GENDERING THE MILITARISATION OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM:
Discourses and Representations of Masculinities and Femininities

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I. INTRODUCTION

“The personal is political,” feminists have declared as their motto. If the personal is political, and the political therefore personal, then this paper wishes to ask, what makes militarisation personal, and how is it political? Militarisation is defined here as the socio-political process “in which individuals or political systems either become increasingly dependent upon, controlled and affected by the military,” or “a process by which individuals and political systems adopt militaristic values, beliefs, and presumptions about human history that enhance military ones” (Enloe, 2004a: 219-220; Rycenga and Waller, 2001:121). By examining dominant discourses of the War on Terrorism, how then is militarisation gendered and gender militarised in the War on Terrorism? How are the consequences of US military activity gendered? In what ways do discourses divide groups of individuals and encourage aggression by the sexual subordination and Othering of enemies? The militarisation process for the War on Terrorism penetrates everyday social thinking and effects how individuals perceive and interpret their state, society, and personal security. Wars have always been and will continue to be reliant on hierarchical gender constructions. In contribution to other War on Terrorism analyses, a feminist perspective highlights the significance of gender in this particular field of US foreign policy, and demonstrates an innovative way to approach IR dilemmas.

The ‘War on Terrorism’ remains an ambiguous policy by definition, but has nonetheless produced two controversial wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively, that have demanded constant justification and explanation, globally as well as domestically. I am interested in how discourses on the War on Terrorism are constructed and reproduced in the US for US citizens. These discourses are often contradictory and result in disturbing ironies, like the description of the death and destruction in New York City as a ‘war zone’ on 11 September 2001, in contrast to the referral to thousands of women and children killed by US bombings in Iraq as ‘collateral damage.’ (Hensman in Joseph and Sharma, 2003: 25)

This thesis treats such larger themes of the War on Terrorism, but also takes a keen interest in individuals and the events in which they perform. Some individuals are anonymous and invisible, while the bodies of others are given a physical presence in the publicity of their person, or the larger group of bodies to which they belong. It is fascinating to observe, as Judith Butler (2004b) does, how gender and sexuality determine which bodies are valuable
and worth protecting, as opposed to those which are meaningless or even dangerous, thus necessitating their destruction.

How gender is formative of US foreign policy is a very timely examination to conduct. This thesis seeks to identify, examine and problematise hierarchical gender identities that are constructed to legitimise the War on Terrorism. After a theoretical and methodological discussion, the discourse analysis will proceed chronologically beginning with those produced during and after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It then continues with the discourses of the US military response, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are at the core of this analysis. The discourse and representation analysis is conducted on political themes, speeches, events, actions, spaces, places, images and individual stories and experiences. They reflect how the War on Terrorism is justified, conducted and supported by the feminisation of the Other, and the masculinisation of the self, where the dehumanisation, demonisation homosexualisation, Orientalisation, and victimisation of Others contrasts threateningly, to the bodily and sexually Puritanistic, heterosexual, physically strong, civilised and righteous self.

This project was born out of a concern for the often-disturbing ways that gender is manipulated to support and legitimise violence and militarism. It is something that continues to both upset and fascinate me, for the capacity of the political world to regard violence as ‘normal,’ even ‘natural,’ is both interesting and distressing. These assumptions are entangled with particular distributions of gender and sexuality that tragically constitute violence, and encourage its perpetuation. These strong, haunting sentiments motivated and sustained my interest and energy in researching and writing with enthusiasm, believing as Hannah Arendt did that “the practice of violence, like all, action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world” (Arendt, 1970: 80).

II. THEORISING GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Feminist IR theorists aim to demonstrate how gender is a central force in shaping IR from state behaviour, power politics, the workings of the global economy, and all other aspects of world politics—“how we care about, perceive, understand, analyse, and critique the world we live in is profoundly shaped by gender” (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 10). As J. Ann Tickner writes, despite these efforts this area of scholarship is still regarded as peripheral amongst conventional IR theorists who fail to understand it and find it impossible to accept as
a serious and useful approach. Agreeing with Tickner, that these misunderstandings occur because “feminist IR scholars see different realities and draw on different epistemologies from conventional IR theorists” (Tickner, 2001: 3; 2004: 50), it is important to first come to terms with these differences and thus demonstrate why gender is important by showing how these gendered realities reveal something meaningful about IR.

One central controversy, therefore that must be clarified early on is the concept of gender. Even though it is generally understood as one’s socially constructed sexual identity, it is nonetheless frequently equated with women and femininity. For gender to be able to tackle IR proficiently, it is essential that ‘gender’ be understood as just as much about “men and masculinity—something that is central to international politics since so much of the discipline is about men and masculinity,” (Ticker, 2004: 51). Also, “it is not only females but males as well who suffer from rigid gender roles” (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 21). This, what I consider to be a serious oversight—also by many feminist thinkers—is another obstacle for traditional IR scholars to take feminist IR theory seriously, often because they feel disconnected or threatened by women-centred conceptions of gender.

However, even this is not enough. If the concept of gender to be employed in a fuller and more meaningful way, it is essential to theorise it further to the point where the idea of sexuality itself becomes not only a theoretical cornerstone of the study, but also inseparable from its methodological principles. As V. Spike Peterson writes, “Feminism is not just ‘about women,’ nor the addition of women to male-stream constructions; it is about transforming ways of being and ways of knowing” (Peterson, 1992: 20). The following section begins by describing the main established approaches to gender, following a deconstruction of the concept in search of the appropriate definition.

