The framework of Russia's Baltic policy is determined by the past. The emerging pattern of relations has its historical determinants, which are therefore a relevant subject to discuss in this chapter before commencing on the actual analysis of Russia's policy. History has a double effect on policy-making: it acts as memory and bequeaths specific processes.(5) In the case of Russian-Baltic relations, this is expressed by legacies of imperial domination and Soviet occupation, and interdependence in terms of demography and economics. It is possible that the importance of history in this region surpasses that of all other post-communist cases.(6)
So the legacy of the past weighs heavily on Russian-Baltic relations. The territories that today make up the Baltic States were first incorporated into the Russian Empire between 1721 and 1795.(7) The collapse of the empire and the subsequent Bolshevik revolution in 1917 led, but only after warfare, to the independence of the three Baltic States. In 1940, the states were "returned" by annexation to the Soviet Union, until this "empire" dissolved in turn, in 1991. The long period of time that the Baltic territories have been a part of a Russian-cum-Soviet entity is an influential factor constituting Russian attitudes towards the renewed independence of these states. The difficulty of dealing with and recognising the Baltics as foreign and sovereign states underlies many of the problems in their relations.
This chapter embraces three themes. First, the legacy of domination will be presented, focusing in particular on imperialism and popular attitudes towards the Balts themselves. This will be followed by a description of the consequences of the Soviet period, with an analysis of the different interpretations of history and of the ethnic question. Finally, the factors inherent in the break-up of the Soviet Union that have affected Russian attitudes and policy will be presented: how identity and independence were intertwined, and how the final disintegration may have influenced Russian perceptions.
Russia's imperial past forms the necessary long-term historical perspective for its Baltic policy in the 1990s and serves to portray the vast changes that Russia has had to adjust to since the disintegration of the Soviet Union - analogously to the situation in 1917, when the Russian Empire crumbled. For most of its history, Russia has been the centre of an empire. The characteristic element of this was its constant territorial expansion, which has been calculated as constituting, on average, all of 50 square kilometres a day for over four centuries.(9) The coast of the Baltic Sea, with its warm-water ports, was the object of Russian territorial ambitions for centuries. For Peter the Great, access to the Baltic Sea had a dual significance: the possibility of bringing Russia closer to Europe economically and culturally, and of becoming a great (sea) power. Furthermore, there was the threat of invasion from the West: Baltic lands were a transit-area of Swedish and German aggression since the times of the assault of the Teutonic Knights on Pskov, the capital of Russia's medieval republic in the north-west, in the 13th century. Strategic and economic interests of the Baltic region were thus the motivation behind Russia's expansion.
As part of the Russian Empire, the Baltic region retained its regional identity to a considerable degree, as it was ruled as a separate entity for most of the 18th and 19th centuries. This separation and preferential treatment was a result of the conception of the region being historically, economically and socially different to the rest of the empire. With the rise of nationalism in the 19th, these Baltic prerogatives were increasingly questioned. The Russian Romantic nationalists, called the "slavophiles", who believed in a historic Russian "civilising mission", criticised any attempts at Europeanisation of the Russian state but advocated the imposition of uniform, centrally directed control throughout the Empire. As they gained in political power against their ideological enemies, the "Westernisers"(10), they began the implementation of a Russification policy in the administration and cultural sphere of Russia's western borderlands in order to remove all remnants of regional particularism. However, many analysts seem to overlook the conceptual contradiction in terms of Russia's grand mission: it was certainly used to incorporate the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples under one Slavic people and thus to deny them an independent identity, and to impose domination over Muslim and Asian areas, but these ethnic and cultural explanations do not hold in the Baltic case. The Baltic peoples were not Slavs, and their cultural heritage was not backward. Russification was thus more administrative than cultural, which is further evidenced by the way the Baltic peoples were able to retain their cultural integrity despite the repression. This is an important background for the examination of Russian attitudes towards the Balts in more recent times.
