Security issues belong to the sphere of priority questions that have determined the character and development of Russia's Baltic policy. As neighbouring countries, the security decisions of the Baltic States are obviously of the utmost relevance to Russia. The influence Russia wields in the Baltic region is clearly stronger than its power at present on the international arena is. This gives Russia more opportunities to enact its policies in a way that is conducive to its own interests. The significance of the region is illustrated by the fact that the role of the Baltic States Russian security -thinking is totally disproportionate to their small size. The historically and geographically determined rationale for this has already been set out in the first chapter.
Russia's security agenda is based on the geographical realities of the proximity of the Baltic States on its border. Russia's strategic aims are to keep the Baltics out of military blocks, to deter the possibility of their territory being used to launch an attack against itself and to maintain a strategic presence in the Baltic Sea. Russia sees it as imperative to retain them as part of a neutral buffer zone that exists de facto (with the exception of the Norwegian border) around the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The historical view of Baltic States as a "window" to the West is not intended as approval of the Baltics actually joining any Western security arrangements, lest the "window" then be closed on Russia. However, what Henry Kissinger interprets as an inevitable and lasting craving for conquered territories(99), has not been visible in Russian Baltic policy in the period 1992-97, as for example the completion of the troop withdrawal process attests.
Security considerations have, in combination with other factors, influenced a policy that is accommodating in issues that have strong international interest and clear legal/moral grounds (such as the withdrawal), but firmly insistent on those points which are deemed vital to national security. But even on the latter points Russia has not threatened outright military intervention. Potential for conflict does exist, due to the inherent differences in the way the two sides view international security arrangements in the post-Cold War era. The Russian sees NATO expansion as hostile and dangerous, whereas the Baltic interpretation of Russian involvement in their security decisions is that Russia is pursuing a neo-imperialist policy in the former Soviet republics. These disagreements, and the importance of security matters in general, contribute to making the security dimension the most prominent one in Russia's Baltic policy.
The major issues to be discussed in this chapter are the question of troop withdrawals and border demarcation, as well as the debate over NATO expansion. These will be preceded by an analysis of the concepts and consensus of security policy, and a brief description of the strategic upheavals that have brought about these security problems.
The changes of the security environment in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union have signified the need for Russia to conform its security perspectives to the "loss" of the Baltic States and to begin viewing them as objects of its foreign and security policy. The degree to which Russia is willing to do so fundamentally shapes its policies in the region. Russian security concerns in the Baltic area were fundamentally heightened with the re-independence of the Baltic States. Prevailing security considerations deal with the strategic importance of the Baltic coastline, and correspondingly, the permanent interest that the region holds for Russia.(100) In addition, Russian grievances centred on the loss of the Baltic component in the all-union security structures. The fact that Russia was obliged to relinquish a number of strategic bases and ports in the Baltic Sea nullified the goal of a centuries-long ambition to control these warm-water outlets in the north. The potential difficulties in supplying Kaliningrad through an independent Lithuania and alarm over possible isolation added to the sense of loss.(101)
This transformation had to be dealt with in the context of Russia's altered status in the international system.(102) Russia's Baltic policy was influenced by the overall difficulties in coming to terms with the loss of both the "outer empire"; the Warsaw Pact countries, and the "inner empire"; the other republics of the former Soviet Union. The security situation gave Russia a heightened sense of vulnerability: its defensive borders had been pushed back 1500km from the centre of Europe, for which reason it felt like it had been the loser not only of the Cold War but also of the Great Patriotic War(103).
The system of foreign policy concepts for Russian national interests and its role in international affairs, as well as its abilities and resources to carry out its objectives, provide the backdrop against which Russia evaluates its security concerns. Arriving at a consensus on the central tenets of foreign policy took until late 1993. The unitary body of thought that then emerged was not subject to substantial variation during the rest of the period in question, although within the foreign policy establishment, there remained disagreement over how to implement the new theoretically assertive policies, and safeguard the established national interests in practice.(104)
The consensus on vital national interests from 1993 onwards was fundamentally security-related: a pursuit of strategic interests in the "near abroad" through increased integration and significant control over this area. The rationale behind this strategy concerned Russia's aspiration to transform itself into a major power - aspirations to a recovery of superpower status have not been expressed. In order to sustain even this reduced status in world politics, the most obvious region to focus on was that of the former Soviet Union, where dependencies continue to exist in many spheres. Becoming a regional power was inevitably the only way to assert a new sphere of influence; resources for anything else (e.g. satellite colonies) simply did not exist.