**Approaching Gender**

There are three different recognised feminist approaches to gender in political theory. Those referred to as *liberal feminists* recognise women’s exclusion from politics. To correct this perceived inequality among autonomous individuals, they pursue strategies for their inclusion. (Squires, 2004: 3) *Radical feminists* seek to interpret and reconfigure the political to make it open to their gendered specificity, and “attribute all of women’s oppression to an undifferentiated concept of patriarchy” (Tickner, 2004: 15). The approach, however, is criticised for being based on the knowledge and experience of Western, white, middle class
women, and therefore does not “recognise differences amongst women based on race, class, sexual preference, and geographical location.” (Tickner, 2001:18)

Both reacting against and emerging from within this is standpoint feminism. Standpoint feminists suppose that women’s experiences of the world are fundamentally different from men’s and therefore they are in a special position to examine this system. (Tickner, 2004: 17) Much of the criticism towards radical and standpoint feminism comes from postcolonial or third world feminists, who are often more comfortable in the postmodern/poststructuralist approach. Postmodern feminists normally use a genealogical methodology, advocate diversity politics (instead of equality or difference), and speak of *gendering* rather than gender. They aim to deconstruct, destabilise and displace the oppositional discourses of political study. (Squires, 2004: 3). The strategy of displacement differs from the strategies of de-patriarchalisation and ontologisation of the latter two feminist approaches. Instead of replacing the political by the social by extending the principles of the public sphere or celebrating their exclusion, deconstructivists argue, “it is more productive to expose the internal tensions and contradictions that lie within any such distinction” (Squires, 2004: 52). In doing so, by politicising something that has been viewed as apolitical, what is perceived as ‘natural’ is actually socially constructed and therefore subject to change.

There are therefore interesting differences in feminist epistemologies. The *objective* frame adopted by liberal feminists, aims to determine ‘truth’ by providing universal values for political reasoning. The *interpretive* frame of radical feminists aims to expose and interpret already existing values within defined communities. Finally, the task of the *genealogical* frame of the strategy of displacement of postmodern feminists is to question the ‘truth’, to “unsettle existing values by questioning their claims to self-evident status… to deconstruct meaning claims in order to look for the modes of power they carry and to force open a space for the emergence of counter-meanings.” (Squires, 2004: 80-81)

While the genealogical frame of postmodernism will serve as the primary frame of analysis in this thesis, the interpretive frame used in standpoint epistemology will also be required. Feminists with the interpretive frame as the default are often less comfortable with the tension between the two frames when combining them in such a way, and seek to resolve this. However, genealogical gender theorists often welcome this contradiction. Christine Sylvester celebrates the blend, recommending a “playful acceptance of all existing epistemologies” (Sylvester, 1994: 108-109). Judith Squires reminds us that the “virtue of empiricist epistemology is that it acts as a reminder that we need the workday efforts as feminist scientists to uncover all the stories about men and women” (Squires, 2004: 108).
Indeed, it would be impossible to conduct this thesis without the capacity to make the experiences of men and women visible. In addition, Squires points out that standpoint epistemology is constantly developing and becoming increasingly sophisticated; its ability to identify multiple realities is beginning to blur the division between standpoint and postmodernist thinking. My thesis therefore will use standpoint feminism to the extent that it will make visible the gendered experiences of individuals, but remain within the postmodern frame in order to deconstruct them critically—which is the central aim of this thesis.

Defining Gender

Subjectivity

Squires distinguishes between three significant approaches to subjectivity. First, the determinist approach assumes biological determinism, in other words, that “one’s biological sex determines one’s social and cultural characteristics and roles” (Squires, 2004: 55). Liberal feminists used this to argue that despite their biology, they were equally capable of rationalistic behaviour and thought (in other words, characteristics deemed masculine). The second approach is constructionist, which emerged in the 1960s to counter biological determinism. Simone de Beauvoir’s influential work The Second Sex was the first to develop the theoretical sex/gender distinction, where sex is one’s biology (male/female), and gender is one’s socially constructed identity (masculine/feminine). This approach has been highly influential and has since become widely accepted.

However, the constructionist approach is under fire from the deconstructionist direction for not challenging the idea of presocial biological sex difference. Postmodern feminist thinkers like Judith Butler (1999) argue that one’s physical sexuality is also a consequence of one’s personal history and experience, that biology itself is a result of systems of social organisation. Postmodern feminists often use Lacanian psychoanalytic theory or Foucauldian theory and methodology, where both the physical and ideological affect gender. The deconstructionist approach to subjectivity is strongly based on Michel Foucault’s notation of subjectivity as the result of the operations of power upon the body (Foucault, 1988: 50). Let us now examine Foucault’s conception of power in order to better understand why the sex/gender distinction requires re-examination and reconfiguration.
Power

Instead of the conventional and simplistic understand of power as ‘power-over,’ Foucault’s conception of power differs in three fundamental ways. First of all, power is exercised, rather than possessed. It is not fundamentally repressive, but also productive and generates effects including resistance; and power comes from below, so it must be analysed from the bottom-up, not top-down. (Foucault, 1978: 92-95; 1980b: 98; Shanely and Pateman, 1994: 220) Power must be understood as penetrating all levels of social existence; “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault, 1978: 93). It is therefore not uni-directional, but multi-directional1 and network-like. Wherever there is a relationship, there is power, and thus, subordination. Hence, social structures are hierarchical, as are gendered structures. But, the domination that is exercised in society is not the kind of one-over-another, but rather, complex and manifold, where “the multiple forms of subjugation... have a place and function within the social organism” (Foucault, 1980b: 96). Because power is not a thing that can be identified in a specific location or in someone’s hands like a commodity, it “must be analysed as something which circulates, or... only functions in the form of a chain” (1980: 98).