The collapse of the Russian Empire in the aftermath of the Revolution was a shock to all Russians, both red and white. Despite the Bolshevik theory on national self-determination, the loss of Baltic territories was traumatic, and difficult to accept. Then the declaration of workers' soviets in both Estonia and Latvia at the end of the year 1917 lead the Bolsheviks to temporarily regard the Baltic region as the sphere of interest of not Russia, but the Russian Revolution.(11) It took prolonged fighting to remove red army troops from Baltic territories, and Soviet Russia did not recognise the independence of the Baltic countries until 1920. This represented a change in attitude: instead of spreading the socialist revolution, the region was neutralised with peace treaties.(12) The treaty signed with Estonia in February 1920 was the first crack in the encirclement imposed on Russia by the Entente countries that were staging an intervention. The predominant memory of this period was that yet again, the Baltic region had been used by the enemy to launch an attack on Russia.
Popular attitudes of neighbouring peoples are often fraught with prejudice and animosity, but they condition some of the responses and decisions made by political leaders. Here I will briefly analyse Russian attitudes towards the Baltic region and peoples, as well as outlining the symbiosis between Russian and Soviet identity.
From the point of view of both Russians and non-Russians, Soviet identity was largely associated with the nationality that held overall power in the Union. This overlapping of identities was coupled with perception that the Soviet state was also essentially Russian; pursuing Russian interests with its ideology as well as reflecting Russian political culture and Russian views.(13) "The overwhelming majority of Russians had been indoctrinated to believe they have moral and historical rights to control and russify the whole Soviet Union, the Baltic republics included."(14) From this follows the widely held conviction of "natural" Russian rights and interests in formerly Soviet territories, and the existence of major Russian minorities who did not conceive of moving to another republic as signifying a move away from their own habits, traditions and rights.
From the point of view of the Baltic peoples, Soviet occupation was regarded as direct continuation of subjugation under the Russian Empire: Soviet leaders were equated with the former Russian overlords. The policies of domination along ethnic lines were evident throughout the period in issues such as Communist Party cadre policy. The second secretaries, in charge of local cadres policy and thus very influential, were predominantly Russian. On the other hand, it cannot be claimed that the Balts were particularly keen on establishing themselves as party functionaries. More importantly, the internal security apparatus in the republics was dominated by Russians or russified Balts, and the "exchange of cadres" system led to a one-way supply of Russian party functionaries from Moscow to the republics. The russified party members were referred to as "Yestonians" in Estonia because of their Russian pronunciation, while the Russian-speaking settler population was generally referred to as the "civilian garrison".(15)
The widespread attitude of equating all Russian residents with the occupying forces has had distinct consequences in the post-1991 period and demonstrates the importance of feelings and attitudes. Russian attitudes towards Balts were complex. The republics were generally viewed as the "Soviet West" thanks to their higher level of economic wellbeing and relatively more links to the West, particularly from Estonia to Finland.(16) The material aspect was dominant in Russian views, leading most to want to participate and imitate the Baltic success, although some would claim a moral and ideological superiority to the Balts.(17)
In the Soviet times, Russians could always declare that the Baltics needed Russian defence capabilities, raw materials and industrial labour force in order to function. The fundamental difference of interpretation was evident in this matter: they considered that Baltic ingratitude prevented them from understanding the inputs from the Russian side - "Russians were doing them a favour"(18). In the new situation, although it was abundantly clear that the Balts had no desire for Russian military protection, Russians have continued to emphasise the economic and even intellectual resources that Russia has, over time, invested in the Baltic region.(19) This serves as justification for Russia's legitimate interests in the Baltic States, according to the President's adviser Sergei Stankevich.(20) Problems of interpretation continued.
The disputed interpretations of either side's views on questions of history help to examine the legacy of the Soviet experience further. This also includes a look at the demographic changes brought about by the regime. These aspects are all significant in Russian-Baltic relations and so deserve to be clarified.
