THE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS THE INDIAN AND THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS

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1 INTRODUCTION: THE US COMMITMENT TO OPPOSING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND ITS RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND INDIA

The United States is officially strictly devoted to opposing the spread of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons can cause instability in international relations, and the more there are of nuclear weapons in a greater number of countries, the greater the chances of nuclear weapons ending up in wrong hands, to people who might use or threaten to use them against the US or its allies. The US promotes the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and its punitive actions against countries like Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and India show how great an impact the policy of opposing horizontal\(^1\) nuclear proliferation can have on the relations of the US with other countries.

India and Pakistan became overt nuclear states by conducting nuclear tests in May 1998. Taking into account the importance the US has given for halting the spread of nuclear weapons, it seems a little surprising that the US has not succeeded in it with respect to Pakistan and India. As the US non-proliferation efforts have not been successful in South Asia, one can wonder whether they will be successful elsewhere, either.

Furthermore, the US has indirectly even contributed to Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Although the US has stated its opposition to the Pakistani nuclear ambitions, it has had mutual defense agreements with Pakistan and given it considerable economic and military support. That help has strengthened the position of the military in the country and given resources that Pakistan has in part been able to use for its nuclear program. Without the assistance from the US, Pakistan might not have been able to proceed with its nuclear program as fast as it has. With respect to nuclear proliferation in Pakistan, the US seems to have acted against the principles of its foreign policies.

My study is about the policies of the US towards the nuclear weapons programs of Pakistan and India. I consider the nuclear programs of both India and Pakistan as well as US policies towards both of them because the two nuclear programs have been dependent on each other and can best be understood in connection to each other. The actions of the US towards the two countries have affected the power relations between them, which has in turn had impact on their motivations to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the US attitude towards one of the programs has maybe also given the other country signs of what to expect itself. Although the US has in principle been against all horizontal nuclear proliferation, it has treated different threshold states in different ways. In South Asia, the US attitudes towards Pakistan may have been more complex than the ones towards India because Pakistan has been a US ally, unlike India, towards which the US has been able to be more critical. However, because the Indian program has been largely indigenous and was started early, the US has had less room for action in India’s than in Pakistan’s case.

\(^1\) With horizontal proliferation, I mean the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries. Vertical proliferation, on the other hand, is the acquisition of more or better nuclear weapons by countries that already have nuclear weapons.
India and Pakistan are not just neighbors who both have nuclear weapons. They have also been more or less in conflict with each other throughout their whole independence, especially because of the Kashmir region, which lies between them and which each states considers to belong to it. The conflict dates back to the independence and the separation of the two countries in 1947. It was decided that Pakistan would be created to become a state for the Muslims in India. The princes governing the areas, of which were to become the predominantly Hindu but officially secular India and the Muslim Pakistan, were allowed to choose to which state they wanted their lands to belong. In Kashmir, the prince chose India although most of the population was Muslim. This gave reason for the conflict that is still going on because Pakistan considers that Kashmir should really belong to it. The conflict has led to three outright wars, numerous smaller clashes, the death of over a million persons, and over ten million refugees. Kashmir is also a symbol for an ideological conflict between India and Pakistan. India has seen it necessary to keep Kashmir as a part of itself in the fear that otherwise dissension and separationism could spread all over India. As the raison d’être for Pakistan is religious, it would be extremely difficult for Pakistan to accept that the Kashmir Muslims would remain on the wrong side of the border. Pakistan has been willing to negotiate a solution with US help, but India has been against a third-party intervention. The conflict has been on agenda of the United Nations (UN) since the organization was born.

The situation in South Asia is made even more difficult by the relations of the neighboring China to the two countries. China has had border disputes with India, while it has long supported Pakistan, thus acting according to the principle that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. Because India claims that China is in principle still a threat for it, it has not been willing to participate in bilateral nuclear disarmament with Pakistan.

Early on, both the Pakistani and the Indian nuclear programs were only aimed at the civilian uses of atomic energy. The relevant decision-makers in the both countries became gradually interested in and devoted to the pursuit of nuclear weapons. The decisions to start nuclear weapons programs matured gradually during the 1960’s and the early 1970’s.2

India was active in the research of nuclear physics from very early on. With its wide power plant program, India has tried to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy has been considered important for industrialization and therefore for the elimination of poverty from the country. In principle, India has opposed nuclear weapons and spoken for universal nuclear disarmament. Because of its huge population, it has expected to be acknowledged as a major international player, equal to China. However, as this did not happened as long as India did not have nuclear weapons, India thinks that it can have nuclear weapons just as legitimately as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, especially as nuclear weapons seem to be the only way to reach such a status.3 On the other hand, with its nuclear weapons, India has tried to improve its security against China and Pakistan.

In Pakistan, the military and the bureaucracy instead of the political parties have held power throughout the country’s independence, if not overtly then in practice at least behind a façade of a democratic government. The military has also controlled the country’s nuclear program. The Indian threat has been the primary motivator of the Pakistani security policies, which have sought favorable alliances with major states to counter India. Pakistan opposes Indian hegemony in the region, and considers that it has the role of an obstacle to such ambitions.4

The US has for decades promoted international cooperation in halting the spread of nuclear weapons. The most important international agreement to regulate nuclear weapons is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) from year 1968, complemented with the safeguards systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was originally set up in 1957. The possibility of developing countries acquiring nuclear weapons has been considered as a threat in the US especially after the first energy crises in 1973, which highlighted the conflict of interests between the developed and the developing countries5.

With my study, I hope to increase understanding about the region and to give light to the reasons that have led to the nuclear weapons race in South Asia and made of the region “the most dangerous place in the world”6. On the other hand, I aim to shed light into the strategies, goals, and choices of the US. I find the South Asian nuclear weapons programs a very interesting and also timely subject for research. This year, the increased tensions between India and Pakistan have again reminded the public of the oldest on-going international conflict on the UN agenda. India and Pakistan, having already been more or less in conflict with each other for the last fifty years, have proclaimed that they are nuclear states and South Asia is considered the most likely region in the world for a nuclear war to take place. The war on terrorism has also focused the attention of the whole world on the problems of South Asia and of Pakistan in particular. Nuclear proliferation is happening also elsewhere in the world. The unsuccessfulness of the US non-proliferation policies in South Asia raises questions on whether they can be successful elsewhere, either. Therefore, it is important to find out why they have not been successful. New ways to halt non-proliferation have also emerged, as implied by the current US plans to start a war against Iraq mainly because of the Iraqi efforts to get weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is possible that the unsuccessfulness of the somewhat softer policies in South Asia has contributed to a consideration of harder policies.

I will proceed by first discussing in Chapter 2 the questions considered in this study and the scope of this study in more detail. Thereafter, in Chapter 3, I take a look at the theoretical models and concepts relevant for my study. Based on these, I formulate my starting hypotheses in Chapter 4. That is followed by the empirical examination of the two nuclear programs and the US actions towards them, Chapter 5, which forms the core of this study. In Chapter 6, I will try to answer the questions posed in Chapter 2 and summarize about the actions of the US. I also take a look at the future prospects for the two nuclear programs.

2 RESEARCH PROBLEM

2.1 Research questions

I am interested in how the US has acted with regard to the nuclear weapons programs of India and Pakistan. I approach this research subject through the following research questions:

1) I consider the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear weapons programs and the reasons behind them. I examine how the nuclear weapons have affected the mutual relations of the two countries.

2) I examine US policies towards the two nuclear programs and consider whether or not they have been successful and why.

3) I am interested in why the US has acted the way it has – or refrained from acting. Thus, I ask what kind of goals and interests behind the goals the US has in South Asia. Furthermore, I consider how important the goal of opposing nuclear proliferation has been in relations to other US goals.

The first two questions are for a large part about finding out facts, examining what has happened. The third question is more about interpreting these facts.

2.2 The scope of the study

I consider the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear programs as well as US actions towards them from the year 1945 onwards, as the Indian nuclear program was started that year. I emphasize the developments from the mid-1960’s onwards because before that neither the Indian nor the Pakistani nuclear program was targeted at the development of nuclear weapons. It was also that time when the spread of nuclear weapons became more of a concern for the US. For practical reasons, the end-point of the time-span of the study is the end of the year 2001.

I discuss military, political, and economic actions of the US at the state level. This means I focus on the actions that can be considered as a part of the official policies of the US. For example corporations’ and citizens’ organizations’ actions are left outside of my study. I study how the US has “officially” acted in the region, and what the “official” US wants to achieve there. I do not concentrate much on the processes internal to the US that lead to its foreign policy decisions.

To be able to understand the US actions towards India and Pakistan, it is necessary to gain knowledge about South Asia and power relations there in general. The national security of each state and also the nuclear weapons programs can probably be explained by the interaction between the US, China, Pakistan, India, and Russia, which forms a greater regional balance-of-power system.
2.3 Methods and materials

In practice, the study is done by the means of a critical literature analysis. My research strategy is a non-experimental case study and my primary method is the analysis of existing literature. A qualitative research method is an arguable choice in the case of ideographic research: in explaining unique, historical situations. On the other hand, the subject of my study can also be seen not as a unique situation but as an example of a more general phenomenon. In that case, the US policies towards the South Asian nuclear weapons programs can be considered as examples of US non-proliferation policies in general and be compared with other proliferation cases. As the scope of a master’s thesis is rather limited, I have not chosen this kind of a research strategy.

As research material, I use books, articles, and statements about geopolitical and Realist theories, US non-proliferation policies, and the South Asian nuclear weapons programs. For the basis of my theoretical framework, I have chosen texts from prominent authors from the schools of thought in question. I base my discussion of the two nuclear weapons programs until about 1990 especially on the book *Nuclear Ambitions* by L. Spector, the former Director of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. Spector has examined nuclear proliferation in the world country-by-country. He moved to the US Department of Energy in 1997 and after that, R. Jones and M. Donough have undertaken to continue his work. Their book *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation* is another central source in my study. Other important sources for the examination of the nuclear programs include articles *India’s Pathway to Pokhran II* and *Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program* by Š. Ganguly and S. Ahmed, respectively, (published in International Security in the spring of 1999), where the developments in the nuclear weapons programs and the reasons for them are discussed. I use statements and reports of the US Administration, especially of the Department of State, as a basis for the official US stances. With respect to the general goals of the US, I use the US Department of State Strategic Plan but rely also quite much on Z. Brzezinski, a long-time influential within the US governmental circles.

3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework of the study stems from the (Neo-) Realist and the geopolitical theories of international relations (IR). These two theoretical traditions do not have to belong together, but geopolitical theories usually also have a Realist perspective on international relations. I chose this kind of a theoretical framework because I am interested in questions of balance-of-power and of the

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8 I use the term Realism, Realist, Neo-Realism, and Neo-Realist to indicate schools of thought, not to mean that someone understands the reality. I use IR to indicate the academic subject of international relations to distinguish it from international relations in general.
9 One reason for this is that same authors, for example Spykman (see below), have shaped both schools of thought. Wilkinson 1985, p. 91.
distribution of power between states as geographic entities. In the following, I will first discuss the Realist and the Neorealist theories and thereafter the geopolitical and the new geopolitical approaches to international relations. Thereafter, I will continue by considering theoretical views on nuclear weapons in particular.

### 3.1 Realism and Neo-Realism

The Realist school of IR considers the relations between states as anarchic by nature. In the absence of an international sovereign, the selfish promotion of one’s own interest leads to a situation where no state can trust another and interprets other states’ actions as hostile and threatening. Therefore, war is natural. The relations between India, Pakistan, and China, characterized by distrust and arms race, can be seen as this kind of a classical security dilemma.

Although international organizations try to manage international relations and to have influence over states, anarchy often still seems to reign in international relations. International organizations are dependent on states’ and especially the major powers’ support and that support is dependent on states’ and the major powers’ own interests. The conflict between India and Pakistan has been going on since the independence of the two countries but the UN (or any other instance) has not been able to help solve the conflict. The conflict is not interesting enough for other states to put effort in trying to solve it. The US, the only superpower, occasionally tries to bring order to the international system but does it rather selectively.

According to Realism, power is both a means and a goal. Power and struggle for power are considered central in political decision-making and politics is a struggle for control over resources and prestige. In Realism, the primary source of power is usually military or political. Neo-Realism is different from Realism in that that states’ goal is not power as such but the security that power can give. For Neo-Realists, states’ interests are also political and economic in addition to the military ones that the Realist theories concentrate on. According to the Neo-Realists, the primary source of power can be economic strength, military, culture, or religion.

In the case of the South Asian nuclear programs, the security of the nation instead of power seems to have been the primary goal, especially at the level of rhetoric. Originally India launched its nuclear weapons program to counter the Chinese threat, whereas Pakistan felt insecure because of the growing nuclear capabilities and of the conventional military superiority of India. However, power as such has also been a goal of the Indian program, as ambitions to strengthen country’s international status have played a role in its program, too. To some extent, the Pakistani program has also aimed at making Pakistan the leading Islamic state.

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11 Whether the US seems to rely on military or economic and political sources of power is discussed below in Chapter 3.2.
According to Realism, states are likely to adopt balance-of-power politics, i.e. try to prevent strong states from expanding and becoming too strong. The threatening states are not necessarily only nearby states but also more distant ones that could become new neighbors if allowed to expand. Following Burchill who has defined balance-of-power as “the absence of a preponderant military power in the international system”, I use a definition according to which a balance-of-power is the absence of a preponderant military power in the international or in a regional system. In my view, a balance-of-power can be also a regional, not just a global phenomenon, where some kind of a balanced situation exists between the powers of two or more states. Although balance-of-power as a concept seems to refer to a stable situation and this view is used to justify the seeking of a balance-of-power, it can also be an unstable situation. States can namely not actually seek a situation of balance-of-power but a position for themselves that is superior to that of others. A balance-of-power might therefore not be a stable situation because all states try to change it and prevail over others.

With its nuclear weapon, Pakistan has achieved some kind of a balance-of-power with India as the nuclear weapon has made Pakistan far more an equal partner with India than it would otherwise be. Alone and in terms of conventional military might, Pakistan would clearly be in a secondary position in relation to India. However, with its nuclear weapon and with the US assistance that has been aimed at ensuring that Pakistan remains its ally and does not turn to anti-Westernism and Islamic fundamentalism, a certain balance-of-power system between the two states has been formed. The interventions of an outside actor have prevented a hegemony from being born and have instead produced a somewhat artificial balance-of-power, or a situation of “arrested unipolarity”. Without the US support and the nuclear weapon, Pakistan could not have been challenging the status quo in Kashmir for decades but India would have prevailed long ago. The consequences of the Indian willingness to prevail on the region and the Pakistani efforts to prevent this can be seen in the regional power relations and in regional conflicts, especially in the Kashmir conflict. The great amount of resources that the two states have put on developing nuclear weapons has also contributed to the ceased economic development of the region.

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13 Burchill 1996, p. 40. The term balance-of-power was originally used in the context of the multilateral European system, where several states of approximately equal strength formed different alliances to counter other alliances or states that were growing stronger than others so that they posed a threat to the others. F. von Gentz formulated the common use of the concept in 1806 as “that constitution which exists among neighbouring states more or less connected with each other, by virtue of which none of them can violate the independence or the essential rights of another without effective resistance from some quarter and consequent danger to itself”. Gentz 2002, p. 307. The concept has been given various meanings, which has caused confusion about what is actually meant with it. E. Haas has listed eight different meanings for balance-of-power: “1) any distribution of power, 2) equilibrium or balancing process, 3) hegemony or the search for hegemony, 4) stability and peace in a concert of power, 5) instability and war, 6) power politics in general, 7) a universal law of history, and 8) a system and guide to policymakers”. Quoted in Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996, p. 37.
Neo-Realism considers system-level (i.e. international system) and unit-level (i.e. individual states) factors separately though sees them as interconnected. The main difference between Realism and Neo-Realism is that in Neo-Realism, the structure of the international system is considered to have great impact on the possibilities states have; the type of the system restricts the array of potential outcomes in international politics. The basic types of system are unipolar (e.g., Classical Rome), bipolar (the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War), and multipolar (Europe from the 17th to the early 20th century).

Although the US is currently the only superpower with a global reach, the system is not really unipolar, but as S. Huntington has put it, a hybrid type of uni-multipolarism, where several other major powers balance the sole superpower. A unipolar superpower could impose its will internationally on its own, and no potential alliance of other states could effectively oppose it. Currently, if several other great powers allied with each other (although this does not seem likely at the moment), they could together oppose the US.

Huntington also considers uni-multipolarism an unstable situation, unlike unipolarism, bipolarism, and multipolarism, where the major powers can be assumed to try to maintain the system. He claims that currently, the other major regional powers (France and Germany, Russia, China, Japan, India, Iran, Brazil, South Africa, and Nigeria) would prefer a multipolar order, because then they would be able to more freely promote their own interests. Huntington claims that other states are provoked into building coalitions against the US by its hegemonic actions, which include, e.g., trying to ensure that other states do not acquire weapons that could be a threat for the US; promoting international sales of American armaments and preventing other states from doing similarly; and punishing states that do not adhere to the American will by sanctions or ultimately by labeling them “rogue states”, thereby pushing them outside of international cooperation. This is implied for example by the formation of the European Union and by trilateral meetings between France, Germany, and Russia. Also as a counterpart to the US, alliances between India, China, and Russia have been suggested as well as ones that include Iran, too. According to Huntington, also the US is unsatisfied with the current situation because other states do not accept its hegemony. Huntington claims that other states increasingly concentrate on promoting their own interests, which often are inconsistent with those of the US. The current system is thus unstable and likely to give way to a new balance-of-power in a multipolar system.

The US is trying to stop its position from weakening, but according to Waltz, the task of sustaining unipolar world hegemony is too great for its economic, military, demographic, and political resources. Because the US considers itself as more powerful than it actually is, its hegemonic actions become unsustainable and actually weaken it. The US capability to impose its will is decreasing: for example, its sanctions do not work as planned when other states do not support them, as is often the case. Hegemonic actions are tolerable as long as the hegemon provides other states with public goods, for example security and stable and efficient

16 Waltz 1990.
17 Huntington 1999.
international institutions. As the US ceases to do this, the support for it diminishes.\textsuperscript{19} Although I concentrate on the actions of the US, the actions of other states in whether or not they are supportive of the US policies are also of great importance for the success of the US policies.

In practice, the US does not often seem very willing to impose its will in a military sense. It does this to protect its the most vital, direct interests, like ensuring the access to the Middle Eastern oil or combating international terrorism that directly threatens the US. On the other hand, exactly these cases have at least so far eventually not led to the strengthening of the position of the US but have instead in fact contributed to an increasing opposition to the hegemonic actions of the US at least in the Muslim world. The Kashmir and South Asian proliferation cases, on the other hand, do not directly touch the most vital US interests and therefore, the US has not been willing to act very decisively.

In the current system, the regionally preeminent powers, including India in South Asia, often face rivaling secondary regional powers like Pakistan. According to Huntington, alliances or cooperation between a secondary regional power and the US are likely because both benefit from opposing the major regional power. Huntington asserts that the US should not waste its resources in trying to maintain order internationally but it should let the regional powers to take care of their prospective regions. However, he considers interventions as justifiable in cases where violence is likely, including in South Asia.\textsuperscript{20}

Realism and Neo-Realism were among the leading paradigms in the field of IR for the most of the last century. The collapse of the Soviet system and the end of the Cold War, however, seemed to bring about a profound change in the international system. Only one superpower was left, and its commitment to liberal democratic values gave hope of a New World Order of more peaceful international relations\textsuperscript{21}.

Realism and Neo-Realism, however, survived the liberal momentum. The unipolar US momentum was soon passed as the numerous conflicts of the 1990’s showed that the era of wars is not over\textsuperscript{22}. In fact, the world might even have become less stable as the former bipolarity might have suppressed conflicts. Realists argue that Realism has explanatory power, as it would only become obsolescent if the international system changed so that it would no longer be a self-help system where no one can ultimately be trusted.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{19} Waltz 2000, pp. 26-35; Huntington 1999.
\textsuperscript{20} Huntington 1999. Huntington considers South Asia prone to violence because the major and the secondary regional power belong to different (i.e. Islamic and Hindu) civilizations. For Huntington’s thesis that differences between civilizations are becoming the major source of conflict after ideological conflicts, see Huntington 1993.
\textsuperscript{21} Already during the 1980’s, liberal democracies’ tendency not to fight each other, the so-called democratic peace, received attention both in academic circles and in actual politics. At the end of the Cold War, it seemed for a while that the world could indeed become less war-prone through the spread of democracy. For a discussion of the democratic peace theory, see Brown et al. 1996.
\textsuperscript{22} The new wars are at least partially of another kind, the principal actors often being non-state level ethnic groups and guerilla forces. The theory of the democratic peace cannot bring much light into this situation because it only applies to states.
\textsuperscript{23} For example, K. Waltz argues that the end of the Cold War notwithstanding, the international system founded in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 has not changed, and Structural Realism still has explanatory power. A. Rusi argues that because no world government or the like emerged from the
The Realist school of thought has contributed much to the theories on nuclear weapons, too. I will discuss these theories below in Chapter 3.3.

3.2 Geopolitics and new geopolitics

In Realism, geographic factors are only one dimension of a state’s power. In geopolitics, on the other hand, the focus is in states that seek power in geographically defined areas, which are somehow natural. Geopolitical theory can be defined as the study of spatial political divisions and its causes and consequences; geopolitics focuses on the impact of geographical factors on national power and international actions. Because of their permanent nature, geographical factors have even been considered to have the most decisive impact on states’ foreign policies. Geopolitics agrees with Realism that war and conflict are normal features of international relations because states seek power and domination over each other.\(^{24}\)

The most influential geopolitical theories have been the ones about the continental and the maritime powers. In 1904, H. Mackinder presented his thesis about the importance of controlling the heartland of Eurasia, the “natural seat of power” with enormous resources. The heartland would be controlled by the state that had control over Eastern Europe.\(^{25}\)

N. Spykman agreed with Mackinder on the importance of controlling Eurasia and therefore on the importance for the US of preventing any other state from gaining such a position. They also shared the view that during different times, different regions become pivotal and especially important. But unlike Mackinder, Spykman claimed that in his time of writing in 1942, it was the rimlands of Eurasia - the peninsular Europe and the coastal areas in the Far East - that were of central importance: control over them was the key to world power. Russia, the power of Eurasia, should not be given access to warm waters, because that would make it too powerful; on the other hand, as long as it did not try to prevail over the rimlands, it could be a suitable ally for the US. Spykman claimed that it was necessary for the US to prevent Europe or the Far East from unifying into a hostile coalition. Spykman preferred interventionist instead of isolationist US policies because he
thought that the US could not withstand economic isolation and could therefore not ignore the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{26}

The US politics of containment during the Cold War were in accordance with this theory. Especially the foreign and defense policies of President Reagan have been described as being based on a view of US-Soviet relations as a quest for control over the Eurasian rimlands.\textsuperscript{27} This was also behind the US interest in Pakistan: to constrain the Soviet Union in the vital Gulf region, the US tried to prevent the Soviets from gaining control over Afghanistan, whereby it needed the help of Pakistan, which the US also wanted to have as a link in the pro-US chain surrounding the Soviet Union.

Controlling Eurasia is still today considered fundamentally important. Z. Brzezinski, the former National Security Adviser of President Carter, claims in his 1997 book that “it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America”. Although the US is currently the sole superpower, the primary arena where the struggle for primacy in world politics takes place is Eurasia, the largest continent in the world. Brzezinski elaborates further that the continuation of the US domination in Eurasia necessitates that the central and northern areas of Eurasia are tied towards the West, the South is not dominated by any one actor, and that the East is not united in a way that would forbid the US from using its offshore bases.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, in South Asia, the US should prevent India from becoming too strong.

The idea that control over Eurasia is of primary importance is on the other hand relatively banal. It is quite natural that control over world’s biggest and most populous areas with most of the world’s resources is of primary importance. What the rimlands theory does point out is the importance for the US of controlling the heartland power(s) on several fronts simultaneously.

Brzezinski defines as “active geostrategic players” states that have the ability to have influence beyond their own borders to the extent that affects the current world order. Although geostrategic players usually are powerful countries, all the powerful countries are not necessarily geostrategic players. Geopolitical pivots, on the other hand, are states that are not powerful themselves, but that are important because of their location or because of the consequences for the geostrategic players from the alteration of their positions. In 1997, Brzezinski defined France, Germany, Russia, China, and India (in addition to the US) as geostrategic players, and Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey, and Iran as geostrategic pivots, although the latter two are also to a certain degree geostrategically active. Brzezinski claims that despite India’s regional hegemonic aspirations, its actions have only a little effect on the US interests in Eurasia.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{26} Visuri 1997, p. 167; Wilkinson 1985, pp. 80-81. Wilkinson provides a thorough discussion on Spykman as well as the differences between Spykman and Mackinder.
\textsuperscript{27} Hsiung 1983, p. 177.
\textsuperscript{28} Brzezinski 1997, pp. xiv, 28, 35.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., pp. 40-41, 46. Geostrategy has been defined as the strategic management of geopolitical interests, as the geographical foundations of a strategy, and as the application of geopolitics into practice. Brzezinski 1997, p. xiv; Visuri 1997, p. 165. I define strategy in general as the seeking of chosen goals by consistent actions. Goals are given in a strategy, and a strategy consists of the actions by which the actor assumes to reach the goals in an optimal way. The concept “strategy” has
The war on terrorism and the attention the US has lately given Pakistan suggest that today also Pakistan can be considered a geostrategic pivot, especially because of its role in the Muslim world. Already before the attacks, the Bush Administration stated that “Pakistan has historically played a pivotal role in this part of the world and will continue to do so”. If Pakistan would turn into fundamentalism and/or anti-Westernism that would definitely have impact on the position of the US in the region and would affect nearby states, too.