Foucault of course is not without critics. (Callinicos, 1990; Eagleton, 1991; Taylor, 1986; Walzer, 1986) Some argue that he places too much emphasis on power as repressive, whereas others in contrast argue that he underestimates the structures of domination. A common criticism is also directed towards the tension in the definition of power as both suppressive and capacitating (therefore as both objectivising and subjectivising). Others, like Gillian Rose (1984), simply dismiss him as a pessimistic nihilist of “simply that old familiar despair” (Rose, 1984: 11).

Postmodern feminists in turn have been criticised for this approach, often by other feminists. They have been attacked for undermining the goal of female emancipation by changing the emphasis from female oppression to gender constructions by rejecting the universal category of ‘woman.’ Others see postmodernism as a “receipt for stasis, if not indeed paralysis” (Evans, 1995: 149) because they believe it removes women’s agency—if power is inescapable, then how should it be countered, even if produces the means for its own subversion? The approach is dismissed as too complicated, impractical, and not applicable.

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1 Hannah Arendt defines power similarly as consensual, as opposed to instrumental; “Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together... The moment the group, from which the power of the group originated to begin with, [the power of someone ‘in power’] also vanishes” (Arendt, 1970: 44).
In spite of these varying criticisms, many, especially postmodern feminists, have found Foucault’s theories immensely useful. (Squires, 2004: 37-38) His broad definition of power allows feminists to critically examine the production of gender from the bottom-up, starting from gender experiences and identities, instead of top-down, when particular assumptions reign as the ‘truth’ about sex and gender. It also transcends the problematic dichotomies of previous feminisms and offers new methods not only of analysing gender, but also new ways of enabling individuals to destabilise and transform the self, to redefine and create new identities that open new possibilities. (Roseneil, 1999: 177) Foucault’s approach, in fact, does not overemphasise the repressive capabilities of power. Critics overlook that one of the prime features of Foucault’s conception of power is that it is also productive. According to Foucault:

If power were never anything but repressive... do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than has a negative instance whose function is repression. (Foucault, 1980b: 109)

While this too can be argued to be ultimately repressive if power were argued to bend subjects to its will by the coercive employment of incentives to obey it. However, considering the repression of individuals, power is the source of the individual itself. One of the primary effects of power is to render “certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires [to] be identified and constituted as individuals” (Foucault, 1980b: 98). Relations of power that produce truths are constantly and infinitely established and re-established by discourse. Freedom from repression is also found within its creator, whereby freedom and power are inseparable from one another; “At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom” (Foucault in Campbell, 1998: 204). Power therefore may be repressive, but it also provides subjects with their agency. Hence, neither women’s agency nor the agency of any gender or sexuality is eliminated in postmodern philosophy.

Power does not exist where there is no capacity for resistance, and discourse, in which power and knowledge are joined together, “transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (Foucault, 1978: 101). This understanding of power, and its presence and function in discourse are inseparable from the aims of this thesis. It is tied to the understanding of gender.
and how power relations construct gender identity. It enables the researcher to identify a broader scope of relations, sources, directions and effects of power, resulting in an analysis seeking a more profound understanding of where power lies in the perpetuation of gender, and with what effects and meaning.

**Gender**

Next is the question of gender itself. One of the most influential gender theorists following Foucauldian notion of subjectivity is Judith Butler, whose understanding of gender is crucial in this thesis. The most essential characteristic of Bulterian gender theory is that gender is approached as *performative*; “There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (Butler, 1999: 33). Like power is not produced alone, neither is gender; “One is always ‘doing’ it with or for another, even if the other is only imaginary” (Butler, 2004b: 1). Gender is therefore an act that requires repetitive performance “of a set of meanings already socially established; it is the mundane and ritualised form of their legitimation” (Butler, 1999: 178). It is a process without beginning or end, “an ongoing discursive practice… open to intervention and resignification” (Butler, 1999: 43).

Because gender is never ‘fixed’ as it is imagined to be, there cannot be merely the two genders (masculine/feminine)—there are many. Gender categories become complicated and multidimensional to the point where their borders become blurred, or are discarded altogether because of their inability to describe the nature and production (and reproduction) of genders. As Butler writes, “Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a *stylised repetition of acts*” (Butler, 1999: 179, italics original). Thus gender is not understood as a noun, but an act and norm. Yet, social constructions divide into male and female sexes. Recalling Monica Wittig, Butler argues, “such a division suits the economic needs of heterosexuality, and lends a naturalistic gloss to the institution of heterosexuality” (Butler, 1999: 143). Thus, not only do social gender norms only legitimise a narrow understanding of two genders, but also this understanding is further discriminatory by adhering to strict heterosexism. Those who do not conform to these norms are punished accordingly.

