of Cuba. President Nixon—as a typical idealist American—wanted Cuba to join the U.S. freely. (Franklin 1997, 9; Rabe 2006.)

In 1901 the United States got the right to intervene in Cuban affairs by the attachment of the Platt Amendment<sup>14</sup> to the Cuban Constitution. It also received Guantánamo Bay as a naval station to guard the Gulf of Mexico. On May 20th in 1902 Cuba gained its formal independence from the United States with Platt Amendment restrictions on its sovereignty. However, the United States intervened in Cuba in 1906-09, 1912 and again in 1917-22. (Huberman & Sweezy 1971, 167; Farber 1976, xvii.)

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<sup>13</sup> Cuba is situated 90 miles South of Florida. CIA - The World Factbook (29.03.2006): <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html> (2006-04-18).

<sup>14</sup> Platt Amendment gave the U.S. the right to intervene in the Cuban affairs when its national interests were threatened (Gonzalez 1998, 4).

### **3.2. From Independence to the Revolution—U.S. Ambassadors and Cuban Dictators**

The Reciprocity treaty between the United States and Cuba was signed in 1903 and lasted until the 1960. It guaranteed a sugar quota for Cuba in return for free entry of U.S. goods. This one-crop economy was supposed to tie the Cuban economy to the U.S. Even though Cuba was prosperous in respect to Latin America in general through 1926-1950, one-crop economy is never recommendable as the terms of trade will definitely work against it at some point. For the U.S., however, it was beneficial and investing in Cuba was safe because, in case of irregularities in Cuba, they could always intervene thanks to the Platt Amendment. (Rabe 2006.)

The U.S. Ambassadors played a significant role in the politics of Cuba before the Revolution in 1959 (Scheer & Zeitlin 1964, 34). For example, in 1933 United States Ambassador Benjamin Sumner Welles mediated between the Machado dictatorship and part of the opposition, which resulted in Machado abandoning power on the August 12th.

On September 4th, 1933 Sergeant Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar (1901-1973) led the “Sergeants’ Revolt” supported by the civilian revolutionaries and became the head of Cuba. In 1934 Batista removed the nationalist government of Ramón Grau San Martín created the previous year. At the time, the Platt Amendment was officially abolished but the United States continued to retain a naval base in Guantánamo Bay. (Farber 1976, xvii-xviii, 20-21.)

Batista controlled Cuba through puppet governments during 1934-40 until the New Cuban Constitution was established and Batista’s rule shifted to a constitutional presidency. At the time, Batista established his relationship with the Havana mafia. (Farber 1976, xviii.)

In 1944 Batista was forbidden by law to seek re-election by term limits and was succeeded by Ramón Grau San Martín (the president of Cuba in 1944-48). Batista retired voluntarily to Florida but returned in 1952 by organizing a coup d’état to remove Carlos Prío Socarrás

(elected in 1948) from power. Batista became president three months before new elections were to be held. The new government received diplomatic recognition from the United States and the island became a major tourist destination, which increased the prosperity on the island. In the beginning, the Cuban public somehow accepted the coup as well, hoping that Batista would restore stability on the island after the political violence, labour unrest and government corruption that had occurred during Prío's regime. (Farber 1976, xviii; Conzalez 1998, 5-6.)

Despite the economic prosperity in the 1950s, the regular Cubans lived in poverty without education and health care. Batista's corruption, particularly his unsettlingly close relationship with the Havana mafia, saw a rise in general opposition to his violent regime. Fidel Castro was one of the opponents of this regime. Castro attempted first to challenge Batista's takeover judicially but his petition was refused. He was imprisoned after leading an attack against Batista on the Moncada Barracks in July, 1953. This attack started a broader revolutionary movement against Batista. However, in 1955, Batista released Castro who went into exile in Mexico and the United States. (Farber 1976, xviii, 46-47; Conzalez 1998, 6-9.)

In May 1956, Castro returned to Cuba to fight for the revolution. In response to a failed assault on the presidential palace in 1957, by other resistance groups unaffiliated with Castro, Batista launched a major assault against Castro and the other rebel groups. During this period of violence, restrictions of constitutional rights and media censorship, the U.S. broke off relations with Batista, stating that it sought a peaceful transition to a new government. (Castro 1978, 29; *Kuuba valloittaa* –elokuva ja kuubalaisen kulttuurin esittelylehti [“Cuba Conquers/Entices”, a film and a magazine on Cuban culture] 2004, 4.)

In the end of 1958 Che Guevara led the revolutionary troops to victory in the city of Santa Clara. This ended the dictatorship of Batista in Cuba for good and started to decrease the power of the U.S. in Cuba as well. It took for long for the U.S. to realize that Cuba was not

interested to join it freely. However, as this became clear, the U.S. started to construct the image of Cuba as a threat.

### **3.3. The U.S.—Cuba Relations from 1959 to the Present**

Dr. **Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz (born in 1926)** has ruled Cuba since the beginning of 1959, when he overthrew the regime of Fulgencio Batista, and transformed Cuba into the first communist state in the Western hemisphere. This was the beginning for Cuba to be perceived as a threat to the Americans.

Castro first attracted attention in Cuban political life through his student activism; his outspoken nationalism and radical critique of Batista and the U.S. corporate and political influence in Cuba brought a receptive following criticism, and attention from the authorities. Since his ascension to power in 1959 Castro has become only more controversial and high-profile, inciting both condemnation and adulation, and in general, debate. (Thomas 1971, 809-823, 835-844, 1038-1090.)

Right after his ascension to power Castro visited the United States. He did it to show that he is different from the previous rulers of Cuba. He wanted to show that Cuba no longer needs the U.S. It is an independent country that will become self-sustaining. (Rabe 2006.) This increased the unrest in the U.S. who had been used to control Latin America with economical arrangements.

“The revolution was waged against the system of power which had existed for six decades. Given the role of the United States in that power structure, the revolution inevitably led to conflict between Cuba and the United States. ... For not only did United States economic interests play a strategic role, but also Cuban governmental affairs were largely under United States control.” (Scheer & Zeitlin 1964, 16, 33.)

Ernesto Rafael Guevara de la Serna (1928-1967), commonly known as Che Guevara or el Che<sup>15</sup>, was an Argentinean-born doctor who became a Marxist revolutionary and Cuban guerrilla leader. Guevara led the 26th of July Movement that seized power in Cuba in 1959 with Castro whom he had met in Mexico City. Che served in various important posts in the new Cuban government such as the President of the National Bank of Cuba and Minister of Industries. Guevara left Cuba in 1965 to evoke revolutions in other countries, and eventually died as a combatant in Bolivia in 1967. (Castro 1972, 246-251.)

Cuba was proclaimed socialist in 1961 largely thanks to Che (maybe Castro would have chosen a more democratic and capitalistic government by himself). Che's premise was the development of people and his goal was to provide everybody a life reflecting human dignity. In the development of society the main concern had to be Man (and not for example some political groups or economic growth), but the society was supposed to create an efficient governance to decrease egoism (false individualism). According to Che the development of society is valuable only if it increases the feeling of solidarity, enables people to be creative and serves the individual development. (Anderson 2004; *Kuuba valloittaa* –elokuva ja kuubalaisen kulttuurin esittelylehti [“Cuba Conquers/Entices”, a film and a magazine on Cuban culture] 2004, 4-5.; Krook 2005, <http://che.playagiron.net/> 2005-11-24.)

Very different societal structures after the Revolution in Cuba in 1959 have caused a rupture in the economical relationship of the respective countries. The U.S. is a constitution-based federal republic which has a strong democratic tradition, whereas, President Castro's Cuba has a one-party system where the Communist Party of Cuba holds the monopoly of political power.

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<sup>15</sup> *Che* is a Spanish interjection used commonly in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, some parts of Bolivia, Costa Rica, and also in Valencia, Spain. It is an exclamation, often used to get attention or express surprise. It is also used in a vocative sense as though it meant "friend". In other Latin American countries, the term *Che* is used to refer to someone from Argentina. For example, Ernesto "Che" Guevara earned his nickname from his frequent use of this expression. Wikipedia (2005): <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Che> (2005-11-23) - See Mannila (2005) about the use of Wikipedia as a reference: [http://www.digitoday.fi/showPage.php?page\\_id=11&news\\_id=51343](http://www.digitoday.fi/showPage.php?page_id=11&news_id=51343) (2005-12-20).

In May 1959 the Agrarian Reform Law was enacted. The following year Castro achieved a complete control of Cuban press and mass media. From June to July 1960 United States-owned oil companies refused to process Russian oil and were then appropriated by the Cuban government. Eisenhower abrogated Cuban sugar quota. In August 1960 a large-scale appropriation of United States-owned property in Cuba was undertaken by Castro. Finally, in October 1960 a full-scale United States economic blockade of Cuba began, and a large-scale appropriation of property owned by Cuban capitalists was undertaken. (Conzalez 1998, 10-13; Farber 1976, xviii-xix; Siltala 2000, 26.)

During the Clinton administration the economic blockade became stricter by introducing the Torricelli and Helms-Burton laws. Clinton signed the Cuban Democracy Act (Torricelli Law) in 1992 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, better known as the Helms-Burton Act in 1996<sup>16</sup>. Control of the economy—codified in the Helms-Burton Act—is supposed to be reverted back to private hands (mostly the U.S. citizens and corporations). The Helms-Burton Act also made the blockade permanent in the American Constitution, which means that only the complete change of regime (including the removal of Fidel and Raúl Castro) can dissolve the blockade. (Siltala 2000, 27.)

Internationally, Castro's leadership has been marked by tension with the United States (culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis<sup>17</sup>) and a close partnership with the Soviet Union<sup>18</sup>. Domestically, he has overseen the implementation of radical land reform followed by the collectivisation of agriculture, nationalization of leading Cuban industries and social

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<sup>16</sup> Legislative information from Thomas - The Library of Congress (2005): [http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills\\_res.html](http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills_res.html) (2005-12-25).

<sup>17</sup> The Soviet Union had a naval base in Cuba. In the October 1962 J.F. Kennedy declared that Cuba would be surrounded until the Soviet missiles have been taken away from Cuba. (Conzalez 1998, 14.)

<sup>18</sup> I attended an open discussion on the controversial personality of Fidel Castro in October 2005 at the University of Helsinki. See e.g. Sirén (17.10.2005) <http://www.kuubaseura.fi> @ Cuba Sí @ Yhteiskunta & Poliitikka @ *Fidel puhutti Helsingin yliopistolla* (2005-12-21).

programs that instituted universal healthcare and expanded public education. Castro's government initially won widespread support among Cubans but alienated many as the new government nationalized industries, suppressed all opposition parties and restricted emigration. (Thomas 1971, 1483-1494.)

In the event of sickness or death, Vice President Raúl Castro, who is Fidel Castro's brother, will legally assume the leadership post. As I mentioned earlier, this should not change the relationship between the United States and Cuba due to legislation that is connected to Castro brothers (Siltala 2000, 27). However, the attempt of the U.S. clearly stated in the Report is to prevent the transition of power from Fidel to Raúl. In the following analysis, I will examine more closely the role of this transition as a threat.

#### **4. The Research Material and Tools for Analysing the Report**

*“Our government will establish a Commission for the Assistance to a Free Cuba, to plan for the happy day when Castro's regime is no more and democracy comes to the island.”*  
—George W. Bush

I find it important to analyse the *Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba* –Report for a few reasons (the main reasons I already presented in the Introduction). One is that it is a fairly recent report and sociologists are to concentrate mainly on the current societal issues<sup>19</sup>. Furthermore, I suggest that this is a suitable place for a sociological intervention.

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<sup>19</sup> Sulkunen (1998, 20) believes that this is the common feature of all the sociological point of views. They all concentrate on explaining and interpreting the current societal phenomena without neglecting the historical consciousness.