Towards the end of the 20th century, it became topical to ask whether states will remain central actors in the world. Similarly, it can be asked whether it is still of interest to talk about states’ geopolitics. I consider, however, states still as central actors on the international arena. International organizations are grounded by states and depend on states’ continuing support. When facing global market forces, some small states may feel having lost part of their sovereignty, but at least the US as a state still has considerable influence in the world. The US is a geopolitical actor as much as before, both regionally and globally.

As examined above, one difference between Realism and the Neo-Realism is whether power is considered as a means or as a goal. Similarly, old geopolitics was based on the primacy of military power in international relations but in new geopolitics the primary means and measure for national power is the economic potential of the nation. Geopolitics is no longer based solely on the need for military security but also on political and economic security. Struggle for power is still considered important, although it is changing: foreign policies are still based on the geographical characteristics (e.g., location and size) of a country.

The arms race between India and Pakistan highlights the importance of military might and therefore old geopolitics is a more suitable framework for viewing their nuclear arms programs. On the other hand, the capability to develop nuclear arms programs. The actions themselves, however, do not directly tell what the goals behind them are, and a strategy cannot be directly deduced from actions. There can be intervening factors that may cause a situation where action A will not have the expected consequences and therefore it might be necessary to resort to action B to correct the situation. Thus action B need not necessarily be a part of the execution of the original strategy, but of a “saving” strategy. Both actions still aim at the same goal. As goals can also change during the execution of the strategy, two successive actions can belong to totally different strategies.

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30 US Department of State 2001b.
31 In geopolitics, states and alliances between them are seen as the only really important actors in international politics. Tuomi 1996, pp. 29, 150; Brzezinski 1997, pp. 37-38.
32 Tuomi 1996, pp. 12, 257-8; Visuri 1997, p. 171; Brzezinski 1997, p. 38. Geopolitical behavior is the ambitions of a geographically defined community to improve its political, military and economic position in regard to other similar communities by the means of management of space. Tuomi 1996, p. 11. Rusi sees the most likely future of the international system in the development of a binary world system, centered in competing trade blocks. He has even suggested that the whole concept of geopolitics could be replaced by that of geoeconomics. He predicts that geoeconomics, driven by commercial competition, will replace geopolitics, driven by military and political competition, as the primary arena of international relations. Rusi 1997, p. 142.
weapons is of course strongly dependent on the availability of resources to do so. The US aid to Pakistan has enhanced Pakistan’s economic potential and therefore its capabilities to develop nuclear explosives.

The US has, however, in this case emphasized the means of new geopolitics and Neo-Realism; it has tried to use its political and economic instead of military power to get the two countries to give up their weapons programs for example by using economic sanctions. This does not mean that the US would not consider military power important but that the US considers the use of military too extreme a measure because the two nuclear programs do not directly threat the US or any other states but only the two adversaries themselves. The US has also given Pakistan both economic and military assistance to improve Pakistan’s military security.

After the Cold War, the importance of economic and political power seemed in general to rise in relation to that of military power. After the attacks of the September the 11th, however, the importance of classical, military security of the nation has again become a more central question also for the US as it can no longer be taken as granted. The importance of military power is likely to become highlighted in circumstances of acute conflicts, whereas the economic strength of a nation is more decisive in the absence of major conflicts. In fact, economic and political factors might become more important only after military security and power are already secured. On the other hand, economic power must underlie military power.

3.3 Theories on nuclear proliferation

3.3.1 Several reasons for proliferation exist

Although nuclear weapons are extremely powerful, not all states try to acquire them. When developing policies to counter nuclear proliferation, it is of foremost importance to understand the reasons why some states try to acquire nuclear weapons while others do not. Otherwise non-proliferation efforts are not likely to be effective.

According to the traditional, Realist arguments, states seek nuclear weapons to counter the security threats they face. The extraordinary characteristics of nuclear weapons make it necessary for every state, whose adversary possesses a nuclear deterrent, to acquire the shelter provided by nuclear weapons. This can be done either by developing own nuclear weapons (costly strategy not available for all states) or by trying to gain a (albeit ultimately always unreliable) nuclear guarantee from a nuclear state. According to the Realist view, the demand for nuclear weapons always exists, and nuclear weapons can be limited mainly by restricting

33 Although India claims that it also counters the threat of China with its nuclear weapons, its weapons are not targeted towards China.
34 Different US approaches to non-proliferation are discussed in Chapter 3.3.
their supply. The existing efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons, including the NPT regime, are largely based on this view.35

According to the Realist view, nuclear proliferation has thus occurred as a chain reaction, because every state that acquires nuclear weapons in order to balance the nuclear threat posed by an adversary becomes threatening to some other state, leading it to seek nuclear weapons in its turn. The chain reaction view seems to have some explanatory power with regard to South Asia: the Pakistani nuclear program is for a great part a response to the Indian program, which in turn has been dependent on the Chinese program.

Security threats notwithstanding, however, not all states seek the shelter of nuclear weapons. Many industrialized nations could in principle develop nuclear weapons but have chosen not to. Security threats can be countered by other means, too. If also those states who do not try to acquire nuclear weapons, anyway face security threats, there has to be some other factors that affect whether a state wants to develop a nuclear arsenal or not. In addition to countering an adversary with nuclear or immense conventional military forces, a state might acquire nuclear weapons to create a means for blackmailing an adversary. Also domestic politics and the development of international norms are factors that affect a state’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons.36 The scientific community of a country, for which a nuclear weapons program can bring money, work, pride, and prestige, can also promote the acquisition of nuclear arms.37

S. Meyer has identified three groups of explanations why states acquire nuclear weapons. First is the technology hypothesis: if the technology is available, governments cannot resist the temptation to acquire nuclear weapons. Second is the political and military hypothesis: states use nuclear weapons to achieve foreign policy, military, or domestic objectives and therefore develop nuclear capabilities when it is viable from the political-military point of view. Third is the ideographic hypothesis: specific events and the individuals lead countries to develop nuclear weapons.38

3.3.2 Nuclear proliferation can be countered in various ways

For the US or any state that tries to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation, a range of policy options is available. The choice of US policy is dependent on the foreign policy orientation of the state that tries to acquire nuclear weapons: on its relations to the US and to other states in the region. Whether and how much the US ultimately opposes the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some state depends on whether the acquisition is supportive or counterproductive of the goals of the US (discussed in Chapter 4).39 Although the US in principle would be against all

36 Ibid. Sagan points out that if the reasons for nuclear proliferation vary, the policy recommendations for countering proliferation can even be conflicting.
37 Lefever 1979, p. 21.
39 Lefever 1979, pp. 120-121.
nuclear proliferation and especially would not publicly support any state’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, it may choose to act against the threshold country more or less harshly. Punishing the threshold country very mildly or not at all can in practice mean that the US accepts the acquisition of nuclear weapons even if its publicly does not support it. Especially in the case of Israel, the US has not been willing to ensure that the country does not possess nuclear weapons. The US cannot directly support any country’s nuclear weapons program if it wants to support the NPT, but it can choose not to do anything against the threshold countries.

There are two basic approaches to halting nuclear proliferation: policies to affect supply- and demand-side conditions of nuclear proliferation. Supply-side policies aim at making the acquisition of nuclear technology and materials difficult or impossible through export controls and also indirectly through denying foreign assistance. Demand-side policies try to affect the reasons why states try to acquire nuclear weapons.

In practice, three different policy lines have been identified that the US uses to halt nuclear proliferation by trying to affect both the supply and the demand of nuclear weapons. First is to promote international cooperation and institutions designed to halt nuclear proliferation. The principal means for this are the NPT and the IAEA safeguards. As only political agreements, these are not always very effective in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons if a country is determined to acquire them. The IAEA does not have an enforceable sanction system, and a party to the NPT is also allowed to withdraw from the treaty if it is faced by a threat to the country’s vital interests. Countries can even proceed relatively far on the way towards acquiring nuclear explosives before they actually violate these agreements. Promoting international institutions is a supply-side strategy in that the institutions mostly try to control states’ possibilities to acquire critical technologies. On the other hand, promoting international cooperation can also work as a demand-side strategy. Such treaties can change the public’s views on the acceptability of having or acquiring nuclear weapons. They can also improve states’ trust on that others will not acquire nuclear weapons, affecting in that way the demand for nuclear weapons.

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40 E. Lefever has identified four, somewhat overlapping levels of a state’s nuclear forces that determine the value of the forces. 1) Most countries have totally refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons. 2) In threshold countries, the nuclear capabilities are being widely developed, pushing the government to undertake nuclear tests. 3) After a nuclear test or after otherwise developing nuclear explosives, a country is on the token nuclear force level where it remains until it develops a military significant nuclear force that convinces other governments of its viability. 4) When a country also has a reliable delivery system that survives in most circumstances, the country has reached the level of a military significant force. This level is divided into four sublevels. At the lowest of these, a country’s nuclear force is significant against its non-nuclear neighbors, at the second level, against a nuclear neighbor of approximately the same level, at the third, against a medium nuclear power, and finally at the highest, against the US or Russia. Both the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear forces are now significant against their non-nuclear neighbors, against whom the forces are not targeted, though, and against each other. The Indian nuclear forces have some significance against China but are not targeted towards it. Lefever 1979, pp. 10-11.

Parallel to promoting international non-proliferation agreements and regulations, national US legislation has been created to tackle the problem of non-proliferation unilaterally. The national US regulations complement the international regulations and have in general been stricter than the international regulations.

Second is to reduce incentives and increase disincentives for nuclear proliferation. One way to do this is to improve the object state’s feeling or perceptions of security by providing it with US security assistance and/or guarantees. This policy is probably the most effective one as the objective and subjective feeling of insecurity is the major reason for states to acquire nuclear weapons. Giving the object state what it needs or wishes - security - helps create a positive attitude within that state towards the US. The most effective way to provide a state with improved sense of security is to give it security guarantees. The mutual defense agreements between the US and Pakistan have included implicit security guarantees, though it is debatable whether nuclear guarantees have been included. The content of the agreements has been that the US will act appropriately if Pakistan is attacked or seriously threatened by a third party. With the significant military and economic aid (see Chapter 5) the US has given to Pakistan, it has also tried to improve Pakistan’s sense of security. This is a demand-side strategy. On the other hand, denying a country the assistance it would otherwise get can also be a policy of denying access to nuclear weapons i.e. a supply-side strategy.

The third policy option for the US is to deny states access to the technology needed to build nuclear explosives. The technical constraints are not expected to halt proliferation altogether themselves but to buy time and give more time for diplomatic efforts and possibly for the regional and domestic factors to change so that programs will be halted. The US has put much emphasis on this policy and has succeeded in making the acquisition of technology quite difficult. However, it might be impossible to make export control systems (heavy)waterproof especially because a wide array of technologies and materials that can be involved in the development of nuclear weapons are of dual-use nature and can also be used for other purposes. Thus transferring them can seem innocent, although they might end up being used in weapons programs. In the case of dual-use products, the suppliers can also play or feel innocent and export controls often cannot restrict the spread of the technologies. Technical constraints are another supply-side strategy.

The US can use rewards or punishments to implement its policies and to influence the behavior of governments that consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The aid the US has given Pakistan is an example of positive incentives the US has used for promoting restraint from nuclear arms. In principle, the US can use both denial and punitive policies as negative sanctions but in practice it has stuck to using denial policies only.

42 Although Dunn and Lefever otherwise classify the US policies similarly, with respect to this category their views differ somewhat. Dunn speaks more broadly of reducing incentives and increasing disincentives, whereas Lefever considers only improving the object state’s perceptions of security by providing it with US security assistance and/or guarantees.
43 Lefever 1979, pp. 122-127; Dunn 1996, pp. 28-30
44 Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 5.
45 Lefever 1979, pp. 129-132; Dunn 1996, pp. 28-30. The Indian “peaceful” nuclear test was an example of an extreme dual-use claim.
46 Lefever 1979, pp. 132-133.
3.3.3 Differing views on proliferation: threat to security or increasing stability?

The non-proliferation policies of the US seem to be based on the conventional thought that nuclear weapons are bad and undesirable. Of course, the US does not seem to think that its own nuclear arsenal is undesirable but only that the spread of nuclear capabilities to even more countries is. It is often thought that the five acknowledged nuclear powers have learned to live with their weapons, but that the potential new nuclear powers could not do this and would be more unreliable, especially because the potential proliferators are mostly less developed countries where the society and the government often are not very stable. And even if the potential new nuclear states are not considered any less capable of dealing with the weapons than the old ones, an increase in the number of the weapons and of people in charge of them alone rises fears of accidental or unauthorized use.

In some cases, other states’ nuclear weapons could also pose a direct threat to the US or its allies. In the case of South Asia, this kind of threat might exist if radical Islam gained more power in Pakistan and got access to the country’s nuclear arsenal. Such developments could be especially threatening towards Israel. The South Asian nuclear weapons programs affect US interests in Middle East, especially because they can affect the military balance between Israel and the Arab states as India and Pakistan have close relations to countries with those countries47.

The US can oppose the spread of nuclear weapons even in cases where it would be extremely unlikely that the US would become their target because they possibly have destabilizing effects. Nuclear weapons are in some respects similar to powerful conventional weapons because conventional weapons can cause significant destruction, too. But nuclear weapons differ from conventional weapons in that the time within which immense destruction can be caused is very short. Also even if a state possesses only very few nuclear weapons, it can use them to blackmail other states because if it succeeded in causing even only one nuclear explosion, it could cause immense destruction. Therefore, with a nuclear weapon, also otherwise small and powerless countries can temporarily change at least regional power relations and gain power on international relations.

Furthermore, as the number of countries with nuclear weapons increases, so does the danger that nuclear weapons end up in hostile, possibly unauthorized hands. As K. Waltz points out, nuclear weapons also make the conventional forces of the US less capable for action and restrict the room for action the US has 48.

A further possible reason for the US to oppose the Pakistani nuclear weapons program is that has wanted to keep its ally dependent on it. As long as Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons, it had to hope that the US would ultimately come to its help if a major war would take place. Thus the US could count on being able to exert influence on Pakistan. Good relations with the US have been seen as desirable also by the Pakistani military. As long as the US can have this kind of influence in Islamabad that ensures that Pakistan does not turn to Islamic

47 Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 3.
fundamentalism or anti-Westernism and that its relations with Pakistan continue to rather promote than disturb US interests, especially those related to energy, in the nearby areas.

For several decades, the US tried to stop categorically all nuclear proliferation. This was because of the belief that proliferation was always against the interests of the US. Martel & Pendley claim that there also was a case for that kind of policy for a long time during the Cold War. First, the phenomenon of proliferation seemed controllable because of the difficulties involved in acquiring nuclear weapons. Second, the US and Soviet security guarantees made many states willing to give up the possibility of acquiring own nuclear weapons. Third, it was feared that because of the bipolar international structure, nuclear weapons possessed by a regional power could provoke escalation into a nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union.49

On the other hand, if the US aims at stability, it might in practice choose not to act very harshly against nuclear weapons if they improve stability. Claims and also evidence exist that suggest that nuclear weapons might at least in certain circumstances improve stability. Nuclear weapons have so far calmed down the behavior of their possessors and have not been used after the World War II50. Because of the history of peaceful relations between the nuclear powers, a notable group of IR scholars have advocated the view, most powerfully presented by K. Waltz in 1981, that the spread of nuclear weapons can actually promote stability in the world and can therefore even be desirable. The logic of the argument is that because of the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons, no state dares to use nuclear weapons against its rival if there is any chance of retaliation: “the presence of nuclear weapons makes States exceedingly cautious”. Moreover, the destructive potential of nuclear weapons is so great that virtually anyone understands not to use them, so that strict rationality on the side of the decision-makers does not need to be assumed.

Waltz also expects nuclear powers to fight each other with conventional weapons only when vital issues are not at stake, because otherwise the fear of escalation would be too great for any conflict to start. Also large-scale arms races in both conventional and nuclear forces could be avoided because when states possess nuclear weapons, it is unnecessary to match the adversary’s capabilities both quantitatively and qualitatively. Instead, it is necessary to possess enough nuclear weapons to ensure a second-strike capability and an ability to cause so major losses on the adversary that it could never totally recover. Also nuclear blackmail is unlikely because a country threatening with the use of nuclear weapons would have to expect to be punished by a nuclear strike if it really did use nuclear weapons.51

49 Martel & Pendley 1996, pp. 211-212. For an argument that the latter fear has been unnecessary, see Waltz 1981.
50 According to Visuri, the reasons for this also include: 1) the fear of moral condemnation; 2) the lack of suitable targets; 3) the unwillingness to break the taboo of resorting to nuclear weapons as it would be easier for others to do the same afterwards; and 4) the superiority of the nuclear powers also in other respects. Visuri 1997, pp. 383-384.
51 Waltz 1981. This relatively popular view has been specified for example so that nuclear proliferation is desirable to states that have nuclear rivals because that is a way to ensure that a conflict between these states will not become nuclear. Sagan 1994.
However, the deterrent has to be relative to the goal. The bigger the possible gains for the adversary, the bigger the deterrent has to be. On the other hand, the smaller the goals of the adversary, the smaller the deterrence has to be to be credible. This diminishes the force of nuclear weapons as a deterrent because they are not a credible deterrent in other than major matters.52

Thus when both adversaries like India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, their use is restricted by the possibility of the adversary to strike back and to cause serious damage. According to these optimistic views, wars between India and Pakistan could be avoided because of their nuclear arsenals, and nuclear weapons may stabilize the subcontinent and can therefore be actually desirable. If this is believed, the US would not have to be against proliferation.

For example S. Sagan has criticized the pro-proliferation view. He claims that Waltz' argument builds on three assumptions, which Waltz considers as realistic. The assumptions are that 1) while a state is still developing a nuclear weapon, its adversary will not launch a preventive war; 2) the adversaries both develop an invulnerable second-strike force; and 3) there is no fear of unauthorized or accidental use. But because of the characteristics of military organizations that make them imperfectly rational, Sagan points out that the three major assumptions of the pro-proliferation view are not always true with certainty. Therefore, one cannot count on new nuclear states not using their weapons, even if using them would work against their national interests. Pakistan causes special worry for Sagan because its nuclear program and weapons are not controlled by civilians but by the military.53

Thus, the weapons do not necessarily bring stability to South Asia. The assumptions 2 and 3 above are not necessarily true in the case of the two countries. At least in the near future, the invulnerability of the nuclear forces cannot necessarily be guaranteed. The command and control systems of the two countries are not yet so developed that unauthorized or accidental use would be impossible in all circumstances.

M. Ayoob considers the nuclear build-up in South Asia as threatening because of fundamental perceptual gaps between the two states. First, Islamabad sees the regional distribution of power as bipolar, and wants the status quo in Kashmir change to reflect this view. New Delhi, however, sees itself as a unipolar hegemon in the region. Second, the view of Islamabad seems to be that nuclear weapons make all wars, except for proxy wars, between their possessors impossible, and therefore counts on India not escalating the Kashmir crises from the level of a local conflict into an interstate war. New Delhi, however, seems to consider conventional warfare as possible even between nuclear powers.54

52 Visuri 1997, p. 369.
54 Ayoob 2001. Ayoob claims that there are two ways to maintain regional order; either a regionally dominant power takes over the task of maintaining stability and ensuring security, or two approximately equal powers balance each other. He considers India as the pivotal and preeminent regional power.
India has long been a proponent of total, universal nuclear disarmament. Although many consider total nuclear disarmament as impossible because nuclear weapons cannot be de-invented, India has pointed out the example of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has also based its opposition to the NPT on the argument that the five acknowledged nuclear powers do not seriously undertake nuclear disarmament, although the NPT in principle aims at it. In practice, the nuclear powers are willing to participate in nuclear disarmament only as long as the disarmament efforts do not affect their capability to cause major destruction. The steps that the US and Russia take towards nuclear disarmament are significant because the less there are of nuclear weapons, the fewer nuclear warheads might end up in unauthorized hands. The disarmament actions do not, however, really affect the power of the US and Russian nuclear forces as they in any case remain very strong. Neither China, France, nor the UK has been willing to participate in nuclear disarmament.

As another side of the same token as some find nuclear proliferation sometimes desirable, it can be argued that nuclear disarmament may be undesirable. Even if all states would publicly commit themselves to nuclear disarmament and extremely intrusive verification mechanisms would be in place, it would be impossible to ensure that all existing nuclear weapons would be permanently destroyed in a way that would not allow them to be reassembled quickly, and that all states would give up their nuclear programs. Nuclear explosives are small and can thus be easily hidden. If one state clandestinely hid some nuclear explosives or had the capability to reassemble weapons significantly faster than anyone else, it would have tremendous opportunities to blackmail its adversaries. Therefore, it would be in the advantage of all nuclear states to clandestinely retain some nuclear weapons if just for the case that someone else did the same. Furthermore, even if all existing nuclear weapons would be destroyed, it would always be possible to redevelop them because they cannot be de-invented. And if states would after all start redeveloping nuclear weapons, these new weapons would probably be less secure than the current ones because the command and control mechanisms would have to be rebuilt, too.55

Even if policy-makers in the nuclear states might think that nuclear total disarmament would be undesirable, to support the NPT, the nuclear powers have to appear committed to nuclear disarmament. If the nuclear powers do not take steps towards nuclear disarmament, their right to nuclear weapons loses some of its legitimacy because the existing nuclear order of NPT calls for eventual nuclear disarmament. At the same time, however, they retain significant nuclear arsenals.

55 Glaser 1998. For example J. Schell has advocated a transformation of nuclear arsenals into virtual nuclear arsenals, which would not be ready to use but could be assembled quickly. In a system of virtual arsenals, the possibility of accidental or unauthorized use would diminish. Waltz has, however, strongly opposed this view by arguing that such a system would be unstable, largely for the same reasons as why he considers nuclear disarmament as unfeasible. Waltz 1997.
4 STARTING HYPOTHESES

I now proceed to make starting hypotheses about the subject of my study, based on the theoretical discussion in Chapter 3 and especially taking into account my research questions.

I expect that the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear weapons programs are for a large part a consequence of the security threats that they have faced and face. As far as Indo-Pakistani relations are concerned, I expect that the nuclear weapons have brought some stability to South Asia at least so that major wars are avoided because the two countries cannot risk large-scale fighting in the fear of escalation. Nuclear weapons should be an effective deterrent with respect to the Kashmir question because the conflict seems to be of great importance for both states.

Because both India and Pakistan have acquired nuclear weapons and in 1998 proclaimed that they are nuclear powers, the US policies do not seem to have been ultimately very successful. I expect that the US policies have not had the wished consequences because they have not addressed the real reasons for proliferation. Another possible reason for the unsuccessfulness of the US policies might be that other states have not supported them because they might not have agreed with the US either on the goals or on the measures to reach these goals. If other states do not find US views and actions justified, they might even become sympathetic for India and Pakistan.

Possibly the US did also not find it absolutely necessary to halt the programs. The US may in principle have believed that nuclear weapons could provide the subcontinent with increased stability, or at least wanted to believe this especially after it was obvious that the programs could not be easily halted and India and Pakistan had became de facto nuclear states.

Because of its current global hegemony, the US is a relevant, albeit in many cases latent actor everywhere in the world. I assume that the policies of the US on the Indian peninsula, as well as elsewhere, reflect the geopolitical worldviews of the successive US leadships. I assume that particular US actions cannot be explained only by the particular situations themselves but by a more general, global geostrategy and the geopolitical views of the US. The US interventions in South Asia have been largely a product of its global aspirations.

From the perspective of the international system, the goals of the US can be reduced into a few guiding thoughts, which can be considered as its overall strategic goals. First, during the Cold War, the US aimed at balancing and overcoming the power of the Soviet Union; its primary goal was to stop the communist sphere of influence from growing and therefore to surround the Soviet Union by own allies. Second, after the Cold War, the US is the only superpower in the world and tries to extend the period of its superior power; as Brzezinski points out, this entails preventing the rise of new great powers that could challenge its hegemony even at a regional level. I consider these two as its primary goals in different time periods.

56 Mearsheimer 2001; Brzezinski 1997, p. 40. Brzezinski further suggests that the post-Cold War international order institutionalizes many qualities of the US system internationally. Thus another,
In my study, I thus expect that with its policies towards the two states and their nuclear programs, the US has tried to promote a regional balance-of-power favorable from its point of view. This balance-of-power would be a stable regional situation with no state (especially in this case India) powerful enough to be able to prevent the US from ensuring that its interests are being served or to endanger the US capability to ultimately impose its will when needed. Cooperation between the US and Pakistan, the secondary regional power, can be expected, as they might be able to gain from joint opposition to India, the major regional power — the US to make sure India does not grow too powerful so that the US possibility to impose its will would be endangered; Pakistan because cooperation with the US can provide it with improved security.