With the introduction glasnost soon after Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, and the increased possibilities to discuss the Soviet past in public that it brought about, the question of annexation began to increasingly be raised in the Baltic republics. The Soviet theory claimed that following a popular uprising of workers against their fascist governments, the Baltic peoples asked to be incorporated into the Soviet Union.(21) The Red Army was presented as liberating Baltic farmers and fishermen from the German invaders. This theory neatly encapsulated a Russian rescue of the Balts from both an internal and external fascist threat. The standard Soviet view went even further in seeing the entry of the Baltic States as a natural development, because it increased the security and economic power of the Soviet Union (that is to say, Russia).(22) Even after the commission set up by Gorbachev to investigate the question of secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact admitted to their existence, and the Congress of People's Deputies condemned them as illegal and invalid (December 1989), the official tenet of voluntary incorporation and deliverance from German forces remained unchanged. The importance to Russians of the "Great Patriotic War"(23) as a collective defence of the Russian heartland prevents them from understanding the inherent contradiction between protection and conquest.
From the point of view of the Balts, the legacy of annexation and of the following mass deportations cannot be underestimated. Russians, particularly those who live in the Baltic States, have difficulties understanding why they are judged for crimes committed over 50 years ago and in the name of a different regime. But for the Balts, they represent the foreign occupiers. The actual concepts of annexation and occupation were the basis for validating the Baltic independence drive from the late 1980s onwards. Most other states had not recognised the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union, which was an important legitimising factor. The existence of the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a rallying point for the independence movements and some of the earliest demonstrations against Soviet power took place to commemorate what was boldly stated as the "victims of the Pact".(24)
The question of state continuity ties in with the entire issue of the 1940 annexation. The Baltic States maintain that at the re-independence of 1991, they reconstituted the republics that existed until an involuntary incorporation into the Soviet Union.(25) They do not regard themselves as successor states of the Soviet Union, but as having been illegally annexed and occupied. Russia has at times used the wording "post-Soviet space" as opposed to talking about the CIS and Baltic States separately. The Russian position leads to the Baltic States being seen as a single geo-political unit, and it emphasises their former Soviet connection instead of the continuity of their inter-war status. The idea of state continuity is important for Baltic identity and in terms of policy, the most significant implications of this concept have been seen in the minority and security spheres. Automatic citizenship has been denied to post-1940 immigrants on the basis that they have arrived under illegal conditions of occupation. As for the security aspect, the minor border changes in 1940, which returned some territory to Russia that had been granted to Estonia and Latvia in 1920, led to a deadlock in border demarcation after 1991. The Baltics insisted on a recognition of the only legitimate inter-state treaty among the countries - the 1920 peace treaties - and this entailed a territorial claim.
The immense demographic changes in the Baltic region since 1939 are possibly without parallel in Europe. Four major changes took place. During the German occupation of the Baltic States, the Baltic Germans were relocated to Germany, and the Jewish population was annihilated almost in its entirety. In the immediate aftermath of Soviet seizure of the Baltics, deportations reduced the numbers of the Balts by a considerable percentage. Emigration and war depleted the populations further, and subsequent waves of deportations (up until 1949) had a disastrous effect. The immigration of Russians and other (mostly Slavic) nationalities throughout the Soviet period and the low indigenous birthrates caused far-reaching changes in the ethnic composition of the Baltic States.(26) This is a legacy that determines the conditions of relations to a great extent.
In late 1985, the First Secretary of the Estonian communist party, Karl Vaino, still openly displayed strong pro-Russian attitudes in emphasising that "the Estonian people's historical destiny has indissoluble links with the (---) Soviet state (---) and the Great Russian People."(27) With accelerating pace, events were to show that his calls to "come to terms with the limitations of nationality" went unheard in Soviet Estonia. The fact that he dwelled on the nationality issue so early in Gorbachev's term serves to demonstrate that the nationality question was very much alive in the republic even before glasnost. Vaino admonished incessant anti-Soviet and pro-Western attitudes of the Estonians further at the Party Congress in March.(28) This presents one example of the latent ethnic tensions and shows that the ethnic problems of the 1990s have not been caused by new-born nationalistic euphoria following the independence struggle, but their rationale lies deeper in the Soviet experience.