Alain Touraine (1981, 27), has been using the sociological intervention in his studies on social movements. The aim of the method is to analyse the structure and features of the informal thinking (in contrast to the scientific thinking). In other words, it means intervening in the functions of a society by analysing the concepts used by the parties involved in a conflict. Normally people involved are either too much or too little aware of their actions (Sulkunen 1998, 17.) As Touraine (1981, 27) believes a researcher can be an intermediary between parties involved (to this theme I will come back in the Conclusions).

In general, people do not consider reports like these very interesting to them if they do not belong to one of the parties involved. The consequence of this is that both of the parties involved might miss something that would be valuable to the core issue in question. The sociological intervention, that is critical and systematic, is of great importance in this case because there is no fruitful dialogue going on between the countries (Siltala 2000, 29).

#### **4.1. About the Report as the Research Material**

George W. Bush, the President of the United States, established the Commission for the Assistance to a Free Cuba in 2003. By May 2004 the Commission published the Report that I use as the research material for my thesis. The aim of this report is to “hasten Cuba's peaceful transition to a representative democracy and a free market economy—ending decades of an oppressive dictatorship.”<sup>20</sup>,

The Commission consists of representatives from a variety of different state departments such as the Treasury, Defence, Justice, Agriculture and Environmental Protection Agency. What has been debated about is the assembly of the Commission that is openly against the

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<sup>20</sup> The Fact Sheet on *Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba* in the WebPages of the U.S. Department of State (8.12.2003): <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/26976.htm> (2005-11-03).

Castro regime. It includes anti-Castro hardliners<sup>21</sup> such as Otto Reich, Roger Noriega, Jose Cardenas, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart<sup>22</sup>.

The report is 458 pages long and addresses different aspects of societal change. *Chapter 1*<sup>23</sup> deals with hastening Cuba's transition by empowering Cuban civil society, breaking the information blockade, denying revenues to the Castro regime, illuminating the reality of Castro's Cuba and encouraging international diplomatic efforts to support Cuban civil society. Furthermore, it challenges the Castro regime by undermining the regime's succession strategy. I see these as the objects of the stories in the Greimasian sense that I further examine in Chapter 5.

”What follows in Chapters 2 through 6 is a survey of the areas in which the U.S. Government can assist a free Cuba in all facets of its reconstruction and renewal. This document proposes a wide range of actions that the U.S. Government might propose to a Cuban transition government. They are not intended to be a prescription for Cuba's future.” (Report, 2.)

*Chapter 2* tackles with meeting basic human needs in the areas of health, education, housing, and human services. *Chapter 3* takes into consideration questions about establishing democratic institutions, respecting human rights, rule of law and national justice and reconciliation. *Chapter 4* moves on to discuss establishing the core institutions of a free economy. *Chapter 5* is dedicated to the modernization of the Cuban infrastructure. Last, in

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<sup>21</sup> See some information on these controversial figures at the website of the Cuba Solidarity Project (1997-2005): [http://vdedaj.club.fr/cuba/garde\\_noire\\_bush.html#reich](http://vdedaj.club.fr/cuba/garde_noire_bush.html#reich) (2005-12-25).

<sup>22</sup> Read about the Congress representatives e.g. Diaz-Balart (2006): <http://diaz-balart.house.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Home.Home>; Ros-Lehtinen (2006): <http://www.house.gov/ros-lehtinen/biography.shtml>; critical portraits: <http://www.kominf.pp.fi/L1extra.html> (2005-12-25).

<sup>23</sup> As I refer to the Report, the chapters are marked in italics (distinguishing them from the chapters of this thesis).

*Chapter 6*, the issue of environmental degradation is addressed.

*Chapter 1* is the longest (52 pages) and describes the transition of Cuba broadly, whereas the other chapters concentrate mainly on one particular topic. The first chapter deals with the most current and fundamental issues, such as how to make the Castro regime fall, whereas the other chapters concentrate more on the situation after Castro and his government have been removed from power. These are the reasons why I concentrate on *Chapter 1*.

The basis for the Report is highly value-oriented even though it seems like the values are not justified in any ways. It espouses noble causes but not the ideology behind it. It does not even clearly define its audience. I want to find out if it is a “happy” day—and to whom—when Fidel Castro passes away, as President Bush put it in October 2003<sup>24</sup>: “Our government will establish a Commission for the Assistance to a Free Cuba, to plan for the happy day when Castro's regime is no more and democracy comes to the island.”

When I analyse the Report and threats presented in it, in Chapter 5 and 6, I refer to it—as mentioned earlier—as “Report” with the page number of the quotation. As mentioned in the Introduction, the whole report can be found from the WebPages of the U.S. Department of State<sup>25</sup>.

#### **4.2. Textual Analysis as the “Research Method”**

The sociological interpretation is supposed to uncover facets of reality otherwise left unnoticed. Pekka Sulkunen (1997, 21) says that this is achieved with the help of theory—a theory about the intelligibility of the reality and a historical background theory about the

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<sup>24</sup> The Fact Sheet on *Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba* in the WebPages of the White House (8.12.2003): <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031208-8.html> (2006-01-01).

<sup>25</sup> The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba –report is found in the WebPages of the U.S. government (2004): <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/c12237.htm> (2005-10-26).

society in question. In this paper, I have already introduced a theory about the U.S. foreign policy. In this chapter I present a theory of the intelligibility of the reality that is based on social constructivism. According to social constructivism the meanings given to social phenomena are constantly produced and interpreted in discourses. Due to this “process nature” of reality, it is better to talk about understanding and producing reality rather than the meanings of reality *per se*. (Sulkunen 1997, 16-17.)

I started analysing the Report by using the *grounded theory* developed by Strauss and Corbin (1998) but grew to prefer a more concrete theory of the semiotic sociology<sup>26</sup>. However, the grounded theory helped me to structure the research material so that I was able see what kind of tools would be the most helpful ones in relation to my research question. As Sulkunen (1997, 35) states, interpretative sociology requires theory about structures that enables the reality to be dealt with as texts. Firstly, this theory derived from textual analysis makes it possible avoid projecting the contradictions of the researcher’s life to the research material. Secondly, it prevents the researcher simplifying the reality presented in the material to his or her sociological theories. (Törrönen 1999, 28-30.)

The theory about intelligibility I use in this analysis to discover the threats presented in the Report is achieved by combining three ways of examining textual structures: the rhetorical analysis and the pending narrative I use to reveal how the threats are presented in the Report, whereas the semiotics of stories I use to discover as a what kind of threat the Cuba is presented in it. All of these textual analyses stress that, as one makes reality comprehensible, one automatically produces values to it. Furthermore, they agree that when making reality understandable, one does it from a certain perspective; a “narrator” is telling a story to a

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<sup>26</sup> One reason for this was that the Grounded Theory has been criticized for the undermining of theory in research. “In arguing that grounded theory inductively emerges from data, Glaser and Strauss have been criticized on the grounds that they advocate a ‘Baconian’ inductivism. On this interpretation, grounded theory is depicted as a *tabula rasa* view of inquiry which indefensibly maintains that observations are not theory or concept dependent.” Haig (1995) [http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/95\\_docs/haig.html](http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/95_docs/haig.html) (2006-01-01).

certain “audience” in the text.

I chose these three semiotic tools of sociological analysis (that I will next present you) because I believe they reinforce each other in a very beneficial way regarding my research question that examines the logic and values of the United States in its foreign policy directed towards Cuba. After analysing the narratives in the first chapter of the *Commission to Assistance to a Free Cuba* –Report with the actantial model of Greimas in Chapter 5, I move on to the analysis of the argumentation with the tools derived from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in Chapter 6. Lastly, before moving to the conclusion, I study how the Report uses the pending narrative of Törrönen to persuade the audience to act.

#### **4.2.1. Sociosemiotic Analysis with A.J. Greimas**

As said, creating threats is an integral part of the foreign policy. As I look at the Report from the point of view of Greimas’ semiotic sociology, I will be able to get a broader view on the threats presented. The actantial model shows how the threats are linked to different actantial positions in the Report. By finding out how the threat is constructed through different actantial positions, the analysis becomes more multidimensional, for example by showing the links between values and actantial positions.

The concepts developed by Algirdas Julien Greimas (1917-1991) create a theory of structures that enables reality to be dealt with as texts—provided that semiotics is namely understood as a theory of textual structures leaving out the metaphysical presumptions or objectives (Sulkunen 1998, 163). Greimas started off as a linguist and a researcher of lexicology before he moved to semantics (Greimas 1999, 4). He developed his famous formal semiotic model called the *actantial model* after having familiarized himself with the work of Vladimir Propp that dealt with the morphology of a folktale (See Figure 1. [Törrönen 1999, 158]).




Figure 1. The Actantial Model.

The actantial model enables me to analyse how the modal identity for the subject to take action is constructed through actantial positions. The four modalities that construct the identity are provided for the subject to ensure success in action. They provide the legitimacy (obligation) and direction (will) for the action and also indicate what kinds of means (abilities and competencies) are needed to achieve the goal and to what kind of obstacles one has to be prepared for. (Törrönen 2000, 85-86.)

The actantial model also helps me to see who is urging the subject to act in face of the threat and how this affects the subject's action. "The relation between the sender and the subject expresses the 'having to do' (obligation) of the action. It makes a difference whether the action is legitimated by the name of God or by the name of personal revenge (Törrönen 2000, 85)."

The relationship between the subject and the object shows what kind of ‘wanting to do’ (will) is the motor for the action. It is useful to look at the relationship of the subject and the object in order to find out what exactly provides the cultural legitimacy for the will, or what unconscious motive drives it toward its object. The object, then, will reveal what kinds of goals are regarded as important. (Törrönen 2000, 85.)

The helpers embody the kind of ‘abilities’ (being able to do) and ‘competencies’ (knowing how to do) that are considered worthwhile or necessary in hindering the threats that has been created by the anti-subject. Anti-subjects and opponents illustrate the kind of resistance that the subject has to overcome in order to achieve the ultimate goal—the removal of the threats. At the same time, they convey to the audience what kind of means are considered inferior or forbidden in the pursuit of the goals. They also draw the boundary between us (good people) and others (bad people). (Törrönen 2000, 85-86.)

In the next chapter (Chapter 5) I make the story structures apparent with the help of actantial model. I use the model as a logical tool for my analysis because it helps me to find out the different actantial positions of the Report and how they are linked to the threats presented. The *sender* is the one who has seen the threats. *Subject* is fighting—together with the *helper of the subject*—against the threats. The *object* is to prevent the threats from becoming reality, so that the *receivers* would be able to live in a more secure and just world. *Anti-subject* is the one who causes the threats and *opponent* is helping the anti-subject in its task.

#### **4.2.2. Argumentation Analysis as a Device to Discoveries**

Chaïm Perelman (1912-1984), a Belgian professor of philosophy and jurisprudence, belongs to the school of the new rhetoric (together with Kenneth Burke and Stephen Toulmin). According to them, the task of rhetoric is to persuade the audience to accept certain theses—that are believable, or likely but not self-evident—in a certain situation (Kuusisto, 1998, 24). So, it is the research of logic and convincing that the new rhetoric deals with.

In the *The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on Argumentation*, Perelman<sup>27</sup>, with his secretary and collaborator Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, sought to construct a theory of argumentation by analysing the methods of proof used in the human sciences, law and philosophy. In their treatise they examined arguments put forward for example by politicians in speeches, lawyers in pleadings and judges in decisions (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 10). The object of this “theory of argumentation is the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to *induce or to increase the mind's adherence to the theses presented for its assent*” (Italics in the original text, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 4). I believe, therefore, that their theory, and the method derived from it, is very suitable for my study.<sup>28</sup>

It is a “theory of argumentation which, with the aid of discourse, aims at securing an efficient action on minds” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 9). Therefore, I study how the U.S. report intends to increase the readers’ adherence of minds to their standpoint. How is the U.S. persuading the audience to accept the existence of threats that Cuba poses?