When India had strong ties to the Soviet Union, it could have been unfavorable for the US if India would have become more powerful. On the other hand, India’s orientation towards the Soviet Union could maybe have been avoided if the US itself would have developed closer relations with India. Also even if India prevailed over Pakistan, China would check Indian power in a wider Asian context. A stronger India could on the other hand be able to check China, but China is in any case constrained from other directions by other major powers: Japan, Russia, the US, and Korea57. Therefore, India is in the sense end relatively unimportant for the US. Pakistan and India do not seem overly important for the US also because the US has not got more engaged in trying to solve the Kashmir conflict.

But there are also reasons for the US to be interested in South Asia. Specifically in South Asia, US goals include “deterring or limiting nuclear and missile proliferation, averting conflicts, and making sure that US relations with regional states are a source of positive influence on US interests in the Middle East/ Persian Gulf region, and not a source of instability”58. The factors that affect the regional power relations can also influence states that potentially could challenge the unipolar position of the US, especially China. Pakistan is strategically interesting for the US because of its location between India, China, and Russia and near the Middle East because of its relations to the Islamic world and to China. India’s great size and population make it significant both as an economic area and as a regional power. The controversies between these two states have had a great impact on the general development prospects of the region. A great amount of the resources of the two poor states has been devoted to developing nuclear weapons, and for example trade between them as well as tourism have suffered from the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Nuclear proliferation in Pakistan and India also make US attention necessary because the US has committed itself to opposing it.

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57 IFPA 1997. Brzezinski considers the US as a natural ally for China. China is surrounded by suspicious neighbors it cannot trust. With the US, China has had neither territorial grievances nor experiences of humiliation. China also needs American investments. The US aspirations for world hegemony, however, have so far made the US China’s “unintentional adversary rather than its natural ally”. Brzezinski 1997, pp. 151, 169, 207.

58 Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 3. These goals are from a report of the Congressional Research Service, and although the report is from the year 1993, I think these goals can be considered as mostly unchanged. Currently, fighting international terrorism should probably be added on the list.
South Asia is also of interest for the US because the region can be used to support possible operations in the Gulf region, which is vital because of oil. The US wishes to see Pakistan have such relations to the Middle Eastern Muslim states that are beneficial for the US interest there. The great natural reserves of natural gas and oil in Central Asia are also a reason for the US interest in the region, as finding, using and controlling new energy resources is becoming ever more important in the face of the growing energy consumption in the world. Access to these resources is of great importance. The access has been controlled by the Soviet Union and thereafter by Russia, and it is clearly in the interest of the US that alternative transportation routes and pipelines are constructed that deny Russia the sole control. The route could be either from Central Asia to the Mediterranean through Azerbaijan and Turkey, or to the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan. The latter possibility could also benefit Pakistan.59

At a somewhat more specific level, the explicit goals of the US foreign policy, stated in the US Department of State Strategic Plan, include to “secure peace; deter aggression; prevent, and defuse, and manage crises; halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and advance arms control and disarmament”. The US aims at preventing “regional instabilities from threatening US vital national interests”, because “left unresolved, such threats can result in loss of life, regional and global disruption in the flow of goods and services, and the need for protracted US intervention”.60 Thus, promoting stability i.e. the absence of war and abrupt change is a general US goal not only because the US wants to avoid war itself but also because stability promotes economic and political development that can benefit the US. Furthermore, stability increases the likelihood that the US can maintain its position and does not have to use its resources to ensure that no other state grows too powerful or disrupts the international order. Instability could endanger the hegemonic position of the US.61 The US attitude towards the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs should thus be dependent on whether they seem to enhance or decrease the stability of the system. As noted above, if the US considers that nuclear proliferation improves stability, it might in principle not oppose it. The US explicitly aims at reducing “the threat to the United States and its allies from weapons of mass destruction”62, but in the case of South Asia, the nuclear weapons do not seem to pose a direct threat to the US.

However, I assume that the goals of checking the Soviet Union and trying to extend the period of superior power have been of foremost importance for the US. Its other foreign policy goals, including the ones of aiming at the absence of regional conflicts and of preventing nuclear proliferation (if this really was its goal in South Asia), are submitted to the first goals and cannot always be promoted if they are in conflict with the first ones.

59 Brzezinski 1997, pp. 125, 139-140.
60 US Department of State 2000c. Goals related to economic prosperity, protecting US citizens and borders, law enforcement, democracy, and humanitarian and global issues are also included in the long-term foreign policy goals of the US in the US Department of State Strategic Plan 2000. Although the Strategic Plan is from the year 2000, I think these goals can be considered as mostly valid already before that.
61 However, I assume that preventing conflicts is a US goal as long as that is supportive of the foremost goal, to sustain the US hegemony.
62 US Department of State 2000c.
5 THE SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND THE US ACTIONS TOWARDS THEM

So far, I have approached the subject of my study from a rather theoretical point of view. In this chapter, I go on to an empirical examination of the subject. This examination is the source from which I try in the concluding Chapter 6 to find answers to the research questions and based on which the hypotheses from Chapter 4 could be confirmed or refuted.

5.1 The early nuclear age: proliferation to developing countries not seen as a major threat

5.1.1 The US Atoms for Peace program

The US has been trying to stop horizontal nuclear proliferation already since 1945. It has primarily tried to do this through legal arrangements and safeguard systems. Originally the US wanted to restrict the spread of nuclear technologies altogether. However, it soon became obvious that it would not take long before it would lose its monopoly on them because the Soviet Union would also succeed in developing nuclear weapons. Thus, in 1946 the US came up with the Baruch Plan, where international control of atomic energy was proposed. According to the plan, while nuclear weapons would have been abandoned, the peaceful use and research on atomic energy would happen under an international monopoly that could not be vetoed by any state. The Soviets did, however, not accept the plan.

After the US lost its monopoly on nuclear weapons after the 1949 Soviet test, the US became interested in exporting nuclear technologies and materials for peaceful purposes because of both political and economic reasons. It started actively doing this after President Eisenhower in 1953 launched the Atoms for Peace program, concretized in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. Within the program, the US offered other states assistance in the realm of civilian uses of atomic energy, if they in return refrained from developing nuclear weapons. The civilian uses of atomic energy were seen as potentially very beneficial for development. Behind the plan was also the development of a hydrogen bomb by both the US and the Soviet Union. The new explosive was even greatly more destructive than the earlier nuclear bombs, and the emphasis given to the peaceful uses of atomic energy was supposed to make public around the world less critical of atomic energy in general.

63 The major difficulty in producing nuclear weapons is to acquire the nuclear material for the core of the explosive. The material can be either highly enriched uranium that contains at least 90% of uranium isotope 235 or plutonium. The explosive energy of a nuclear weapon results from a fission where either uranium or plutonium is used and/or from a fusion where thermonuclear materials like lithium are used. In the more modern thermonuclear explosives, a fission reaction is often enhanced by a fusion reaction. Plutonium that does not appear in nature can be reprocessed from uranium fuel, and therefore the amount of plutonium potentially available for nuclear weapons has grown as the number of nuclear reactors in use has risen. For a primer on nuclear weapons, see, e.g., Spector 1990, pp. 417-422.

64 Quester 1970, pp. 18-19, 103.

65 Heiskanen 1995, p. 25; Lefever 1979, p. 3.
and also of the nuclear weapons of the US. Being at the time the only state capable of exporting nuclear technology, the US could with this carrot also possibly win neutral states on its side.\(^{66}\)

It was realized in the US that as a less desirable consequence of the program, also less developed countries could in the future have a capability to develop nuclear weapons because plutonium could be produced from the fuel used in the nuclear reactors the US was to supply. Therefore, especially because of pressure from the Congress to do this, the Eisenhower Administration demanded bilateral safeguards from the recipient countries.\(^{67}\) An international safeguard system was introduced by the creation of the IAEA in 1957.

Since the Atoms for Peace program, the US has been active in exporting nuclear technology, with the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) assisting the American industry. The US is, e.g., the world’s biggest exporter of enriched uranium. Although the US exports only to countries with safeguarded nuclear facilities, it has not always been able to make sure where its exports eventually end up.\(^{68}\)

The Atoms for Peace program has later on been blamed of clearly improving capabilities to nuclear proliferation, as knowledge, reactors, and plutonium production capabilities were distributed around the world.\(^{69}\)

5.1.2 A wide civilian nuclear program launched early on in India

The Indian nuclear program originated in 1945, when the Tata\(^{70}\) Institute for Fundamental Research, designated for the research of nuclear physics, was opened in Bombay. In newly independent India, the father of the Institute, physicist H. J. Bhaba, sold Nehru the idea of the usefulness of nuclear power for the industrialization of the country. Before becoming the Prime Minister, Nehru had thought that because of the preponderance of nuclear force in the international system, it was necessary for all countries to acquire the shelter provided by nuclear weapons. Later on, however, he opposed nuclear weapons. Bhaba was given the lead in the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was set up in 1948. The atomic energy program became under the control of the Prime Minister early on highly autonomous and covered from the public. The Indian Department of Atomic Energy was created in 1954.\(^{71}\)

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\(^{67}\) Ibid., p. 99. Plutonium did not seem a suitable material for hydrogen bombs. However, although it was maybe not evident at the time the Atoms for Peace -plan was launched, plutonium works well on more sophisticated fission explosives. Quester 1970, p. 143-144.

\(^{68}\) Lefever 1979, pp. 3, 13.

\(^{69}\) Quester 1970, p. 143.

\(^{70}\) Named after the influential Tata family that provided financing for the Institute.

\(^{71}\) Ganguly 1999, p. 150; Tamminen & Zenger 1998, p. 232; Chellaney 1999. From the point of view of the civilian uses of atomic energy, the Indian program has not lived up to the great expectations. Although India has the widest nuclear power program in the developing countries, the importance of which for the economy has been emphasized in public, only 2.5 % of Indian electricity was produced with nuclear power in 1993. The civilian nuclear projects have been
Originally India was not interested in acquiring nuclear weapons but was devoted to the promotion of nuclear disarmament, being loyal to the Gandhian principles of non-violence. India was supposed to become a great country exactly because it prioritized the economic well-being of its citizens more than the development of expensive nuclear weapons. It was India who in 1954 raised international opposition to the US nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Similarly, Prime Minister Nehru first suggested in 1954 an international treaty forbidding all nuclear tests. India also lobbied for an universal test ban treaty during the Geneva negotiations, for a non-discriminating non-proliferation treaty in 1965, for a treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in 1978, for a freeze of nuclear programs in 1982 and for a gradual program for giving up nuclear weapons in 1988. The Indian nuclear weapons policies have been targeted at either a global nuclear disarmament or the principle of equal and legitimate security for all. On the other hand, India has long sought the status of a major power, for example in the form of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. This is has, however, not been granted. As the permanent members of the Security Council are also the only acknowledged nuclear powers, there seems to be grounds for the Indian complaints about the important status given for nuclear weapons in international relations.

India was among the countries for which the US offered assistance within the Atoms for Peace program. In the same spirit, the first Indian nuclear research reactor was built with Canadian help in 1956. Canadians also assisted in building the CIRUS reactor that started operating in 1960 and that made the production of nuclear explosives possible for India. In 1964, India acquired the capability to produce plutonium, being the fifth country in the world to succeed in this. But because India was not able to enrich uranium itself, the US committed itself to supply a light-water reactor in Tarapur with enriched uranium for 30 years after its opening in 1969, a commitment that became a source of schism between the two countries (see Chapter 5.2.6 below).

On the other hand, in the spirit of India’s program for economic self-reliance, it was considered important to keep the atomic energy program as indigenous as possible. India did also mostly not accept international safeguards, which it considered as intrusive, on its facilities. The Soviet Union lined up with India in opposing the safeguards that the capitalist US demanded.

The US did not see India in a totally positive light in late 1940’s and early 1950’s. Reportedly, in a US State Department report from 1949 India was considered even as Japan’s potential “successor in Asiatic imperialism”. Furthermore, in the same report it was allegedly stated that “in such a circumstance a strong Muslim bloc subject to constant delays, mainly because the country has not been able to become technologically and materially self-reliant as fast as planned. Also safety issues have caused significant delays. Both India and Pakistan have pressing energy needs, and the lack of energy makes it difficult for them to become attractive for foreign manufacturing investors. Tamminen & Zenger 1998, pp. 232-233; Sharma 1987, pp. 224-226; Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 50.

75 Quester 1970, p. 100.
under the leadership of Pakistan and friendly to the US, might afford a desirable balance of power in South Asia”. 76

Nehru, an opponent of the use of force in international politics, had publicly turned against the development of nuclear weapons. However, he gave Bhaba, the head of the AEC, wide freedoms in developing the Indian nuclear program. Bhaba considered the acquisition of nuclear weapons already in 1958 and started equipping a plutonium-reprocessing facility the same year, although it was allegedly meant for civilian uses. The Indian defeat in the Sino-Indian war in 1962 strengthened Bhaba’s interest in nuclear weapons and made him lobby for them in public. The Indian Atomic Energy Act granted the nuclear program privacy and gave the chairman of the AEC wide freedoms of action with regard to the nuclear program. The chairman was only accountable to the Prime Minister. 77

5.1.3 Alliance with the US improves Pakistan’s security

During the 1950’s, especially after Indian opposition in the UN to the US policies on Korea, Pakistan became an ally of the US. The US had interest in allying with Pakistan because of its location near the Soviet Union, China, and the Middle East. In Pakistan, the pro-Western bureaucratic élites and the anticommunist military prompted the alliance. Pakistan’s joining of several US-led security arrangements (e.g., Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact) made it a recipient of US military and economic assistance. To promote US-Pakistan security cooperation, the US also arranged visits and education for Pakistani military officials in the US. The US support enhanced the domestic position of the military, and strengthened the military’s view that allying with the West was a viable way to ensure security against India. In 1959, Pakistan and the US signed a mutual defense agreement, under which the US could, although very unlikely would, respond to a nuclear attack to Pakistan with the same measure. 78

Although Pakistan’s defense was during the first decades of independence based solely on conventional weapons and nuclear weapons were not seriously considered, there was some interest in nuclear power as far as its peaceful uses were concerned. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was set up in 1957 for the research and development of peaceful nuclear capabilities. Both the sole Pakistani research reactor and the heavy-water nuclear power plant in Karachi were brought under IAEA safeguards. 79 Unlike India, Pakistan did not build up a wide civilian nuclear program. As the nuclear program grew, it was mostly for military purposes only. 80

76 Kapur 1995.
77 Ganguly 1999, pp. 150-152; Sharma 1987, p. 223; Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 112. As noted above, Nehru’s stance on nuclear weapons before he was Indian Prime Minister did not indicate total opposition to nuclear weapons. However, he might have considered nuclear weapons as a necessary evil.
80 FAS 2000b.
5.2 Rising US concern on proliferation

5.2.1 Security threats increase interest in nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan

The dramatic defeat in a border war against China in 1962, followed by the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, marked a clear turning point in the Indian strategic thinking in general and for its nuclear program in particular. Especially the rightist opposition impugned the liberal foreign policies of Nehru that had aimed at countering the threat posed by China by trying to improve relations with it. With his personal authority, Nehru was able to calm down the debate on nuclear weapons, but after his death in 1964, the pro-lobby got louder. It was feared that if India did not develop nuclear weapons, China would periodically blackmail it, though making it in a subtle enough way to avoid Western criticism.81

The new Indian Prime Minister L. B. Shastri opposed the acquisition of nuclear weapons on the grounds of their costs, of their antagonizing effect towards Pakistan, and of their little value against China unless a large nuclear arsenal would be acquired. He stated publicly that India would not acquire nuclear weapons and announced in December 1964 that India was instead trying to get a nuclear guarantee from the nuclear powers. In May 1965, his Foreign Minister S. S. Singh admitted, however, that the hope for a guarantee had been in vain. India’s quest for nuclear guarantees was complicated by the country’s insistence on preserving its non-aligned status. On the other hand, the US had given India support during the 1962 Sino-Indian war, and this implied to some Indians that India had an implicit US security guarantee against China and did therefore not need an explicit one.82

Tensions were also increasing in Indo-Pakistani relations. In Pakistan, this led to a gradual attitudinal change towards nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s relationship with the US also experienced its first splintering when the US supported India during the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Because of the apparent Indo-US rapprochement, Pakistan developed very near relations with China, US opposition notwithstanding. This relationship, however, contributed to the rapprochement of the US and China. Pakistani Foreign Minister, Z. A. Bhutto, was in favor of developing nuclear weapons and tried to persuade the head of Pakistani military dictatorship, M. A. Khan, to investigate the possibilities of developing nuclear weapons. A. Khan turned the proposition down on account of his belief that if needed, Pakistan could acquire nuclear weapons by simply buying them from its Western allies.83

In 1965, India and Pakistan got into a war over Kashmir, which had been a reason for a conflict between the two states already when they became independent in 1947 (see Chapter 1). The Soviets helped to negotiate the Tashkent agreement of January 1966 that ended the war and marked a return to the status quo ante. The war led India to increasingly rely on the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the support China had given Pakistan during the war highlighted the Indian security

dilemma: it was surrounded by two enemies that had close relations with each other. Shortly after the war, Shastri still opposed the adoption of a nuclear weapons program, partly because of the costs of such a project. However, as the public pressure grew and the threat of a two-front war was real, he announced that the accomplishment of nuclear delivery systems by China would lead to a reconsideration of Indian nuclear policies. In 1965 he also commissioned the AEC to start a classified project for preparing an underground nuclear test. It was estimated that the preparations would take three years, but it is uncertain what the level of technological preparedness was at the time. The preparations were, however, halted in 1966 when Bhaba died because his successor, V. Sarabhai, was strictly against developing nuclear weapons.84

The US punished both India and Pakistan for the conflict over Kashmir by cutting off the supply of weapons in 1965. This made Pakistani leaders more interested in nuclear weapons because India started to gain a clear superiority in terms of conventional weapons as the Soviet Union supplied it with armaments. The US-Soviet détente also diminished Pakistan’s value as an ally for the US.85

After Shastri’s death in 1966, I. Gandhi formed the new Indian government. She continued to seek nuclear guarantees from the US and the Soviet Union. At most, the superpowers were willing to jointly declare that they would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. These qualified propositions were only offers of negative guarantees (i.e. nuclear states do not themselves use the nuclear weapons to attack non-nuclear states) and not enough for India, which feared a Chinese attack, and sought a positive security guarantee (i.e. guarantee of support against aggressive third parties). At the same time, Sarabhai continued to improve the nuclear infrastructure of the country. The first Chinese hydrogen explosive test in 1967 increased the willingness in the Indian parliament to conduct own nuclear tests.86

In 1971, another war broke out between India and Pakistan. For Pakistan, the war was a traumatic experience as it led to the division of Pakistan into two and to the neutralization of the former East-Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Pakistani President, Army Chief Y. Khan, was blamed for the unsuccessful war, and in the aftermath of the war, a powerful group within the military removed him from office and replaced him by Z. A. Bhutto, who had won the general elections in West-Pakistan in 1970. Islamabad was disappointed with the US not providing Pakistan with more support against India, which increased its sense of insecurity. The Soviet support for India also increased Islamabad’s hostility towards the Soviet Union, a feeling that was later reinforced by the Afghanistan war.87

85 In 1966, Pakistani Foreign Minister and President-to-be Z. A. Bhutto even took the stance that if India was to acquire nuclear weapons, “even if Pakistanis have to eat grass, we will make the bomb”. Ahmed 1999, pp. 182-183.
86 Tamminen & Zenger 1998, pp. 237-238; Ganguly 1999, pp. 156-159; Lefever 1979, p. 31; Sagan 1996, pp. 65-66. Sagan claims that India did not consistently seek nuclear guarantees. He also claims, as noted above, that Sarabhai opposed the development of nuclear weapons. During his tenure, however, the Indian nuclear program clearly progressed. Sarabhai died in 1971.
The 1971 war made the Indian pre-eminence over its adversary obvious. As Pakistan became less a threat, more Indian resources became available for the defense against China. On the other hand, the war made India’s security threats evident again. During the war, it became apparent that the US, Pakistan, and China had approached each other. The US intervened in the conflict by moving an aircraft carrier towards the Bay of Bengal, thereby constraining India from invading West Pakistan.\textsuperscript{88} Many in India have seen that this meant that the US in fact threatened India with nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{89}

In March 1972, Z. A. Bhutto adopted a secret nuclear weapons program, which was not only to counter both India’s conventional and nuclear forces but also to help build a new national identity after the division of the country and to improve the status of the defeated military. In late 1972, the first Pakistani nuclear reactor capable of producing plutonium started operating. The Pakistani decision to seek nuclear weapons was sealed with the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 (see below). On the other hand, in November 1972, Pakistan proposed a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) to South Asia, a proposition it has often repeated.\textsuperscript{90} Pakistan has also in general regularly proposed bilateral Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms control measures and also usually been willing to participate on the multilateral ones, too, if India would join them as well.

### 5.2.2 Indo-Soviet friendship

Under the guidance of I. Gandhi, moral considerations slowly but steadily started to get subordinated to more mundane imperatives in the Indian foreign policy. Although India was strong enough to check Pakistan alone, against China it needed an ally\textsuperscript{91}. Thus instead of adhering to the principle of non-alignment, India drew nearer to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was a major exporter of military equipment to India from the 1960’s onwards, the terms of trade being very favorable to India. The arms trade between the two countries continued until the very end of the Cold War and even beyond. The Soviet Union, however, in principle opposed nuclear proliferation in India.\textsuperscript{92}

India’s relations with the US had deteriorated after 1967 because of considerable disagreements on trade, foreign aid, and investments. In the face of increasing tension in South Asia and of the US-China rapprochement, India and the Soviet Union sealed in 1971 their relationship with a twenty-year treaty on peace, friendship, and cooperation, which virtually included a security guarantee for India from the Soviets, although the treaty was not binding. On the other hand, India did

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\textsuperscript{88} Spector 1990, p. 64; Lefever 1979, p. 33; Ganguly 1999, p. 159.

\textsuperscript{89} IFPA 1997.


\textsuperscript{91} Ganguly 1997.

\textsuperscript{92} Ganguly 1999, p. 158; Thakur 1993. See Thakur 1993 for a detailed discussion of the Indo-Soviet military relationship. By the latter half of the 1980’s, 4/5 of Indian military equipment procurement was from the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union, India was a show-case of Soviet weapons being effective in the Third World. India managed to fit the weapons trade with the Soviet Union partially into its policy framework of self-reliance, for example through indigenous production with Soviet licenses.
not have to totally give up its non-aligned status, as the treaty did not explicitly include a Soviet nuclear guarantee.\(^93\)

Until the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, the relationship with the Soviet Union was important for India because the steady supply of arms improved its security. After the war, Indian security threats were greatly diminished as Pakistan was defeated and divided. China, too, changed its foreign policies into a more moderate direction. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, it was thus quite unlikely that India would get involved in a major war. That time, the supply of armaments from the Soviet Union served another purpose: namely, to support India’s desire to become a strong regional hegemon.\(^94\)

5.2.3 The international non-proliferation regime

After the US had lost its nuclear monopoly in 1949, the superpowers shared an interest in preventing further states from acquiring nuclear weapons, as they wanted the international system to remain bipolar and stable. The possibility that the states defeated in WWII, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, would seek nuclear weapons, made the superpowers willing to work together to come up with legal arrangements to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons.\(^95\) The main framework through which they have worked and by which nuclear weapons are internationally regulated is the NPT, which has been strengthened by the export controls of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Club (NSC) and by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Also treaties on a complete ban on nuclear tests and a cut-off in fissile material production have been sought but so far, these efforts have been hampered by, e.g., Indian and Pakistani opposition (see Chapter 5.4.4).

China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons gave new impetus for the US and the Soviet Union to seek a multilateral treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. As a consequence of the US 1953 Atoms for Peace program, plutonium production capabilities had spread in many countries.\(^96\) Guidelines for the treaty were created in 1965 in the United Nations Political Committee and the NPT was eventually signed by the US, the UK, and the Soviet Union in 1968. The treaty became into force in 1970.\(^97\)

As a promoter of nuclear disarmament, India was active in the negotiations and in drafting the treaty. The final treaty also includes two aspects that had been especially important for India. First is the access to the peaceful applications of nuclear technology given to the non-nuclear states in return for them accepting not to obtain military nuclear technology. The other is the inclusion of the ultimate

\(^93\) The treaty required joint military consultations if the security of either party was threatened and prohibited the parties from joining a military alliance against each other and from assisting third parties in conflicts against each other. Ganguly 1999, pp. 158-159; Tamminen & Zenger 1998, pp. 239-240; Lefever 1979, p. 34; Thakur 1993.
\(^94\) Thakur 1993.
\(^95\) Eskelinen 1995, p. 3.
\(^97\) Ganguly 1999, pp. 155-158.
goal of universal nuclear disarmament in the treaty (Article 6). The stumbling block that eventually stopped India from signing the treaty was its insistence that all countries would be allowed to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions. The US could not accept this because of the impossibility of separating peaceful from military nuclear explosions.  