The vast numbers of workers who immigrated to Estonia and Latvia (less to Lithuania due to its predominantly agricultural structure) throughout the Soviet period caused serious alarm in these republics, where it was feared that the indigenous nationalities would soon become minorities.(29) These antagonistic feelings began to be expressed openly in the glasnost period. Economic and environmental concerns combined with the ethnic question made the immigration issue even more contested. A labour-intensive industry, which had to import a substantial part of its labour force from outside the Baltic republics, and then exported the commodities, was not regarded as economically sound. Moreover, it was seen to be a deliberate attempt on the part of the central authorities to drown out the Balts in their own republics.(30) For most Russians, emigration to Estonia and Latvia meant a considerable rise in living standards.
The hostility in ethnic relations has been accredited in part to the economic structures of the centrally planned system. The enterprises controlled by the central authorities in Moscow tended to be large, whereas those run by the local authorities were small and did not have equal access to resources also distributed by the centre. Wages in heavy industry were higher, and because of the relative overrepresentation of Russians in heavy industry, this was seen as a discriminatory policy, as were the other benefits given to immigrants such as faster access to housing. The vast numbers of Soviet military officers and servicemen also created friction in ethnic relations. More evident however, even before glasnost brought it to the forefront, was the ecological aspect that related to immigration. The most environmental damage was caused by the labour-intensive industrial enterprises, which as a rule mostly employed Russian and other Slavs. For example, plans to build a new Estonian phosphate plant caused large-scale resistance, which was based on sound environmental concerns but with an ethnic undertone. The ecological movements implicitly opposed these immigration policies.
From the point of view of the Baltic peoples, the independence movement was aimed as much against Russian as Soviet domination and further at Russian immigrants.(31) As for the Russians resident in the Baltic republics, their attitude towards independence varied across time, place and social group.(32) For instance, those living in predominantly Russian areas such as north-eastern Estonia were more prone to negative attitudes than those in ethnically heterogeneous areas whereas those who had been resident for a longer period were more sympathetic to Baltic independence. Although developments such as the new language laws increasing the use of the local languages passed by the legislatures in 1988 gave the Russian-speakers justifiable concerns, the bulk of resistance consisted of specifically pro-Soviet rather than pro-Russian forces. An apparent discrepancy existed between those who were connected to central authorities and those who were not. Baltic Russians in the military, the KGB, the communist party apparatus and in centrally controlled enterprises working mostly as managers all had vital interests which were threatened by the independence movements. They were active in setting up counter movements based on Soviet/Russian opposition.(33) However, the vast majority of Russian settlers consisted of blue-collar workers. They were also affected by the language laws and the prospective change in the status of the republics, but as a rule their Soviet loyalties were weak and so they did not feel as directly threatened. This explains their relatively unenthusiastic response to strike calls.(34) The attitudes of these people often changed over time. In the 1991 referendums substantial numbers of Russians supported independence. The strongest support came from the intellectuals, who had associated themselves with the emerging Popular Fronts, which initially were in favour of inclusive citizenship rights.(35)
Despite the prospect of difficulties in the form of losing economic privileges and the perceived ultranationalist Baltic proclamations related to language issues in particular, many Russians could see positive things in staying in the Baltics even if they were to become independent. Some analysts even go so far as to see that Russians can accept a subordinate position in Baltic States because of the higher and advanced level of these societies, and that the problems are not ethnic or economic, but artificially caused (initially by party-state apparatus officials).(36) This does not seem plausible considering that the main ethnic problems pertain to citizenship, but what is interesting is that only 52% of Russians in Latvia and 59% in Estonia considered the Soviet Union as "rodina", their homeland, in 1991.(37) The fact that nearly half of the settlers had lost their connection to the Soviet Union, even in a situation where they live rather isolated from other nationalities, reflects increasing acceptance of the host republics. However, the economic reality of Baltic affluence probably outweighed a sincere appreciation of Baltic culture.
In contrast to the strong national feelings of all the three Baltic indigenous nationalities, there is no distinct and unified national identity of the Russian speaking minorities - the "homo sovieticus" never having emerged. A minor but interesting point to make is that in Riga, the Russian community is decidedly heterogeneous consisting of Russian and Russian-Jewish intellectuals historically present in the city. Their support for Latvian independence was substantial.(38)
Intermarriage and knowledge of local languages can be seen as relevant to settlers' attitudes towards the host country. Intermarriage between Latvians and Russians was the third highest in the Soviet republics, at 33% of all marriages according to statistics from 1988.(39) In Estonia the equivalent figure was 16%. There may be a causal relationship between this and the fact that language knowledge was also higher in Latvia than in Estonia (17% of Latvian Russians in 1970 as opposed to 12.5% in Estonia, with the figures rising to 21% in Latvia but falling in Estonia by 1989).