According to Perelman’s rhetoric the main thing in argumentation is to take into consideration the context in which the text is presented. Understanding cultural values of the audience in question is highly important. The audience—as understood for the purposes of rhetoric—is “*the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation*” (Italics in the original text, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 19).

In Chapter 6, I first analyse, in compliance with Perelman’s study, the premises of argumentation presented in the Report. Understanding the strength or the weakness of the premises is of great importance when analysing the over-all validity of the argumentation.

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<sup>27</sup> Read Oliveira (6.7.1999) about Perelman: <http://www.vusst.hr/ENCYCLOPAEDIA/perelman.htm> (2005-11-30).

<sup>28</sup> The new rhetoric of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca is more suitable for the analysis of this study, compared to the theories of Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*—even if they belong to the same tradition of rhetoric—because it is especially aimed at studying the written argumentation, whereas the teachings of Aristotle concentrate on the spoken argumentation.

Successful argumentation analysis is not based only on analysing the different argumentation techniques but on analysing the different strategies of language used to shift the consensus achieved on the premises to the controversial conclusions as well.

As I already mentioned, the domain of argumentation is that of the credible, the plausible, and the probable. According to Perelman, it is the idea of self-evidence as characteristic of reason<sup>29</sup>, which we must abandon, if we want to make place for a theory of argumentation that will acknowledge the use of reason in directing our own actions and influencing those of others. Pascal was of the opinion that if self-evidence is considered the characteristic of reason, all proof would reduce to the self-evident, and what is self-evident would have no need of proof. However, the logical theory of demonstration—that is the basis for the new rhetoric—was developed following Leibniz. According to Leibniz even the self-evident needs proofs. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 2-3.) In other words, even if it would seem self-evident for Americans that Cuba is a threat, they still have to demonstrate it in their argumentation.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 65-99) divide the premises—objects of agreement—into two classes: the first group consists of the real, comprising facts, truths and presumptions; the second group concerns the preferable, comprising values and hierarchies. In Chapter 6, after I have analysed the premises of the Report, I will further analyse the U.S. argumentation by looking at the actual argumentation techniques derived from Perelman.

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<sup>29</sup> The idea of self-evidence as characteristic of reason is the result of the Cartesian rational science that has left its mark on the modern science for the last three centuries. René Descartes considered rational only those demonstrations which started from clear and distinct ideas (self-evident axioms) and were extended by means of apodictic proofs and deducted to the logical theorems. According to Cartesian rational science, a disagreement is, therefore, a sign of error. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 1-2.)

## Motivating with the Pending Narrative

A researcher Jukka Törrönen has found an important macrostructure of persuasive speech by studying semiotics. He calls this rhetorical form the *pending narrative*. “With it the speaker not only describes the world and its social phenomena but also lays a foundation for transforming the world to conform to the objective imposed in the narrative” (Törrönen 1999, 153).

As I analyse the Report in the next chapter, we shall see how the U.S. is using the pending narrative to inspire the audiences toward specific goals of action. Therefore, it facilitates the understanding of "how" the argumentation aids the fulfilment of the U.S. interests.

Narratives are an integral part of human lives. As Robert Atkinson<sup>30</sup> (2002) puts it: “we are the storytelling species”. Törrönen (2000, 82) continues that we compose narratives in order to make sense of our own life, to interpret other lives, to explain social and political events, as well as to map the possible routes of the coming day. Narratologists have defined narrative as involving at least two events (neither of which presupposes or entails the other logically). Narratives, therefore, have a beginning, middle and an end. The middle explains the change from the beginning to end.

Greimas has proposed, with his model of the canonical narrative schema (developed from the studies of Vladimir Propp and Claude Lévi-Strauss) that an ideal narrative is composed of the three mini-narratives: the qualifying test, the decisive test and the sanctifying test (Greimas & Courtés 1982: 203-206). According to this model, each test has its own specific function within the narrative: the qualifying test builds up the subject’s motivation to act, the principal test actualizes the action, and the sanctifying test aims at evaluating the action.

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<sup>30</sup> Robert Atkinson, Ph.D. (University of Pennsylvania), founded the Center for the Study of Lives in 1988. His doctoral training is in cross-cultural human development, and he has master's degrees in both folk culture and counseling. His primary interests are in the narrative study of lives, the methodology and interpretation of the life story interview, and cultural influences on life span development.

Greimas' canonical narrative schema explains the functioning of the pending narrative. As the motivation for the action has been created, in other words, when the qualifying test has been fulfilled (Greimas & Courtés 1982: 203-206), the story is interrupted. The other two tests, the decisive test and the sanctifying test, never occur. Their accomplishment is transferred to the responsibility of the audience. As said, the pending narrative aims at motivating the audience to take action. "This motivation involves two parts, a contract part and a qualification part. The contract part establishes an agreement between the sender and the subject to eliminate the anti-subject and to bring about a new equilibrium" (Törrönen 2000, 83).

However, it also constructs for the narrator and the audience specific actantial positions in relation to the action set forward. The pending narrative operates then in the dimension of the represented action, which Greimas calls "utterance" and in the dimension of interaction between the narrator and the audience, "enunciation". (Törrönen 1999, 155.)

I believe that the pending narrative finalizes the U.S. argumentation of Cuba as a threat. The reason for the need of the Report is made apparent by interrupting the story after presenting several threats.

## **5. The Threats Apparent in the Actantial Models**

*"Social identity lies in difference, and difference is asserted against what is closest, which represents the greatest threat."—Pierre Bourdieu.*

The text in *Chapter 1* is possible to arrange into six main actantial models (See the Attachment 1, Tables III-VIII). In addition to the *Chapter 1* I have also arranged the executive summary and introduction to the actantial models (See Attachment 1: Table I and II). All models share many similarities. In five of the actantial models (actantial models

2-6)—as well as in the summary and the introduction—the *sender* is the United States. Sender is the actor who has realised the threat(s). In one of them the sender could be seen either as the United States or Cubans (actantial model 2), and in one of the actantial models (actantial model 1) the senders are the Cuban dissidents:

“Now, the tide of public opinion has turned and Castro's loyalists must constantly work to restrain the Cuban people from *organizing and expressing demands for change* and freedom. Cubans are increasingly losing their fear and vocalizing their desire to be architects of their own destinies. Examples of this include the efforts of such brave *dissidents* as Raul Rivero, Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, Martha Beatriz Roque, and Oswaldo Paya.” (Italics added, Report, 16.)

The U.S. government, agencies and NGOs are the *subjects* in most of the stories (actantial models 2-6 and the summary). Subjects are the actors fighting against the threat(s). In two of them (in the introduction and the actantial model 1), however, the subject is the Cuban people.

Furthermore, the Cuban people are pictured as the *receivers* in all of the actantial models. Receivers are those who should be able to live without threats shadowing their lives. “Recognizing *the humanitarian need in Cuba* as a basis for U.S. policies on remittances, gift parcels, and family travel, the Commission recommends a tightening of current policies to decrease the flow of resources to the regime” (Italics added, Report, 39).

Receivers throughout the whole Report are implicitly also the Americans and other people in the Western Hemisphere who would suffer after the Cubans if the U.S. government will not be able to stop the Castro regime of functioning: “The *Castro regime continues to be a threat not only to its own people*, but also to regional stability, the consolidation of democracy and market economies in the Western Hemisphere, and the people of the United States” (Italics added, Report, 12).

It is the prevention of the threats becoming reality that differs the most. In other words, there are many different *objects* in the actantial models. In the summary and the introduction the core of the object (that is told in the introduction) is the same: to free Cuban people from Castro's repressive rule. It is enlarged in the summary by adding to its object a peaceful transition to a representative democracy and a free market economy that will result in the improvement of the living standards of the Cuban people.

In the first of the actual actantial models, the object is to find ways to empower Cuban civil society and strengthen the democratic opposition through material assistance and training. In the second actantial model the object is to break the information blockade by, for example, building on the work already underway by the U.S. Government broadcasting entities. In the third one the object is to deny revenues to the Cuban dictatorship, by undermining the regime-sustaining tourism and by limiting the regime's manipulation of humanitarian U.S. policies, among other measures. In the fourth story the object is to illuminate the reality of Castro's Cuba, including its threat potential. In the fifth model the object is to encourage international efforts to support Cuban civil society and challenge the Castro regime. In the last actantial model the object is the most important of them all: to undermine the regime's "succession strategy"<sup>31</sup> by supporting a democratic transition. This object is implicitly added to the objects of the other stories as well.

"U.S. policy must be targeted at *undermining this succession strategy* by stripping away layers of support within the regime, creating uncertainty regarding the political and legal future of those in leadership positions, and encouraging more of those within the ruling elite to shift their allegiance to those pro-democracy forces working for a transition to a free and democratic Cuba." (Italics added, Report, 51.)

*Anti-subject*—the one who causes the threat(s)—in all of the stories is the Castro regime, and in one of them (actantial model 2) it is the Cuban Communist Party (CCP), in particular. The

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<sup>31</sup> "The Regime's survival strategy is to maintain the core elements of the existing political structure in passing eventual leadership of the country from Fidel to Raul Castro and others currently in the senior leadership" Report, 51).

*opponent aka helper of the anti-subject* is mentioned only in one of the actantial models (actantial model 3); in the third story and in the summary (and more vaguely in the introduction too) the helper of the one who causes the threat(s) is mainly the government of Hugo Chavéz, and other countries, organizations and people who support the Castro regime economically. “Cheap Venezuelan oil is vital to keeping the Cuban economy functioning, generates additional hard currency, and enables Cuba to postpone much needed economic reforms (Report, 43).”

This may be deliberate; the U.S. may want to create an impression that the Castro’s Regime does not have any friends, which makes the supporting of the efforts of the United States even easier. Or then, that Cuba no longer has any significant allies, as it used to have the Soviet Union.

The *helpers of the subject*—the actors possessing the competencies and capacities needed to assist the subject to prevent the threat(s) from becoming reality—are the U.S. government, agencies and NGOs, third countries, and the third-country organizations, religious and faith-based groups (actantial model 1); Cubans and third-countries (actantial model 2); Western world (including international actors such as the European Union) and the civil society in Cuba (actantial models of the introduction and the summary, actantial models 3-6).

“Examples of the types of projects that *willing third-countries and NGOs* could engage in include: technical training and material assistance to the Independent Libraries Project; outreach initiatives on labor rights in Cuba; technical training for independent unions provided by willing third-country trade unionists; publicly available Internet access facilities in diplomatic missions in Cuba, which also could be used to distribute other informational materials related to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights; direct relationships between willing third-country governments and independent civil society and opposition groups; and solidarity visits to the families of political prisoners by prominent foreign figures.” (Italics added, Report, 46-47.)

On the following page (36) are the different actantial positions in the stories presented in the Report:

<b>Actantial Position</b>	<b>Actor</b>
<b>Senders</b> —the actors who has realised the threat(s)	The United States (actantial models 3-6, the summary and the introduction) / either the Cuban people or the United States (actantial model 2) / the Cuban dissidents (actantial model 1).
<b>Subjects</b> —the actors fighting against the threat(s)	The U.S. government, agencies and NGOs (actantial models 2-6 and the summary) / the Cuban people (the introduction and actantial model 1).
<b>Objects</b> —the prevention of the threat(s) becoming reality	To free Cuban people from Castro’s repressive rule (actantial model of the introduction) / a peaceful transition to a representative democracy and a free market economy that will result to the improvement of the living standards of the Cuban people (actantial model of the summary) / empower Cuban civil society and strengthen the democratic opposition (actantial model 1) / break the information blockade (actantial model 2) / deny revenues to the Cuban dictatorship (actantial model 3) / illuminate the reality of Castro’s Cuba, including its threat potential (actantial model 4) / encourage international efforts to support Cuban civil society and challenge the Castro regime (actantial model 5) / undermine the regime’s “succession strategy” by supporting a democratic transition (actantial model 6, implicitly in all actantial models).
<b>Helpers</b> —the actors assisting the subject to prevent the threat(s)	The U.S. government, agencies and NGOs, third countries, and the third-country organizations, religious and faith-based groups (actantial model 1) / Cubans and the third countries (actantial model 2) / Western world (including internationals actors such as the European Union) and the civil society in Cuba (introduction, summary and the actantial models 3-6).
<b>Anti-Subjects</b> —the one who causes the threat(s)	The Castro regime (all actantial models) / the Cuban Communist Party (actantial model 2).
<b>Opponents</b> —the helper of the one who causes the threat(s)	The government of Hugo Chavéz (actantial model 3 and vaguely in the introduction).
<b>Receivers</b> —the actors receiving a life without threats	The Cuban people (all actantial models).