Furthermore, India continued to demand nuclear guarantees for the non-nuclear states from the nuclear powers. Indeed, in 1968 all permanent members of the Security Council excluding France voted for a UN Security Council Resolution on Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Nations. The resolution welcomes assistance from the nuclear powers to non-nuclear states if the latter are threatened by nuclear weapons, but it is totally unbinding. Both India and Pakistan abstained from voting for the resolution, because it did not give strong enough guarantees.  

The Indian attitude towards drafting the NPT became more passive after the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, and when a draft of the treaty was examined in 1967, Indian Secretaries’ Committee, Foreign Minister, and Prime Minister agreed on rejecting the treaty. India has claimed that the treaty was discriminatory as it grants some states a right to nuclear weapons but to others not. India has also criticized the treaty on the grounds that the nuclear powers have not filled their obligation to nuclear disarmament, and that the treaty gives legitimacy to the five acknowledged nuclear powers’ nuclear weapons. Furthermore, India claims that the treaty is dangerous because certain non-nuclear parties to the treaty have secretly violated it. Also Pakistan decided to stay outside the NPT. Its rejection of the treaty was mainly caused by New Delhi’s decision, and Pakistan was not so much against the treaty in such. 

The Indian demands targeted at the restriction of the military power of nuclear weapons so that countries would not be in unequal positions: the non-nuclear states would not need to fear to get blackmailed or attacked by nuclear weapons, and the whole division between nuclear and non-nuclear states would eventually cease to exist as the former would undertake nuclear disarmament. As the NPT did not satisfy these demands, India preferred to stay totally outside of it and maintain an option to acquire nuclear weapons.

The NPT denies nuclear powers from transferring nuclear explosives to non-nuclear countries and from aiding or encouraging non-nuclear states in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Similarly, it prohibits non-nuclear countries from accepting such help or nuclear explosives if these are offered to them. In the Article 3, the IAEA is given the mandate to monitor compliance with the treaty and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in non-nuclear states. All parties to the NPT are supposed to cooperate for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The nuclear states are supposed to agree on nuclear disarmament, which ultimately aims at the complete abandonment of nuclear weapons. 187 states, excluding Israel, Cuba, India, and Pakistan have signed the treaty. The nonproliferation regime, however,

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98 Ibid., pp. 155-156.  
100 Thakur 1993; Singh 1993; Moshaver 1992. However, many other countries did not ratify the treaty right away, either.  
101 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968.
lacks effective enforcement and punishment mechanisms, and has therefore not been able to prevent a determined state from developing nuclear weapons, as the Indian and the Pakistani examples show.

The NPT defines a nuclear power as a state that has built and successfully exploded a nuclear explosive before January the 1st, 1967. This is the only definition of a nuclear power in international law, and has necessarily frozen the number of legal nuclear states into five. The treaty does not leave any possibility for states that have acquired nuclear weapons after that date for joining in or to be accepted as nuclear states. It is thus impossible for such states to become parties of the treaty unless they permanently give up their nuclear weapons. Otherwise the whole treaty should be re-written and accepted, signed, and ratified by all the members of it.

5.2.4 The first Indian nuclear test

Already in 1970, India had announced it was making research for an underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes.\(^\text{102}\) The preparations for the test were completed by the end of 1972. By the early 1970’s, India was both capable and motivated (see Chapter 5.2.1 for a discussion of the Indian security situation) to carry out a nuclear test. Thus, that India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 was by no means totally unforeseeable. Only the political decision to carry out a test, its costs (e.g., sanctions imposed by other states) notwithstanding, was needed. The decision was probably made in the winter 1970-1971. The eventual timing of the test was largely dependent on I. Gandhi's declining domestic standing after the oil crises had put the economy under strain\(^\text{103}\). The secretive nature of nuclear research implied that the discussion about the test was taken in a small circle and that public debate was limited. The public opinion in India was in any case mostly favorable to testing. The world including the US was, however, surprised by the test when it was carried out on May 18, 1974.\(^\text{104}\)

India claimed that the test was made for peaceful purposes: nuclear explosions were supposed to be useful for example in building tunnels and channels.\(^\text{105}\) Spinn-offs from nuclear research to other technologies were also expected. The peaceful nature of the celebrated “Smiling Buddha” explosion was questioned everywhere from the outset as there is no way of separating peaceful from non-peaceful nuclear explosions. Besides, if India really would have been researching the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, it should have carried out several tests, not just one.

The claimed peaceful nature of the test was a compromise between the pro- and anti-nuclear elements in India. Even a “peaceful” explosive could be used as a powerful threat; on the other hand, India did not have to give up its pacifist rhetoric. The explosion marked a start of a nuclear obscurity or option strategy for India. The capability to produce nuclear explosives could be used as a threat. At the

\(^\text{102}\) Lefever 1979, p. 25.
\(^\text{103}\) Ganguly 1997.
\(^\text{104}\) Ganguly 1999, pp. 159-160; Chellaney 1999; Lefever 1979, pp. 27, 33. For a discussion on the preponderance of domestic factors in the Indian nuclear program, see Sagan 1996, pp. 65-69.
\(^\text{105}\) So far, no tunnels or channels have been built with the help of nuclear explosives.
same time, however, India assured that it had not taken the final step of assembling nuclear weapons and did not possess them, thus avoiding the negative international responses and sanctions that overt nuclear weaponization would have caused. As to the Indian definition of a nuclear weapon belong both the nuclear warhead and the delivery system, it could claim it did not possess nuclear weapons as long as these two were not combined. India has also emphasized that its nuclear program is a part of its policy of non-alignment and continuously reaffirmed its willingness to participate in universal nuclear disarmament together with other nuclear powers.106

The 1974 test has been considered as more a symbolic and political gesture to improve India’s international standing rather than a new military approach. First, India waited long after China had acquired nuclear weapons before it developed its own weapons. Second, India did not build up a nuclear arsenal in a long time after its test. The test, combined with India’s conventional weapons build-up, were ways for India to search the status of a major regional power that could no more be pressurized the way it was during the 1971 war when the US moved its aircraft to the region.107

The test was domestically first greatly celebrated, although the original euphoria did not last long. The international reaction was also less favorable than India had expected. France did congratulate India, and China showed mild criticism. China’s stance was that not only the superpowers had a right to nuclear weapons, but it called the Indian test nuclear blackmail against Pakistan.108

Canada’s reaction was strongest, which was understandable because it had had extensive cooperation with India on the nuclear realm, and because the plutonium used in the test originated in the CIRUS reactor built with Canadian help. Canada ended all nuclear cooperation with India, something that India had not expected.109

The Soviets simply announced that India had conducted a peaceful explosion and was committed to not acquiring nuclear weapons. This reaction was partially dependent on the Soviet Union itself insisting on conducting peaceful tests for researching the possibilities to use them for mining. In 1976, the Soviet Union also agreed to sell heavy water to India after Canada had cut off its supply.110 However, in principle the Soviet Union was against nuclear proliferation in India.

Bhutto responded to the test by stating that also Pakistan needed to acquire nuclear weapons, an “Islamic bomb”111. Immediately after the Indian test, Pakistan tried to benefit from the negative international reactions and called for nuclear assurances from all five nuclear powers or at least one of them for states that were faced by potential nuclear blackmail. However, no new assurances were given. Pakistan also repeated its proposition for a South Asian NWFZ but India rejected the idea. In February 1975, after Pakistani persuasion and Indian protests notwithstanding, the

110 Lefever 1979, p. 37.
111 FAS 2000b.
US lifted the 1965 ban to sell conventional arms to the two countries. Pakistan tried to build stronger ties with Iran and Turkey as also these states were also concerned about Indian nuclear activities. In the latter case, the efforts hardly led anywhere but Iran became a source of military hardware and training.\textsuperscript{112}

The US also reacted negatively, although not very harshly. In August 1974, the US International Development Association Act was amended so that the US would oppose any loans to non-NPT-member countries that develop nuclear explosives. The US suspended shipments of enriched uranium to India but removed the suspension in September 1974. Thereafter the US tried to closely scrutinize that its shipments of enriched uranium did not end up being used as a material for nuclear explosives. In December 1974, the Senate cut bilateral aid to India. As US attempts to persuade India to accept non-proliferation measures (for example IAEA safeguards) failed, the US lost interest in nuclear cooperation with India.\textsuperscript{113}

The US lost its hegemonic position as an exporter of nuclear technology in the 1970’s. The market became divided between several exporter countries, which could not agree on export rules. As the Indian test made it obvious that the existing export control systems were lacking, unclear, and varied from country to country, the suppliers of nuclear technology met in 1974, setting up the London Nuclear Suppliers’ Club (NSC), which aimed at creating common rules for the export of nuclear technologies and materials.\textsuperscript{114}

The strong international reactions kept India from carrying out more tests. It is surprising, though, that India showed restraint at this point, especially as further tests could have seriously have damaged the NPT regime, which was already tottering because of its first test.\textsuperscript{115}

5.2.5 Pakistan builds nuclear capabilities

In the 1970’s, financing from Libya and other Arab countries set the Pakistani nuclear weapons program going.\textsuperscript{116} Z. A. Bhutto even apparently agreed with Qaddafi that Pakistan would provide Libya with several nuclear weapons later on as a payback for financing and uranium that Qaddafi offered to provide. China started assisting Pakistan in its nuclear program in 1974 by sending twelve scientists. In 1975, China helped Pakistan in building a nuclear research plant. As noted above, in the 1970’s and early 1980’s, China did not oppose nuclear proliferation in new countries because it thought that was a way to decrease the US and the Soviet influence.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{112} Lefever 1979, pp. 43-44; Moshaver 1992.
\textsuperscript{114} Liira 1995, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{115} Ganguly 1997; Chellaney 1999.
\textsuperscript{116} Mushtaq 2001.
\textsuperscript{117} Meyer 1984, p. 135; Spector 1990, p. 61.
From early on, the Pakistani nuclear weapons program was divided into two competing sections: the plutonium and the uranium program. As far as the plutonium program was concerned, in 1973 Z. A. Bhutto tried to buy a nuclear reprocessing plant for the enrichment of spent uranium fuel to plutonium from France, although pretending that the plant was to be used for peaceful purposes only. France first accepted to sell a plant but eventually cancelled the deal (see below). The plutonium program of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was led by I. Ahmed. However, after Dr. A. Q. Khan arrived in Pakistan in 1975, he apparently managed to convince the Pakistani leadership of the advantages of uranium over plutonium. Thus Pakistan started also taking steps on the uranium route by undertaking clandestine efforts to build a uranium enrichment plant. Khan became the head of the uranium program (separated from PAEC in 1976) of Khan Research Laboratories. He was considered as the father of the nuclear program and a national hero. Khan had worked at a nuclear plant in the Netherlands where he presumably obtained knowledge and information that he later used for the benefit of the Pakistani nuclear program. The construction of both the Sihala pilot facility and the Kahuta full-scale facility was started in 1978. The Pakistani nuclear program soon became heavily dependent on clandestine transfers of nuclear hardware and technology (discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.3.2).

In 1977, China and Pakistan planned together to build and test Pakistan’s first nuclear weapon, but these plans were abandoned when the military coup of General Zia ul-Haq took the power from Z. A. Bhutto in July 1977. Bhutto claimed that he had been removed from office because of his commitment to the nuclear program. Zia, however, soon continued the nuclear program. It has been claimed that the reason for removing Bhutto was that he did not enjoy Washington’s support.

M. Desai, Indian Prime Minister since 1977, opposed overt weaponization, assembling nuclear weapons. The Pakistani efforts to acquire nuclear weapons started to be apparent towards the end of 1970’s, which gradually led to new attitudes towards weaponization in Indian statements. After Desai’s government fell in 1979, it was followed by an interim government of C. Singh. During Singh’s tenure it was in 1979 no longer claimed that India would not even think of acquiring nuclear weapons. Instead, it was admitted that India might do so if Pakistan was to make a nuclear test.

The major threat India was countering with its nuclear weapons had originally been China. Now the program was given new direction as it was for the first time made dependent on the actions of Pakistan. The Pakistani threat became gradually the overt reason for the Indian nuclear weapons program, while China has remained the covert reason.

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118 FAS 2000b.
120 Bhutto proclaimed his own victory in the 1977 national elections. The opposition denounced the results as fraudulent and demanded new elections. As anti-government turmoil rose in Pakistan, the army removed Bhutto. Zia promised elections in three months’ time, but when it became apparent that Bhutto’s popularity had not suffered, the elections were postponed. Z. A. Bhutto was hanged in 1979. Lifschultz 1998.
121 Kapur 1995.
After returning to power in 1980, I. Gandhi proceeded to further develop the country’s nuclear capabilities. Despite significant US pressure, critical facilities were not placed under IAEA safeguards.\(^{124}\) Around the turn of the decade, India also started efforts to develop a thermonuclear bomb, although this became publicly known first in 1989\(^{125}\).

5.2.6 US non-proliferation regulations tightened

In 1976, the increasing worry about nuclear proliferation, caused in part by the Indian 1974 test, resulted in the US Congress in the Glenn-Symington Amendment to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, which denied US military and economic assistance from countries importing unsafeguarded enrichment and reprocessing technology (the former needed on the uranium and the latter on the plutonium route to developing nuclear weapons). The amendment was, however, later to hit Pakistan but not that much India because the latter’s program was quite indigenous, making it unnecessary for India to import so much technology. The Amendment authorized the President to waive the enrichment-related sanctions if he was convinced that the importing country was not seeking nuclear weapons. Since the law was passed, no President has ever been able to state that with respect to Pakistan.\(^{126}\) The reprocessing-related sanctions could, however, be waived more easily and even indefinitely if the President considered it was in the US interest\(^{127}\).

By 1976, also the Pakistani program had become a source of worry in Washington. The plutonium reprocessing plant that France had agreed to sell would have allowed Pakistan to produce plutonium and, despite the required IAEA safeguards, would have enabled Pakistan to build up plutonium stocks. US Vice President H. Kissinger traveled in 1976 to Pakistan to lay pressure on the country to join the NPT and to cancel out the order from France. He promised that the US would supply Pakistan with new A-7 bombers, had Pakistan agreed to cancel the deal. This did not bring the desired results but after Paris had obtained US intelligence data about the Pakistani nuclear program, it eventually agreed to cancel the deal. In September 1977, the US halted economic and military aid to Pakistan because of the deal but resumed it in August 1978 after France had totally ended carrying out the agreement with Pakistan.\(^{128}\)

President Carter had presented himself as a strict opponent of nuclear proliferation already in his election campaign. Furthermore, he gave special attention to the Pakistan nuclear program. The Carter Administration had a policy of regional influentials, which meant that certain states had regionally predominant positions. On the Indian subcontinent, India was considered as such a state\(^{129}\), and the Pakistani nuclear ambitions interfered in this picture.

\(^{124}\) Spector 1990, p. 65.
\(^{125}\) IFPA 1997.
\(^{127}\) Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 139.
Towards the late 1970’s, as the use of nuclear energy had become more widespread, it was clear that several countries around the world were slowly achieving latent nuclear weapons capabilities. Therefore, a lot of research was conducted on nuclear proliferation, especially on its technological aspects, implications, and US policy options. The US was especially concerned about the proliferation consequences of plutonium recycling. In the 1970’s, research on plutonium for nuclear power generation became namely popular because the oil crises had highly increased the expectations of the importance of nuclear energy in the future and at the same time led to a worry that the uranium resources would run out. Also Pakistan used these fears to claim that it was researching the peaceful uses of plutonium. The US worry about proliferation led it to initiate the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) conference. With the INFCE, the US aimed at convincing other states that the spread of plutonium recycling would lead to nuclear proliferation, and at trying to strengthen its claims that plutonium recycling was neither economical nor necessary (the US claimed that sufficient nuclear fuel resources existed).\(^{130}\) The overall consequence of the research efforts was the focusing on the technological, supply-side dimension of nuclear proliferation.

During the Carter Administration term, the increased US activism in non-proliferation led to the 1978 US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), where the US committed itself not to export critical technologies to countries that might use them to acquire nuclear explosives. Also technologies and material associated with reprocessing (i.e. the plutonium route) are subjected to strict export controls.\(^{131}\) The Act made it necessary that states that receive nuclear materials or technology place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards. The Act caused one of the few occasions where the US sanctions touched the largely indigenous Indian nuclear program. In 1980, the Act led to the ending of all US nuclear cooperation with India, eventually also as far as the sales of spare parts and fuel for the Tarapur reactor were concerned, although this particular reactor was under safeguards. To ensure that India would not abandon the safeguards from Tarapur, however, in 1983 the US negotiated an agreement with India and France that the latter will provide the former with fuel and spare parts for Tarapur.\(^{132}\) When the term of this agreement was over, the US succeeded in creating a consensus among the possible supplier countries about making a new supply deal dependent on India accepting full-scale safeguards on all its nuclear installations. In this case, it was China who accepted to sell fuel although only the reactors in question were safeguarded.\(^{133}\)

In 1978, President Carter declared that the US will not use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear members of the NPT if they are not allied or in close cooperation with nuclear powers. This declaration has been repeated by the other US presidents, too.\(^{134}\) The declaration was a unilateral repetition of the US-Soviet declaration from 1966 (see Chapter 5.2.1), and therefore not really anything new, although it had some symbolic value.

\(^{130}\) Nye 1984, p. x; Meyer 1984, p. 4.
\(^{131}\) Heiskanen 1995, pp. 31-32.
\(^{132}\) Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, pp. 5-6; Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 120.
\(^{133}\) IFPA 1997.
\(^{134}\) Heiskanen 1995, p. 39.
5.3 Countering the Soviet threat

5.3.1 The war in Afghanistan and US aid to Pakistan

By 1979, all the few Pakistani nuclear facilities were still under IAEA safeguards. However, in the face of growing evidence that the Pakistani nuclear program did not aim at peaceful purposes only, under the 1976 Glenn-Symington Amendment (see above), the US stopped aid to Pakistan in May 1979 after Pakistan had imported uranium-enrichment equipment. Washington’s criticism towards the Pakistani program softened after the Iranian revolution, which led the US to think that Pakistan could replace Iran as a post for gathering intelligence about the Soviet Union. The Carter Administration’s decision to offer Pakistan increased economic and military assistance was strengthened by the Soviets marching into Afghanistan in the end of 1979, which increased Pakistan’s strategic importance for the US. Islamabad, however, rejected the Carter Administration’s initial offer of $400 million.

In 1981 Pakistan accepted the offer of the new Reagan Administration for a six-year aid package worth $3.2 billion. The US also agreed to sell Pakistan forty F-16 fighter-bombers. This was made possible by an exemption from the enrichment-provisions of the Glenn-Symington Amendment by the Congress, which granted the President the authority to waive the sanctions for ten years if this was in the national interest. In early 1982, the President also waived the reprocessing-provisions of the Amendment indefinitely. By this time, Pakistan was no longer needed for intelligence purposes but as an ally against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Pakistan became a channel through which the US gave aid to the Afghan resistance. Washington also hoped that its aid could help restrain the Pakistani nuclear weapons program as Pakistan was provided with advanced conventional weapons that enhanced its national security. This view was propagated until 1989 also by both Presidents Reagan and Bush.

Already this time, differences between the US legislative and the executive in the views on how to best work against nuclear proliferation could be seen. In this case, it the US Congress was keen to ensure that the Afghan resistance was given enough support, whereas the Administration was afraid that the assistance could make Pakistan a target for Soviet retaliation. Usually however, the Congress has preferred stricter policies against nuclear proliferation than the President, who has wanted to have flexibility to ensure that the overall US interests are being served.

Also China collaborated with Pakistan and the US in supporting the Afghan resistance. This connection strengthened the basis on which Pakistan and China built their extensive cooperation in the realm of nuclear and missile programs.

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139 Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 2.
140 Weiner 1996.
Thus although the Pakistani nuclear program was going on, the US was willing to make special exemptions from its own non-proliferation legislation, when other, more important US interests were so served. During President Reagan’s term, countering the Soviet Union was the primary foreign policy objective, and other considerations had to be adjusted to serve this goal. The President did not only perceive Soviet Union as a balance-of-power rival but also as a real threat to the existence of the US-led capitalist system. The relations of the US with a foreign country were dependent on the “usefulness” of the country in the anti-Soviet crusade. Therefore, the Communist China and the undemocratic Pakistan were likely to have closer ties with the US than the democratic India that had been tilted towards the Soviet Union.141

Though India was not directly threatened by the support the US gave Pakistan during the Afghanistan war, it made it impossible for India to act unconstrained as a major regional power and gave Pakistan a chance to act independently in regional matters, also with respect to the Kashmir question. Another source of worry for India was Islamic revival in Pakistan that Zia propagated, which resulted in Pakistani support for the Afghan fundamentalist guerrillas and in Pakistani links to the Persian Gulf states and the Khomeini government in Iran.142

5.3.2 Clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities

The Pakistani nuclear program has relied heavily on clandestinely exported materials and knowledge. Also the Indian program has benefited from such covert transfers. Nuclear transfers are strictly regulated by the NSG and the NPT Exporters’ Committee Guidelines. However, towards the end of 1980’s it became obvious that India and Pakistan had obtained nuclear technology and materials also from and through Western Europe. Sometimes the agents that worked for India or Pakistan got involved in outright smuggling, for example by using falsified or lacking export documents. In other instances, export licenses were obtained from the supplier countries because of the negligence of officials or gaps in regulations. On the other hand, a wide array of technologies and materials used for nuclear weapons production are of a dual-use nature. Transferring them can seem innocent and the suppliers can also play or feel innocent.143

The Pakistani uranium enrichment facility in Kahuta was largely a product of extensive clandestine transfers from the late 1970’s onwards. The facility presumably started the production of weapons-grade uranium in 1986. Canadian, British, Dutch, Swiss, and American companies were involved in the transfers. A West German agent provided Pakistan with an entire uranium conversion installation in 1977-1980. During the 1980’s, further Pakistani nuclear transfer partners were found in Sweden, the Netherlands, and West Germany. West German agents’ assistance was especially important for helping Pakistan to produce tritium for advanced nuclear weapons.144

142 Spector 1990, p. 70.
143 Ibid., pp. 31-33.
144 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
Pakistani efforts to acquire critical technologies continued throughout the 1980’s. Although Pakistan did not hesitate to get involved in clandestine transfers, it also bought dual-use components for its enrichment facilities legally from the world market. The world market for nuclear technologies and materials became more competitive and when the supplier countries had to fight for market shares, they were not always as strict as the US in export control, which made questionable transfers easier. New supplier countries from outside the NPT also entered the market that were willing to trade with countries interested in the acquisition of nuclear technologies. The latter countries also cooperated with each other. The export license criteria varied in West European countries. Especially West Germany became a major supplier for the threshold states. In the end of the 1980’s, the export controls were finally tightened there after several smuggling scandals.  

In 1984, Sweden sold Pakistan a flash x-ray machine needed in the production of plutonium explosives. However, the US convinced Sweden that it should send neither manuals and spare parts for the machine nor an expert to teach how to use it to Pakistan. In 1987, Pakistan tried to send two men to the US to get training on the use of the machine but the US did not accept them when it was found out that the men were atomic scientists.

Further evidence on the Pakistani efforts to improve the uranium enrichment capabilities came in April 1987, when a large-scale Pakistani smuggling effort was revealed. Pakistan had tried to transfer custom-manufactured equipment and blueprints for a uranium enrichment plant from Europe with the help of Swiss and West German companies. Pakistan denied its involvement in the smuggling effort and the US did not react, either. Another illegal transfer received more US attention in July, however, when a Pakistani-born Canadian, A. Pervez, was arrested after having tried to smuggle material for nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment facilities from the US to Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan was also making major illegal transfers from West Germany that aimed at enabling Pakistan to produce tritium for advanced nuclear weapons. The Reagan Administration attempts to get Germany to halt the transfers did not meet with success.

The Indian non-safeguarded plutonium production has also been dependent on exported heavy water. In the late 1980’s, it was found out that India had obtained great amounts of heavy water through a West German agent. Most of the heavy water had originated in China. Other source countries, including Norway and the Soviet Union, were led to believe that the heavy water they sold would be used in a country where IAEA safeguards were in place. These activities that went on throughout the 1980’s, enhanced the Indian weapons production capabilities.