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2 This forms the basis of queer theory, of which Butler is considered to be one of the main developers. Queer theory is useful in this thesis particularly when examining for example homophobia and heterosexism in masculinities.
The body, as the subject of this control, is as central to the process of gender as the mind because it too is a site of gender ‘doing’ or ‘being done to.’ The body itself is “constructed by discourses and practices that take the body both as their target and as their vehicle of expression” (Gatens, 1992: 132). Bodies are public—and political. Butler writes that “although we struggle for the rights over our own bodies, the very bodies for which we struggle are not quite ever our own... my body is and is not mine” (Butler, 2004a: 21). In addition Butler distinguishes between the discursive presence of visible and invisible bodies. For example, that violence against bodies with a silent discourse—where lives and therefore losses do not exist—“leaves a mark that is no mark” (2004b: 25).

Foucauldian notions of discipline and production are both present. In Discipline and Punish (1975), Foucault argues that power relations work on the body, and discipline it. Importantly, the concept of ‘discipline’ for Foucault;

may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology.

(Foucault, 1987: 215)

In The History of Sexuality: Volume One (1978), Foucault introduces the term bio-power to refer to the process by which techniques and institutions of power discipline the body and control and regulate populations. He argues that power is no longer exercised over legal subjects by the domination of death, but over the biology of human bodies and thus the level of life itself. (Foucault, 1978: 139-145) Foucault’s genealogical study suggests that the notion of sexuality did not exist until it was forced into the open by the repressive compulsion of ritual confessions of sex that emerged in the nineteenth century with the institutionalisation and psychiatrisation of society. Regulated confession and psychoanalysis formed discourses of ‘true’ sexualities, and condemned others as false and perverse. Thus, it is the power regime of sexuality that creates, categorises and legitimises the idea of sexuality. Sexual identity is “always constructed within the terms of discourse and power, where power is partially understood in terms of heterosexual and phallic cultural conventions” (Butler, 1999: 40).

3 As an immediate example she cites, for example, African AIDS victims. This argument is made in Undoing Gender (2004b) in the context of how gender and sexuality are related to the recognition of personhood, and likewise, dehumanisation. In Precarious Life (2004a), she forms a similar discussion of September 11 and post-9/11 politics. These ideas are important to this thesis, and will be discussed in further detail in the context of gendering IR.
This thesis is interested in masculinities and femininities (in their plurals) as they are produced and performed in the War on Terrorism. There is no single masculinity, and no single femininity, but rather many interpretations of each that are located in fluctuating hierarchies according to crosscutting factors like nationality, race or religion. The interest is not simply in the gender hierarchies between but also within these identities, as hierarchies and power relations exist between different masculinities, and different femininities, not simply between masculinities and femininities. And, in Bulter’s prescription, the deconstruction of the political genealogy of gender ontologies should provide insight into the constitutive acts of gender. These acts are then located and accounted for as prescribed by the forces that discipline the social appearance of gender (Butler, 1999:44).

Race, Religion, and the Orient

But there is still another dimension of gender that remains untouched, and those are the effects of other social dividers like race, class and religion. Such factors have often been discussed in relation to the War on Terrorism, but less often in relation to gender. Yet, this thesis holds that they are inseparable from gender identities—and central to the nature of the discourses of the War on Terrorism. The supposition that the categories of ‘men’ and ‘women’ “simply need to be filled with the various components of race, class, age, ethnicity, and sexuality in order to be complete” (Butler, 1999: 21) assumes that these variables are incomplete, therefore are permanently under (re)definition. Cultural identity, therefore, is gendered because gender cuts across its constitutive categories.

Culture has a close association with race and culture when a people’s common characteristics are discussed. Edward Said (1993) discusses the process of classification of nature and humans into types. Reviewing Kant, Diderot, or Johnson, Said recognises a “penchant for dramatising general features, for reducing vast numbers of objects to a smaller number of orderable and describable types” (Said, 1993: 199; italics original) in the eighteenth century. These designated generalisations gathered power in the nineteenth century when they were allied with genetics. Difference began to be discussed in terms of genetic universals, the Other’s primary characteristics, and his/her “primitive” state (Said, 1993: 199-200). Therefore, while race can be defined in terms of genetic or physical difference, its meaning lies in the concept of racial difference. While there have been attempts to identify different levels of racism e.g. Wieviorka, 1994), such attempts should be understood as a part of a continuum. Even so, as Said argues, racial difference created by European colonialism
enabled the creation of the idea of the White Man. It was an idea, and a reality involving a particularly “reasoned position towards both the white and the non-white worlds” (Said, 1993: 227-288). It defined what it meant to be a White Man in the world (in other words, the leader of human civilisation and the messiah of the savagery of the non-White world).

Gender hierarchies are created when differences in social categories precisely like race are introduced. Commonly, they characterise the Other by constructing their sexual identity as inferior, often by feminisation. For example, categories of race generally involve the discursive construction of particular masculinities and femininities. (Lewis and Mills, 2003; Puar and Rai, 2002) Nira Yuval-Davis for instance observes that, “blackness has been associated with evil, monsters and base sexuality” (Yuval-Davis, 2003: 50). She also argues that “the embodiment dimension of the racialised Other puts sexuality at the heart of the racialised imagery which projects dreams of forbidden pleasures and fears of impotency onto the Other” (2003: 51). Racial and minority stereotyping endows specific characterisations that can often stand in contrast to one another, for example the ‘violent’ Afro-Caribbean and the ‘wimpy’ Asian men. Members of the hegemonic community regard the Other as inferior and uncivilised, and possessive of a base, lustful sexuality. Indeed, black men have often been lynched for “mythical sexual intercourse with white women which could only be constructed as rape within this discourse” (ibid.). The myth of the strange and unknown Other as a rapist is frequent within racialised discourses. Cynthia Enloe additionally points out that the relationships with racialised others involve other forms of sexual domination. The Asian sex tourism industry is an example of the dependence of postcolonial individuals on male Orientalist fantasies. These postcolonial subjects are economically dependent on these sexual dreams and desires of Western men for survival. (Enloe, 2000a: 35-40, Yuval-Davis, 2003: 52)