Table 1. The Actantial Positions of the Report.

## **6. How the Threat Is Created in the Report**

### **"Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba"**

*"He who does not study rhetoric will be a victim of it"—found on a Greek wall from the 6th Century B.C.*

Not only threats are important in the foreign policy, but also the way they are built. The rhetorical analysis of Perelman brings into the light the discursive diplomacy of the U.S. and its logic. By showing the way the Report starts to convince the audience with premises and moving on to the argumentation techniques, I will be able to analyse how the graveness of the threats is warranted and what kind of methods are used in order to achieve this. However, without the pending narrative the values and the logic of the Report would remain uninteresting facts. The pending narrative ignites the passion from accepting the values—due to the logical argumentation—to the action by constructing a tension caused by the developed threats. It reveals the connection of rhetorical convincing and the desired action.

As one analyses the Report one is able to see the different audiences to whom this Report is directed. The first discourse is supposed to convince the Cubans and the international community:

“For more than four decades, Fidel Castro's destructive policies at home and abroad have caused great hardship for the Cuban people. He has systematically undermined the democratic principles and fierce national pride of Cuba, destroyed its economy, subverted his neighbors, and launched bloody military expeditions around the world. ... Cubans continue to be denied fundamental freedoms. They cannot form independent, alternative political parties outside of the communist party, elect representatives of their own choosing, form free associations, or freely express themselves. They are denied recourse to an independent judiciary that could protect their rights.” (Report, 1-2.)

“We propose increased efforts to illuminate the reality of Castro’s Cuba ... including its threat potential.... The Castro regime continues to be a threat not only to its own people, but also to regional stability, the consolidation of democracy and market economies in the Western Hemisphere, and the people of the United States. The Castro regime harbors dozens of fugitives from U.S. justice, including those convicted of killing law enforcement officials. It aggressively conducts espionage against the United States, including having operated a spy network, one of whose members was convicted of conspiring to kill U.S. citizens. The Castro regime also has engaged in other hostile acts against its neighbors and other democracies in the Hemisphere. On several occasions, Castro has threatened and orchestrated mass sea-borne migrations to Florida of tens of thousands of Cubans in an effort to intimidate and harm the United States.” (Report, 9-10, 12.)

Whereas the second discourse argues in favour of the U.S. government to augmenting the budget reserved for the Cuban cause and maybe even to change some legislation concerning the case.

“In the past, the United States has tended to initiate policies towards Cuba that were implemented in isolation from each other. ... The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba sought a more proactive, integrated, and disciplined approach to undermine the survival strategies of the Castro regime and contribute to conditions that will help the Cuban people hasten the dictatorship’s end. The recommendations also focus on actions available to the United States Government, allowing us to establish a strong foundation on which to build supportive international efforts.” (Report, 7, 15.)

Often these discourses overlap each other which make them more convincing. The aim of the Report *Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba* is to get Cubans and the international actors to act according to the Report at the right moment, in other words, when Castro will pass away. To achieve this, the U.S. argumentation has to be efficient. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 45)

“an efficacious argument is one which succeeds in increasing the intensity of adherence among those who hear it in such a way as to set in motion the intended action (a positive action or an abstention from action) or at least in creating in the hearers a willingness to act which will appear at the right moment”.

I will now show the efficiency of the argumentation of the Report by examining it here openly. First, I analyse the basic premises—linked to threats—found from the Report. I will present them with the help of extracts. Then, I will sum them up in a simple way before I move on to analyse the argumentation techniques.

I start the analysis of the premises by scrutinising all the facts, truths and presumptions that the Americans creating this Report have included. All of them are somehow related to the concept of threat. The threat is used as a catalyst for the audience to act in a desired way. Then I show what kinds of values are represented and the hierarchy between them. The right values, we are told, are threatened. The last group of premises for argumentation, that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) present, are the different *loci* for arguments<sup>32</sup>. Moreover, because I argue that analysing the *loci* is irrelevant to the argumentation—it does not bring out anything new in relation to the research question or the key concepts of this thesis—I omit their analysis from this study.

### **6.1. The American Facts, Truths and Presumptions about Cuba as a Threat**

The conceptions of the real can vary widely depending on the philosophic views people profess. However, everything in argumentation that is deemed to relate to the real is aimed at

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<sup>32</sup> *Loci* are very general, rules for reasoning—that normally remain implicit. They are considered to help the speaker to construct his or her arguments and they play a part in the justification of most of the choices he or she makes. They are things generally considered desirable. According to Perelman, they can be called as “storehouses for arguments”. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 84.)

*Loci of quantity* is used when something is valued better according to quantitative reasons. For example the happiness of the majority of Cubans is more desirable than the happiness of the ruling elite. “[A]ttention and pressure must be focused on the ruling elite so that succession by this elite or any individual is seen as what it would be: an impediment to a democratic and free Cuba” (Report, 51). *Loci of quality* is used when one cannot appeal to the quantity. Then one appeals to the uniqueness of the cause. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 85-93.) As in the case of Cuba, the Report states that this time the dictatorship’s end is closer than before due to the unique approach of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba undermining “the survival strategies of the Castro regime and contribute to conditions that will help the Cuban people hasten the dictatorship’s end” (Report, 15).

According to the *Loci of order* the state of affairs that has existed longer is considered better than the one that has existed a shorter period of time. In the Report one can read that the freedom is something that has always existed until the Castro regime came into existence 45 years ago. Therefore it is preferable to achieve the

the universal audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 66). This Report brings out many so-called facts and truths, which again may be a consequence of the simple fact that it is directed towards the universal audience.

Facts may either be observed facts—this is perhaps the case for most premises—or supposed, agreed facts, facts that are possible or probable. Facts must conform to those structures of the real that are accepted by the audience and they will have to be defended against other facts that may compete with them in the same argumentative context. A fact loses its status as soon as one starts to question it. It is then no longer used as a starting point but as the conclusion of an argument. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 68.)

Everything just said about facts is equally applicable to what are called truths. The term “facts” is generally used to designate objects of precise, limited agreement, whereas the term “truths” is preferably applied to more complex systems relating to connections between facts. They may be scientific theories or philosophic or religious conceptions that transcend experience. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 68-69.)

Now we examine the premises for the justification of making this Report. The first premise directed towards the American audience is presented as a **fact**: previous policies were not efficient; therefore it is implicitly argued that a new, more efficient policy is needed.

“In the past, the United States has tended to initiate policies towards Cuba that were implemented in isolation from each other. For instance, economic sanctions were initially imposed with little, if any, support to Cuban civil society, and were not coupled with initiatives to break the regime’s information blockade or proactively engage the international community. In addition well-meaning humanitarian policies were authorized without thorough consideration of the relationship they would have to the fundamental policy objective of assisting the Cuban people to regain their freedom and their right to determine their way of life and their future.” (Report, 7.)

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previous state of affairs again. There are many other *loci* to use but I do not consider them necessary to analyse here because they are not clearly linked to the presenting of threats.

The second premise, directed primarily towards the Americans (which can be seen as the use of “us” in connection with the U.S. government), secondarily towards Cubans and international actors, which is also presented as a fact and reveals why the policy presented in this Report is efficient. According to the Report the past policies the United States has initiated towards Cuba were not efficient because they were implemented in isolation from each other but the current one will be successful due to its holistic approach:

“The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba sought a more proactive, integrated, and disciplined approach to undermine the survival strategies of the Castro regime and contribute to conditions that will help the Cuban people hasten the dictatorship’s end. The recommendations also focus on actions available to the United States Government, allowing *us* to establish a strong foundation on which to build supportive international efforts.” (Italics added, Report, 15).

The third premise presented as a fact, which is the first premise directed only toward the Cuban audience, is found in the beginning of the introduction of *Chapter 1* where George W. Bush declares that, “The Cuban people have a constant friend in the United States of America” (Report, 12). The third premise is presented as a fact, but just by looking at the history of the relations of the two countries, one can start to question its truthfulness. Consequently, when one dubious statement is found in the Report, it is only understandable to critically question the other “facts” in the report as well.

Then we proceed to look at the premises that are the goals of the Report. When the Report talks about freedom and peace, the **truth** is used as an object of agreement. The first premise present as a truth is found in the introductory words of Bush: “freedom is found in every heart” (Report, 12). Before these words the Report states—as already mentioned—that the fundamental objective of the Report is to assist the Cuban people to *regain* their freedom and their right to determine their way of life and their future.” (Italics added, Report, 7.) I would question, though, whether Cuban people have ever really had freedom. I would argue that they should finally *gain* the freedom independent from the Cuban dictators and the “Big Brother” from the North.

A peaceful world can also be seen as a premise for all. As the Report wants to convince the audience of the need of a new regime in Cuba, which is its main goal, it says that the current regime is a threat to the peace firstly in Cuba and probably later on in the U.S. too.

“This image [as a prime tourist destination] belies the true state of Cuba’s political, economic, and social conditions, its status as a state sponsor of terrorism, and the increasingly erratic behavior of its leadership. We propose increased efforts to illuminate the reality of Castro’s Cuba ... including its threat potential.... The Castro regime continues to be a threat not only to its own people, but also to regional stability, the consolidation of democracy and market economies in the Western Hemisphere, and the people of the United States. The Castro regime harbors dozens of fugitives from U.S. justice, including those convicted of killing law enforcement officials. It aggressively conducts espionage against the United States, including having operated a spy network, one of whose members was convicted of conspiring to kill U.S. citizens. The Castro regime also has engaged in other hostile acts against its neighbors and other democracies in the Hemisphere. On several occasions, Castro has threatened and orchestrated mass sea-borne migrations to Florida of tens of thousands of Cubans in an effort to intimidate and harm the United States.” (Report, 9-10, 12.)

This is the first time when a threat is explicitly used in the Report. All the previous threats were implicit—they were “the backside of the coin”. If one does not support the policies suggested in the Report, Cubans will remain as “captives” without democratic freedom. If one does not want to believe this, one ignores the wise words of a “friend” (the U.S.).

**Presumptions** are more insecure than facts and truths but also they can work as a credible basis for a convincing argument. Presumptions are linked to things that occur normally and likely and to which reasonable people can trust. For example, we can presume that the nature of the act tells something about the nature of the actor; we can presume that good people do good things and bad people do bad things. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 71-74.)

Some presumptions of the Report that ponder on the future are found in the following chapter:

“There is no way to predict exactly what form a transition in Cuba will take, but what is certain is that soon the Cuban people will be freed from Fidel Castro’s repressive rule. Clearly, the agents of change are the Cuban people, who are struggling to define Cuba’s future. Based on the experience of recent history, one can predict that when given the opportunity, the Cuban people will choose democracy and a market-based economy.” (Report, 2.)

However, although presumptions also enjoy universal agreement, adherence to them falls short of being a maximum and hearers expect the reinforcement of their adherence at a given moment by other elements. When justification will lessen a status of a fact, this is not true of presumptions. Actually, in most cases, presumptions are accepted at the start in order to open the argumentation. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 70.) For example, a presumption in the previous extract from the Report, concerning the Cubans’ decision to choose democracy and a market-based economy, would desperately need, but does not receive, reinforcement later on in the Report.