Before India’s involvement in large-scale smuggling became public, India claimed that its nuclear program was transparent and therefore only peaceful and blamed Pakistan of clandestine nuclear transfers, making Pakistan seem more suspicious than India. After the Indian smuggling actions became known, it was hard to

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147 Spector 1990, pp. 97-98.
148 Ibid., pp. 35-38.
imagine why it would engage itself into such wide clandestine transfers if they were for peaceful purposes only.\textsuperscript{149}

5.3.3 US policies fluctuate between threats and giving aid

In the 1980’s, China was intensively involved in assisting the Pakistani nuclear program. According to US intelligence, China helped Pakistan operate the Kahuta plant and had given Pakistan enough enriched uranium for two explosives, followed by more material later on, including enough tritium for ten hydrogen bombs. China also allegedly gave Pakistan a complete model of a nuclear weapon in 1983. The model would have been very valuable for Pakistan because using it, Pakistan could manufacture reliable weapons without having to conduct a nuclear test. The Chinese model has indeed been considered as one reason why Pakistan long refrained from conducting tests. In 1983, Pakistani Foreign Minister Y. Khan witnessed a Chinese nuclear test, which caused rumors that the tested device was actually a Pakistani one. Using the Chinese model, Pakistan also reportedly built and tested a complete weapon with a non-nuclear core in September 1986. In 1986, Pakistan and China signed an atomic energy cooperation agreement.\textsuperscript{150}

Although Pakistan had somewhat concentrated on the Khan uranium program, around the mid-1980’s, problems in that program led Pakistan to again put more effort on the plutonium program. China helped Pakistan also on the plutonium program, e.g., in the construction of the Khushab heavy water reactor.\textsuperscript{151}

In early 1984, Pakistan announced that it had succeeded in producing enriched uranium, though it claimed that it had only produced low-enriched uranium not suitable for nuclear weapons. In the summer of 1984, it was known both within the Reagan Administration and the US Senate that the Pakistani nuclear weapons program was continuing. As further evidence, it was found out about the large scale of the Chinese involvement in the Pakistani program and also that Pakistan had tried to smuggle nuclear weapons equipment out of the US.\textsuperscript{152} President Reagan responded to this information by sending a letter to President Zia in September 1984 to express his concern about the Pakistani program and to threaten with grave, though unspecified, consequences if Pakistan would enrich uranium over a 5 \% -level. By accepting this limit, Pakistan would have remained significantly apart from actually producing nuclear explosives, because for them, uranium enriched to at least 90 \% is needed. In the letter, Reagan required clearly more abstinence from Pakistan than the US legislation, which only denied Pakistan from possessing nuclear explosives. Pakistan seemed to assure the US that the 5 \% -limit would not be exceeded, but later on denied having accepted a clear limit. Though the US pressure on Pakistan did not lead Islamabad to halt its weapons program, the pressure was enough to keep Pakistan from conducting a nuclear test.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., pp. 71-74.
\textsuperscript{151} FAS 2000b.
\textsuperscript{152} Spector 1990, pp. 92-93.
At the same time, the Soviet Union was moving more forces close to the Pakistani border and violating the Pakistani air space by bombing Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. Therefore, the Reagan Administration decided to provide Pakistan with advanced air-to-air missiles. Also key congressional committees expressed their willingness to accept a new share of the 1981, $3.2 billion assistance package for Pakistan. Although Pakistan successfully tested a non-nuclear triggering package for nuclear weapons in July 1985, thus taking another important step in developing nuclear weapons capabilities, the Congress authorized US assistance only three weeks later. At the same time the Congress, however, brought the threat of sanctions back on Pakistan as it strengthened the US non-proliferation regulations by the Pakistan-specific Pressler Amendment. According to the Amendment, the President has to annually certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive before aid could be disbursed or arms sold to Pakistan. Furthermore, the Congress enacted the Solarz Amendment that prohibits US assistance to non-nuclear states that have smuggled items for nuclear explosives out of the US.\(^{154}\)

The US seemed, however, to be willing to sacrifice its opposition to nuclear proliferation in the face of other important considerations, especially the rivalry against the Soviet Union. The US did not punish Pakistan for crossing the 5 % - limit set in the Reagan letter although Pakistan had done that at the latest by October 1985. The Congress might not have been fully aware of Pakistan’s progress in uranium enrichment at the time of the authorization of assistance for Pakistan in July, but the Reagan Administration was aware of it in October when Presidents Reagan and Zia met in at the UN. Because Reagan did not want to risk losing the US ally in Afghanistan, he did not bring the subject up. The US thus quietly accepted to watch, or not to see, Pakistan develop nuclear weapons. Another six-year flow of assistance to Pakistan from October 1987 onwards, this time worth $4.02 billion, was announced by the Reagan Administration in March 1986. This was possible as the waiver of the Glenn-Symington Amendment had been extended until the fall of 1994.\(^{155}\)

After information about Pakistani nuclear smuggling activities and Chinese assistance to the Pakistani program had become available, it was rumored in the summer of 1984 that India might make a pre-emptive attack on the Kahuta enrichment plant in Pakistan. After the mid-1980’s, it was also increasingly feared in Pakistan that Israel would make such an attack to prevent the Muslim Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons. These fears led to increased efforts to protect the facility. It was also rumored that India and Israel might attack the Pakistani facilities together.\(^{156}\)

Around the mid-1980’s, both India and Pakistan were making significant progress in their weapons programs in ways that made it obvious that neither program aimed at the peaceful uses of nuclear power only. At the same time, however, the Indo-Pakistani relations improved so that in the end of 1985 there seemed to be hope of the normalization of them. These hopes were, however, crushed by internal

\(^{154}\) The Pressler Amendment was directed only towards Pakistan because the 1981 waiver to the enrichment sanctions of the Glenn-Symington Amendment had also only applied to it. Spector 1990, p. 94; Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 140.


political turmoil in both countries. Also in general though the Indo-Pakistani relations occasionally seemed to be improving, positive developments were always short-lived and the relations remained tense.\textsuperscript{157}

Though Pakistan was developing its nuclear weapon capabilities, throughout most of the 1980’s, it also had another nuclear policy objective, which was to achieve assurances for mutual nuclear restraint with India. President Zia proposed bilateral measures that would have led to the ending of the two nuclear weapons programs. He wanted to get rid of the expensive weapons program that also caused difficulties with the US.\textsuperscript{158}

5.3.4 Pakistan attains the capability to produce nuclear weapons

In the summer and fall of 1986, unofficial as well as official US Administration reports acknowledged that Pakistan was at least almost capable of producing nuclear weapons, had produced weapons-grade uranium, and had tested non-nuclear parts of a nuclear explosive. Nonetheless, in October 1986 President Reagan certified the Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device, as required by the Pressler Amendment. The US assistance was thus left unaffected the obvious Pakistani advances notwithstanding. The Reagan certification apparently relied on the view that Pakistan had not yet actually produced and assembled all the components for a weapon although it had the explosive material. From this time onwards, Pakistan was considered almost a de facto nuclear state that had material for nuclear weapons and could assemble a few nuclear weapons quickly if needed.\textsuperscript{159}

Around the turn of the year 1986-1987, Pakistan and India were drawn into a new crisis when India arranged the biggest military rehearsal in its history called Brass Tacks. The resulting mobilizations for rehearsals on both sides led to fears of a major clash between the two countries. Though this danger was avoided as the US successfully set up consultations between Zia and Indian Prime Minister R. Gandhi, the relations between the two countries remained tense.\textsuperscript{160}

During the winter, further information was published about both countries making progress in their uranium enrichment efforts. In March 1987, during the Brass Tacks crises, a notable Indian journalist, K. Nayar, was invited to meet A. Q. Khan,\textsuperscript{157} Spector 1990, pp. 66-67, 95-96. I. Gandhi was assassinated in October 1984. The Congress chose her son, Rajiv, to be her follower. US Department of State 2000a.\textsuperscript{158} FAS 2000b.\textsuperscript{159} Spector 1990, p. 95.\textsuperscript{160} The rehearsal was not only to serve military purposes but also to threaten Pakistan, which supported Sikh insurgents in India. India had in vain tried to persuade the US to lay pressure on Pakistan to withdraw this support. Because the US-Indian relations were not very good, India was not willing to take the risk of starting an outright war against Pakistan for this cause. Despite Pakistani inquiries, India did not clarify it the objectives of Brass Tacks. After India had received signs of Pakistan troops moving close to the border and nervous Indian officials had publicly expressed their fears of a war, diplomatic consultations between the two countries were eventually arranged. Ganguly 1995, pp. 326-327; Spector 1990, pp. 66-68, 96-97. In Brass Tacks, India also rehearsed the use of tactical nuclear weapons in field operations. IFPA 1997.
the head of the Pakistani uranium program. In the interview, Khan told that Pakistan had proceeded significantly in the enrichment of uranium and owned material for a nuclear weapon. On the following day Khan, however, denied giving such a statement. The resulting debate about the interview’s truthfulness decreased the political significance of the issue so that there were no consequences for the US aid. The alleged statement was in any case generally taken seriously, especially in India, although Pakistan refrained from admitting that it had nuclear weapons. This was the first time when nuclear weapons were used as an open threat in the region: Khan allegedly told that his country would use nuclear weapons if its existence were being threatened. In reality, Pakistan did not yet have a nuclear capability because of the lack of a delivery system. Soon after the Khan interview, President Zia gave further confirmation about the situation in the Pakistani nuclear program. He announced that Pakistan was capable of manufacturing a nuclear weapon if it wished but had neither actually done it nor manufactured weapons-grade uranium. It has been claimed that the Pakistani statements about the nuclear weapons made India willing to stop the Brass Tacks crises from escalating further in the face of the possibility of a nuclear war.¹⁶¹ Thus nuclear weapons might have been a stabilizing factor in the crises.

In 1987, India pronounced that it was convinced that Pakistan had a nuclear weapon.¹⁶² Though India remained calm the apparent Pakistani nuclear capability notwithstanding, it tried it as an argument in lobbying for US action against the Pakistani nuclear ambitions and particularly for a decrease in US aid to Pakistan. After the Pervez smuggling affair (see above) that apparently violated the 1985 Solarz Amendment, which prohibits US assistance to non-nuclear states that have smuggled items for nuclear explosives out of the US, opposition to aid for Pakistan increased within the US legislators. Pakistani Prime Minister M. K. Junejo tried to avoid such setbacks by suggesting a bilateral ban on nuclear tests between India and Pakistan. India rejected the proposal, however, because it did not take China into account. New Delhi possibly also thought that no concessions were needed from India at a moment when Pakistan faced high pressure from the US. The US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs M. Armacost expressed US concerns about the Pakistani smuggling efforts on his visit to Islamabad in August 1987 and demanded Pakistan to restrain its nuclear activities. President Zia did not admit such activities were taking place. At the same time, however, negotiations on Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan were in a critical phase. President Reagan certified the US aid again since according to his knowledge, Pakistan did not technically possess totally assembled nuclear explosives and in December, the Congress authorized $480 million of new aid to Pakistan. This happened even though during the congressional debate on new aid for the next year, the US Ambassador-at-Large for Non-Proliferation R. T. Kennedy admitted that Pakistan has crossed the 5% limit in enriching uranium.¹⁶³

In early 1988 in a congressional testimony related to the Pervez smuggling affair, the US administration admitted for the first time in public that Pakistan had a nuclear weapons program under way. By waiving the Solarz Amendment with regard to Pakistan, President Reagan indirectly admitted that the Pakistani

government was involved in ongoing smuggling. In March, a thorough report on the Pakistani nuclear activities based on Reagan Administration information was published in New York Times Magazine. It was stated that Pakistan had both enough highly enriched uranium and almost all components for several nuclear weapons, even if no weapons had so far been assembled.\(^{164}\)

Though the Indian plutonium build-up was obvious, the US Department of State testified to the Congress in early 1988 that the final step to acquiring nuclear weapons remained not taken for India. A few months later, however, a press report citing US intelligence sources claimed that India had been producing twenty nuclear weapons per year from late 1986 onwards. According to the same report, a Department of State source had stated that India had in fact produced nuclear devices in 1974-77, but on the other hand that the Department of state did not believe that India was producing nuclear weapons at the moment.\(^{165}\)

By the early 1988, the strategic situation in South Asia had changed as the Pakistani de facto nuclear capability ended India’s nuclear weapons monopoly on the subcontinent and decreased the value of India’s superiority on conventional weapons. This highlighted the importance for India of maintaining superiority in nuclear weapons, leading India to put emphasis on expanding its nuclear infrastructure and on developing ballistic missiles (see Chapter 5.5.1). India stated that Pakistan was pressing it to reconsider its nuclear policies as well as to build up its unsafeguarded plutonium stock.\(^{166}\)

On the other hand, India at the same time increasingly established its credentials as the major regional power by expanding and improving its conventional military forces and ballistic missile capabilities and by intervening in internal conflicts in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the latter operation also gaining recognition from the US. Under R. Gandhi, New Delhi also started rapprochement with Beijing in order to make China less threatening for India as well as to decrease Chinese support for Pakistan. Though the Sino-Indian relations were relatively peaceful and even a historical summit between the two states took place in the end of 1988, border disputes remained unsolved, and China continued to support Pakistan. The Sino-Indian relations continued to improve gradually throughout the 1990’s until the Indian 1998 tests. On the other hand, these Indian actions in turn strengthened Pakistan’s inclination to develop nuclear capabilities.\(^{167}\)

Around the turn of the decade, India continued to add to its unsafeguarded plutonium production potential. In 1990, it was estimated that India was able to produce enough plutonium for more than 40 nuclear weapons per year. In 1996, the unsafeguarded plutonium production potential was further greatly increased. India also started making efforts to produce advanced thermonuclear weapons.\(^{168}\)

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\(^{164}\) Ibid., pp. 69-70, 99-100.  
\(^{165}\) Ibid., pp. 69-70.  
\(^{166}\) Ibid., p. 70.  
5.3.5 Increasing US pressure on Pakistan

Zia died in a plane crash in August of 1988. Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Z. A. Bhutto, became Pakistani Prime Minister of a multi-party government after winning the elections in November 1988. Already before she was elected, B. Bhutto had indicated that she could be willing to halt the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, she had close ties to the US, which made it more likely that the US could press her into curbing the program down. Such pressure was also more likely to be forthcoming because the Soviet Union started withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan around the turn of the year 1988-1989. At the time of the Pakistani elections, President Reagan again certified that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. However, he qualified his statement by admitting that it did not mean that Pakistan was not developing one and that it was increasingly difficult to know with certainty whether Pakistan possessed one or not.169

As the Soviet forces were withdrawing from Afghanistan, New Delhi tried again in vain to persuade the US to cut aid to Pakistan, referring to the Pakistani nuclear activities. R. Gandhi hoped that a cut-off of the US aid would press Pakistan to slow down its nuclear program. At the same time, however, the Indo-Pakistani relations showed some temporary improvement. At end of 1988, B. Bhutto and R. Gandhi signed an agreement that the two countries would not attack each other’s nuclear installations, an agreement that the leaders of the two countries had made orally in 1985. Later on, increasing tensions between the two countries postponed the agreement’s entry into force until January 1991. Thereafter, the two countries started regularly changing lists of plants covered by the agreement. In July 1989, R. Gandhi also made the first state visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Islamabad in several decades. Confidence-building measures continued to be introduced between the two countries, for example, in 1992 they agreed to give advance notifications of military exercises and to avoid flying over each other’s territories with military aircraft.170

In the spring of 1989, B. Bhutto faced strong pressure from the US to curb the nuclear program, especially as it did not seem sure that the US Congress would show green light for as extensive amounts of military aid to Pakistan as before. Pakistan was especially interested in acquiring 60 F-16 bombers from the US, similar to the 40 bombers that the US had supplied Pakistan with in 1981-1987. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed, which made it obvious that the aid that the US would give Pakistan would only be used against the Indian threat. The US had never admitted that helping Pakistan to counter India would be a basis for its support for Islamabad.

B. Bhutto’s room for action was, however, quite restricted because her government faced severe domestic difficulties. Indeed, he fragile position of Bhutto’s democratically elected government gave the US a new reason to support Islamabad. The US support was expected to strengthen Bhutto’s domestic standing and Pakistani democracy. This view was relatively popular in Washington especially because B. Bhutto enjoyed relatively wide popularity there. Continuing

aid from the US to Pakistan became even more likely as the Pakistani support for anti-Communist Afghan guerillas was still considered as necessary. At the same time, Pakistan showed no signs of destroying its stockpiles of nuclear weapons material and continued to enrich uranium. ¹⁷¹

During the summer of 1989, press reports based on German and US government sources stated that Pakistan was testing nuclear delivery systems, thereby possibly violating the US conditions for the use of the F-16’s, and was continuing clandestine transfers. At the same time, in the face of growing Indian capabilities, the pressure increased in Islamabad towards more overt nuclear weaponization: even B. Bhutto stated that if India further advanced on the weapons’ track, Pakistan would reply in a similar manner. ¹⁷²

Despite all this, the Congress accepted the sale of further F-16’s in the summer of 1989. The Bush Administration assured the Congress that none of the previously delivered F-16’s had been made suitable for delivering nuclear explosives and that this was not allowed under the conditions of the new contract, either. Furthermore, it was stated that the sale would be cancelled if it was found out that Pakistan possessed a nuclear explosive device. ¹⁷³ In October 1989, President Bush again certified that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, although he noted that it was increasingly difficult to know this for sure as the Pakistani unsafeguarded nuclear program was continuing. In November, the Congress in its turn suspended the Glenn-Symington Amendment with respect to Pakistan until April 1991. Unlike in 1987 when the Amendment was also suspended, no debate took place. However, the suspension was only for one year, indicating that the Congress wanted to follow the developments in Pakistan closely. ¹⁷⁴

Although the situation in Kashmir had been relatively peaceful since the end of the 1971 war ¹⁷⁵, in 1990, another serious crises developed between India and Pakistan about the region. In the end of 1989, a full-scale uprising begun in the Indian Kashmir, and India blamed Pakistan for agitation. As the crises went on and India tried to suppress the uprising harshly, Pakistan got more involved. ¹⁷⁶ India also planned to strike at the Kashmiri training camps located in Pakistan. As Pakistan picked up signals that it interpreted to mean an Indian attack, it started making preparations for a war, too. The heated statements of the both sides even gave grounds for a fear that the two countries were at the brink of a nuclear war. This time, Pakistan presumably produced cores for several nuclear weapons, something it had been able to do since 1986 but had not done before ¹⁷⁷. According to US intelligence, Pakistan had also installed a nuclear weapon in an F-16 during the crises. Though neither the talks between the two Foreign Ministers nor US Deputy National Security Advisor R. Gates’ visit to South Asia seemed to help, India eventually withdraw and war was avoided. It can be argued that the threat of

¹⁷² Ibid., pp. 106-107.
¹⁷³ Ibid., pp. 107-108.
¹⁷⁶ The uprising was originally indigenous but its scope was later probably clearly magnified by Pakistani support.
nuclear weapons might again have helped to stop the crises from escalating further.  

5.4 After the end of the Cold War

5.4.1 US sanctions on Pakistan

As discussed above, although the end of the Cold War diminished Pakistan’s strategic importance for the US, the US did not immediately act decisively against the Pakistani nuclear program in the fear of possible consequences of sanctions on the fragile Pakistani democracy. However, Pakistan’s reckless attitude and especially the escalation of tensions in Kashmir in the spring of 1990 changed the US attitude. In October 1990, President Bush did not renew the certification required by the Pressler Amendment because it seemed that Pakistan had fabricated the core for nuclear weapons during the crises with India in the previous winter. In the previous few years, the technically undefined formulations of the Pressler Amendment had given Presidents Reagan and Bush the possibility to certify aid despite advances in the Pakistani nuclear capabilities, but at this point such a certification was impossible. Therefore, sanctions were imposed that halted all US military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Also the delivery of 28 F-16’s that Pakistan had already in part paid for was stopped. Washington also made Islamabad aware of that it might impose other sanctions on Pakistan and even label it a “rogue state”. The Bush Administration, however, still accepted cash sales of military munitions and spare parts to Pakistan case-by-case, using a controversial loophole in the Pressler Amendment, which the Congress probably had not planned. The US sanctions did also not affect financing from the international financial institutions, and as an international consensus on proliferation policies for South Asia was lacking, other industrialized countries remained a source of finance and weapons systems for Pakistan.

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178 Lifschultz 1998; Spector 1990, pp. 78-79; Ganguly 1995, p. 328. The US pressure might have been the key to the de-escalation of the crises. Ganguly 1997.

179 The B. Bhutto government faced serious problems: social and economic reforms were halted by disagreements about the powers of different authorities; ethnic conflicts rose; the government itself was fragmented, corrupt, and inefficient and lacked the support of the military; law and order deteriorated. President G. I. Khan dismissed the B. Bhutto government in August 1990. Elections were held in October of the same year, and M. N. Sharif became Prime Minister of a coalition government. The Sharif government turned out to be relatively successful and stable, but also it eventually had internal problems. Sharif had also serious tensions with President Khan. This led to the resignation of both of them in July 1993. An interim government was set up until the elections in October 1993. After the elections, B. Bhutto became again Prime Minister, but her coalition government faced difficulties from the outset. The position of the government was improved by the election of a close associate of Bhutto, F. Leghari, as President. US Department of State 2000b.


181 The sanctions were placed on Pakistan not only because of its nuclear weapons program but also because of its human rights violations and because Pakistan was claimed to be involved in international drug trade and terrorism. Ahmed 1999, pp. 189-190; Shah 2001, pp. 348, 353; Thakur 1993; Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 7. From 1991 onwards, Pakistan was also directly a target of the original Glenn-Symington enrichment sanctions, which in part overlapped with the Pressler Amendment sanctions. The Reagan 1981 waiver had expired and although Presidents Bush and
At the end of 1991, Pakistan stated that it had frozen the production of highly enriched uranium. Thereafter, it apparently stuck to the freeze as far as weapons-grade uranium was concerned, but not with respect to low-enriched uranium, which could later on be further enriched.\textsuperscript{182} Although the US was in principle pleased with the cap, it had differences of opinion about verification with Pakistan\textsuperscript{183}.

Within the US Administration there was also criticism towards the ending of the aid to Pakistan because its possible consequences were feared. Both the Pakistani democracy and the economy were fragile and could possibly not stand under the sanctions and anti-Westernism and Islamic fundamentalism could rise. Rising Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia was also in general a cause of concern in Washington\textsuperscript{184}. Also the view propagated by Pakistan that the US sanctions only reduced the influence the US could have on Pakistan started to gain support in Washington especially within the Clinton Administration. In 1995, the Administration stated that “while the Administration strongly supports the (Pressler) amendment’s goals of curbing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, the legislation needs to be revised to fit current global realities and to better achieve our non-proliferation objectives” and that “given its troubled neighborhood, Pakistan stands in danger, over time, of drifting in directions contrary to our fundamental interest and its own”\textsuperscript{185}. On the other hand, the earlier US policy of trying to take Pakistan’s security needs into account by supplying it with conventional armaments had not led to the wished results i.e. removed incentives for nuclear weapons. In any case, Washington tried to emphasize positive engagement in its dealings with Islamabad.\textsuperscript{186} The possible consequences of the ending of the aid created some worry also in the US Congress. In September 1992, the Congress thus eased the prohibition of development aid to Pakistan a little.\textsuperscript{187}

Also the F-16 question had to be resolved in some way. Assuming that it would receive the F-16’s later on when the sale would again be allowed, Pakistan did not stop making payments\textsuperscript{188}. As the US neither agreed to deliver the bombers nor give back the almost US $ 1.3 billion that Pakistan had paid for them, by early 1995 the F-16’s led to quarrel between the US and Pakistan. Some parts of the Pakistani military wanted to give up the freeze on the production of highly enriched uranium if the bomber question would not get a proper solution. As the US wanted Pakistan to stick to this and to its other voluntary restraints on its nuclear program (to refrain from making nuclear tests, from deploying nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, and from exporting related technologies), it started looking for ways to solve the issue and to modify the Pressler Amendment. After a long process beginning already in 1993, this happened finally in 1996 through the Brown Amendment.

\textsuperscript{182} Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 132.
\textsuperscript{183} Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 140.
\textsuperscript{184} Kapur 1995.
\textsuperscript{185} Even an Islamic confederation of nine states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey) was feared to be forming, and especially Pakistan saw such a possibility as interesting when the US-Indian relations started to improve. IFPA 1997.
\textsuperscript{186} US Department of State 1995b.
\textsuperscript{188} Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, pp. 7-8.
\textsuperscript{189} Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 132.
which made it possible for the US to start compensating Pakistan its payments in other ways, although the F-16’s were not delivered. Also economic and certain kinds of military assistance to Pakistan was allowed again.\textsuperscript{189} The continuing supply of arms from Russia to India was also considered by the Administration as a fact that made the delivery of military equipment to Pakistan more acceptable\textsuperscript{190}.