As became apparent in the previous chapter, the Russian leadership became very vocal about its new emphasis on its "near abroad". Of critical significance was the axiom that the most substantial threats to Russian national security and interests emanated from the "near abroad".(105) In the Baltic context, the implicit meaning was the danger of NATO enlargement. Furthermore, intimidation in the minority conflict was reflected in the isolated veiled threats of the use of "any" measures deemed necessary for the protection of Russian minorities.(106)
The Russian Military Doctrine (MD) promulgated in November 1993 spelled out several threats to Russian national interests that would permit the use of force to protect these interests.(107) This assessment can be interpreted as an opportune means of furthering neo-imperialist policies, and the entire MD could be used to justify military intervention in a number of cases. Several of the contingencies of the MD were relevant to Baltic policy: the oppression of the rights and lawful interests of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics, attacks on military facilities (use of force to defend facilities, not only people) and the expansion of military alliances that would impinge on Russian vital security interests were named as instances where force might be used. The MD served as a model to justify the need for force if such a situation should arise owing to political circumstances, but in itself has been thus far not more than a rhetorical device. In terms of Baltic policy, it was a threatening piece of paper, even if only rhetorically or theoretically.
Some analysts go so far as to declare that regional hegemony in the entire former Soviet territory - that is to say, not only the CIS - has been declared to be Russia's explicit strategic aim.(108) This is contentious, because Russian troops were withdrawn and even implicit (official) threats to Baltic security have been rare. The use of force is against international norms, and in order for Russia to have a justified position on the minority issue (namely, that Estonia and Latvia are in breach of commonly accepted international norms), it needs to try to avoid similar accusations. The question of Russia's policy aims regarding the Baltic region was certainly not clarified until February 1997, and attempting to analyse the underlying objectives in terms of a re-establishment of military power in the region may not be feasible. What is relevant to the security dimension is that the Baltic States interpret Russia's attempts to influence them in various ways as embracing a deeper, strategy- and therefore security-based motive.
Conflicts arising in Baltic-Russian relations are often lodged in these fundamental differences of interpretation. One of the problems is the evidently divergent perception the countries have of the status of the Baltic States in the new European security structure. The Baltic States see Russian foreign policy as constituting a security threat for them.(109) What Russia perceives as its legitimate interests, are viewed by the Balts as subverting their rights as sovereign countries or attempts to pull them into the Russian orbit - against their will. The debate on something being a "vital national interest" as opposed to it being a reflection of "neo-imperialist thought" is a constant topic in post-Soviet studies of Russian foreign and security policy. From its own perspective, Russian interests in its military and economic security in the Baltic area, in the just treatment of its nationals, and in keeping free communications, are perfectly legitimate. On the other hand, Russian justifications are often clearly reminiscent of the traditional spheres of influence -thinking: because its security needs demand this strategy, these interests must be seen as legitimate.
The central security issues in Russian-Baltic relations - the withdrawal of former Soviet troops and the demarcation of state borders - were also confounded by different starting points. For Russia, the context of troop withdrawal was the loss of bases, leading to a general disruption of some elements in the defence system and a fear of possible internal disruption in the army when troops had inadequate living quarters to return to. For the Baltic States, withdrawal of foreign troops from their territory was a fundamental question of state security and sovereignty. As for the border dispute, from Russian perspective the Estonian and Latvian stance constituted a territorial claim, but the extent to which Russia could count this as a real security threat - of territorial annexation - is highly questionable. For Estonia and Latvia, the principle of adhering to or at least recognising the 1920 treaties and its borders was a question of national self-identification.
The resources available to Russia to further its interests have been limited in the period under study. This may help explain the evident disparity between threats and practice. Russian perceptions of its interests have been modified by its recognition of the limitations that it has on its freedom of action due to economic weakness. It may also constitute an important tactic in its policy arsenal, to periodically intimidate the Baltic States. Overall, Russia's Baltic policy in the security sphere has thus been more on the level of threat, not action.