The role of the Baltic republics was crucial in the disintegration of the Soviet system. What this means to the Russians is contradictory. In part, the Balts have been accused of bringing about the destruction of the system along with the loss of superpower status. On the other hand, Russia's democratic leadership did not rebuke Baltic independence claims during the summer of 1991, without openly and unequivocally endorsing it either. President Yeltsin did meet the Baltic leaders in Tallinn to sign a declaration acknowledging the "state sovereignty" of all four states concerned. However, he also made claims to support the right of Russia to protect Russians in other former republics before independence had been attained. The attitude towards the Baltic role in the break-up reflects the ambiguous nature of the new Russian identity: whether to accept the disintegration and loss of empire or not. Russians view themselves as the major victims of the Soviet system so for them, Baltic claims that the development of their countries was impeded by Soviet control is not justified.(40)
The role of the Baltics in the break-up of the Soviet Union holds a contradiction also in the fact that the Baltic intelligentsia was perceived by Gorbachev as a natural ally in his reform policy. The economic advancement of the states was presumably also thought to make them a fertile ground for perestroika. However, the Soviet leadership did not view the nationalities question as important until 1988, and even then did not devise a policy for addressing the grievances that had been aired as a result of glasnost. Instead, the leadership was increasingly reacting to events and conducting "crisis management". When accepting diverse social grass roots organisations in the Baltic States, Gorbachev unwittingly let loose ethnic tensions as the issue was not regarded as important. One major mistake of the Soviet leadership was in underestimating the strength of nationalism and overestimating the influence of his proposed reforms to cure ethnic ills.(41)
The Soviet military and the political and governmental apparatus were vehemently opposed to Baltic independence.(42) It was a direct threat to the central apparatus as it attacked Soviet sovereignty. The fact that the Baltic republics were instrumental in the disintegration process has led to their dislike by some Russian officers.(43) The strategic aspects of relinquishing defence positions and the age-old ambitions in the Baltic region were naturally even more relevant for army professionals than other people. In addition, the Baltic republics, especially Latvia, had been favourite retirement areas for Soviet officers.
The threat of force and its implementation marks a major contrast between attitudes of the Soviet authorities towards Baltic and East European independence movements. The Baltic leaders' calls for negotiations were turned down on the grounds that negotiations could only be conducted with foreign countries. The interesting question is whether this was only because of a prediction that if they let the Baltics go, the whole construct of the union would crumble or to what extent was it a distinct vision that the Baltic States comprised something entirely different to East Europe. This pattern of thought is also reflected in the present Russian attitudes towards the independent Baltic States. Another implication for consequent relations was the illegitimacy of the use of force in the mind of the public and state apparatus. After the violent crack-down in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991 Gorbachev shifted the blame for the casualties to local military commanders, which may imply that he understood that the use of violence had become unjustified even in Soviet policy. This is also reflected in the fact that most of the confrontation took place through telegrams sent to the Lithuanian president Landsbergis and through economic pressure instead of military action.(44) The use of brutal force was objectionable also to many Russians in the Baltic, who as a result increased their support to Baltic independence claims.(45)
The long-held perception of Russians is that the Baltic area is strategically significant or even vital for the security of Russia and therefore a "natural" region of acquisition and influence. This assumption has been justified also by European balance of power theories, as the Baltics have given a "window to Europe" to both Russia and the Soviet Union. This sense of legitimate domination is, however, qualified by other conceptions. The region is perceived concurrently as a regional entity (the 'ostzeiskii provintsij', later "Pribaltika"; both denote the region next to the Baltic Sea) and as distinctively different from the other republics in terms of advanced development ("our West").