Some other examples of the premises presented as presumptions in the Report are the following phrases that are linked to the already presented facts: “No tyrant can stand forever against the power of liberty” and “Cuba será pronto libre [Cuba will soon be free.]” (Report, 12). The first presumption is based on the fact that every tyrant (before Castro) has always lost his power at some point—either by dying or losing the power otherwise. The second presumption is linked to the first one: when Castro will lose his power, Cuba will become free.

## **6.2. The Threatened U.S. Value Hierarchies**

We have ideas about the desired state of affairs such as world peace and comfort. These states of affairs are based on values and their hierarchies which is why values enter basically into every argument. However, it seems that there are no common values to all human beings. The values are valid to the universal audience only when their contents are not clearly defined. With the help of values, one expresses either, a positive or a negative stand to a

certain object. For example “good” and “true” are positive values, whereas “bad” and “false” are negative values. Most importantly values are used to direct people in their choices and to convince people of the already-made choices. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 75.)

Values are, thus, comparable to facts: when one of the interlocutors puts forward a value, one must argue to get rid of it, under pain of refusing the discussion; and in general, the argument will imply that other values are accepted. It is by being vague that the values appear as universal values and claim a status similar to that of facts. It is, however, only the non-universal aspect of values that gives them a status of their own. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 75-76.)

“According to E. Dupréel, universal values deserve to be called 'values of persuasion' because they are '*means of persuasion* which, from a sociological viewpoint, *are that and no more than that*; they are, as it were, spiritual tools which can be completely separated from the material they make it possible to shape, anterior to the moment it is used, and remaining intact after use, available, as before, for other occasions'.” (Italics in the original text, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 76.)

As such, freedom is a rather universal value and the reader can easily agree with the Report on the need for freedom for the Cuban people. However, when the “freedom” is more clearly defined in the Report, it is defined from the perspective of a democratic country. Therefore, it is not appealing to the universal audience anymore but to a large audience consisting of the supporters of democracy:

“Cubans continue to be denied fundamental freedoms. They cannot form independent, alternative political parties outside of the communist party, elect representatives of their own choosing, form free associations, or freely express themselves. They are denied recourse to an independent judiciary that could protect their rights.” (Report, 1-2.)

Furthermore, freedom to people who have lived “in captivity” all their lives is not only a positive thing; when one is free, one is on his or her own. Some people do better with freedom than others. This is something that the Report is not addressing at all.

The difference between facts and values can be best understood with the help of an example. It is a fact that Fidel Castro continues to maintain one of the world’s regimes. With the help of values the Report expresses a negative stand to the regime: “Fidel Castro continues to maintain *one of the world’s most repressive regimes*” (Italics added, Report, 12). Similarly it is a fact that there are Cubans who defy the regime. With the help of values the report expresses a positive stand to these Cubans: “*Brave Cubans* continue to defy the regime” (Italics added, Report, 12).

Perelman divides values to the abstract values, such as justice or truth and to the concrete values, such as Cuba or the Church. Values are abstract when they are not attached to a certain person or institution, which is the case with concrete values. He believes that one cannot create an argument without the presence of both but it is up to the situation as to what kind of values will become more important in the rhetoric in question. One observation is that concrete values are more commonly used in conservative societies, whereas abstract values are easily connected to the criticising of the society. Abstract values are tightly related to the societies in change—they are used for defending the need of change. This is one reason why it is easy to see many abstract values in the Report that deals with the changing of the Cuban regime. On the other hand, President Bush and his government are conservative, which can be seen in the use of many concrete values in the Report as well. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 77-79.)

Argumentation relies not only on values but also on hierarchies, such as the superiority of men over animals, of the just over the useful. However, such hierarchies often remain implicit. The knowledge of the value hierarchies of the audience is actually more crucial than knowing their exact values. Most values are indeed shared by a great number of audiences, and a particular audience is characterised less by which values it accepts than by the way it

grades them. Values may be admitted by many different audiences but the degree of their acceptance will vary from one audience to another. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 80-83.)

To the quantitative hierarchies we can oppose the heterogeneous hierarchies. Values are generally considered interconnected. It is this connection between them that lays the foundation for their subordination: for instance the “end” value is often deemed superior to that which is the “means” or the “cause” value is ranked superior to that of constituting “effect.” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 81)

The reason why one feels obliged to order values in hierarchy, is that simultaneous pursuit of these values leads to incompatibilities. To avoid the incompatibilities, one is obliged to make choices, in other words, to order values in hierarchy. For example, to survive society needs to have an ideological basis as well as a material basis for its functioning. Generally speaking, Americans have repeatedly interpreted Cuban value hierarchies in a wrong way. For example, they were convinced that, as the Americans would invade the Bay of Pigs, all the Cubans would embrace them and help them to take over the country. Instead of the economic stability that the U.S. would have provided, Cubans chose to help Castro to regain Cuba’s manhood. (Rabe 2006.)

This confusion of value hierarchies could be explained by the mixing of the values of Cubans living in Cuba and the values of Cuban-Americans. The Cubans who first left Cuba to move to the United States were prominently from the (upper) middle class. The majority of the Cubans who stayed in Cuba were the poor ones who welcomed the socialism wholeheartedly.

In the Report the “right” values—such as freedom and economical well being—are shown to be threatened if the Castro regime will not cease to exist. However, the role of threatening is not as crucial here as I presumed it would be.

<b>Premises:</b>	<b>Threats:</b>
<u>Facts:</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The previous policies were not efficient, therefore a new policy is needed.</li> <li>2. This policy will be efficient due to its holistic approach.</li> <li>3. The U.S. is a true friend of Cubans.</li> </ol>	<p>If this policy will not be implemented the consequences will be severe.</p> <p>If people/organisations will continue to help Cubans without taking into consideration the holistic plan of this policy, significant losses will be evident.</p> <p>If Cubans will not listen to the advice of a friend, the misery will deepen.</p>
<u>Truths:</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Freedom is found in the hearts of Cubans.</li> <li>2. Castro regime is a threat to peace.</li> </ol>	<p>Cubans will continue to be miserable without freedom.</p> <p>Peaceful state of affairs will be shaken in Cuba, U.S. and the whole world.</p>
<u>Presumptions:</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Cuban people will choose democracy and a market-based economy.</li> <li>2. No tyrant can stand forever against the power of liberty.</li> <li>3. Cuba will soon be free.</li> </ol>	<p>If the audience does not believe in the presumptions, things will get worse.</p>
<u>Values:</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Freedom as a universal value.</li> </ol>	<p>If the audience does not behave according to the recommendations of the Report, their values will be violated.</p>
<u>Value hierarchies:</u> Not directly linked to threats.	

Table 2. The Premises of the Report.

I believe I have now made the premises of the argumentation of the Report clear enough in order to move on to the actual argumentation techniques. These techniques are used to carry on the work laid out in the premises to the conclusions as well. The threats revealed in the premises are further strengthened with the following techniques.

### **6.3. The Argumentation Techniques for Creating the Threat Discourse**

With the help of argumentation techniques one aims at obtaining a justification for the claims used in argumentation. They are the resources of language used for the credibility of claims. In the Report they are used to convince the American readers of the justification of the calculated budget in hastening Cuba's transition. Similarly these techniques are used for convincing the Cuban audience of the authenticity of the good intentions of the American government. Most importantly, these techniques are used to convince the reader of the threat that the Castro government poses to the Cuban people, the United States, and the democratic countries in the world.

However, how convincing an argument will become does not depend only on the logical structure of the argumentation but it also takes into consideration the causal links of the writer(s), the goal and the means achieving it, the examples, metaphors and oppositions used in the text.

The actual argumentation techniques can be divided into two main groups: to the associative techniques and to the dissociative ones. Perelman considers the associative argumentation to combine different elements to the same group, under the same heading, whereas, dissociative argumentation tries to separate two elements previously linked together.

The associative techniques can be further divided into three main groups: quasi-logical arguments, arguments based on the structure of reality, and the argumentation concerning the relations establishing the structure of reality.

### **Quasi-Logical Arguments Highlighting the Threat of Information Blockade**

Quasi-logical argumentation is similar to the formal reasoning of logics, but it differs from it because it requires a reduction of a non-formal character so that the arguments appear demonstrative. Furthermore, quasi-logical arguments derive their persuasive strength from their similarity with the logical reasoning. However, by the terms of logic it is very difficult to express the wanted things in the natural language. The result of this is that one often resorts to other forms of argumentation to make it convincing enough. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 193-194.)

Comparison to historical events is an example of quasi-logical arguments. The Report states that the Cuban civil society is—similarly to the Polish civil society two decades ago—showing the willingness to fight against the current misery:

“These people demonstrate the same determination to challenge the system that was evident in the Polish ‘Solidarity’ movement two decades ago. The same resilience and determination of Czech leader Vaclav Havel’s Charter 77 and of the ‘Solidarity’ movement is also embodied today in the activists of the Cuban independent library movement, and the scores of independent journalists who risk everything so that the world no longer can claim ignorance about the repressive practices of a ruthless dictatorship.” (Report, 16.)

This similarity of historical facts justifies the similar means that the U.S. has in mind for Cuba: “By continuing to isolate the Castro regime while supporting the democratic opposition and empowering an emerging civil society, the U.S. can help the Cuban people in their efforts to effect positive political and social change in their country” (Report, 16).

Another example of a quasi-logical argument is to refer to scientific tests (which is probably more easily associated with quasi-logical argumentation than the comparison to historical events):

“According to a December 2003 poll of Cuban public opinion, more than 75 percent of the Cuban public watch state-run television or listen to state radio on a weekly basis. The regime uses these media programs to advance its propaganda war against Cuban civil society and other forces for change. The Cuban public, however, is increasingly seeking external and non-state sources of information ... Access to the equipment necessary to receive foreign media, however, remains a critical obstacle to empowering civil society. The Castro regime blocks many external radio signals and limits the ability of Cubans to obtain the necessary equipment to receive international broadcasts. Accordingly to the poll, only 15 percent of Cubans had access to satellite channels.” (Report, 26.)

In this example one easily sees how the quasi-logical argument is used to highlight the threat that exists in Cuba due to its information blockade. People in Cuba have no freedom—they are continuously being brainwashed by the regime which opposes change. However, Cubans seek ways out of this propaganda, but in order to do this, they need help from outside. Similar to the use of scientific tests is the using of numbers: “There are estimated to be only 270,000 computers in Cuba, with a paltry 58,000 connected to the national Internet network, which blocks access to most sites on the worldwide web” (Report, 27).

### **Arguments Based on the Structure of Reality Warn about Naivety**

“[T]he arguments based on the structure of reality make use of this structure to establish a solidarity between accepted judgements and others which one wishes to promote” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 261).

The arguments that apply to relations of succession, which unite a phenomenon to its consequences or causes and also, the arguments, which apply to the relations of co-existence, which unite a person to his actions or a group to the individuals who form it, are examples of the argumentation based on the structure of reality. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 262)

A causal explanation found in the Report states that the good American intentions have been one cause for the survival of the Castro regime:

“To alleviate the hardships of a portion of the Cuban population, the United States has implemented various measures by which those with family members in Cuba can send cash remittances to them; travel to Cuba carrying gifts; and ship ‘gift parcels’. ... Castro has exploited these policies by effectively shifting burdens that ought to be assumed by the Cuban state and by profiting enormously from these transactions. ... And it is this source of resources, on a net basis, which is by far the largest hard currency source for the Castro regime after tourism”. (Report, 33-34.)

The threat that follows from this is that if the Americans do things with good intentions, without listening the U.S. government, the Castro regime will ruthlessly continue to misuse the flow of resources from the U.S. for maintenance of the current regime and the misery of Cuban people.

The arguments that apply to a relation of co-existence, which unites a person to his actions, are also present in the Report, mainly in dealing with the “tyrant” Fidel Castro and his “ruthless actions” which can be seen for example in his encouragement of prostitution: “Cuban women choose prostitution ‘because they like sex’”(Report, 18).