An essential aim of foreign policy has been to keep other states (the US in particular) or organisations (in which Russia is not a member) from increasing their influence (political, economic or military) in the region. In the military sphere, this signifies that the establishment of a buffer zone of neutral and possibly militarily weak countries along the western borders is imperative from the Russian security perspective.(110) This way of thinking is clearly reminiscent of the traditional spheres of influence: Russia's justification was that its security needs demand this strategy and moreover, that it is therefore entitled to control this area - thus these interests must be seen as legitimate. However, the assertion that Russia would prefer to see weak states on its borders is at odds with the traditional fear of foreign intervention. Neutral neighbour states with credible defence systems of their own may be more advantageous to Russian security if it wants to deter them from falling under the influence of potentially hostile states.
Troop withdrawal was the most prominent security issue in the first half of the period 1992-96. The situation was relevant from a security perspective because of the combination of the changed security environment: Baltic independence following the collapse of the union and the remaining Russian military capabilities for aggression. At first, Russia insisted on a gradual and staged withdrawal to take place no earlier than 1997-99. From the Baltic perspective, troop withdrawal should have been the first priority because the occupation had been illegal. The problems associated with the process itself were manifold. The most pressing questions dealt with the future of the various military installations for air defence and missile defence on Baltic territory. Of these installations the most significant ones were the training centre for nuclear submarine crews at Paldiski, Estonia, which was the only one of its kind in the Soviet Union, as well as the radar station at Skrunda in Latvia. Dismantling these installations and relocating them was known to require enormous amounts of money and some time, and their relocations to the Russian interior inevitably weakened Russia's defensive effectiveness, for which reasons Russia insisted on maintaining and leasing the territory of the bases.(111)
Social problems constituted the second major problem area in terms of withdrawal. The costs of the construction of new housing for the returning troops was known to be high and the relocation itself a precarious issue, after the experiences Russia had gained from pulling out of Eastern Europe. Estonia and Lithuania were willing to help build housing for the armed forces but not to pay compensation to the Soviet government for army property. Latvians was quick to claim ownership of all property occupied by Soviet forces themselves.(112) In the end, various Western countries contributed to financing the housing construction.(113) Other social problems centred on the future and the rights of the military personnel residing in the Baltic States. Especially Latvia had been a favourite retirement spot for Russian officers, and they were certainly in the category of persona non grata in the restored Baltic States.
The actual processes of negotiations and withdrawal were complicated and protracted. Russia threatened to halt the pullout on various occasions. The reasons for the threats related either to the settlement of the minority issues or of the status of remaining military pensioners. In addition to the decree of president Yeltsin in October 1992, Defence Minister Grachev made statements on various occasions in 1993 on the suspension of withdrawal. He stated the reason for these suspensions was the absence of interstate treaties between the parties, which would regulate withdrawal timetables as well as social guarantees for military personnel and their families. On a subsequent occasion he threatened to have the troops stay until the Russian minority question was resolved.(114) In the end, Grachev's statement had as little effect on the withdrawal process in practice as Yeltsin's decree suspending the pullout in October 1992 did. Because the statements issued by ministers or the president were not enforced on the ground, it is plausible that they were mostly attempts to intimidate the Baltic side into concessions on various points. This view is supported by the way Lithuania was also included in the decree, although there were no problems with the Russian minority in this country. Therefore the question of minority rights seems to have been utilised to serve strategic ends.
Lithuania had had its withdrawal agreement since September 1992, but Russia halted further negotiations on property, social and transit questions in mid-June 1993 over the issues of occupation and compensation brought up by the Lithuanian delegation. The problems were caused in part by Lithuania's $140-billion compensation claim to Russia for damages caused during an illegal occupation period.(115) From Russia's point of view Lithuania was obliged to recognise all the positive development it had experienced during the Soviet era. However, the last Russian troops left by the end of August 1993 after a protracted period of confusion and last-minute threats that they were not going to leave.