Conflicts and tensions dominate the overall legacy of historic relations between Russia and the Baltic States. These negative impulses give hardly any hope for a positive development of Russian-Baltic relations. Russian policy towards the Baltic States is bound by these, and a host of other factors. Where can Russia go from such an imperialist past? As the following chapters will demonstrate, the past is not the only factor in decision-making. Legacies are important, but so are choices made in the present. The interaction between present and past developments will be followed in this thesis.
5. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot: Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval (Cambridge 1994), p. 23.
6. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan: Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore 1996), p. 402.
7. The Baltic provinces were conquered by Russia in 1710. Estland and Livland were officially incorporated in 1721, but Kurland was not officcially given to Russia until the third partition of Poland in 1795. Vilho Niitemaa and Kalervo Hovi: Baltian historia (Jyväskylä 1991), pp 272, 276.
8. The following account is based on Niitemaa and Hovi, pp 278, 310-314, 354-64, 394; Edward Thaden: Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855 - 1914 (Princeton 1981), pp 3-10, 36, 227; David Kirby: The Baltic World 1772 - 1993 (Singapore 1995), pp 278, 310-314, 354-364; Elizabeth Teague: Russians Outside Russia and Russian Security Policy, in the volume The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C 1994), p. 83-89; Walter Clemens: Baltic Independence and Russian Empire (Basingstoke 1991), pp 16, 28, Alexander Pikayev: Russia and the Baltic States, in the volume The Baltic States in World Politics (Surrey 1998), pp 133-136; Iver Neumann: Russia and the Idea of Europe (London 1996), pp 28-39.
9. Richard Pipes: The Formation of the USSR: Communism and Nationalism, 1917 - 1923 (Cambridge, Mass. 1964), p. 1, quoting A. Bruckner: Die Europaisierung Russlands (Gotha 1888).
This term denotes the "zapadniki", who sought to modernise Russia by emulating European political and economic
systems and who believed that Russia had the possibility of becoming a "western" state.
11. Aappo Kähönen: Bolshevikkien Suomen ja Baltian kuva 1918 - 1920. Master's thesis, Helsinki University 1998, p.
Ibid., p. 112.
Alexander Motyl: Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity and Stability in the USSR. (Ithaca 1987), pp 39-49.
Kristian Gerner and Stefan Hedlund: The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire (London 1993), p.60.
Rein Taagepera: A Note on the March 1989 Elections. Soviet Studies Vol 42, No 2, 1990.
The importance of the possibility to watch Finnish television in northern parts of Estonia was judged by Mart Nutt,
an Estonian Member of Parliament, to have been invaluable. (Lecture 20 November 1998, notes are held by the author.)
Clemens, p. 150.
Ibid., p. 150.
Statement by President Yeltsin's press security Valery Kostikov in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research
Report, Vol 2, No 35, 3 September 1993 "Newsbriefs".
John Dunlop: The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton 1993), p. 290.
Radio Free Europe Research, Baltic Area Situation Report, No 6, 25 September 1986.
22. Gerner and Hedlund, p. 62.
This is the term Russians use for the Second World War.
24. In this thesis I have used the terms "annexation" and "occupation period" without particular uneasiness, as it is widely
considered an established historical concept.
This interpretation was strengthened by the response of the Finnish government, which claimed it did not need to
officially recognise the Baltic States in 1991, because the recognition it had promulgated in 1919 had never been
Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser: Russians as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor
States (Oxford 1996), p. 96.
RFE, Baltic Area Situation Report, No 7, 6 September 1985.
RFE, Baltic Area Situation Report, No 3, 1 April 1986.
Aksel Krich: The Integration of non-Estonians into Estonian Society (Tallinn 1997), p. 14; Gershon Shafir:
Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and
Estonia (Albany, N.Y 1995), p.159.
Aksel Kirch, Maria Kirch and Tarmo Tuisk: Russians in the Baltic States: to be or not to be? Journal of Baltic
studies, Vol 24, 1993, p. 161.
Shafir, p.174; Melvin, Neil: Forging the New Russian Nation: Russian foreign policy and the Russian-speaking
communities of the former USSR (London 1994), p.12.
Graham Smith: The Resurgence of Nationalism, in the volume The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Basingstoke 1994), p.135.