### **The Structure of the Cuban Reality Needs Modification**

When using argumentation that aims at modifying the structure of reality, one either tries to arrive at a generalisation from a particular case, or one reasons by analogy. There are at least three types of argumentation arriving at a generalisation from particular case: argumentation by example, illustration, or different models. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 350-398.)

This is the argumentation technique that is used the most in the Report. The Report states examples of all the areas that have to be dealt with in order to hasten the change in Cuba. These examples are connected to the concept of threat so that it is implied that, if the areas

mentioned are not dealt with, the consequences will become increasingly severe. It gives examples how the Castro regime is suppressing the civil society, which leads to an acceptance of the American intervention.

“There is a growing international consensus on the nature of the Castro regime and the need for fundamental political and economic change on the island. This consensus coalesced, in large part, after the regime’s brutal March-April 2003 crackdown on peaceful pro-democracy activists, an act properly characterized as the most severe repression of peaceful political activists in the history of Cuba, and certainly the most significant act of political repression in Latin America in a decade.” (Report, 10.)

Furthermore, it gives examples how this has been done successfully in other parts of the world, which means that it is possible to achieve in Cuba too. Therefore, in addition to the threats, also the possibilities are pictured in the Report. Similarly the Report gives examples of encouraging international diplomatic efforts to support Cuban civil society and to challenge the Castro regime. One of them is showing the poor state of labour rights: “Currently, Cuban workers do not have the right to organize freely into independent unions. Cuban citizens who attempt to organise independent unions have been persecuted and in some cases, imprisoned.” (Report, 47.)

### **The Dissociation of Concepts Helping to Separate the Truths from Lies**

Dissociation aims at breaking the connection between two elements that have been considered united. Lack of connection between two elements may be proved by actual or mental experience, by changes in the conditions governing a situation and by the examination of certain variables. The technique of breaking connecting links therefore consists in affirming that elements, which should remain separate and independent, have been improperly associated. When one claims that the appearance does not correspond to the reality, or theory to practice, one is using dissociative argumentation. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 411–412, 415–450.)

In the Report dissociative argumentation is used in connection with the Castro regime. The Report accuses the regime of giving a wrong—in other words, a too good—impression of the state of affairs in Cuba at the moment:

“Cuba presents itself internationally as a prime tourist destination, as a center for bio-technological innovation, as a successful socialist state that has improved the standard of living of its people, and as a model for the world in terms of health, education, and race relations. This image belies the true state of Cuba’s political, economic and social conditions and the increasingly erratic behaviour of its leadership.” (Report, 44.)

Similarly the Report claims the regime is not being honest when it gives the impression that women and Afro-Cubans are doing well in the country. “Castro denies the fact that his policies have forced women into prostitution, claiming that Cuban women choose prostitution ‘because they like sex’” (Report, 18). “Afro-Cubans and mixed-ethnicity Cubans comprise 62 percent of the population. Yet despite the regime’s incessant rhetoric of social inclusion, Afro-Cubans are underrepresented in leadership positions and continue to be socially marginalized.” (Report, 18-19.)

Dissociation technique is used, in short, to open the eyes of the international audience: Cuba is neither a prime tourist destination nor a safe society for Cubans to live in.

I present here the summary of the argumentation techniques before proceeding to the next level of the analysis:

<b>Argumentation techniques:</b>	<b>Aims at:</b>
These techniques are used to convince the reader of the threat that the Castro regime poses to the Cuban people, to the United States, and to all the democratic countries in the world.	Getting the audience to act in intended way.
<u>Quasi-logical arguments:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Comparison to historical events shows that there is a same kind of willingness to fight against the misery among Cubans, as was the case in the successful Polish civil society movement two decades ago. Therefore, Cubans should be encouraged in their efforts.</li> <li>2. Referring to scientific tests shows that the regime is at propaganda war with the Cuban civil society and that Cubans seek ways out.</li> <li>3. The use of numbers shows how bad the current situation in Cuba is and how the outside world can help to improve it.</li> </ol>
<u>Arguments based on the structure of reality:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What follows from a causal explanation about good humanitarian intentions of Americans, is that it is better to stop trying to do good, if one is not completely sure that it will benefit Cubans in the long run.</li> <li>2. As Fidel Castro has said and done many dubious things in the past, the threat is that he will continue to do increasingly more suspicious things.</li> </ol>

Table 3. The Argumentation techniques used in the Report.

The successful argumentation analysis is not based only on analysing the different argumentation techniques, instead, it is important to analyse especially how with the different strategies of language one can move the consensus achieved on the premises to be valid in the case of the controversial conclusion as well. Efficient arguments alone are not efficient enough; they have to support each other in the same context. After achieving this coherence of the argumentation, one is ready to consider how to get the audience to act. All of the argumentation techniques receive rhetorical force from the pending narrative—the interruption of the story as soon as the motivation for an action has been created and identities have been established for the actors involved in action.

#### **6.4. How the Report Ignites Passion**

“The rhetorical force of the pending narrative comes from its sudden interruption: as soon as the motivation for an action has been created and as soon as identities have been established for the actors involved in the action, the story is interrupted, brought to a halt” (Törrönen 2000, 81).

The storylines that I was able to find with the actantial model helped me to find also the pending narratives. As I shared in Chapter 4, in the model of the canonical narrative schema Greimas proposes that an ideal narrative has three mini-narratives: the qualifying test, the decisive test and the sanctifying test (Greimas & Courtés 1982, 203-206). The pending narrative, however, fulfils only the qualifying test of the canonical narrative schema. At the same time, it also constructs for the narrator and the audience specific subject positions in relation to the action set forward. (Törrönen 1999, 155.)

In the Report the dimension of the represented action, which Greimas calls “utterance”, tells the reader the current state of affairs in Cuba, including its threat potential. In the dimension of interaction between the narrator and the audience, “enunciation”, the Report urges the two different audiences that I presented in the Chapter 6.

The qualifying test provides four modalities for the subject in order to ensure success in action. They, together with certain semantic content, will provide the action with its legitimacy (obligation) and its direction (will) and also indicate what kinds of means (abilities and competencies) are needed to achieve the goal. (Törrönen 1999, 159.)

The opponents and anti-subjects illustrate what kind of resistance the subject has to overcome in order to achieve the object. At the same time they tell what kind of means are not appropriate for achieving the object. They also help the “identity building” by drawing the boundary between us (good people) and others (bad people). (Törrönen 1999, 159.)

The last page of *Chapter 1* lists recommendations for the U.S. government on how to act. To get the acceptance of the augmentation to the budget—the primary means—is the main goal of the report. In other words, the main goal is to convince the U.S. people that a free Cuba is worth the new budget.

Alternatively that the main goal is the implicit one which I already discussed in the Chapter 2: strengthening of the U.S. identity as a friendly country rather than the “enemy” country. The need for this exists as Minkinen (2004) presents in his dissertation. The U.S. has lost the respect of the other social actors by using its power and violence too much. This report could therefore be seen as an attempt to restore its image as the benevolent helper of the countries whose people lack freedom.

The pending narrative receives its power to influence by using efficiently the spatial, temporal and positional aspects of identity building. First, it is commonly underlined in the pending narrative that there is a danger of the Other (the Castro regime) against whom the subject has to fight. When the threat is underlined the pending narrative tries to create an impression that Our (democratic countries) values (respect for freedom and human rights) are at stake.

The first aim of the pending narrative is to awaken within the audience the will to defend the borders (which the narrator has realised are threatened) or to get the audience to act in order to obtain necessary borders. Second, when telling the pending narrative the narrator weakens opposite or parallel histories of action (previous reports were not efficient) and procedures for action (the well-meaning humanitarian projects do not work when implemented in isolation from other procedures), so that his or her action plan would have a goal that is as clear as possible. (Törrönen 1999, 61-62.)

## **7. Conclusions—"Freedom Is Not Free"**

*"If I have to choose the lesser of two evils, I choose neither."*—Karl Kraus

### **7.1. Conclusions on the U.S. Foreign Policy Rhetoric on Cuba and the Castro Regime**

With the help of Greimas' theories, I was able to see the stories represented in the Report *Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba* as a combination of the hero stories (in which the subject hero rescues the receivers from the adversary) and tragedies (in which the subject is not empowered to fight for achieving the objects). The Report shows both of them possible but not necessary. As Alker (1996, 269-270) puts it: "Life is not a myth or a fairy tale with a guaranteed happy ending; neither is it an inevitable tragedy, one that encompasses all of Western civilization or the human species."

The pending narrative serves as a motivation to choose the hero story and do what the report recommends; otherwise it suggests that the tragedy is inevitable. Cuba is constructed as a threat as long as it is rule by Castro. The greatest threat, that is present in all the stories, but most apparent in one of them (See Attachment 1, Table VIII), is the succession of power from Fidel to Raúl and the continuation of the current regime. William LeoGrande (1997) has argued that Washington does not hate communism or Cuba's violations of human rights.

The hatred of Washington is focused on Fidel Castro (Siltala 2000, 27). That is why all the policy suggestions are aimed at removing the Castro brothers from power. For example, the economic blockade will not be removed if either one is in power even if the country would declare itself democratic.

The situation in Cuba was linked to a heroic story of great warfare in which humanity—the United States—has battled against the forces of darkness to destroy the evil. The “evil” over the years has been, according to Campbell (1990, 268)—in addition to the Castro regime—for example Red China, North Vietnam, Nicaragua, Libya and terrorists. In recent years the U.S. had more or less left Castro alone, probably hoping that the economic blockade would start to work in a desired way. However, now that Hussein is no longer a threat, and when Iran has been dealt with, the U.S. will be able to direct all its efforts to undermine the Castro regime.

In the Cuban-American press the image of Castro is overtly identified either with Hitler or a demon (Siltala 2000, 20). This is not the first time the U.S. links a foreign ruler to a demon; it told a similar story first, during the Gulf War and later during the Iraqi War. As Shapiro (1992, 469) has said, the U.S. attempts to re-establish its damaged collective subjectivity by the reproduction of the “Enemy”.

The stories presented wanted to give the audiences the causes, the effects and the motivation to act in accordance with the U.S. recommendations. This is done by efficient argumentation. The premises (facts, truths, presumptions, values and their hierarchies) for the argumentation are convincing and the argumentation techniques (the associative and dissociative ones) are used to support the premises. Although there are some weak spots present as well. Some statements reveal the enormous emotional charge of the Americans, which weakens its efficiency towards the international audience. However, these kinds of statements may appeal to the American audience.

Freedom is not, however, free. The argumentation techniques were used to convince the American readers of the justification of the calculated budget to hastening Cuba's transition. Similarly these techniques were used for convincing the Cuban audience of the authenticity of the good intentions of the American government. As the Report wants to convince the audience of the need of a new regime in Cuba, it says that the current regime is a threat to the peace firstly in Cuba and mostly likely later on in the U.S. and the other democratic countries as well. With the help of values the Report expresses a negative stand to the Castro regime and a positive stand to Cubans in general.

This thesis presents an analysis of one picture—created through American “storytellers”—of the situation in Cuba and its consequences first to the United States and finally to the rest of the world. This thesis familiarized the reader with the foreign policy rhetoric of the United States concerning its relations with Cuba. In this thesis, I have exposed the logic which the U.S. used for producing the image of Cuba presented in the Report. While uncovering the logic, also the main values of the U.S. became clear. Most of them, such as freedom and peace, are directly connected to the main theme of this story—“threat”, as I have already showed. If the Castro brothers continue as the head of Cuba, neither freedom nor peace is guaranteed for the Western hemisphere.

#### **7.1.1. A Discourse of Threat**

The sociosemiotic tools helped me to discover that the U.S. Report can be seen as a grand discourse of threat. The main threat is that the Castro regime will not cease to exist and from that follows many other threats such as the violations of human rights and increasing poverty of the Cuban people. This was not a surprise, since the United States has had the tendency to create discourses of threat in its foreign policy, which is, according to Campbell (1992), a normal feature of foreign policy in general. In foreign policy different elements are actively created as threats to the others, so that the existence of the own country would become justified.