Russian-Estonian negotiations ultimately reached a compromise between the two sides' demands in November 1993, when the completion date of troop withdrawal was set on August 31, 1994. The number of troops declined from around 10 000 to 3 000 during 1993. Problems remained concerning housing, although the pullout had mostly been completed, because the majority of the families of military personnel still remained in Estonia.(116)
In Latvia, there were around 15 000 troops left at the end of 1993, down from 27 000 at the beginning. Russia also offered to complete its withdrawal by the end of August 1994 with the condition that it should be allowed to keep the radar station at Skrunda for 6 years. Eventually, a compromise solution was reached whereby Latvia decided to rent it to Russia until August 1998 with an additional 18 months time to dismantle the installation, thereby annulling one of the major irritants in the relations between the two countries. However, the conflict in the military sphere was protracted. Latvia accused Russia of continuing to send unauthorised troops to its military installations in Latvia. Border guards had prevented entry on several occasions of soldiers being sent in by railway and air, but the Latvian Ministry of Defence claimed Russia was sending them in secretly on warships. It also issued statements concerning the numerous violations of Latvian airspace and the illegal entry of warships into Latvian harbours.(117)
Despite the problems surrounding the issue, troop withdrawal was carried out on schedule. The Russians were by no means eager to leave the Baltics, but besides the obvious facts of commitments and international pressure, there were financial and other constraints that made the continuation of the military presence very difficult. Notably, no new recruits were allowed to be sent to the Baltic area to the replace the servicemen whose terms of duty had expired.(118) In addition, the armed forces were obliged to pay for the services they received (e.g energy and food supplies) in first Western and then domestic (Baltic) currencies. The completion of troop withdrawal changed the security scene and let other issues take prominence.
Borders and transit
The question of border demarcation has been an irritant in Russian-Baltic relations, and although it may not constitute a security problem as such, it is best placed in the security context. Already at the beginning of 1992, the Latvian Supreme Council had annulled the annexation of part of its territory in 1944 to the Pskov province of the RSFSR.(119) The Estonian government had also issued its first official declaration on the border issue in the summer of 1992, calling on Russia to pull back its border guards to the old frontier marked by the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty. The implication of the territorial claims (an area of approximately 2000 square kilometres for Estonia and 1600 for Latvia) was clear. Russia's response did not come until November, when it unilaterally declared the existing administrative border to be the state border.(120) The question was subsequently presented at the negotiations, but no compromise could be reached as the two sides' perspectives were completely at odds with each other. The settlement of the issue would have demanded an implicit or even explicit acknowledgement on the part of the Russians that the Baltic States had indeed been annexed and occupied, and this was something that the Russian leadership was not prepared to do.
The security problems caused by the non-signing of border agreements between Russia and Estonia and Latvia were not threatening as such to Russia. The territorial claims inherent in the refusal to deal with anything else than the 1920 treaty as a base cannot seriously be espoused and built into a security risk. On the other hand, the territorial claims, other security issues and problems in Russian-Baltic relations definitely have had resonance in the Duma and the public at large. In that sense, they must be taken into consideration as threats, even if only as a domestic stratagem. The enemy image of the Baltic States is striking. Estonia was voted by the Duma as being the country most hostile to Russia in 1994. In August 1996, Latvia claimed the title of "enemy number 1" after parliamentary declarations supporting the breakaway republic of Chechnya and condemning the occupation of 1940, which leads back to the problem of the territorial claim. More out of the pressures set by prospective EU-membership, Estonia moved to disown its prior principle on the issue in autumn 1996. .(121) Latvia soon followed suit and attested its willingness to consider dropping its demand.(122) The option chosen by Russia to respond to these overtures reflects its Baltic policy in general. It can attempt to slow down Baltic EU accession by not signing a border agreement, and it can use the issue to widen the divisions among the Baltic States themselves, Lithuania having no unresolved border questions at all with Russia.
Instead of border problems, Lithuania was faced with the problem of Russian military transit to its enclave Kaliningrad. In the end, Russia used economic pressure on Lithuania to resolve the transit question. Lithuania had followed the most conciliatory path towards Russia throughout the period in question. However, Russia refused to ratify the trade agreement or to implement the MFN-accords until Lithuania relented on the transit issue. Lithuania extended the earlier transit regulations to cover the year 1995, although it had passed legislation changing and tightening the rules that were to have come into force at the beginning of 1995. These were to apply for all foreign countries equally. They stipulated the need for individual permits for the transport of personnel and goods, as well as prohibiting the simultaneous transport of troops and equipment or weapons and ammunition.(123) Ultimately, in exchange for an immediate implementation of agreements concerning economic relations, Lithuania left the earlier regulations in force for one year, with the implication that it would be repeated subsequently, as has indeed been the case.