John Hiden and Patrick Salmon: The Baltic Nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the twentieth
century (Singapore 1994), p. 151.
Melvin (1994), p.12.
Clemens, p. 142.
Leon Gudkov: The Distintegration of the USSR and the Russians in the Republics. The Journal of Communist
Studies, Vol 9, No 1, 1993, pp 82, 86.
Melvin (1994), p. 15 (Quoting Moskovskie novosty, 27 January 1991).
Anatol Lieven: The Baltic Revolution: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia on the Path to Independence (New Haven
Smith (1994), p.139.
Stanley Vardys and Judith Sedaitis: Lithuania: The Rebel Nation (Oxford 1997), p.163.
Vardys and Sedaitis, p.169.
Riina Kionka and Raivo Vetik: Estonia and the Estonians, in the volume The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States (London 1996), p.140.
11. Aappo Kähönen: Bolshevikkien Suomen ja Baltian kuva 1918 - 1920. Master's thesis, Helsinki University 1998, p. 50.
12. Ibid., p. 112.
13. Alexander Motyl: Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity and Stability in the USSR. (Ithaca 1987), pp 39-49.
14. Kristian Gerner and Stefan Hedlund: The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire (London 1993), p.60.
15. Rein Taagepera: A Note on the March 1989 Elections. Soviet Studies Vol 42, No 2, 1990.
16. The importance of the possibility to watch Finnish television in northern parts of Estonia was judged by Mart Nutt, an Estonian Member of Parliament, to have been invaluable. (Lecture 20 November 1998, notes are held by the author.)
17. Clemens, p. 150.
18. Ibid., p. 150.
19. Statement by President Yeltsin's press security Valery Kostikov in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol 2, No 35, 3 September 1993 "Newsbriefs".
20. John Dunlop: The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton 1993), p. 290.
21. Radio Free Europe Research, Baltic Area Situation Report, No 6, 25 September 1986.
22. Gerner and Hedlund, p. 62.
23. This is the term Russians use for the Second World War.
24. In this thesis I have used the terms "annexation" and "occupation period" without particular uneasiness, as it is widely considered an established historical concept.
25. This interpretation was strengthened by the response of the Finnish government, which claimed it did not need to officially recognise the Baltic States in 1991, because the recognition it had promulgated in 1919 had never been revoked.
26. Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser: Russians as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States (Oxford 1996), p. 96.
27. RFE, Baltic Area Situation Report, No 7, 6 September 1985.
28. RFE, Baltic Area Situation Report, No 3, 1 April 1986.
29. Aksel Krich: The Integration of non-Estonians into Estonian Society (Tallinn 1997), p. 14; Gershon Shafir: Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia (Albany, N.Y 1995), p.159.
30. Aksel Kirch, Maria Kirch and Tarmo Tuisk: Russians in the Baltic States: to be or not to be? Journal of Baltic studies, Vol 24, 1993, p. 161.
31. Shafir, p.174; Melvin, Neil: Forging the New Russian Nation: Russian foreign policy and the Russian-speaking communities of the former USSR (London 1994), p.12.
32. Graham Smith: The Resurgence of Nationalism, in the volume The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Basingstoke 1994), p.135.
33. John Hiden and Patrick Salmon: The Baltic Nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the twentieth century (Singapore 1994), p. 151.
34. Melvin (1994), p.12.
35. Clemens, p. 142.
36. Leon Gudkov: The Distintegration of the USSR and the Russians in the Republics. The Journal of Communist Studies, Vol 9, No 1, 1993, pp 82, 86.
37. Melvin (1994), p. 15 (Quoting Moskovskie novosty, 27 January 1991).
38. Anatol Lieven: The Baltic Revolution: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia on the Path to Independence (New Haven 1993), p.174.
39. Shafir, p.179.
40. Lieven, p.176.
41. Smith (1994), p.139.
42. Stanley Vardys and Judith Sedaitis: Lithuania: The Rebel Nation (Oxford 1997), p.163.
43. Lieven, p.203.
44. Vardys and Sedaitis, p.169.
45. Riina Kionka and Raivo Vetik: Estonia and the Estonians, in the volume The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States (London 1996), p.140.