I presume that the values of the international community, such as human rights and democracy, are part of the argumentation tactic of the Report. They could be considered to disguise the main agenda of the United States on Cuba, which could be the legitimization of the current political structure in the United States, which is, furthermore, part of the overall identity building of the U.S. (the justification of its existence and recovery of its manhood, lost due to Castro's Cuba).

The territorial expansionism has always played an important role in the identity building of the U.S.—as I referred to Campbell in Chapter 2. Furthermore, subduing the archenemy—a communist leader—would lift up the country's self-esteem that has lost the respect of other international actors (see e.g. Minkkinen 2004).

However, threats are not created merely because of a country's identity building. In international relations power is not solely based on weapons and wealth. An integral part of power is the ability to influence the perceptions of the other actors concerning threat to security. Creating mutual understanding of the enemy is, therefore, an enormous tool for power. (Ojanen 2005, 17.) The discourses of threat created in the Report can, accordingly, be seen as a struggle for power in the realm of international relations. The U.S. is not alone in this struggle, as I have pointed out Cubans too—starting from Martí—have actively portrayed the U.S. as a “monster”.

C. Wright Mills (1960, 177) argued just after the Cuban revolution that it is actually the United States that one can largely blame if Cuba might harden into a dictatorial tyranny. He professed the following:

“The policies the United States has pursued and is pursuing against Cuba are based upon a profound ignorance, and are shot through with hysteria. ... More than any other single factor, these U.S. policies are forcing the Cuban Government to become ‘harder’, to become more restrictive of freedom of expression inside Cuba. In brief, they are forcing Cubans to identify all ‘minority views’ with ‘counter-revolution’. And they are forcing the Cuban Government to identify ‘anti-communism’ with ‘counter-revolution’.”

Could it be then, that all that the U.S. is accusing Cuba of is actually a natural reaction to its own actions? Would there be any threats for Cubans and for the Americans if the U.S. would change its policies?

I argue that one should not try to make the world too simple. One should not hide the existing problems by creating new problems outside our countries. Instead, one should try to learn to live with the acknowledgement that our countries (in the same way as we as human beings) are never “ready”. One should try to improve constantly and slowly, and to remember that there are no easy ways or short cuts. To discover the right path to the actualization of the state one can use the expertise of the social scientists.

I see the finding of better ways (than making enemies and waging wars) to secure the identities of countries as the most important task of the international politics at the moment. Perhaps the next step is, as Shapiro (1996, 478) suggests, “a comparative ethnology of modern societies in search of differing levels of acceptance of inner disorder.” He continues to stress the importance of getting to know more about what generates demands for coherence within both the orders of the self and the collectivity, for the suspicion deepens that these demands are responsible for the interpretations that map international or external dangers. (Shapiro 1996, 478.)

However, in a way the U.S. tendency to see threats can also be seen as a positive thing: if one is able to notice the threats before they become reality, one might be able to remove the threat entirely. In other words, it could be regarded as an efficient prevention of conflicts. It is true that the United States have also been able to help the bloodless transitions from dictatorship to democracy in different parts of the world. Furthermore, using argumentation in modifying a pre-existing state of affairs is always better than doing so by using force:

“The use of argumentation implies that one has renounced resorting to force alone, that value is attached to gaining adherence of one’s interlocutor by means of reasoned persuasion, and that one is not regarding him as an object, but appealing to his free judgment. Recourse to argumentation assumes the establishment of a community of minds, which, while it lasts, excludes the use of violence.” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 55.)

In any case, what continues to trouble me is that the U.S. is not talking *with* Cuba even if it is talking *about* Cuba, quite often. This is understandable, though, as one glances the present legislation of the U.S.: talking to the Castro brothers is not useful since even agreeing with them on the implementation of a market economy in Cuba would not stop the blockade because it is prevented by the U.S. constitution. Besides which, I do not believe that the Castro brothers would ever agree on it. I see the continued socialism in Cuba—despite the decrease in the standard of living of the Cuban people—as a question of pride.

As long as Fidel lives, he cannot give in to the United States because, if he would do that, all his work would have been in vain. He has been proud to be able (as a previously dependent island state) to stand against the superpower all these years and he cannot loose face. Because the U.S. wants to regain its “lost face” it cannot give in by stopping the blockade. I believe that mediation is the only way to go forward in this conflict. My opinion is, that the mediator should be the international community (for example either the United Nations or the European Union) and the mediation should happen between Cubans in Cuba and

American-Cubans. Furthermore, sociological research on both sides could contribute significantly to an efficient mediation.

Siltala (2000, 11) argues that when Fidel Castro passes away the role of the rich and active Cuban community in the U.S. will be pivotal when assessing the relationships between the countries. This argument receives support from the fact that the anti-Castro Cuban community in the U.S. was also represented in the Commission that created the Report.<sup>33</sup>

## **7.2. On Research Moral and Ethics**

In my thesis, I have taken into consideration the research ethics throughout the research process. Firstly, I was analysing a public document and did not, therefore, need permission to its use as the research material. Also the people mentioned in the thesis (for example President Bush and the controversial U.S. Congressmen) are public figures and therefore I did not need to change their names or hide their identities in any way. Moreover, I have been as objective as I can be while conducting the research. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the use of theory has helped me to be objective in a way that I have not been projecting my own life and values to the analysis. However, as the sociology classic Max Weber has famously argued, a completely value-free analysis does not exist, even if that has to be the goal of every researcher (Gronow 1996, 276).

I have critically analysed in what kind of foreign political circumstances the Report *Commission for assistance to a Free Cuba* was created and to where it locates in the time line of the historically constituted international order. Furthermore, I have examined what meaning it could have for both Cubans and, especially, for the United States. I think that the

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<sup>33</sup> Since the revolution in 1959 approximately one and half million Cubans have moved to the United States. They are the third largest Hispanic community in the U.S. According to Siltala (2000, 11) they are leading the U.S. foreign policy concerning Cuba. The lobbying of Cuban-Americans in Washington is highly influential—only the Israeli lobbyists have more influence on the U.S. government (Siltala 2000, 22). The main channel for Cuban-Americans to raise their voice is through the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF) that was established in 1981. CANF is an organization that overtly opposes the Castro regime (Siltala 2000, 22).

knowledge of the past is vital when considering where we go from here. I also hope that when the interest of the international community is directed towards Cuba and the United States early enough, the U.S. could not be able to use the Clausewitz's (1986) justification of war (“war is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means”) if the things will not proceed as the U.S. wished they would when the Castro regime is no more. In the light of everything already mentioned in this thesis and as Minkinen (2004) stated in his dissertation, it is very likely that at some point, the U.S. would turn to violence, also in the Cuba-issue, in order to maintain its hegemony.

### **7.3. Development Possibilities—Quo Vadis Cuba?**

The theory about intelligibility I used in this analysis to discover the threats, and how they were presented, in the Report was achieved by combining three ways of examining textual structures. This, in some way, could be seen as too ambitious a task for a Master's Thesis. By concentrating on one method I might have been able to make the reading experience more pleasurable and maybe I would have been able to go deeper into the analysis itself. The strength of using these three different ways of examining the textual structures of the Report is that it gave an accessible insight to all of the research questions and I was able to obtain a broader view of the Report.

Greimas' semiotic analysis is a very good tool for structuring the material. However, I found that it did not provide a deep enough insight to the research material. Perelman's rhetoric, on the other hand, paved a way for a more intriguing path to the research material and to a more comprehensive understanding of the semiotics of international politics. Then again, his argumentation analysis is very complex, which meant that an explanation required perhaps too large a portion of the whole study. I believe, however, that a possible continuation of the study into the U.S. foreign policy discourse in respect to Cuba would benefit from a further application of Perelman's rhetoric.

The next step could be, for example, to compare the argumentation techniques of the American Report and a similar report prepared in Cuba. It could answer questions, such as, what kind of plans, if any, does Cuba have for itself as its leader passes away? What kind of threats do the Cubans depict in their policies? Are the threats to Cubans linked, more, to foreign policies or domestic policies? This comparison could open up new horizons within the U.S. foreign policy on Cuba by taking into consideration the Cuban perspective<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup> The Cuban perspective could also be studied on the level of individuals, for example, by doing life story interviews on Cubans (both in Cuba and in the U.S.). For as long as the U.S. claim to stress the importance of the individual in its foreign policy discourse, as Campbell (1992, 271) has remarked it does, it would, therefore, seem logical to take Cuban individuals into consideration as well. Not only could it aid a more peaceful transition in Cuba, it could also have other benefits. As Atkinson (1998, 10, 13-14) states:

“Stories can affirm, validate, and support our own experience in relation to those around us. They enforce the norms of a moral order and shape the individual to the requirements of the society. Stories help us understand our commonalities with others, as well as our differences. ... Life stories can help the researcher become more aware of the range of possible roles and standards that exist within the human community. ... They can provide the researcher with information about a social reality existing outside the story, described by the story, as well as about the story itself as a social construct.”

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## Attachment 1. Actantial models of the Report

Before presenting each actantial model, I explain shortly what is told in each chapter.

### Executive Summary of the Report (xiii-xxxi):

In the executive summary the reader is informed of “America’s commitment to stand with the Cuban people against the tyranny of Fidel Castro’s regime” (Report, xiii) and the Report is one indicator of the commitment. Then it is told that through all the different methods the aim of the Report is to help the Cubans to change the societal structure of Cuba peacefully from dictatorship to democracy and market economy, which will result to the improvement of the living standards of Cuban people.

**Table I. Actantial model of the executive summary of the report (xiii-xxxi).**

<b>Actantial Position</b>	<b>Actor</b>
<b>Sender</b>	the United States and especially its Cuban population living in Florida.
<b>Subject</b>	the United States.
<b>Object</b>	A peaceful transition to a representative democracy and a free market economy, ending decades of an oppressive dictatorship that will result to the improvement of the living standards of the Cuban people.
<b>Helpers</b>	the Western world, civil society in Cuba.
<b>Anti-Subjects</b>	the Castro regime.
<b>Opponents</b>	Especially the government of Hugo Chavéz, and other countries, organisations and people who support the current government economically—consciously or unconsciously.
<b>Receiver</b>	the Cuban people.

In the story structure of the executive summary the *sender*—in other words the actor who has realised the task to accomplish, the object to attain—is the United States and especially the Cuban population living in the U.S. Furthermore, one can clearly find the United States presented as the *subject hero* and the Cuban people as the *receiver*. The *object* is to change the structure of the Cuban society in order for the Cuban people to become happier. *Anti-subject* is the dictator Fidel Castro and his regime. The *helpers of the subject* are the Cubans living in Florida, the NGOs in Cuba and possibly the rest of the Western world. The *helpers of the anti-subject* are the Chavéz’s Venezuelan government, and other bodies that assist the regime to survive. The greatest threat seems to be the implementation of a succession strategy and the continuation of the Castro regime even after Fidel Castro's death.

**Introduction of the Report (1-4):**

In the introduction the sad state of Cuban society under Castro is more highlighted. It is also mentioned many times that the agents of the change are Cubans not Americans: “Clearly, the agents of change are the Cuban people, who are struggling to define Cuba’s future” (Report, 2). The U.S. attempts to avoid the problem of intervening in changing of the structure of a sovereign country by talking about sovereign rights of people: “The fundamental goal of any U.S. assistance to a free Cuba must be to empower and respect the sovereign rights of the Cuban people.”