The fascination with the so-called Orient goes back far in time to early European colonialism. Edward W. Said is well known for his criticism of Orientalism, which he describes as “a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European Western experience” (Said, 1993: 1). The Orient was a source of great material and cultural richness and inspiration to Europe, and the relationship between the two is a relationship of power, domination, and complex hegemony. It cannot be described as simply a product of the European imagination. The Orient was not Oriental simply because it was discovered to be so, but because it “could be - that is, submitted to being - made Oriental” (Said, 1993: 6). As a result the Orient was instrumental in defining Western self as its contrasting image, idea, personality, and experience. Europe acquired strength and identity by
portraying the Orient as its inferior self. (Said, 1993: 2, 3) The heritage of colonialist thought therefore continues to define the unequal relationship between West and East.

While Said’s perceptions of Orientalism lack a gender perspective, his observations have been helpful to postcolonial feminist theories that have in that context made the gendered perceptions of the self and Other, as described above. They recognise that the “discourses of cultural and sexual difference are powerfully mapped onto each other” (Yeğenoğlu in Lewis and Mills, 2003: 549). The highly publicised and controversial debate surrounding the Muslim veil demonstrates this ongoing discourse. Opinions are highly fractioned not only between East and West, but groups of people in them, including Muslims themselves, as well as feminists. Postcolonial feminists often accuse Western feminists of essentialising and victimising non-Western women as being in need of the emancipatory assistance of their ‘liberated’ Western sisters, and this allegation is constantly repeated in the case of the veil.4 As Meyda Yeğenoğlu describes, the veil captures Western fantasies where the exotic female figure represents the mysteries and secrets of the Orient. The concealment is seductive, but simultaneously threatening, explaining Western desires to liberate the backward and uncivilised Orient by lifting the veil, demystifying the Other. The colonizer’s desire to control and dominate the (feminised) foreign land and bodies is articulated in the surveillance of what may lurk behind the veil. (Yeğenoğlu in Lewis and Mills, 2003: 547-557)

The religious dimension of interpretations of the Orient cannot be ignored either. The terrorists of 11 September 2001 were Muslim, and so the US voices of the War on Terrorism have been particularly targeted at Islamic fundamentalism with immense suspicion and hostility. In stark contrast to this is an American Christian fundamentalism that is apparent in US foreign policy discourses. Considering that religions supply individuals with answers to existentialist predicaments, definitions of good and evil, and meaning to life itself, it is a considerably powerful domain of everyday ontology and epistemology. Both Christianity and Islam seek to answer on behalf of all of humanity, not just a particular collectivity, and thereby engage its members in religious and cultural imaginations and their hierarchies of desirability - determining global inclusions and exclusions (Yuval-Davis, 2003: 42-43). Religious principles are also determinants of the limits of sexual propriety. Different standards and practices often provoke scorn or disgust from other religious cultures - as we

4 Western feminists are increasingly aware, however, that the veil may no longer be a tool and symbol of traditional female oppression. Instead, many consider that it has become an asset to their struggle, the “embodiment of their will to act, their agency” (Yeğenoğlu in Lewis and Mills, 2003: 558)
have seen in the case of the veil. For example, David Campbell in *Writing Security* (1998) discusses the Puritan American self constantly defining and redefining itself in contrast to spiritually inferior Others, due to their paganism, race, communist beliefs, or other rationalisations. Indeed, religious Others are often approached by the West in much the same way as racial or Oriental others, whereby non-Christians are seen as morally inferior, if not pagan-like, and thus also sexually perverted and depraved. However, again we must be cautious, for there are variations and exceptions in these constantly transforming discourses. As mentioned, Islamic women are more likely to be regarded as victims of Muslim men, both sexually as well as politically. The relationship between East and West, however, remains hierarchal with the West asserting a relative moral superiority and desire to control.

These processes discussed here are dehumanising and demonising for the Other in question. Gender and sexuality are indeed part of the cultural discourses of identity that result in the production and legitimisation of imagined hierarchical borders between communities by differentiating between us/them and inside/outside. As we find ourselves already discussing it, the following section proceeds directly to theorise gender in International Relations.

**Gendering International Relations**

Feminist theory identifies international politics from its realist roots essentially as a masculine-constructed arena therefore its rules, values and expectations are gendered in favour of men by a process of socialisation—“how individuals are taught culturally appropriate attitudes and behaviours” (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 19)—forming gender identities. 5 Peterson and Runyan call “gender ideology” the belief system of gender stereotypes legitimised in this process (1993: 26). Butler concurs, saying that “genders can be neither true nor false, neither real nor apparent” but still punishments are distributed to those who do not abide by them (Butler, 1990: 141-140).