"NATO expansion to countries in immediate proximity to our borders will elicit a negative reaction from public opinion and promote undesirable sentiments in civilian and military circles and could ultimately lead to military and political de-stability".(124)
The aspect of NATO I am discussing in this chapter is the way NATO and the idea of Baltic accession has been viewed from the Russian security perspective. In the international context chapter I shall come back to the subject of NATO in the way in which other countries and international institutions have played a role in Russian-Baltic relations. The NATO issue is the most prominent example of how Russia's Baltic policy cannot be dealt with in isolation from its policy towards the West and European security.(125)
From the security perspective, the possibility of NATO expansion right up to the borders of Russia is undoubtedly the most serious issue that Russian foreign policy has had to confront and thus had a direct bearing on its Baltic policy. It was not until 1993 that Russian policy makers began to devote serious attention to the matter (Hungary declared its desire to join in 1989).(126) Russia has made it clear that Baltic membership in NATO would be perceived as a striking provocation. It considers itself threatened by isolation and alienation by enlargement, and views the prospect of having NATO forces and even nuclear weapons in the Baltic States as utterly unacceptable. In order to put pressure on the West, Russia has emphasised the dangers of offering membership to the Baltics because of the reaction that would cause in conservative and patriotic circles. Consequently, Russia has made consistent efforts to influence the geographic range of NATO expansion. For most of the period in question, Russian leaders believed that their viewpoint would have considerable weight in the deliberations of NATO members. The whole issue of enlargement has been anathema to Russians and all talk of Russia receiving compensation for agreeing to the enlargement, an idea toyed with by Kozyrev, was categorically denied by the president in March 1995.(127)
Various unofficial documents have been leaked to the press in which the implication has been that Russia would consider it necessary and justified to send in its troops to the Baltic States the moment they were accepted as NATO members. Some scenarios even predicted this leading to large-scale nuclear war between the alliance and Russia.(128) Although the Foreign Ministry has denied the existence of such plans, the leaks themselves were probably intended to pressure the Baltics. There were occasions when the deputy foreign minister, Sergei Krylov, made threats about Russia resorting to military, not only political and economic, measures, to prevent Baltic accession to the alliance.(129) Pressure tactics were used also when an unofficial study of possible Russian countermeasures to expansion was leaked to the press, which stated that Russia considers its moral and legal right to invade the Baltic States if they were given NATO membership.(130) Thus Russia was able to exert pressure on the Baltic States without officially being quite so controversial.
Yeltsin's secret letter to president Clinton on the eve of the Baltic presidents' visit to the US in July 1996 represented the fierce objections of Russia to Baltic membership in NATO. Its immediate objectives were to prevent a public statement of American support for Baltic membership and to induce the American president to take up the issue of discrimination against Russians in the Baltics. The wording of the text was harsh: Russia protested the "glaring and widespread human rights violations" in the Baltic States. Yeltsin brought up the issue of Baltic EU membership, implying possibly that instead of NATO membership, the Baltics should strive to become EU members, which Russia would condone. He made it clear that Russia's position on Baltic NATO-membership remained adamantly opposed. "There can be no question of even the hypothetical possibility of extending NATO's sphere of operation to the Baltic countries. Such a prospect is categorically unacceptable to Russia, and we would regard steps in that direction as posing a direct challenge to our national security interests and destroying the fundamental structures of European stability." (131) Consequently, when Clinton did not elaborate on Baltic membership in public, which Russia took as a diplomatic victory.
In response to the security threat posed by NATO expansion and the manifest Baltic unwillingness to conform to typical small state conduct towards a powerful neighbour, Russia initially attempted to solve its concerns by dealing directly and exclusively with NATO.(132) This strategy proving to yield too little, Russia began to develop a long-term strategy. This consisted of a dual approach of seeking to deal with the alliance over the heads of the Baltic States on overarching security matters and developing bilateral relations with these countries at the same time in order to be able to settle disputes. Russia developed the idea of providing the Baltic States with so-called cross guarantees, security guarantees from both NATO and Russia to take away the need for membership, but this idea was never fully developed because it found no resonance outside Russia.(133) The Baltic States explicitly turned down an official offer of security guarantees from Russia while simultaneously negotiating a security charter with the US in late 1997.