**Table II. Actantial model of the introduction of the report (1-4).**

<b>Actantial Position</b>	<b>Actor</b>
<b>Sender</b>	the United States, other countries that the U.S. wants to include in the “strong international coalition” and the United Nations Human Rights Commission.
<b>Subject</b>	the Cuban people.
<b>Object</b>	to free the Cuban people from Fidel Castro’s repressive rule.
<b>Helpers</b>	the United States, the international community.
<b>Anti-Subjects</b>	the Castro regime.
<b>Opponents</b>	Everyone supporting the regime’s “succession strategy” from Fidel to Raul Castro.
<b>Receiver</b>	the Cuban people.

The *sender* is the United States, but not alone: “Countries around the globe and the United Nations Human Rights Commission increasingly recognize the oppressive nature of the Castro regime” (Report, 1). Next, one can find the Cuban people presented as the *subject hero* and as well as the *receiver*. The *object* is to free the Cuban people “from Fidel Castro’s repressive rule” (Report, 2). *Anti-subject* is the dictator Fidel Castro and his regime. The *helpers of the subject* are the United States and the international community. The *opponent* is everybody who assists the regime to succeed from Fidel to Raul Castro. The greatest threat seems to be the same as in the executive summary: the implementation of a succession strategy and the continuation of the Castro regime even after Fidel Castro's death.

The text in *Chapter 1* was possible to arrange into six following actantial models.

**1. Empower Cuban Civil Society (15-25):**

This chapter discusses how the Castro dictatorship has made the Cuban civil society weak and divided. However, recently the changes have started to occur thanks to brave dissidents who have expressed demands for change and freedom despite its dangers. The U.S. interprets this as a call for help to empower the Cuban civil society. “Cuban civil society is not lacking spirit, desire, or determination; it is hampered by a lack of materials and support needed to bring about these changes” (Report, 16).

**Table III. The 1<sup>st</sup> Actantial model of the Chapter 1: Empower Cuban Civil Society (15-25).**

Actantial Position	Actor
<b>Sender</b>	"brave" Cuban dissidents such as Raúl Rivero, Dr. Oscar Elías Biscet, Martha Beatriz Roque, and Oswaldo Paya <sup>35</sup> .
<b>Subject</b>	the Cuban people (the democratic opposition in Cuba, the families of political prisoners, independent actors – the U.S. is encouraging especially the youth, women and Afro-Cubans to become subjects in strengthening Cuban civil society).
<b>Object</b>	to find ways to empower Cuban civil society and strengthen the democratic opposition through material assistance and training.  the U.S. government, agencies and NGOs, and the

<sup>35</sup> See the WebPages of the Cuban opposition: <http://www.lanuevacuba.com/oposicion-debate.htm> (2005-12-25).

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<b>Helpers</b>	third-country organisations, religious and faith-based groups.
<b>Anti-Subjects</b>	the Castro regime.
<b>Opponents</b>	—.
<b>Receiver</b>	the Cuban civil society.

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The *senders* are the Cuban dissidents who have attracted action to “Castro’s 45-year strategy of co-opting or crushing independent actors” (Report, 15). In addition, one finds the Cubans also presented as the *subject* and the Cuban civil society as the *receiver*. The subject in reality is maybe more the U.S. than Cubans but the report does not want to give that impression. The *object* is to find ways to empower Cuban civil society and strengthen the democratic opposition through material assistance and training. *Anti-subject* is the Castro’s regime. The *helpers of the subject* are the U.S. government, agencies and NGOs, the third-country organisations, and religious and faith-based groups. The *helper of the anti-subject* is not portrayed. The threat is the continuous lack of freedom which is manifested in the violations of human rights.

## **2. Break the Information Blockade (26-28):**

This chapter talks about the information isolation in which the Cubans live today: “Strict editorial control over newspapers, television, and radio by the regime’s repressive apparatus prevents the Cuban people from obtaining accurate information on such issues as the Cuban economy and wide-scale and systematic violations of human rights and abridgement of fundamental freedoms” (Report, 26). It also introduces the ways the U.S. can help to break this information blockade caused by the Castro regime.

**Table IV. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Actantial model of the Chapter 1—Break the Information Blockade (26-28).**

<b>Actantial Position</b>	<b>Actor</b>
<b>Sender</b>	the United States/Cubans
<b>Subject</b>	the United States.
<b>Object</b>	In concert with efforts to strengthen Cuban civil society, and building on the excellent work already underway by U.S. Government broadcasting entities, the Commission recommends a near-term program to deploy COMMANDO SOLO as an airborne platform for radio and television transmissions on a regular basis; an increase in the use of third-country private radio stations for broadcasting media materials on the island.
<b>Helpers</b>	Cubans and the third countries.
<b>Anti-Subjects</b>	the Castro regime, in particular, the Cuban Communist Party (CCP).
<b>Opponents</b>	—.
<b>Receiver</b>	the Cuban people.

The *sender* can be either the United States or Cubans. In this actant model, one can clearly find the United States presented as the *subject hero* and the Cuban people as the *receiver*. The *object* is to build on the work already underway by the U.S. Government broadcasting entities; the Commission recommends a near-term program to deploy COMMANDO SOLO as an airborne platform for radio and television transmissions on a regular basis; an increase in the use of third-country private radio stations for broadcasting media materials on the island. *Anti-subject* is the Castro regime and particularly the Cuban Communist Party (CCP). The *helpers of the subject* are Cubans and the third countries. The *helper of the anti-subject* is not presented. The threat is the continued information blockade and propaganda war directed towards Cuban citizens.

### 3. Deny Revenues to the Cuban Dictatorship (28-44):

In this chapter the U.S. government tells that the Castro regime is using the American people to support the dictatorship: “[T]he regime facilitates tourism by assisting U.S. travellers to evade U.S. travel restrictions which enhances the regime’s currency reserves and undermines our overall policy goals of minimizing direct subsidies to the regime” (Report, 31).

**Table V. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Actantial model of the Chapter 1—Deny Revenues to the Cuban Dictatorship (28-44).**

<b>Actantial Position</b>	<b>Actor</b>
<b>Sender</b>	the United States and especially its Cuban population living in Florida.
<b>Subject</b>	the U.S. government.
<b>Object</b>	to deny revenues to the Cuban dictatorship for example by undermining the Regime-sustaining tourism and by limiting the Regime’s manipulation of Humanitarian U.S. policies.
<b>Helpers</b>	the Western world, civil society in Cuba.
<b>Anti-Subjects</b>	the Castro regime.
<b>Opponents</b>	Especially the government of Hugo Chavéz, and other countries, organisations and people who support the current government economically—consciously or unconsciously.
<b>Receiver</b>	the Cuban people.

The *sender* is the United States. Again, the United States is presented as the *subject* and the Cuban people as the *receiver*. The *object* is to deny revenues to the Cuban dictatorship for example by undermining the regime-sustaining tourism and by limiting the regime’s manipulation of humanitarian U.S. policies. *Anti-subject* is the dictator Fidel Castro and his regime. The *helpers of the subject* are the Western world and the civil society in Cuba. The *helper of the anti-subject* is especially the government of Hugo Chavéz, and other countries, organisations and people who support the current government economically—consciously or unconsciously—for example in connection with tourism. According Siltala (2000, 22) there is a contradiction between the public rhetoric and the private action of the Cuban community in the U.S.; publicly many Cuban-Americans support the economic blockade, whereas privately they send so much money to Cuba that it exceeds the net incomes the Cuban government receives from tourism. The threat is the strengthening of the Castro regime.

#### 4. Illuminate the Reality of Castro's Cuba (44-45):

When in the last chapter the Report wanted the Americans not to be so naïve, in this chapter the aim is to convince the rest of the Western world of the misery Castro has caused to Cubans by keeping the dictatorship alive.

**Table VI. The 4<sup>th</sup> Actantial model of the Chapter 1—Illuminate the Reality of Castro's Cuba (44-45).**

<b>Actantial Position</b>	<b>Actor</b>
<b>Sender</b>	the United States.
<b>Subject</b>	the U.S. government and NGOs
<b>Object</b>	Illumination of the reality of Castro's Cuba, including its threat potential.
<b>Helpers</b>	the Western world, civil society in Cuba.
<b>Anti-Subjects</b>	the Castro regime.
<b>Opponents</b>	—.
<b>Receiver</b>	the Cuban people.

The *sender* is the United States. The U.S. government is presented as the *subject* and the Cuban people as the *receiver*. The *object* is to illuminate the reality of Castro's Cuba, including its threat potential. *Anti-subject* is the dictator Fidel Castro and his regime. The *helpers of the subject* are the Western world and the civil society in Cuba. The *opponent* is not apparent. The threat is that people do not believe that Cuba will become a threat to the Western world.

**5. Encourage International Diplomatic Efforts to Support Cuban Civil Society and Challenge the Castro Regime (45-50):**

Now, especially after the “2003 crackdown on peaceful pro-democracy activists” (Report, 45), when the international community understands, how the current regime in Cuba is harmful to Cubans, it should support the civil society in Cuba and challenge the Castro regime. The Report (45) accuses the international community of lacking in actions: “All too frequently, moral outrage and international condemnation have not translated into real actions that directly assist the Cuban people in their quest for freedom and basic human rights”. This chapter focuses on encouraging the international actors to assist the U.S. in challenging the Castro Regime.

**Table VII. The 5<sup>th</sup> Actantial model of the Chapter 1—Encourage International Diplomatic Efforts to Support Cuban Civil Society and Challenge the Castro Regime (45-50).**

<b>Actantial Position</b>	<b>Actor</b>
<b>Sender</b>	the United States.
<b>Subject</b>	the U.S. government, agencies and NGOs.
<b>Object</b>	Encouragement of international efforts to support Cuban civil society and challenge the Castro regime.
<b>Helpers</b>	the international actors such as the European Union (EU) and the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the civil society in Cuba.
<b>Anti-Subjects</b>	the Castro regime.
<b>Opponents</b>	—.
<b>Receiver</b>	the Cuban people.

The *sender* is again the United States. The U.S. government, agencies and NGOs are presented as the *subjects* and the Cuban people as the *receiver*. The *object* is to encourage international efforts to support Cuban civil society and to challenge the Castro regime. *Anti-subject* is the dictator Fidel Castro and his regime. The *helpers of the subject* are the international actors such as the European Union and the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the civil society in Cuba. The *opponent* is not apparent. The threat is that the international diplomatic efforts will support the regime instead of the civil society.

## 6. Undermine the Regime’s “Succession Strategy” (50-52):

The last chapter brings forth the physical and mental deterioration of Castro. According to the Report the senior Cuban leadership is preparing to the “‘succession’ of the regime that will keep the senior leadership in power” (Report, 51). It continues that is time for also the U.S. government to prepare for this change by preventing the “succession” by its policies. “U.S. policy must be targeted at undermining this succession strategy by stripping away layers of support within the regime, creating uncertainty regarding the political and legal future of those in leadership positions, and encouraging more of those within the ruling elite to shift their allegiance to those pro-democracy forces working for a transition to a free and democratic Cuba” (Report, 51).

**Table VIII. The 6<sup>th</sup> Actantial model of the Chapter 1—Undermine the Regime’s “Succession Strategy” (50-52).**

Actantial Position	Actor
Sender	the United States.
Subject	the U.S. government, agencies and NGOs.
Object	Undermining the regime’s “succession strategy” by supporting a democratic transition.
Helpers	the Western world, civil society in Cuba.
Anti-Subjects	the Castro regime.
Opponents	—.
Receiver	the Cuban people.

The *sender* is once more the United States. The U.S. government, agencies and NGOs are the *subjects* and the Cuban people are the *receivers*. The *object* is to undermine the regime’s “succession strategy” by supporting a democratic transition. *Anti-subject* is the Castro regime. The *helpers of the subject* are the Western world and the civil society in Cuba. The *helper of the anti-subject* is not mentioned. Only in one of the actantial models I was able to find an opponent aka a helper of the anti-subject. This may be deliberate; the U.S. may want to create an impression that the Castro’s Regime does not have any friends, which makes the supporting of the efforts of the United States even easier. Or then Cuba does no longer have any significant allies, as it use to have the Soviet Union.