As a consequence, men’s experiences and knowledge in IR are accepted as universal and even superior (Hoffman-Hizi, 2002: 7). The continuing public-private dichotomy structurally sustains this perception, where masculinities are political and active, and femininities are personal and passive. For example, central concepts such as ‘power’ and ‘security’ that have origins in realist thought have distinctive gender constructions that

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5 For a clear sociological discussion about how discourse analysis reveals how patriarchal discourses are created and maintained and how individuals become socialised see Walby, 1990:97-103. World religions and ideological systems are core examples of how patriarchy is mediated through language and belief.
legitimise an aggressive masculine identity. Taking the concept of ‘power’ as an example, Spike V. Peterson and Anne Runyan point out that it,

Is usually defined as ‘power-over,’ specifically, the ability to get someone to do what you want. It is usually measured by control of resources, especially those supporting physical coercion... and obscures the fact that power reckoning is embedded in sociocultural dynamics and value systems.

(Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 33)

It is not that this type of power is not a so-called reality, but that it is a socio-culturally determined interpretation, which is essentially biased towards perpetuating self-sustaining cycles of violence;

The point is not that power-over, aggressive behaviour, and life-threatening conflicts are not ‘real’ but that they are only a part of a more complicated story. Focusing on them misrepresents our reality even as it (to some extent unnecessarily) reproduces power-over, aggressive behaviour and life threatening conflicts.

(Peterson and Runyan 1993: 35)

The concept of ‘security’ is similarly gendered. It “is understood not in terms of celebrating and sustaining life but as the capacity to be indifferent to ‘others’ and, if necessary, to harm them” (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 34).

Peterson and Runyan refer to ‘Gender ideology’ as the belief system of gender stereotypes that are legitimised in the process of socialising individuals to particular gender roles. In gendering IR, feminist theorists pay close attention to the oppositional dichotomous structures in IR. They structurally sustain the perception of masculinity/men as political, active, and rational, and femininity/women as personal, passive and irrational, respectively. For example, self/other, autonomy/dependence, agency/passivity, rational/emotional, fact/value, hard/soft, mind/body, civilised/primitive, public/private are all androcentric dichotomies. (Peterson and Runyan 1993: 25) Dichotomies hold a set of assumptions that allocate dominance to term A at the expense of not-A. (Gatens, 1991: 93) Feminists are particularly interested in deconstructing them because of their dominance over social thinking

6 Androcentric—prioritising men as the most important actors and men’s experiences and perceptions as the most worthwhile and legitimate. They are considered to be natural and are thus left unchallenged. (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 25).
and practices, and thus over constructions of gender, man and woman, where men’s experiences and knowledge are accepted as universal and even superior, even in IR (Hoffman-Hizi, 2002: 7). Their deconstruction provides opportunities to break down existing divisions and imagine how they might be reconstructed differently.

The feminist ‘bottom-up’ approach seeks to challenge this thinking ontologically and epistemologically. It pushes it beyond its typical dichotomous and state-centric locking, and seeks to recognize how uneven social structures, especially gender hierarchies, have a detrimental effect on the general populace, its groups, and individuals. (Tickner, 2001: 48) Or, as Peterson and Runyan put it:

These values not only fail to benefit everybody; they no longer (if ever) unproblematically benefit elite men. And they have never afforded accurate understandings of the world. These orientations are not all bad, but their pursuit at the expense of other values has always been costly.

(Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 43)

Feminist IR theorists thus argue that the state too is gendered due to the male domination of political elites and the ‘cult of masculinity’ among its members. As such, state policies are also gendered. This does not mean that women are invariably oppressed by the state, but women are nonetheless frequently marginalised or ignored in state affairs, delegitimising and de-politicising their experiences, sufferings, and security concerns by binding them to the ‘private’ sphere. Feminists especially point to structural violence, such as poor health care, sexual harassment, wage gaps, rights and resources that sustain structural inequality and power relations. (Peterson, 1992: 45-46)

Physical violence, too, is gendered. The state concerns itself with ‘hard’ security issues, in other words, violence that engages the power of the state for the protection of its own power and existence, often against another state. However, the state does not act as the securer of the protection of women’s bodies. (Peterson, 1992: 46) Sexual violence and violence against women (including domestic violence) interpreted as ‘private’ and thus not of public or political interest is especially disturbing. The shocking scale violence that is targeted against women and their children behind the closed doors of the home is not considered to be a matter of state concern. This apathetic posture helps legitimise the idea of violence against women as an unstoppable natural reality of everyday life and heterosexual relationships. The
state can thus prove to be lethal to its female, second-class citizens. The main point here, however, is that the state is not only the legitimate actor of violence, but also the determinant of what violence warrants state intervention by dividing of violence into categories public and private. This division prioritises the interests of masculinist elites, marginalises women’s sufferings and keeps them in a subordinate social position. This division also becomes problematic when examining the issue of terrorism, as will be discussed later.

It is also necessary to mention that these structures are also legitimised by gendered national identities, on which a state’s continued existence and success is dependent. Because nationalist identities invoke ideas of community, which consists of familial relations, gender roles are more difficult to distinguish. However, the family implies matrimonial relations that create metaphors of motherlands, fatherlands and homelands that appeal to a shared sense of transcendental purpose and community for states and their citizens alike. In addition, these national identities are frequently used by political elites to promote state interests throughout the society in question, while concealing racial and social class divisions. (Tickner, 2001: 54-56) In wartime, women’s bodies become sites of national security. Their identities as mothers to children are enlarged to encompass motherhood to the nation-state. (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996: 359-360) Women are both the mothers of the nation and the nation itself. The state is thus personified as a female embodiment of the nation to be protected by the (usually masculine) citizens of the state. Lady Liberty of the United States, Britannia of Britain and the French Marianne are fascinating examples of this feminine national personification that is not only the embodiment of national values, but also its honour, purity and righteousness. Although often adorning battle gear, these characters are divine cheerleaders of the national cause, and stand in the sidelines of battle as reminders of national cause and virtue.