From the Russian security perspective, Baltic membership in the EU is not considered a danger. This is
despite the fact that the EU is an organisation in which Russia is not a member, and which one day may
have a substantial military component and thus fulfil the criteria of organisations hostile or inimical to Russian
special interests.(134) Even before the relationship of the EU with its military organisation, the Western
European Union, is conclusively settled, joining the EU would mean an "escape to Europe" for the Baltic
States; a definite retreat from the Russian sphere of influence in political and economic terms, and
participation in the common foreign and security policy of the Union. Setting obstacles to EU membership
in the form of unsigned border treaties and raised voices about the discrimination of minorities was one way
in which Russia sought to influence security-related events in the Baltic States, but its basic attitude towards
EU enlargement has been positive. In economic terms, EU membership for the Baltics would present Russia
with the benefits of being neighbours to a dynamic economic area. Moreover, the EU is not considered a
threat in Russia because of the inherent differences between this organisation and NATO: the EU is
Russia's main trade partner and its major donor of aid.(135)
To recapitulate, Russian security perceptions have been transformed from a global to a regional level. Its thinking on security matters has developed through a brief phase of prioritising "internationalisation" and co-operation with the West, into a more assertive policy of defining and pursuing its vital geo-political interests. Russia sees itself as having interests in the post-Soviet space that must not be ignored or intercepted by the international community. The loss of Baltic bases and ports constituted an immediate security problem in Russian-Baltic relations. Nevertheless, the tradition of solving security problems through territorial expansion has not surfaced in Russian official policy towards the Baltic States. The "imperial idea" seems to have dissolved, but has it?
The Baltic region is still considered a vitally important area for Russian security. Economic considerations have possibly become vastly more significant in Russian-Baltic relations, and the possession of territory or ports may no longer be essential. But on the contrary, preventing the influx of hostile forces still is.
In strategic terms, Russia does not perceive the Baltics as belonging to Europe, but to the post-Soviet space, and thus in its "legitimate" orbit and sphere of influence, unable to "escape to Europe" in the sense that they are not granted the right to make their own security arrangements. The prevalent Russian view is that the Baltic States do not need to join any military blcok, because there is not threat to their security. The Baltic States and Russia have, of course, totally different views on what consitutes a security threat for the Baltics. In its security thinking, Russia determines a neutral status for the Baltic States as the only acceptable model. Russia has accepted Baltic States as independent states, which is reflected in the fact that it concluded treaties and conducted negotiations with its new neighbours, but on the other hand, Russia prefers still to develop relations and deal with the West over the heads of Baltic States. Forging its attitude towards small states as equal partners has been difficult. Russians have not considered these small states as constituting a direct threat as such, but as part of an organisation that is set up against Russia, the territories of the Baltic States might be used to launch an attack against Russia - as has happened in the past. Whether Russia is determined to avoid such a development at all costs, has not been tested. There are other aspects of Russian-Baltic relations that constrain Russia from resorting to violent measures against the Baltic States to protect its security interests. These and other elements of Russian policy are the subject of the following chapters.
99. Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy (London 1994), p.176.
100. Robert D.Blackwill: Russia and Its Periphery, in the volume Engaging Russia (New York 1995), p.15.
101. Kaliningrad, as a Russian exclave, does serve to reduce the Baltic losses. See Anatoly Trynkov: The Region's Security: An Expert View from Moscow, in the volume Kaliningrad: The European Amber Region (Aldershot 1998), p. 117.
102. Richard Latter: Security and Stability in the Baltic Region (London 1994), p.13.
103. This is the Russian term for the Second World War.
104. Paul Goble: Russia and Its Neighbours. Foreign Policy, No 90, 1993, p. 84.
105. Leon Aaron: The Emergent Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy, in the volume The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C 1994), p.23. Blackwill, Braithwaite and Tanaka, p.8.
106. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 April 1995, p.15, "Kozyrev Is Determined" (Dimitry Gornostayev). (CDPSP, Vol XLVII, No 16.)
107. Lothar Ruhl: The historical background of Russian security concepts and requirements, in the volume Russia and Europe (1997), p. 22.
108. Aivars Stranga: Baltic-Russian Relations: 1995 - beginning 1997, in the volume Small States in a Turbulent Environment: The Baltic Perspective (Riga 1997), p. 187. A researcher of Latvian nationality, which helps to explain his views to some extent.