The Brown Amendment was based on the expectation that Pakistan would continue the freezes on its nuclear program. Although Pakistan did not give up these restraints, it at the same time proceeded in its nuclear program in other ways. The plutonium program proceeded especially as a reactor where plutonium could apparently be produced was built with Chinese support. Pakistan also upgraded its uranium program and seemed to be enhancing its uranium enrichment capabilities.\textsuperscript{197} In early 1992, Pakistan stated for the US that it had the ability to assemble a nuclear weapon, although this was meant to show the US that the ability notwithstanding, Pakistan could resist the temptation to become a nuclear state.\textsuperscript{192}

Despite the contrary will of its Chief of Army Staff and a part of its public, Pakistan supported the US during the Gulf War, where the US-led, UN-mandated troops attacked Iraq that had marched on Kuwait’s oil fields. The war, however, led to the physical presence of the US in the Gulf, which further diminished Pakistan’s importance. Yet, because Pakistan was still considered as useful in the case of possible further military operations in the Gulf region, the US sought to maintain ties with the Pakistani military, the ending of the aid notwithstanding. Another reason why the US wanted to maintain relations with the Pakistani military was because of the military’s influence over the country’s nuclear program.\textsuperscript{193}

\textbf{5.4.2 Improvement in the US-Indian relations}

For India, the end of the Cold War meant an end to the favorable relationship with the Soviet Union and to the Soviet security guarantee. The supply of arms and spare parts from the former Soviet states became more unreliable, and the terms of the trade worsened for India. The Soviet Union had also backed India politically on the Kashmir question, but Russia did not want to take the same kind of a clear stance.\textsuperscript{194}

Although trade with Russia continued, India started turning a little to the US. The two countries increased security cooperation; for example, in 1992, they arranged joint military exercises. At the same time, the US also started to turn from

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., pp. 133-134.  
\textsuperscript{190} US Department of State 1995b.  
\textsuperscript{192} Ahmed 1999, p. 190.  
\textsuperscript{193} Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 11.  
\textsuperscript{194} Ganguly 1997. In 1988, the Soviet Union had leased India a nuclear-powered submarine, the Soviet opposition to the India nuclear weapons program notwithstanding. The leased submarine was to help India build and operate indigenous nuclear-powered submarines, a program for which was started in 1985. Thakur 1993, IFPA 1997. In 1997, the US denied all transfers of technology without a special permission to an Indian company, which seemed to be trying to develop submarine reactors. Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 116.
supporting Pakistan to giving more attention to India: while it was less flexible towards the Pakistani nuclear program, it became a little more tolerable towards India in general. In 1992, the US seemed to give up trying to persuade India to sign the NPT and instead focused on trying to freeze the nuclear status quo in South Asia. The US suggested a regional conference on the South Asian nuclear situation but India refused to take part of it, stating that it preferred bilateral efforts with Pakistan. After the restructuring of the Indian economy was started in 1991 because India struggled under grave liquidity problems, India also became economically more interesting for the US, and by 1995 the US was the main trading partner and investor to India. It also seemed that India could be accepted as a major international player. The US stated for example that “India has the potential to be among the great world powers of the 21st century” if it would act responsibly. In the early 1990’s, India and its supporters in the Western countries also started an international negative-image campaign against Pakistan.

5.4.3 Reforms of the US non-proliferation policies

In the early 1990’s, actions of both the US Congress and the Administration implied that they had accepted that the US would in the near future not succeed in getting India and Pakistan to give up their nuclear weapons. Instead, the US seemed to concentrate on trying to halt further progress in the nuclear programs and in the stockpiling of fissile material and also on ensuring that the weapons would not be deployed. Special attention was also given to trying to ensure that India and Pakistan would not develop and deploy nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Thus, in 1994 in a report to the US Congress it was stated that “…our objective is first to cap, then reduce, and finally eliminate the possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. We seek also to help reduce tensions and avoid conflicts which could possibly escalate to the use of WMD or ballistic missiles. Therefore, we are attempting to help create a climate in which each country’s sense of security is enhanced through tension reduction and confidence-building measures.” Unfortunately, the confidence-building measures did not work too well, as it was noted in 1997 that they had been used ineffectively, if at all.

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197 US Department of State 1995b.
198 Shah 2001, p. 348-349. The Indian domestic politics were at the time relatively unstable. R. Gandhi remained in power until 1989 when his government crumbled because of corruption charges. Two short-lived interim governments were followed by V. P. Singh’s coalition government after the elections in November 1989. In the Parliament, the government was dependent on the support of the militant Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which demanded India to abandon the policy of nuclear ambiguity and to become an overt nuclear state. The government collapsed already in 1990. Singh’s successor government also turned out to be short-lived, giving way to new national elections in June 1991. R. Gandhi was assassinated during the campaign. US Department of State 2000a; Spector 1990, p. 80.
200 US Department of State 1994. Confidence-building measures can include, e.g., arranging regular meetings or channels of communication between different elements of the two countries.
201 US Department of State 1997.
In the 1990’s, the US non-proliferation legislation was again reformed. In 1992, the US Congress completed the Foreign Assistance Act so that the President was required to promote regional non-proliferation in South Asia and to report the Congress twice a year on the developments in the Indian, the Pakistani, and the Chinese nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and especially on whether India and Pakistan possessed complete nuclear weapons.\[202\]

From 1993, onwards the Clinton Administration reformed the US export control policies by easing export controls somewhat. The reforms aimed at improving the competitiveness and the export opportunities of the American industries that had so far suffered from the relatively strict US policies. Lighter controls were justified by the view that many products under US export controls were easily available from other countries.\[203\] The US export policies were reformed to a somewhat opposite direction than the international regulations (see below). However, US export controls with respect to several countries’ missile projects were tightened in 1992.\[204\]

In 1994, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA) was passed by the Congress. The Act introduced financial sanctions that would automatically take place in case of acts of nuclear proliferation from a non-nuclear state, for example if it would conduct nuclear tests. The new sanctions included a halting of all US economic and military aid, credits, bank loans, and export licenses as well as a requirement for the US to veto loans in international financial institutions. For the first time, the US now had legislation also with respect to India about sanctions that affected its relations with the US also on other issues than those directly related to the nuclear program. For the sanctions to be waived, a joint resolution by the both houses of the US Congress was necessary. At the same time, also the US Export-Import Bank Act was completed so that all financing from this US bank would be halted if a country intentionally supported a non-nuclear state in acquiring unsafeguarded plutonium or enriched uranium. In the NNPA, the President was also granted the right to waive the sanctions arisen from the 1976 Glenn-Symington Amendment (see Chapter 5.2.6) that were related to Pakistani actions prior to June 29, 1994, if this was in national interest. On the other hand, the Act ended the being in force of the 1982 Reagan waiver of the Glenn-Symington reprocessing-provisions. Thus, if Pakistan would after this time import such technologies, a new waiver would be necessary before US assistance could be given to Pakistan.\[205\]

As new Pakistani violations (see the discussion on the ring magnet case below) to the US legislation made it impossible for aid to be resumed, the US continued to supplement its legislation to be able to have some cooperation with Pakistan and thus also to exert influence on Islamabad. The July 1997 Harkin Amendment made it possible for certain US instances to support export and investment activities of US companies in Pakistan.\[206\]

\[203\] Heiskanen 1995, p. 32.
\[204\] Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 10.
\[206\] Ibid., p. 136.
Also the idea of counter-proliferation appeared in the US policies. In 1994, Washington launched the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative that meant reassessing the threat of WMD’s and making the necessary adjustments in the US defense system. The US stated that it could consider the possibility of first-use of nuclear weapons to deter the use of biological or chemical weapons. It was thus suggested that the US could possibly militarily prevent other states from acquiring WMD’s as well as that the US could even consider its using its own WMD’s for this purpose, a stance that has deterrence effect as such. The reasons for the Initiative were the Gulf War and the experiences with the Iraqi WMD programs as well as the US Bottom Up Review, which led to a reorientation of conventional US forces.207 A consequence of the US counter-proliferation stance can be seen in the current US plan to attack Iraq, which is suspected to be close of acquiring a nuclear weapon. In the case of India and Pakistan, the new policy hardly had a very big impact, as the two programs do not pose a direct threat to any other state than they themselves.

5.4.4 Efforts for new international non-proliferation treaties

In the 1990’s, despite tighter nonproliferation measures, the spread of advanced technologies became increasingly difficult to control because new suppliers entered the market, indigenous production capabilities increased, and the Soviet Union had collapsed.208 The early 1990’s witnessed tightening in the international export controls, and a change in the nature of the NPT regime in that that the role of the UN was strengthened. After the extent of the Iraqi nuclear program became revealed in the Gulf War, the program was considered in the Security Council and the rights and tasks of the IAEA were widened. The shock caused by the Iraqi program made the supplier countries also acutely aware of the varying export control standards and of the problems in the export control regime. This led them to agree in 1992 on new, stricter international export restrictions and controls.209 After the Cold War, different nuclear arms regulation efforts, e.g., the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) between the US and Soviet Union/ Russia, regional NWFZ intentions, and efforts for the Complete Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), made of halting nuclear proliferation and of nuclear disarmament topical themes. This rendered the Indian argument that the nuclear powers did not care about their commitment to nuclear disarmament less powerful. These efforts also put pressure on India and Pakistan to accept non-proliferation measures.210

In the Article 6 of the NPT, the nuclear powers commit themselves to nuclear disarmament, although without any binding time schedules. During the Bush (Senior) and Clinton terms, the US started using nuclear disarmament efforts as a non-proliferation measure. Especially an indefinite extension of the NPT, a complete ban on nuclear testing, and a universal cut-off of the production of fissile

208 Joseph 1996, p. 11.
materials were targets of the Clinton Administration. 211 Such agreements can work for non-proliferation in various ways. First, they restrict the availability of nuclear materials. Second, they demonstrate the non-nuclear countries that the nuclear powers take their commitment to nuclear disarmament seriously and thereby rip them of an argument for opposing the NPT regime. Third, they can also have impact on the public’s opinions about nuclear weapons. Preventing proliferation was also named as one of six priorities of the US foreign policy and an obligation by the Clinton Administration 212.

In 1995, the NPT was extended unconditionally and indefinitely, with only India, Pakistan, and Israel remaining outside the treaty. Also a treaty on a complete ban on nuclear tests was a goal of the Clinton Administration. After the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits all kinds of nuclear tests, was negotiated, however, India refused to sign it in August 1996. That alone made it impossible for the treaty to come into force at all, because it is necessary that all the 44 states that use atomic energy ratify it first. From the Indian point of view, this clause violates the Vienna agreement on treaties, according to which a state that is not a party to a treaty cannot have obligations on a treaty imposed on it. India has also criticized the treaty for being aimed at strengthening the status quo favorable to the recognized nuclear states instead of at comprehensiveness and disarmament. The nuclear powers can namely continue making computer-aided tests in laboratories, but these kinds of tests are only possible after a state has already conducted nuclear tests. The French and the Chinese nuclear tests during the negotiations were also considered by some Indians as evidence of both that the nuclear states were not going to give up their weapons and also of the unreliability of China. 213 After India had refused to sign the treaty it was suspected that India was maybe going to conduct further nuclear tests because if it did not, it would have rejected the treaty for nothing. At the same time, internal pressure also rose in India to conduct further tests. 214 In part, the efforts for the CTBT may have pushed India towards testing. Although Pakistan in principle supported the CTBT, it required that the treaty’s entry into force would be conditional on the Indian ratification and also later made its signatory dependent on India doing the same. 215

However, not all other states that use nuclear power have ratified the CTBT, either. Even the US has not done this: the ratification did not pass through the legislative during the Clinton term, and later on President Bush has not been willing to ratify the treaty.

Several factors contributed to India rejecting the CTBT. One was that after only India, Pakistan, and Israel, the latter enjoying its special relationship with the US, remained outside the indefinitely extended NPT, the South Asian states were bound to become the main targets of US pressure on non-proliferation issues. This strengthened the Indian domestic opposition to bending under foreign pressure. Second, the Brown Amendment had caused worries in India that the US wanted to

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211 Heiskanen 1995, p. 38.
213 Lok Sabha XI Debates 1996.
214 Singh 1998, p. 46; Makhijani 1997; Bidwai & Vanaik 1997. The CTBT allows states to withdraw from the treaty if they think their vital national interests are endangered.
have Pakistan as an ally again. Third, the upcoming elections in India and the pressure from the BJP pushed the government to take a hard stance towards the treaty.216

In September 1993, President Clinton announced that the US also wanted to bring about an international agreement that would prohibit the non-safeguarded or weapons-related production of fissile materials. India and Pakistan turned out to be stumbling blocks also on the way of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, although they originally in 1995 supported the beginning of the negotiations in the UN. They made the treaty conditional on progress on nuclear disarmament. Pakistan, which demanded that existing stockpiles of fissile material would also be taken into consideration, apparently wanted to delay the treaty because it would have left India with a larger existing stockpile. However, India was constantly able of producing more fissile material than Pakistan and therefore it has been claimed that a rapid negotiation of the treaty would in fact have been favorable to Pakistan. Some Indian analysts likewise complained that the treaty would leave China with a larger stockpile than India.217

The FMCT would be important for South Asia not only in that it would lead to a cut-off in the production of material for nuclear weapons but also because it would open a way to deal with the states that are outside the NPT. Also new verification and control systems could be introduced with the treaty that could also be acceptable to such states.218 But like the CTBT, the FMCT has also not come into force.

5.5 The overt nuclearization of South Asia

5.5.1 The missile race

Since the 1980’s, at the same time as India and Pakistan were developing nuclear weapons, they were also trying to achieve capabilities to deliver the weapons. India had bombers that were tested in the early 1980’s and were suitable for dropping nuclear explosives to Pakistan. To be especially able to counter-threat China over the Himalayas, however, missiles were needed. India also started a space program early on and had first in the 1960’s wide cooperation with the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and later also with the UK, France, West Germany, and the Soviet Union. The Indian space program started to be a target of considerable investments after the 1971 war. The efforts were strengthened in 1983 when the program was reorganized. In 1980, India succeeded in launching a space satellite, the delivery rocket of which could carry its load over 800 km’s on the earth.219

216 Ganguly 1997.
219 Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 114; IFPA 1997; Tamminen & Zenger 1998, p. 243; Chanda et al. 1998a. Also in the space program, increasing national self-reliance has been a goal for India.
To also ensure a capability to deliver the nuclear weapons it was developing, Pakistan started putting special effort on acquiring ballistic missiles from the mid-1980’s onwards. That time it started developing short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) with support from China, which has greatly helped Pakistan also on the realm of ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{220}

The Indian 1980 launch, in addition to other missile programs around the world in the 1980’s, led the US to seek an export control regime for missile technologies as another step in its non-proliferation efforts. Such a system was eventually created in 1987 in the form of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).\textsuperscript{221} Especially ballistic missiles can namely be a major source of instability because they are very fast and able to pass through defense systems.\textsuperscript{222}

The Indian ballistic missiles include the 250 km –range Prithvi and the allegedly 2500km –range Agni. The Prithvi was first tested in 1988. Its range was enough to reach major targets in Pakistan but not in China. The Agni that was tested for the first time in May 1989, was able of reaching important targets in China. Its range was, however, in practice probably shorter than 2500 km, and the weapon was still far from operationally reliable.\textsuperscript{223}

The reasons for the development of the Agni were both symbolic, demonstrating the country’s status as a technologically advanced major power, and strategic, aimed presumably mainly at countering China’s nuclear forces. It is unlikely, however, that China would in the 1980’s have targeted its nuclear weapons against India. China had instead probably concentrated its limited forces against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, by 1990 India itself had never targeted any of its nuclear arsenal towards China. The Agni, however, caused concerns in Beijing. Because the US tried to pressure India to give up the development of the Agni, India tried to present the missile as a mere demonstration of India’s technological capability and claimed that it had not been decided that the missiles would be deployed. These kinds of claims were, however, not credible: because of the immense costs associated with the development of intermediate-range missiles, they have only been developed to carry nuclear warheads.\textsuperscript{224}

India has also claimed to be developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBM) called Surya, and cruise missiles. The development of the Surya is dependent on the development and testing of the Agni. Furthermore, India has been trying to acquire integrated air defense and anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) systems. Long-range capabilities might be seen as prerequisites for the status of a major international power, and the ICBM project also implies that India wants to have a counter-deterrent against the US, too.\textsuperscript{225} The US has naturally not been very pleased especially about the latter project. The general US opposition to the Indian ballistic missiles can probably be

\textsuperscript{220} Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 133.
\textsuperscript{221} Toivonen 1995, pp. 67-68.
\textsuperscript{222} Zimmermann & Chellaney 1996.
\textsuperscript{223} Tamminen & Zenger 1998, p. 243; Chanda et al. 1998a; Spector 1990, pp. 74-76.
\textsuperscript{224} Spector 1990, pp. 74-76; IFPA 1997.
explained in part by the fact that the development of the Surya is dependent on the development of both the Agni and the Prithvi.

In May 1992, the US punished both Russia and India with two-year technology transfer sanctions for a sale of rocket engines to India that the US insisted were of a dual-use nature and could be diverted to military uses. The punished countries claimed that the US reaction stemmed from the fact that the Russian space agency had outbid a US company on the sale. As Russia and India made preparations to launch an Indian satellite by a Russian booster rocket in 1993, Washington threatened to make the two-year sanctions permanent. As Russia agreed to make changes to the agreement with India that made it more acceptable for the US, the US removed the sanctions with respect to Russia. In the case of India, the sanctions were in place for the two years.\(^226\)

In 1993, the US launched the South Asian Ballistic Missile Initiative within which it was supposed to ensure that critical missiles would not be deployed and to consider other missile-related questions, too. Pakistan showed interest in the suggestion but the suggestion did not lead anywhere because of Indian disinterest.\(^227\)

Although China promised in 1991 to comply with the export controls of the MTCR, in 1991-93 it sold Pakistan tactical M-11 missiles and components. These missiles have a range of 280-300 km. The US sanctioned both China and Pakistan for their trade with an export embargo for certain high-tech products first 1991-1992 and then again 1993-1994 but raised them when China had again promised to stick to the rules of the MTCR.\(^228\) The latter M-11 transfer was probably in part a response to the US sale of F-16’s to Taiwan, which was according to China also against an existing Sino-US understanding. The M-11 issue emerged again in 1995 and 1996 when new US reports on transfers became public that stated even that Pakistan was constructing a production site for M-11’s with Chinese support. No sanctions were, however, placed on either country, as the Clinton Administration considered the evidence too weak.\(^229\) Another possible reason why sanctions were not imposed was because they would also have harmed US businesses in China.

Indian tests of the Agni continued until early 1994. Under Western pressure, India halted the development of the missile before the next test scheduled for late 1994. In 1995-97, India again increased its efforts to develop ballistic missiles, which led to worries of an arms race in South Asia. In 1996, India planned to continue the Agni program, but in the end of the year these plans were again cancelled as US pressure was mounting. The Prithvi was tested again in 1996 and 1997 and also put into small-scale production. The decision on the production of the Prithvis was probably in part a response to the US Brown Amendment. India even reportedly possibly deployed these missiles in the spring of 1997 near the Pakistani border, although they were equipped with conventional warheads only. India did not admit that it had technically deployed the missiles but that did not change the issue so

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much because the missiles could have anyway been used within a very small time. The strong criticism of the US towards the ballistic missile programs probably convinced India not to openly deploy the Prithvi. In the summer of 1997, the Agni program was, however, started again, but the missile was tested for the first time in five years only in April 1999.

In the latter half of 1990’s, the development of the ballistic missile program also pushed India towards new nuclear tests, because it started getting to the stage after which reliable nuclear warheads were needed for the missile systems to be further developed.

The Indian (near-) deployment of the Prithvis in the spring of 1997 pushed Pakistan towards deploying the M-11’s. This would have made US sanctions necessary on both Pakistan and China, the source of the missiles. The US Deputy National Security Adviser S. Berger traveled to Pakistan to try to calm Islamabad down. Instead of deploying missiles, Pakistan then announced ballistic missile tests for its Hatf-3 for July 1997, which was claimed to have a range of 600 km, enough to reach New Delhi. China has probably helped Pakistan with this missile, too. Furthermore, Pakistan stated it was also developing the Ghauri missile, which allegedly had a range of over 1500 km. Pakistan reported testing the Ghauri in April 1997, in the spring of 1998, and in April 1999. In mid-1999, tests were conducted with the M-11’s. The Chinese M-9 and DF-15 -missiles have been suspected to be models for the longer-range Shaheen-I and –II –missiles, which Pakistan has also been developing, but no transfers of these Chinese missiles to Pakistan have been proved.

5.5.2 Continuing Sino-Pakistani cooperation

China remained an important source of help for Pakistan in the realm of the nuclear program throughout the early 1990’s. In November 1989, China announced that it would sell a new 300-megawatt nuclear reactor to Pakistan. China did not demand that all Pakistani nuclear installations would be placed under IAEA safeguards but that only the new plant and its fuels would be safeguarded. Pakistan had not been able to make major nuclear acquisitions under such terms since the 1970’s. The similar Soviet sale of two nuclear power reactors to India that had been planned in 1987 made the sale easier for China. Although China signed the NPT in 1992, it helped Pakistan to construct the reactor and also a purifying plant for tritium gas in 1994-96. The US protests notwithstanding, France announced a power plant sale to Pakistan under similar conditions in February 1990.

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231 IFPA 1997.
232 Zimmermann & Chellaney 1996.
233 Jones & McDonough 1998, pp. 131, 137; IFPA 1997; Teeple 1999. The Pakistani short-range missiles Haft-1 and Haft-2 have not lived up to the expectations and have probably not been taken into use. FAS 2002.
The Soviet sale to India did eventually not to take place because the Soviet Union fell apart but India started negotiations about a similar deal with Russia in the early 1990’s. The negotiations continued throughout the 1990’s and even soon after the 1998 nuclear tests (see below) Russia continued to plan the deal. The US opposed the deal, especially because Russia had in 1992 agreed to demand full-scope safeguards if it was to export nuclear technology. Russia, however, claimed that it was allowed to sell the reactor because its predecessor, the Soviet Union, had committed itself to the deal already before 1992.237

In 1994-95, a Chinese company sold ring magnets that are used in the production of weapons-grade uranium for a Pakistani nuclear research center. This could have led to US sanctions towards China under the 1994 addition to the US Export-Import Bank Act (see above) after it became public in the spring of 1996. Credits from this US bank to China and the delivery of military equipment to Pakistan that had been enabled by the Brown Amendment, were halted in the spring of 1996. However, as the sanctions would have hit most hardly unrelated US businesses in China, the US decided not to impose them after the Chinese government stated that it had not been aware of the sale and did thus not on purpose support the Pakistani uranium enrichment efforts. At the same time, China also stated that it would not give support for any unsafeguarded nuclear installations in general.238 Thus in the 1990’s, as China was seeking a better international image and better relations with the US, its attitude towards Pakistan and especially towards its nuclear program had to get less supportive than before. China also suggested that Pakistan would pursue peaceful relations with India.239

For Pakistan, the ring magnet affair had quite grave consequences. Although the Brown Amendment had made aid to Pakistan possible again, Pakistan could not receive any US economic and military aid because of the 1976 Glenn-Symington Amendment. The 1994 NPPA had given the President the right to waive the Glenn-Symington sanctions as far as Pakistani actions before the mid-1994 were concerned. The ring magnet transfer, however, took place after that. This consequence seems to have been unexpected at least to some US Administration officials. It was namely stated in a US Department of State briefing on the solution of the ring magnet affair that “in the case of Pakistan…there will be no change in the implementation of Brown (Amendment)”240. The Glenn-Symington sanctions could not be waived because the Amendment originally allowed this to happen only if Pakistan was not trying to acquire nuclear weapons.241

240 US Department of State 1996.
5.5.3 Near-testing

In December 1995, India made preparations for nuclear tests. The governing coalition\(^{242}\) was officially committed to not to manufacture nuclear weapons, but domestic pressure from the Hindu-nationalist, pro-nuclear Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) especially at the time of the election campaigns pushed the government towards testing. Also the improving US-Pakistani relations had a similar effect. After US intelligence revealed the Indian intentions, the US Ambassador to India, F. Wisner, pressured India to cancel the testing.\(^{243}\) It is in principle also possible that the Indian government was at the time not actually planning to really conduct a test but that it made preparations only to test international responses and to reply to the pressure from the BJP. It was also claimed that India was actually preparing a test for the Prithvi missile, not for nuclear weapons.\(^{244}\) The Indian preparations led to similar action in Pakistan, too, which was revealed by satellite pictures in March 1996. However, Pakistan did not admit it was preparing a test, although it stated that it had the capability to reply to a possible Indian nuclear test in the same manner.\(^{245}\)

The BJP was committed to deploying both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as well as to not signing any international non-proliferation agreements. After the BJP rose shortly to power in the Indian elections in May 1995, A. B. Vajpayee, who was trying to form the government, wanted to conduct nuclear tests. The preparations did not, however, lead to action because the BJP government could not get the confidence of the Parliament. The following fragile coalition government stated that India would stick to its option strategy of preserving a possibility to manufacture nuclear weapons.\(^{246}\) In 1997, further Indian nuclear tests were not considered as probable\(^{247}\).


\(^{246}\) Ibid., p. 115. The reputation of Rao’s government was stained by political scandals shortly before the elections in May 1996. The BJP won the elections but the coalition government it had tried to build remained in power for only 13 days. Thereafter, a 14-party coalition government managed to stay in office for almost a year before being replaced by a 16-party coalition, which collapsed in November 1997. After the elections in February 1998, a BJP-led coalition government rose to power with Vajpayee as Prime Minister. US Department of State 2000a.

\(^{247}\) Ganguly 1997.
5.5.4 The 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests

In Pakistan, Sharif rose to power again in 1997\textsuperscript{248}. The original strong domestic support-base of the government gave grounds to hopes that it could meaningfully participate on negotiations with India. In 1997, several high-level Indo-Pakistani meetings took place, and a hot line was set up between the Prime Ministers’ offices. However, little concrete progress was made.\textsuperscript{249} The chances of an improvement in the Indo-Pakistani relations decreased again as the BJP rose to power in India.