There have been attempts to alter or even abandon traditional realist thinking about security, but it continues to dominate our understanding of politics in its conventional sense despite its the increasing realisation of its inabilities and inadequacies as a political category especially in a post-Cold War era. In the post-September 11 period, realism has continued to relinquish its inter-state assumptions of IR, but retains such fundamental assumptions as rational actor behaviour or game theory. Articles on the War on Terrorism published in the widely read and respected realist journal World Politics provide a general sketch of the direction of post-September 11 realism. Daniel Philpott (2002) for example, addresses the

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7 The term ‘citizen’ has been historically problematic for women. When men were endowed with the rights of citizenship, women continued and continue still to be excluded from positions of economic and political power, including military combat, thus enabling them to be referred to as so-called second-class citizens (Tickner, 1997: 627).
problem of non-state actors in IR, but replaces the inter-state dilemma with a Samuel Huntington (2002) type of ‘clash of civilisations’ scenario where radical Islam is pitted neck-to-neck against Western Westphalian international society. Likewise, Lisa Anderson (2004) approaches the War on Terrorism by attempting to assess “What are the rules of this game?” (Anderson, 2004: 307) and Daniel L. Byman (2003) strives to ‘know’ the enemy Al-Qaeda, and thereby educate citizens and government officials to enable them to devise effective strategies for their annihilation. Mainstream realism, therefore, continues to focus on strategic calculations and the discovery of objective truths about IR, even in the War on Terrorism.

The feminist approach emphasises how dramatically gender identities are involved in creating, sustaining and legitimising the realist security system. It is important to bear in mind that so far at present the feminist IR approach is heavily Western, and that analyses conducted with it are mainly critiques of Western states. This thesis focuses on the United States, but also deals heavily the non-Western countries of Afghanistan and Iraq. This approach is nonetheless appropriate because of the main interest being in US foreign policy, and the inclusion of Third World/Orientalist feminist theory helps to alleviate the heavy Western imprint. The next section discusses war and militarisation from this approach.

**War and Militarisation**

War and violence are accepted as natural and inevitable consequences of an anarchic world order. The tautological belief in fighting for peace and then sustaining it by preparing for war creates a self-perpetuating cycle of militarisation and violence. As a result, arms races emerge that “involve sacrificing social welfare objectives in favour of defence spending and training of young people to risk lives and practice violence in the name of putatively higher objectives” (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 36). In the process, structural androcentric dichotomies are assumed and defined that legitimate opposition and conflict, for example self/other, us/them, friend/enemy, aggressive/passive, soldier/victim, and protector/protected. Again, these definitions are considered to be natural and are thus left unchallenged. As a consequence, the former experience of the world is celebrated and the latter marginalised, forbidding the possibility of alternative experiences.

This androcentrism becomes tremendously obvious when observing war. Women’s roles and experiences in war have largely been invisible, implying that they are not considered to be important in the war system. History books consistently exclude any mention of women
and instead focus on—and often celebrate—great strategies, battles and military leaders. In actual fact, women are just as centrally instrumental in enabling war as men. The practice of war militarises the bodies and sexualities of both men and women, albeit in different ways, with different consequences and forms of suffering. To this I now turn my attention.

**Masculinity and the Military**

The war system is dependent on the maintenance of producing and reproducing gender roles that maintain its effectiveness and legitimacy. This entails sustaining a type of masculinity that encourages men to sacrifice their lives and kill others, and subordinate femininities that help men fulfil these roles.

Referring back to the process of socialization, Joshua S. Goldstein argues, “Men are made, not born. Unlike women, men must take actions, undergo ordeals, or pass tests in order to become men. They are told to ‘be a man’” (Goldstein, 2001: 264). Peterson and Runyan concur that military machismo is highly gendered because “militaries need men to act as ‘men,’ that is, to be willing to kill and die on the behalf of the state to prove their ‘manhood,’” (Peterson and Runyan, 2003: 83). J. Ann Tickner writes that, although war is generally considered to be manly, military training is focused on turning men into soldiers “using misogynist training that is thought necessary to teach men to fight [and] such training depends on the denigration of anything that could be considered feminine” (Tickner, 2001: 57). This hegemonic masculinity is dependent on the degradation of a feminised understanding of peaceful conflict-resolution that is perceived as idealistic and unrealisable (2001: 49). There is therefore a close relationship between gender roles and how they are understood—one is defined in relation to the other, and they interact hierarchically.