109. Evaldas Nekrasas: Lithuania's Security Concerns and Responses, in the volume The Baltic States: Search for Security. (Riga 1996), p.61.
110. Alexander Pikayev: Russia and the Baltic States: Challenges and Opportunities, international he volume The Baltic States in World Politics (Surrey 1998), p. 154; NATO and EU enlargement: the case of the Baltic States (conference proceedings) (Riga 1996), p.30.
111. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 May 1992, p. 3 "What Is Troop Withdrawal? Everyone Has His Own Understanding of It" (Yelena Visens). (CDPSP Vol XLIV, No 19.)
112. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 June 1992, pp 1, 3 "Russia Wants to Ratify Treaty with Latvia. But Can't Afford To" (Andrei Sorokin). (CDPSP, Vol XLIV, No 23.)
113. In addition, a voucher program was set up by the U.S whereby military personnel received a set sum of money to be used in Russia for buying or building a house. Interview with Kirsti Narinen, former Counsellor at the Embassy of Finland (Tallinn). (26 October 1998, notes are held by the author.)
114. RFE/RL, Vol 2, No 43, 29 October 1993, p.17 "News Briefs: 18 - 22 October 1993".
115. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 August 1993, pp 1,3 "Russian Troop Withdrawal Suspended from Lithuania" (Tamara Nikolayeva). (CDPSP, Vol XLV, No 23.)
116. Estonian Radio, 7 January 1993. (Summary of World Broadcasts Soviet Union (SWB)/1583, 11 January 1993, p. A2/2.)
117. Latvian Radio, 7 and 8 January 1993. (SWB SU/1582 and 1583, 9 and 11 January 1993, p. A2/2.)
118. RFE/RL, Vol 1, No 19, 17 July 1992, p.59 "Military and Security Notes" (Stephen Foye).
119. 119 RSFSR = Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Izvestia, 20 March 1992, p.3 "Russia Rejects Latvia's Territorial Claims" (Gennady Charodeyev). (CDPSP, Vol XLIV, No 12.)
120. RFE/RL, Vol 1, No 45, 13 November 1992, p.69 "Weekly Review, 28 Oct - 3 Nov 92" (Hal Kosiba and Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka).
121. CDPSP No 45. Sevodnya, 6 November 1996, p.1.
122. Ibid., p.2.
123. Transition, No 4, 29 March 1995, p.45 "Compromise at the Crossroads" (Saulius Girnius).
124. Valery Zhdannikov, "Russia Concerned About Possibility of NATO Expansion", Sevodnya, 6 January 1994, p.1. CDPSP, Vol XLVI, No 1.
125. Vladislav Vershinin: The Changing Security Environment in the Baltics and Russian National Interests (London 1996), p.1.
126. Aivars Stranga: Russia and the Security of the Baltic States 1991 - 1996, in the volume The Baltic States: Search for Security (Riga 1996), p.151.
127. Ibid.,p. 152. Possible "compensation": no nuclear weapons spread, a non-aggression pact between NATO and Russia, and strict promises that Baltic States and Ukraine would never be admitted.
128. Sevodnya, 28 September 1995, p.1 "NATO Expansion - An Unsuccessful Compromise" (Pavel Felgengauer). (CDPSP, Vol XLVII, no 39.)
129. The Baltic Independent, Vol 6, No 280, 8 - 14 September 1995, p.2 "Russia Threatens Balts over NATO Expanstion".
130. The Baltic Independent, Vol 6, No 288, 3 - 9 November 1995, p.2 "Study Done to Government Orders, Says Paper".
131. Yeltsin's letter to Clinton on eve of Baltic presidents' visit to the US. Izvestia, 6 July 1996, p. 2 "Secret Yeltsin-Clinton Correspondence" (Konstantin Eggert and Maksim Yusin). (CDPSP, Vol. XLVIII, No. 27.)
132. Stranga (1997), p.193.
133. The Baltic Independent, Vol 6, No 280, 8 - 14 September 1995, p.2 "Russia Threatens Balts over NATO Expanstion".
134. Paul Goble, p. 82.
135. 135 Interview with Reino Paasilinna, Member of the European Parliament. (12 January 1999, notes are held by the author.)