Right after the BJP formed the government, India proceeded to make its second series of nuclear tests on May 11\textsuperscript{th} and 13\textsuperscript{th}, 1998. Pakistan had tested the Ghauri missile two days before Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee had showed green light to testing so that the exact timing of the test might have been in part response to the Pakistani test. As the international reactions to the tests were not very harsh, the US offers of economic and military incentives, including a repeal of the Pressler Amendment, did not suffice to get Pakistan to refrain from testing. With the reluctant lead of Sharif, whom President Clinton had desperately tried to persuade not to test, Pakistan conducted its first nuclear tests on May 28\textsuperscript{th} and 30\textsuperscript{th}. Both India and Pakistan proclaimed that they are nuclear states and admitted that the tests were made for military purposes. India tested thermonuclear and fission explosives as well as tactical nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{250} In addition to uranium, Pakistan apparently also used plutonium in one of the tests, indicating that it had succeeded in either producing it or importing it secretly\textsuperscript{251}.

After the Indian tests, the US immediately imposed economic sanctions over India under the Glenn-Symington Amendment and the 1994 NNPA. The wide sanctions halted aid, credits, and the export of certain technologies to India. The same sanctions were later imposed on Pakistan, too, but all US economic and military aid to Pakistan had been halted already in 1990 under the Pressler Amendment. India tried to avoid sanctions by showing interest on signing the CTBT, but once the sanctions were in place, they could not be easily removed.\textsuperscript{252}

\textsuperscript{248} President Leghari dismissed the Bhutto government in November 1996, accusing it of corruption and bad governance. After winning the elections in February 1997, Sharif formed again the government. A close associate of him, R. Tarar, was elected President. The track of this government was not clean, either: it directed a one-sided accountability campaign against the opposition and restricted the freedoms of the press. Furthermore, the government was characterized by political instability and administrative inefficiency. US Department of State 2000b; Malik 2001, pp. 357-358.


\textsuperscript{250} Lifschultz 1998; FAS 2000a.

\textsuperscript{251} FAS 2000b.

\textsuperscript{252} Chanda et al. 1998a; Chanda et al. 1998b; Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 118. The consequences of the sanctions were not a surprise to the Indian government; in 1995 a confidential report was published, which estimated the effects of the sanctions for the Indian economy. According to the worst scenario, the economy would decline 5 to 10 years. It was rumored that the analysis was repeated two weeks before the tests.
First, the US did not succeed in creating a consensus within the G-8—countries on common sanctions on India, because some countries found the strict US sanction policies somewhat questionable as the US itself has not been committed to nuclear disarmament. However, as fears of an Indo-Pakistani arms race rose after the Pakistani tests, the industrialized nations reached a consensus on their policies and imposed severe sanctions on both countries, including a decision by the G-8 countries not to approve non-humanitarian credits from international financial institutions to either country.\(^{253}\)

In the fear that if the preparations were revealed, the international and especially the US pressure would again lead to a cancellation of the tests like presumably happened in 1995, India put effort on keeping the preparations secret and making them fast. The Indian statements for the US shortly before the tests also gave the impression that no tests would be conducted at least in the near future. As a result, the tests surprised the US, which had despite the change of the Indian government not believed that India would really conduct tests right away. It has also been claimed that counterproductive to the US efforts to persuade India not to test was the export from the US of certain sensitive technologies to India in the previous years that, allowed by the Clinton Administration.\(^{254}\)

After the tests, India and Pakistan were strongly pressurized into signing the CTBT. President Clinton originally made the removal of the sanctions conditional on their joining the CTBT. India found it very difficult to accept the CTBT, however, because it had opposed it so strictly in 1996 and because almost the whole Indian political spectrum supported the opposition to the treaty. After the 1998 tests India announced, however, that it will not conduct further tests because its tests had provided it with a capability to make computer-based nuclear test simulations. In practice, India therefore acts according to the treaty. Both India and Pakistan have been willing to accept the CTBT under certain conditions, but it has been impossible for other states, especially the US, to accept any conditions. Conditions would also be contradictory to the goals and spirit of the treaty. Pakistan first made its joining of the treaty conditional on India signing it, too, but later gave up this condition. As another condition, Pakistan has demanded the US to act as an intermediary in the Kashmir conflict, but this has not been possible because of Indian opposition. Furthermore, Pakistan has demanded that its debts would be forgiven. The most problematic Pakistani condition has been its demand on security guarantees.\(^{255}\)

Although President Clinton originally demanded that would India and Pakistan sign the CTBT and halt their nuclear weapons programs before the sanctions could be lifted, gradually the US attitude became more flexible again and Washington started offering partial removals of sanctions in return for smaller nonproliferation efforts. A reason behind this was in part simply that the sanctions did not bring the desired results: the two nuclear programs continued and the CTBT was not signed. Already in November 1998, President Clinton waived a part of the sanctions on both countries for one year under the India-Pakistan Relief Act. This was a response and an incentive for the non-proliferation steps (including a moratorium

\(^{254}\) Auster & Chellaney 1998.  
for testing) the two countries were taking. Also Pakistan severe economic difficulties caused concern in Washington.256 A further part of the sanctions was waived in October 1999257.

Soon after the tests, Indian Minister of Interior L. K. Advani threatened that India could use its nuclear weapons to solve the Kashmir question. Advani told that India was going to act in a determined way about Kashmir but would adhere to the principle of no-first-strike. Pakistan replied in an even more straightforward way when the Foreign Secretary S. Ahmed told that a basic reason for the Pakistani nuclear program was to find lasting solutions, especially in Kashmir.258

By undertaking the tests, the Indian government decided to abandon its relatively successful policy of nuclear ambiguity, despite the international criticism and sanctions India was bound to face. It was obvious that a Pakistani test would follow, and thus the Indian tests created a new shock in its dangerously delicate relationship with Pakistan. By conducting the tests, India also caused a new crack in its relationship with China.

For this change of the Indian policy, several explanations have been offered. The government wanted to boost its own domestic popularity and its parliamentary position and to enhance India’s position on international arenas. Indian scientists have also been claimed to have given nuclear weapons a mythical status. S. Ganguly has argued that after the end of the Cold War, there was a perception of increased Pakistani and Chinese threat in India. The decision was also for a large part simply the result of a long process and of the decisions made over the decades to build a nuclear program.259

India has had close relations to Israel in the realm of nuclear programs. After the 1998 tests, some Arab newspapers even claimed that a part of the Indian tests were made with the help of Israeli equipment.260

Another source of concern is the pressure on Pakistan to place its nuclear forces under high alert in the fear of Indian pre-emptive attacks. The Pakistani Air Force is namely vulnerable for such an attack because all its air bases are within the range of Indian Air Forces, especially after the US supplied India with technology that improves the capability to destroy aircraft on the ground.261

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests threatened to solve the NPT regime altogether, forcing the US to punish the two states. The punishments did prove somewhat inefficient as the two states have remained nuclear states and concentrated on developing delivery systems. The sanctions could also not be made too harsh because it was feared what would happen when the economically weak Pakistan could no longer stand them. The first Muslim country to have a nuclear weapon could be tempted to export its nuclear technology to Iran, Iraq, or Saudi-
Arabia, if they offered economic aid. This would cause a significant threat to Israel and could import the nuclear arms race to the Middle East.

Also after the 1998 tests, India has repeatedly stated its willingness to participate in total global nuclear disarmament. Actually India and Pakistan did not violate the NPT with their tests, because neither state had signed the treaty in the first place. They have been under great pressure to sign it, though, for the treaty is based on its universality. If the goals of the treaty can be violated without grave consequences by ignoring the treaty, other countries may not be willing to adhere to the treaty either. However, India and Pakistan cannot be accepted into the treaty as nuclear states because of the treaty’s definition of a nuclear state. It is considered too risky and actually impossible to reformulate the treaty in a way that would allow India and Pakistan to join it. The treaty would be in danger of losing its credibility as a means of ensuring non-proliferation, and huge re-negotiation efforts would be necessary. On the other hand, it could be possible to attain reassurances from India and Pakistan that they will act according to the NPT in the future even if they are not members to it. In this way the two states would at least recognize the NPT. France acted likewise in 1968, when it committed itself to act according to the treaty although it did not join it.262

In both India and Pakistan, the domestic enthusiasm caused by the tests improved the government’s standing. However, the government’s popularity decreased soon in both countries. In India, it took less than a year after the tests until the government fell, and in Pakistan, Sharif was removed from power by a military coup in October 1999.263

5.5.5 The US sympathy shifting from Pakistan to India

In early 1999, there was hope of improving Indo-Pakistani relations, and Vajpayee even made a goodwill-visit to Pakistan. At the same time, however, Pakistani-backed forces crossed the line of control in Kashmir and captured some strategically important sites in the Kargil region on the Indian side. India found this out in May and responded in a forceful way, and making the situation to seem very dangerous. The Indian response together with US pressure especially during the Sharif-Clinton meeting in Washington in July 1999, convinced Pakistan to order the intruding forces to return to Pakistan. In part, the reason why Pakistan provoked unrest in Kashmir was to attract US attention, because Pakistan is likely to get territorial concessions from India only through US involvement. The Kargil affair was extremely humiliating for the Pakistani military and contributed to a military coup in October 1999, when General P. Musharraf resumed power from Sharif. The military coup led again to the imposition of sanctions over Pakistan under the

263 Lavoy 1999. However, although BJP’s coalition government fell apart in April 1999, Vajpayee formed also the next government after BJP’s success in the elections in September 1999. US Department of State 2000a.
Section 508 of the US Foreign Assistance Act, though these sanctions were largely overlapping with the sanctions already in place.\textsuperscript{264}

After the military coup, the US attitude towards Pakistan became increasingly critical, especially as Musharraf’s stance on Kashmir was very inflexible. At the same time, the US-Indian relations started to improve. India seemed to start achieving what it had sought with its nuclear tests: the recognition of its status as a major international player. The US also started criticizing the Pakistani actions in Kashmir more clearly than before and calling Pakistan to withdraw its support for the guerrillas. Such gestures were able to make attitudes in India more positive towards the US. When he was in New York in the fall of 1999, Vajpayee even called India and the US natural allies. In the spring of 2000, President Clinton visited South Asia, being the first US President to do this in 22 years. The main site of the visit was India, where Clinton spent several days, whereas he stopped over in Pakistan only for a couple of hours. This was a clear sign of the growing importance of India for the US and of Pakistan’s inferior position in the region.\textsuperscript{265}

As a result of the visit, the US and India released a joint statement where they stated that they were “partners in peace, with a common interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security”. Despite their differing view on how to approach non-proliferation, they were “prepared to work together to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery”. The two states also repeated their promises not to commit further nuclear tests.\textsuperscript{266}

Clinton, however, emphasized the importance of a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue. This stance might have encouraged destabilizing Pakistani actions because this view makes Pakistan equal with the major regional power, India. The Clinton Administration was also careful not to be too hostile towards President Musharraf as it worried that if his government was to fall from power, its position might be taken by radical Islamists.\textsuperscript{267}

\textsuperscript{264} Ayoob 2001; Shah 201, p. 353; US Department of State 2001a. Prime Minister Sharif tried to replace the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Musharraf, one of the heads of the Kargil adventure, with a family loyalist, but ended up being himself deposed by the Army. The Supreme Court of Pakistan gave Musharraf time until October 2002 to restore parliamentary democracy. The elections took place, but Musharraf remains the President, the authorities of whom have been greatly widened during Musharraf’s term. At the time of the writing, the consequences of the elections are not yet clear. Musharraf has given more freedom and power to the decentralized grassroots level at the expense of politicians – in the local elections in 2001, political parties were banned from contest. Like military coups often are, Musharraf based his coup on the need to save Pakistan from the incapable politicians’ hands. In Pakistan’s case, his claim is not totally untrue. Democracy in Pakistan has been unstable at best and often outright disastrous. The elected governments have been guilty of bad governance, corruption, and private gain seeking. The two latest democratically elected prime ministers, B. Bhutto and N. Sharif, are both in exile after being convicted of corruption and of an attempted airplane hijack, respectively. US Department of State 2000b; Malik 2001, pp. 357-358; Economist 6.1.2001. The reforms badly needed in Pakistan necessitate strong-handed governance, clear goal setting and ability to push through unpleasant changes. A democratically elected government might not be able to do this as it always has to think about its constituencies and probably has not the chance to stay in office long enough to go through the long reform processes. A military dictatorship could possibly make reforms more easily as it is not that dependent on popularity within the public.


\textsuperscript{266} The White House 2000.

\textsuperscript{267} Omestad et al. 2000; Ayoob 2001.
Around the turn of the century, it was generally believed that India has around 60 nuclear weapons and Pakistan less than half of that amount. In the summer of 2000, US intelligence reports were published that stated that the scale of the Pakistani program had been previously underestimated and that Pakistan seemed to have manufactured even clearly more nuclear warheads and had better delivery systems than India. India did allegedly not have any nuclear-capable missiles, as the Agni still needed about a decade’s development before it would be reliably usable with nuclear warheads. Pakistan denied these claims, but the Indian view was that they confirmed the Indian perception of the Pakistani threat and justified the Indian nuclear weapons. Specialists have, however, noted that such reports had to be considered with reservations; during the Cold War, the superpowers also used “reports” on each other’s great capabilities to justify the arms race. It is ironic that information on the success of a weapons program can turn against oneself in that that the adversary uses it to further own purposes, because for the deterrent to be credible, a nuclear state has to show that its nuclear program is successful. Furthermore, as Waltz has pointed out, an arms race need not be the result of nuclear proliferation by two adversaries because they do not need to match each other’s capabilities but just to have sufficient second-strike capabilities to cause unacceptable damage on the other.

In November 2000, Prime Minister Vajpayee called a unilateral cease-fire in Kashmir. Pakistan responded by pulling troops back from the line of control. Vajpayee tried to negotiate directly with the Kashmiris but these talks did not lead to results, mostly because Pakistan did not want them to. During the summer of 2001, General Musharraf accepted Vajpayee’s invitation to bilateral negotiations in India. The negotiations failed to reach anything else than a consensus on the need to continue talks. The reason for failure was, of course, Kashmir. As long as the Kashmir dispute remains unsolved, all other issues the countries should decide upon remain unsolved. These include nuclear weapons, troop levels, cross-border trade, water supplies, and pipelines that could transport cheap gas from Iran through Pakistan to India. Vajpayee and Musharraf have been considered as capable if anyone of reaching a settlement on Kashmir that would be accepted in both countries because they represent the most hawkish elements in their countries. An important hurdle to real peace negotiations about Kashmir has been Pakistan’s insistence on tripartite talks involving the Kashmiris as equal partners, a demand India has not been willing to accept.
5.6 The war on terrorism: Pakistan regains strategic importance

After coming into office, President Bush Jr. worked for a withdrawal of the sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan after the 1998 tests. Speaking about Pakistan, a Bush Administration official stated that they were “looking at the entire sanctions regime with a fresh eye”. However, in Pakistan, “a return to democratic government before US assistance in most areas can resume” was necessary. Bush has not continued putting pressure on India to sign the CTBT because he has himself also not been willing to ratify the treaty.

After the terrorist attacks of September the 11th, 2001, Pakistan’s strategic importance to the US rose again. The US offered Pakistan economic and military incentives to persuade it to join the anti-Taliban alliance. This was not necessarily to be an easy task, because Pakistan itself had been Taliban’s main supporter. To ensure both countries’ support for the US war on terrorism, within two weeks after the attacks, the US announced a withdrawal of the sanctions laid on Pakistan and India after their nuclear tests, including Glenn-Symington sanctions and also Pressler and Export-Import Bank Act sanctions in the case of Pakistan (the latter had already previously been waived in the case of India). On the other hand, the US had agreed on significant concessions on both countries’ sanctions already before the attacks. In Pakistan’s case, however, the sanctions imposed because of the military coup remained in place. The US rescheduled $379 million of Pakistan’s bilateral debt and secured a new IMF loan. Also write-offs of debt were discussed with the Paris Club creditors.

Musharraf’s decision to withdraw Pakistan’s support for Taliban, and instead to support the US and its allies, put his government in an extremely difficult position as Pakistani fundamentalist groups started immediately to oppose the government’s actions. However, the Pakistani government did not have much of a choice. It chose the path of least destruction for Pakistan – otherwise it could have been possible (although unlikely) that also Pakistan would have been bombed, and Pakistan could have ended up on the US list of rogue states. Support for the US also led to a withdrawal of the financial sanctions imposed on Pakistan after its nuclear tests. The government, whose legitimacy had been called into a question by foreign governments, maybe also wanted to gain respect in the international arena. Furthermore, it was clear that Pakistan would have to face thousands of Afghani refugees and cooperation with the West ensured more support in dealing with the problems caused by the refugees.

274 US Department of State 2001b.
277 Pakistan would probably have got the loan in any case but it would have been clearly smaller. Economist 29.9.2001a.
6 CONCLUSIONS: THE GOAL OF OPPOSING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SOMETIMES SUBORDINATED TO OTHER US INTERESTS

The US attempts to halt nuclear proliferation in South Asia failed in that India and Pakistan did acquire nuclear weapons and finally did proclaim that they are nuclear powers in May 1998. The US opposition to the nuclear weapons programs has, however, probably slowed them down. And in practice, ensuring that nuclear weapons will not be used remains naturally of greatest importance, and for this goal the US has worked and concentrated its policies on.

This concluding chapter is organized according to the questions posed in Chapter 2, as I now especially try to provide answers for them, taking into account the hypothesis presented in Chapter 4. I start this chapter by discussing the reasons behind the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear weapons. Then I discuss and evaluate the US actions and policies and look for reasons for why the US did not succeed in halting nuclear proliferation in South Asia. After that I consider the US goals and interests in South Asia. Finally, in the concluding section 6.4, I discuss prospects for the future of US non-proliferation policies in South Asia.

6.1 The South Asian nuclear weapons programs

What have been the reasons for the programs? What has been the effect of the programs on Indo-Pakistani relations? (Research question no. 1)

The US policies could only have been successful had they addressed the reasons behind the Indian and the Pakistan nuclear weapons. The US view on the reasons for Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons has also framed the US attitudes and policy choices in that that certain reasons to acquire nuclear weapons can seem to the US more justified than others. The acquisition of nuclear weapons as an attempt to improve the otherwise unsatisfactory national security can seem to be a more acceptable reason than for example the hope to become a great power.

The nuclear weapons programs can be seen as primarily either active or reactive. They are mostly active for example if the primary reasons are in the country’s aspirations to become a great power, a leading Muslim state, or a regional power. If they are in the first place reactive, they are responses to other states’ actions, to changes in power relations in the world or to events in the region. In reality, the programs can be actions to improve the countries’ international status, but they have often been presented as reactions - India developed nuclear weapons because of China and Pakistan because of India - because reactions can seem more justified than actions. Reactions can be presented so as if other states would have pushed a state into acquiring weapons, maybe even against its will, whereas in the case of actions, a state is acquiring weapons, something generally considered as bad, just for its own benefit.
In Chapter 3.3.1, different kinds of explanations were presented for why states acquire nuclear weapons. As my starting hypothesis, I expected in Chapter 4 the South Asian nuclear weapons to be for a large part responses to the security threats the two countries face. However, from the examination of the nuclear programs it seems that although this certainly was one of the reasons, different kinds of explanations for nuclear proliferation actually have to be combined.

National security has been the most commonly used justification for the two nuclear weapons programs. Both India and Pakistan have indeed had security threats that they have tried to counter with their weapons programs, and these threats give them some kind of an understandable claim to nuclear weapons or other kind of strong defense forces. Pakistan and India have had border disputes throughout their history, and if one of the countries has a nuclear weapon or is even possibly developing one, the other cannot afford not to develop one, too. China’s nuclear weapon was among the biggest reasons why India developed a nuclear weapon, and because of its enmities with India, China has been willing to help Pakistan in its nuclear program. The Indo-Pakistani nuclear race can also be interpreted with a Cold War logic, according to which by building up a nuclear arsenal, India has tried to provoke Pakistan into an arms race that the Pakistani economy would not cope with.278

The Indian nuclear weapons program developed gradually as a response to the Chinese program and to the development of Sino-Indian relations. Later on, the Pakistani threat played a major role for the Indian program, but the Pakistani program developed clearly as a response to the Indian program, not the other way round: the Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race developed gradually only after an Indian initiation.

India still cites the threat of China as a reason for not accepting bilateral non-proliferation arrangements with Pakistan. Of course, the Chinese nuclear weapons do in principle pose a threat for India. In practice, however, there has long been no kind of threat of war between India and China. In 1989, also R. Gandhi publicly shared this view. Neither state has also directed its nuclear forces against the other.279 The Indian demand that also China should be involved in regional non-proliferation arrangements makes it impossible for bilateral Indo-Pakistani nuclear disarmament to take place. By referring to China, India makes of its nuclear weapons an international issue because the Chinese nuclear weapons have in turn been developed as a response to those of the US and the Soviet Union. India is thus unwilling to give up its nuclear weapons except for in the extremely unlikely case that universal nuclear disarmament would take place.

Although India might have launched its program originally largely because of security threats, the security threats argument is at present not very convincing in India’s case. If India’s two adversaries, Pakistan is willing to give up its nuclear weapons if India does, and China is not really a threat for India at all. The quest for an acknowledged international status remains therefore a more plausible reason for the Indian weapons. As Huntington leads one to expect in a case of a regionally

predominant state, India thinks that a multipolar world system is developing where it can be one of the major powers. India has demanded to be acknowledged as a major international player with a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. As this has not happened without India having nuclear weapons, India has tried to get such a status by acquiring them.

India claims there are no just grounds for denying a nation of a billion from having an equal right to nuclear weapons as other nuclear powers have. The mere size of the population was a justification for nuclear weapons in China’s case, too. Henry Kissinger noted in 1971 that no one can ignore a state with a billion inhabitants and a nuclear capability; after China had become a nuclear power, the US started treating it as a major international power. India wants to be treated as an equal of China. Because this has not happened, India has considered the NPT and especially its indefinite extension in 1995 as discriminating: some states a granted an eternal right to possess nuclear weapons while others are forever denied the same right. Some Indians have even used the term nuclear apartheid: when the five permanent members of the Security Council are allowed to enhance their security with nuclear weapons and use these weapons as means of power and prestige, why would India not have the same right? NPT did also not stop vertical proliferation: although most states did not have the right to have any nuclear weapons, the nuclear powers were allowed to continue building their nuclear arsenals.

Some Indian observers have also blamed the MTCR and the NSC of being originally secretly set up cartels of the major industrial states through which they try to “retain market dominance and strengthen their long-term security and economic interests” and which undermine Third World civilian space and nuclear programs. It has been further claimed that the industrialized countries try to restrict the spread of missile technologies because missiles could restrict the major powers’ capabilities to “intervene in regional conflicts without incurring significant political or military costs”. The end effect of the controls on India has been an emphasis of indigenous production.

India has not been satisfied with nuclear powers’ nuclear disarmament actions. Universal nuclear disarmament is included as an eventual goal in the NPT and India has required that as a condition for its acceptance of arms control measures. By lobbying for universal nuclear disarmament, India has in some way also tried to reduce the Chinese threat diplomatically, although because of the unlikelihood of nuclear disarmament, the lobbying can seem as mere rhetoric. On the other hand, if total nuclear disarmament is not a realistic goal or as discussed in Chapter 3.3.3, maybe not even desirable, it is hard to find good justifications for that that the states that first managed to acquire nuclear weapons are more justified to have them than others. The Indian anti-nuclear ambitions and its claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council have legitimate grounds as the country is home to one sixth of the humankind. But because India has used these arguments as rhetorical weapons and eventually acquired nuclear weapons, the moral superiority India has sought with its rhetoric has been seriously injured.

Because India’s aspirations to become a great power and at least a regional major power is not an argument likely to gain sympathy or acceptance from other states, India has stuck to its alleged security threats to legitimize its nuclear weapons. Great power aspirations have, however, been a relatively efficient reason to raise domestic support for the nuclear program. Some political leaders, including I. Gandhi and those of the BJP, have tried to improve their domestic position by taking advantage of the nuclear card and the popularity of the efforts to make India a great power. Such domestic factors have especially played a role in the timing of the nuclear weapons program.

Both the Indian and the Pakistani programs have enjoyed wide domestic support. Thus although acquiring nuclear weapons is generally at least in the industrialized world seen today as less acceptable than it was some decades ago, this is not the case in India and Pakistan where the 1998 nuclear tests were greatly celebrated by the population. For example, a poll in 1996 indicated that clearly most Indians were in favor of further nuclear tests. The Indian supporters of nuclear weapons have blamed the opponents of selling their country to foreigners like the maharajas did in the 1800th century: they claim that the opponents try to sabotage India’s quest for self-sustainability and prevent India’s rise to the status of a regional great power. Also the Pakistani nuclear weapons program has had a strong domestic supporter base, as polls since the early 1980’s have shown. In Pakistan, nuclear weapons have become a symbol for the nation and, because of the popularity of the weapons program, a means for the country’s leaders to enhance their domestic position, especially for the military, whose continuing importance the development of nuclear weapons and the continuation of the Kashmir conflict have helped to ensure.

Certain individuals, like BJP politicians in India or Z. A. Bhutto and A. Q. Khan in Pakistan, seem to have had considerable impact on the development of the nuclear programs. Other political leaders might have preferred different kinds of security solutions. On the other hand, at least in the case of the democratic India, the public had chosen exactly these leaders. And as noted above, in both countries quite positive attitudes towards the nuclear weapons programs reign.

Also Islamabad has probably expected nuclear weapons to enhance Pakistan’s international status, especially its standing among the Muslim states, as nuclear weapons make Pakistan technologically the most advanced one of them and strengthen its relations to the Persian Gulf states. Demand for nuclear technology in Muslim countries in general has also contributed to the Pakistani weapons program at least by making financing available.

Pakistan has not accepted India’s leading role on the subcontinent and nuclear weapons are a way for it to balance the Indian power, something it could not do by conventional forces. The nuclear weapon has made it possible for Pakistan to keep the Kashmir issue open. Without the Pakistani nuclear weapon, India would probably have prevailed in the conflict already long ago.

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284 Zimmermann & Chellaney 1996.
286 US Department of State 1997; Spector 1990, p. 95.
287 Spector 1990, p. 95.
Among the reasons for the nuclear weapons must have been that they have been considered as a politically and militarily viable way to improve the security of a state — although one must wonder whether nuclear weapons are ever really a viable way to defend oneself or to attack an adversary, as nuclear war would hardly be for anyone’s benefit. The economic cost-effectiveness of nuclear weapons is also questionable. But if one state acquires nuclear weapons, it can seem to its adversary that acquiring nuclear weapons and getting the shelter of their deterrent power is the only effective way to protect itself. Pakistan could also hardly ever have had conventional military forces equal to those of the much bigger India. Nuclear weapons were a way to create some kind of a balance-of-power.

Although Waltz has argued that nuclear weapons could make conventional arms races unnecessary, this has, however, not happened in South Asia: despite the nuclear weapons, the two countries continue to have large conventional military spending and an ongoing conventional conflict with each other. This can imply that India and Pakistan do not consider nuclear weapons as a strong enough deterrent against each other and think that conventional war is still possible, the nuclear capabilities notwithstanding.

In Chapter 3.3.3, the possibility was discussed that nuclear weapons would not be totally undesirable if because of them, major wars between India and Pakistan would be avoided, as large-scale fighting could not be risked in the fear of escalation. Strategists in both India and Pakistan have indeed argued that nuclear weapons have brought stability and the situation should not be changed. S. Ganguly has argued that after the nuclearization of South Asia, both India and Pakistan have seemed to avoid full-scale conflict with each other because it could escalate too far. He claims that the two states have instead tried to exploit the internal conflicts of each other. This he sees as a variant of G. Snyder’s stability/instability paradox, which means that although stability is achieved between nuclear arsenals, nuclear adversaries act destabilizingly at other levels of their mutual relations.

India and Pakistan have not had a full-scale war since they both have nuclear weapons, but they have been at least on the very brink of a conflict several times. The Kargil conflict in 1999 was so grave that many have considered it as the fourth Indo-Pakistani war. In principle, the evidence can be interpreted in both ways, either that the nuclear weapons have contributed to the two states not having a full-scale war against each other, or that the weapons have not been able to calm down their possessors.

The periodic rising of tensions between India and Pakistan seems, however, to indicate that although nuclear weapons made direct conventional war between the Cold War superpowers impossible, the same does not hold for South Asia. One reason for this is that unlike the US and the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan are neighbors. Because of this and because of the preponderance of the Kashmir conflict in the relations between the two countries and also in their domestic politics, the two countries have not been able to “import” their mutual conflict elsewhere like the superpowers did. The Kashmir conflict is acute and concrete,

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unlike the Soviet-US quest for world hegemony was. Waltz has claimed that nuclear states would not in any case fight for issues of great importance. This does not hold in South Asia: both India and Pakistan seem to consider Kashmir vital issue. Waltz has also stated that “where much is at stake for one side, the other side moves with care”\textsuperscript{290}. However, neither India nor Pakistan has always shown care on its moves and statements about Kashmir. Thus the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear arsenals seem to be deterrents just against each other, but not against the conventional forces of the other state.

6.2 The US policies towards the nuclear programs

Have the US non-proliferation policies in South Asia been successful or not and why? (Research question no. 2)

As both India and Pakistan have acquired nuclear weapons, the US non-proliferation policies have at least in the end not been totally successful in South Asia. However, by making the acquisitions of nuclear weapons more difficult, the US opposition can have postponed it. The US interventions have also helped in ensuring that India and Pakistan have not started a full-scale war against each other since they have acquired nuclear weapons. The US seems to have been in principle consistently against nuclear proliferation in South Asia, but it just has not succeeded in halting it. Thus it has to be asked what went wrong with the US policies.

In Chapter 4, I assumed that the US policies have not had the wished consequences because they have not addressed the real reasons for proliferation. The US has concentrated quite much on trying to deny access to nuclear technology and materials. Also the multilateral international non-proliferation arrangements are mostly supply-side measures while the demand for nuclear weapons has not been internationally systematically addressed. Although access to technology is necessary for a country to acquire nuclear weapons, it does not alone lead a state to acquire nuclear weapons. At least in the case of India and Pakistan, the technology has existed if a country has been eager enough to do what ever it takes to acquire it. Thus supply-side policies to countering proliferation are not enough alone. Such US policies have ultimately not been totally effective because not all other countries have supported them (see below), because of loopholes in regulations, or because of a lack of control. However, export controls are good because they make the acquisition of nuclear technologies and materials so complicated and expensive, at least for less developed countries like India and Pakistan, that a nuclear weapons program is launched only if high political motivation to do so exists. Export controls are not bad policies but have to be combined with policies that affect the demand for nuclear weapons. As noted in Chapter 3.3.2, the purpose of export policies is also mainly to postpone the acquisition of nuclear weapons so that there is time for other kind of policies to be used.

\textsuperscript{290} Waltz 1981.
In practice, the US actions to halt nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia were for several decades directed more towards Pakistan than towards India. Many of the US policies and regulations have to do with importing nuclear or missile technologies and materials, and the Indian program has often escaped these measures because it is for a great degree indigenous. After the early 1970’s, the Indian nuclear weapon did in principle already exist but the Pakistani effort could possibly still have been halted so that a South Asian nuclear arms race would have been avoided. A further reason has been the concern that Pakistan could possibly share nuclear technology with radical Middle Eastern states.  

The US has also tried to decrease the demand for nuclear weapons in South Asia. Especially, it has tried to improve the Pakistani sense of security. The military and economic assistance the US gave Pakistan to strengthen it against the Soviet Union was also expected to diminish the Pakistani demand of nuclear weapons by strengthening Pakistan’s conventional forces. The assistance has, however, not been wide and strong enough to remove the Indian threat. The US has not been willing to give Pakistan binding security guarantees against India, and anything less than that has not been enough for Pakistan. The acquisition of nuclear weapons has become unnecessary for states like Germany and Japan because of the explicit US security guarantees. Yet the US or the other nuclear powers have not been willing to give Pakistan or India such guarantees. A binding security guarantee could be dangerous for the US because then the US might get directly involved in the Kashmir crisis. Like Pakistan has experienced several times when the US assistance has been withdrawn, the assistance has also been a somewhat unreliable source of security. Instead of removing the motivation for nuclear weapons, the assistance indirectly contributed to Pakistan acquiring them by making resources available.

The problem with the US policies seems to be that they have lacked conviction as the US has not been prepared to put very much at stake to halt the two programs. Because neither India nor Pakistan has been openly hostile towards the US, the US has been able to be a little soft towards them.

The US has also not been willing to do much about for example the Indian desire for the status of a major power. It is easy for the US to say that India deserves special attention and is the major regional power but that is not enough for India. To really accept India as a major international power would mean that India would have an equal position with the other major (nuclear) powers. That would mean that India would have a chance to have more to say about global issues, and that is difficult for the US to accept.

Neither has the US done much to remove the domestic political reasons behind the programs, but this would anyway probably have been extremely difficult. The US has supported certain individuals, for example B. Bhutto, as the US wished that she might curb the nuclear program down. However, if the reasons for nuclear weapons that are related to security threats and the desire to gain a better international status would be removed, the domestic popularity of the weapons would also diminish.

291 Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 5.
292 Lewis & Johnson 1996, p. xii.
As the examination of the US sanction legislation and policies reveals, another problem with the US policies has been that the US views on non-proliferation have often not been consistent themselves. Although the US Congress and the President have agreed on the importance of opposing nuclear proliferation, especially since the Indian 1974 test explosion, they have often disagreed on the means to achieve this goal. This has led to clashes over the authorities of the legislative, which has often stuck to strict approaches and sanctioning, and the executive, which has wanted to have independent room for action to ensure that general US interests are taken into account. As a consequence, "...most US non-proliferation legislation applicable to South Asia has been imposed on the executive branch over the President’s objection that the goals could be promoted better, and with less damage to bilateral relations, through behind-the-scenes diplomacy and pressure." It is interesting that there have been differences between the executive and the legislative in general, although there have been different holders of the offices from different parties and different political lines. However, this is probably because in general, both branches of the government have wanted to have maximal powers in relation to the other and maybe not so much because of constantly differing views on how to tackle nuclear proliferation.

In Chapter 3, the claim was discussed that the US capability to impose its will is decreasing and its sanctions do not work as planned when other states do not support them, leading to the expectation in Chapter 4 that the US policies might not succeed if other states do not support them when they do not agree with the US views on goals or on means to reach the goals. This has also been in part the case with respect to the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear programs. Despite the US sanctions, the two countries were able to make acquisitions from other countries, including from Western Europe, when other countries did not see as stringent export controls as the US as necessary. The Pressler Amendment sanctions would have had still graver consequences for Pakistan if Islamabad could not have turned to other sources of finance. After the Indian 1998 tests, the US could first not create a consensus on sanctions among the G-8-countries. This was possible only after the Pakistani tests had caused fears of the escalation of the situation. Thus without other countries’ support, the US policies indeed are less powerful.

Especially in the 1990’s after the Pressler Amendment sanctions were in place, the US tried to use a strategy of promising Pakistan that it would forgive the former Pakistani violations of US regulations if Pakistan would in the future obey the regulations. This way, the US wanted to regain the possibility to lay pressure on Pakistan with potential sanctions. This hope led to several amendments of the US legislation, but did not prove to be a very efficient way to deal with Islamabad because the threat of sanctions was not enough to convince Pakistan to curb down its nuclear activities. Islamabad seemed to consider nuclear weapons as so important that it was rather willing to face severe economic difficulties than to give up the weapons.

As it has become obvious that the efforts to halt India and Pakistan from continuing their nuclear weapons programs have been in vain, the US has put emphasis on trying to make sure that the weapons will not be used. The US has also tried to

293 Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, pp. 2, 5.
persuade India and Pakistan to join the treaties of the non-proliferation regime and to launch confidence-building measures, for example prior notifications of military activities and discussion groups between the two countries. Diplomatic efforts targeted at enhancing dialogue and transparency are a safe and low-cost way for the US to try to work against proliferation, but as noted in Chapter 5.4.3, unfortunately they have often not worked as well as hoped.

6.3 The US interests and goals

Why has the US acted the way it has? What kind of interests and goals does the US have in South Asia? How important has ensuring nuclear non-proliferation been with respect to other US goals? (Research question no. 3)

In Chapter 4, I discussed the possibility that if nuclear weapons seem to improve stability, the US might not be against them but in fact consider them as even desirable or at least not see it as absolutely necessary to halt the programs. Although this could in principle be possible, there is no evidence that the US would have seen nuclear weapons as desirable in South Asia, or furthermore promoted them. But it is possible that the certain indecisiveness in the US policies has been caused by a view that nuclear weapons in South Asia are not so much against US interests that it would have been absolutely necessary to halt the weapons programs. It can also be that although the possibility of nuclear weapons having stabilizing effects would be acknowledged, it would still be seen as necessary to oppose nuclear proliferation. Otherwise some other states, where proliferation would clearly be against US interests, could also become more interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. If the US opposition to nuclear weapons would seem selective, it would be more difficult for the US to get other states’ support for its policies. Waltz argued that the measured spread of nuclear weapons could be desirable. Thus it can also be that the US has thought that although nuclear weapons could bring stability to South Asia, slowing the programs down would still be necessary so that the two countries would slowly learn to live with the weapons. It is thus also possible that the US policies have been aimed at slowing the programs down rather than halting them.

Although the US seems to have in principle been against nuclear proliferation in South Asia, a certain inconsistency of its policies notwithstanding, it seems from Chapter 5 that the US has not given this goal the primary importance. As expected, the goal of balancing and overcoming the power of the Soviet Union was more important for the US regionally during the Cold War.

This is made evident especially by the massive assistance the US gave for Pakistan throughout the 1980’s during the war in Afghanistan. All the time, the Pakistani nuclear program was proceeding and this was something the US actually wanted to sanction. On the other hand, Washington hoped that its aid could help restrain Pakistani nuclear weapons program as Pakistan was provided with advanced

\[294\text{ Spector 1990, p. 12; Joseph 1996, p. 12.}\]
\[295\text{ Waltz 1981.}\]
conventional weapons that enhanced its national security. Thus it was hoped that the two goals, countering the Soviet Union and halting nuclear proliferation, could be served with the same policy. However, this did not work but was instead possibly even counterproductive as far as non-proliferation was considered as because of the aid, Pakistan could have more resources available for its program. Still, the US hope that aid might halt proliferation cannot be considered as just a cheap justification for why the US gave Pakistan assistance its nuclear program notwithstanding. Improving a threshold country’s security is not in general a bad non-proliferation policy, but the US aid was just not enough to secure Pakistan against India. Possibly also the timing of this policy was not right because in the 1980’s, the Pakistani nuclear program was already clearly proceeding and had developed its own force that pushed it forward. Thus it seems that the US has not aimed at supporting Pakistan’s nuclear program but has done it somewhat accidentally when trying to keep Pakistan in its sphere of influence.

I expected that after the Cold War the foremost goal for the US would have been to try to ensure that the superior US position cannot be challenged even regionally. Although this hypothesis has not been refuted, the South Asian nuclear programs do not provide so clear evidence for this. As expected in Chapter 4, cooperation has existed between the US and Pakistan, the secondary regional power. But it does not seem that the primary US aim has been to be directly against India, the major regional power. The US has not been overly interested in South Asia and does not seem to be against Indian regional hegemony as such. Especially during the Carter and Clinton terms, the US considered India’s regionally predominant position as convenient or natural. The US can allow India to be a regional hegemon in South Asia because China checks India in a wider Asian context. During the Cold War, when India’s relations with the Soviet Union were close, Indian hegemony on the subcontinent was less desirable from the US point of view. This was, however, probably not so much because of India itself but because of the fear that the Soviet Union could exert power on the subcontinent through India. By supporting Pakistan, the US has indirectly acted against India, but the assistance the US gave Pakistan was directed against the Soviet Union. Another reason for the US to have good relations with Pakistan is that the US has wanted to ensure Pakistan is oriented towards the West and that Pakistan contributes positively to the oil-related interests of the US. Also after the Cold war, the US rather sees Pakistan as its own ally than as an unstable, anti-Western Muslim state, which furthermore possesses a nuclear weapon. These reasons are not so much related to India. Thus the research material provided neither confirmation nor annulment for my hypothesis that the US has tried to promote a regional balance-of-power where no state (especially India) is powerful enough to be able to prevent the US from ensuring that its interests are being served. As the US assistance for Pakistan had also other reasons, it could not be proved that it was targeted at balancing India and Pakistan.

The US has wanted to have a secured presence in the region, either directly or through a close ally. As South Asia itself does not seem that important for the US, the reason for the need for presence is more in the energy resources of the Gulf region and of Central Asia. Pakistan served this purpose well enough during the Cold War. When the US itself has been present in the region, like during and after the Gulf War, Pakistan has not necessarily been needed. Because of its instability and its suspicious actions, including its nuclear program and its support for the
Kashmir guerillas, Pakistan is not an optimal ally for the US: it is uncomfortable for the US if its ally is criticized by the most of the rest of the world. If the US could get India to be a relatively reliable ally by giving it the same kind of assistance as it has given Pakistan, the US would do maybe that. India, however, is not as easily satisfied as Pakistan. India is not primarily seeking security like Pakistan, but it also wants to be acknowledged as a major, influential international player. On the other hand, Pakistan’s relations with other Muslim countries have offered the US a channel through which to have contact with these states, many of which are important because of their oil and natural gas resources.

My assumption that the actions of the US reflect the general geopolitical worldviews of the US leadership turned out to be a bit problematic. That is because both the US executive and the US legislative have powers over the country’s foreign policies and, as discussed in Chapter 6.2, even if a consensus has been reached on what US interests abroad are, they have often had differing views on how to best serve these interests. The actions of the US have therefore not always formed a logical whole because the two instances have at the same time tried to promote different kinds of policies. Furthermore, the execution of the policies formulated by one instance has sometimes been prevented by the other.

Although there is no evidence that the US has considered nuclear weapons as a means to promote stability, as expected, the US has otherwise tried to promote stability by intervening diplomatically when Indo-Pakistani relations have become especially tense. However, if the US really wanted to promote long-term stability in the region, it should put more effort on trying to help the two states in finding a solution to the Kashmir question because otherwise tensions increase periodically. Of course, it is possible that the US simply cannot do much about the issue, as a lasting solution cannot be forced. However, it seems that the US has not used all the possible carrots and sticks to persuade the two states to reach a solution. Furthermore, had the US not intervened in the subcontinent, India would probably have become a regionally hegemonic power and prevailed in the conflict with Pakistan before the latter developed nuclear weapons. This could have prevented the Pakistani nuclear weapons program altogether and in the end have resulted in improved stability in the region.

6.4 Prospects for the future

After the long efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, it seems highly unlikely that India would agree to give them up, especially because it sees them as a means to achieve the status of a great power. And when India does not give up its weapons, neither does Pakistan. Thus, not trying to persuade the two states to give up their nuclear weapons but enhancing the safety of the weapons and ensuring that they will not be used is of primary importance. It can be argued that the restrictions on export of nuclear material and technology have become useless against India and Pakistan now that they both already have nuclear weapons. Neither have sanctions really worked as a way to lay pressure on the two countries.
Even if it would be extremely difficult to persuade India and Pakistan to give up their weapons, they cannot be accepted as legitimate nuclear powers to the NPT. The awkward situation could ultimately be solved through more general steps towards nuclear disarmament that would also include China, but this kind of development does not currently seem very likely. A promise of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council could also persuade India to participate in nuclear disarmament.

The command and control mechanisms in India and Pakistan are far from the quality of the established nuclear states. Originally, also the other nuclear states had much weaker control mechanisms, and several near-accidents have been reported. Over the decades, the old nuclear powers have been able to improve the security of their forces, although the safety of the Soviet nuclear arsenals also caused great worries after the Soviet Union fell apart. The threat of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons is currently much greater in India and Pakistan. Technical help from the established nuclear powers would be valuable in addressing the problem, but this kind of help is officially against the NPT.

In Western eyes, India and Pakistan might also seem to be less reliable possessors for nuclear weapons than the US or the UK. In the West, the stability of the society and the reigning ideology make it very unlikely that the use of nuclear weapons could be considered as justified or that any segments of the society would be willing to use them. Especially Islamic fundamentalism, on the other hand, has shown its capability to use even the most extreme means.

India and Pakistan have been acting reliably in that sense that neither state exports nuclear or ballistic missile materials or technology. However, as the two countries have not been very eager to introduce export controls of international standards, it has been feared that they could become suppliers of sensitive technologies, especially for example when Indo-Iranian relationship got closer in the 1990’s. Also widespread corruption in India is a concern in this respect.

However, there are examples of states, which have had nuclear weapons or a capability to build them but have given up their weapons programs and destroyed the weapons they had after their national security has otherwise improved. The clearest example of this is South Africa, which declared in 1991 that it had nuclear weapons but that it will destroy them and thereafter did so and joined the NPT. So it could be that if good enough carrots were offered, also India could agree to give up its weapons. States that have nuclear weapons or a near capability to assemble them have a great power resource in them as they can be used to blackmail economic or military benefits as rewards for giving up the weapons capability. Examples of such behavior are Ukraine and North-Korea.

But an agreement over Kashmir is a necessary precondition to any lasting solution to Indo-Pakistani relations. The continuing conflict in Kashmir makes the nuclear arms race between the two countries especially worrying. The high lands of Kashmir are probably the most probable reason for a nuclear war in the world.

Again in the winter of 2002, Indo-Pakistani tensions escalated because of terrorist attacks related to the Kashmir question and because of missile tests. So far, India and Pakistan have not resorted to the use of nuclear weapons to solve the issue and it seems unlikely that they ever would because of the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear attack and a following counterattack. However, even the possibility that this could happen is very threatening.

Even when the nuclear deterrence holds and the weapons are not used, they have very considerable effects on South Asia. The real costs of the programs are kept secret but they are estimated to be around US $ 6 billion for each country by 1999 for a small arsenal of warheads and missiles. In addition to these costs, the two countries face immense costs for the deployment, targeting, and command-and-control of the weapons, for the dismantling of old weapons, and for nuclear defenses. The opportunity costs are huge especially for such less developed countries like India and Pakistan. And not just that the existing money could be used on something else than nuclear weapons; the two countries would have altogether more resources if they gave up their weapons programs. For example, India and Pakistan, which both have pressing energy needs that hinder their economic development, could greatly benefit from the international cooperation on the peaceful uses of atomic energy if they were members of the NPT.299

The Kashmir issue is extremely difficult to solve, as it is very much a zero-sum situation. The most probable solution is that in time, the current line of control that is the de facto border between the two countries becomes a de jure border.300 If the Kashmir question could be solved in a way that would leave both sides somehow satisfied, there would be hope of nuclear disarmament on the subcontinent. The chances of a solution are also very much dependent on both countries’ domestic politics, which would have to undergo a profound change for the countries to give up the nuclear weapons.

The US stance to solving the conflict continues to be that “ultimately it has to be the two sides talking to each other to solve the issue of Kashmir, and not with the United States playing the kind of role that is suggested by the term “mediator”’’ but that however, “to the extent that the two parties want us to play some role in that dialogue, fine”.301 Pakistan would welcome the US to act as an intermediary but India opposes such involvement. And nothing can be done against the will of one of the adversaries, as that would not be a way to persuade them to show restraint with their nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the conflict may have such explosive potential that the US does not want to take the risk of getting more involved, as that would require the use of significant amounts of resources.

Since the war on terrorism, the US-Pakistan relations have again been better. Combating international terrorism is seen as such a vital issue in the US that as long as Pakistan’s support is needed in these efforts, the US cannot be too critical.

299 Lavoy 1999.
300 Different kinds of regional arrangements have been suggested that would make of Kashmir an open area with non-restricted passage although parts of it would formally belong to two different countries. The solution should be something both sides could portray as a victory. Economist 14.7.2001.
301 US Department of State 2002a.
of Pakistan. Also in the long term, the US has to make sure that Pakistan remains relatively stable and does not become more of a home for various fundamentalist terrorist groups. On the other hand, the US can hardly afford lining up with a state, which supports Kashmir-related terrorism. And as India is also quite interesting for the US, especially economically, the US wants to ensure it has good relations with it as well. But the tensions in Kashmir harm the development of the relations of the US to both of countries.

After the terrorist attacks on September the 11th, 2001 the US has stressed the possibility of counterproliferation. This means that, as a pronounced change to the clearly anti-proliferation but much less harsh US policies in the past, the US can in extreme cases even use its nuclear weapons against certain states’ alleged WMD programs. For example, the US Under Secretary of State J. Bolton stated in January 2002 on the Conference of Disarmament that “the United States regards the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology as a direct threat to international security, and will treat it accordingly”. The Bush Administration is formulating “a comprehensive strategy to enhance our (the US) security. This strategy must include strengthening nonproliferation measures (prevention), more robust counter-proliferation capabilities (protection), and a new concept of deterrence, relying more on missile defense and less on offensive forces.” During the Bush Jr. term, the development of new kinds of nuclear weapons has also been considered in the US, and President Bush has not been willing to sign the CTBT. All this seems to indicate a strengthening of the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. As it thus seems unlikely that general nuclear disarmament will take place, it also makes it more unlikely for that to happen in South Asia.

There are chances that India and Pakistan proceed even significantly in agreeing and implementing mechanisms that ensure the safety of the weapons and minimize the possibility that they will be used. India could agree to participate in a regional NWFZ if the other nuclear powers participated in it as well. Pakistan is likely to accept non-proliferation arrangements if India participates on them. Unfortunately, as long as the Indo-Pakistani relations remain strained especially because of Kashmir, any positive developments can be fast reversed. A lasting solution to the Kashmir question is thus of a great importance for the future of the subcontinent.

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