A study of hegemonic masculinities in politics is found in Charlotte Hooper’s *Manly States* (2001), which amongst several other works interested in masculinities draws its theory first and foremost from R.W. Connell’s *Masculinities* (1995). Adapting Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony, Connell describes hegemonic masculinity as located at the top of the relations of dominance and subordination among groups of men. Hegemonic masculinity is not a fixed gender type, but varies in time and place. It must instead be defined as “the masculinity that occupies the hegemonic position in a given pattern of gender relations, as

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8 Goldstein, for example, remarks that in his writing on the Second World War historian Stephen Ambrose only passingly mentions women in reference to wartime prostitution—therefore as commodities, but otherwise “Ambrose bypasses sex, presumably because it does not matter at the front” (Goldstein, 2001: 338)

9 See for example (Bourke, 1999: 132) and (Goldstein, 1999: 264-269)
position always contestable” (Connell, 1995: 76). There can be no equivalent hegemonic femininity because although there are hierarchies among femininities, all femininities are subordinate to the hegemonic masculinity regardless. This masculinity relies heavily on a self-identification with heterosexuality and defines itself in opposition to homosexuality, which is at the bottom of the gender hierarchy among men. But, heterosexual masculinities can also be subordinate. Hooper also remarks that hegemonic masculinity is often racist and oppositionally defines itself against other ‘subordinate’ non-white masculinities. (Hooper, 2001: 55) This will be important when looking at the dehumanisation and demonisation of terrorists/Afghani and Iraqi men. (Connell, 1995: 76-78; Hooper, 2001: 54-55)

Here we again find violence as a disturbing instrument in gender and sexual relations. Most instances of major violence are performed by men and generally function to draw boundaries and exclusions, symbolic and physical, not just against women, but amongst each other or against homosexual men. Violence can be a method of asserting masculinity, and it is the ideology of masculinity that legitimises its use. (Connell, 1995: 83)

Hegemonic masculinities are particularly significant and visible in the military, where the hegemonic masculinity is the combative ideal, also accounting for the relentless misogynistic and homophonic character of militaristic identities. (Tickner, 2001: 57) Because the ‘feminine’ is equated with an inferior and undesirable, anything interpreted as feminine is regarded as threatening to the realisation of hegemonic masculinity. Arguably, this ‘proving one’s manhood’ is an inescapable and essential characteristic of an institution whose purpose is to persuade men to act kill and/or die for their state. It is effective too, for those who fail to display the appropriate behaviour are publicly disgraced become group-outsiders as ‘failed men.’ (Goldstein, 2001: 269) Arto Jokinen argues that men are easily persuaded, tempted or even forced to accept hegemony because is assures, if not at least promises them a degree of gender-based power for all men (Jokinen, 2000: 215).

Goldstein elaborates widely on misogyny—the “’mother’s milk of militarism’” (Goldstein, 2001: 371)—in militaries as a way of promoting a hegemonic masculinity. He argues that central to putting pressuring men to conform to the desired masculinity is the fear of shame. Becoming a group-outsider as a ‘failed man’ is an unbearable fate, considering that one’s position in one’s social group is one of the most essential driving forces of human behaviour (Goldstein, 2001: 269). Men therefore must either “pay the price of a warrior mentality— anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), emotional difficulties in relationships—or pay the price of humiliation and shame that faces the sissy as a failed man” (ibid.).
This helps explain the aggressive homophobia prevalent in militaries, which are often endorsed by state in its laws—for example in the US, in the ‘Don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy. Goldstein provides an interesting analysis, explaining that because homosexuality is equated with femininity, it is incompatible with and destructive for the hierarchal hegemonic masculinity structure of the military;

[The presence of gay soldiers] makes ambiguous the construction of male soldiers as dominant sexual actors whose submissive-receptive partners are women external to the military force... Because homosexuality is read as effeminate, the presence of openly homosexual men shatters the homosocial unity needed to successfully carry out aggression against fraternising across ranks.

(Goldstein, 2001: 374)

He links this homophobia with the need to feminise one’s enemies as a form of “symbolic domination” (2001: 356). Because masculinity is the dominant identity, enemies are psychologically subordinated by sexualising them with the subservient gender—femininity. During the Gulf War, for example, Saddam Hussein was frequently feminised or rhetorically sodomized by American troops. The systematic repetition sexist expressions in war function to legitimise and re-emphasise such hierarchies. For example, “a US pilot, after shooting down a male Iraqi pilot, reportedly said he ‘cold smoked the bitch’ (not the ‘bastard’)” (ibid.).

It may well be that nationalism is heterosexist as Peterson argues. Not only does nationalism denigrate the ‘other’ out-group as feminine in its inferiority that establishes the in-group as the dominant masculine. This order can be reversed by feminising the self in order to rally the protectionism of citizens against a masculine, aggressive enemy. Regardless, the relationship remains heterosexual. Social relations are organised within heterosexist groups by “polarised gender identities, heterosexist families, masculinist ideology, patriarchal power and

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Goldstein is quick to remind that this is by no means universal; “The US military's homophobia reflects a culturally embedded view that homosexuality represents a feminisation of men. By contrast, other cultures elsewhere have constructed homosexuality as having a masculinising effect in males and this is an asset in military mobilisation. In the Theban Sacred Band of ancient Greece—a very capable military force—gay relationships among soldiers were openly encouraged. Men were placed in the ranks alongside their lovers on the theory that they would not disgrace themselves by showing cowardice while their beloved was watching. The sexual bonds between male soldiers enhanced cohesion and boosted motivation.” (Goldstein, 2001: 374-5)

While the policy does not forbid homosexuals to join, they must remain ‘in the closet,’ in return for not being asked about their sexual orientation, otherwise risking expulsion. See (Bell and Binnie, 2000: 64-65). The ban on homosexuals in the British military was only lifted in 2000.
authority... [to] achieve group coherence and continuity through hierarchical (sex/gender) relations” (Peterson, 1999: 55).

The systematic rape of an enemy’s female population is the most disturbing form of symbolic humiliation in war. Women as child bearers embody the nation—and men the state—and hence are seen as national property to be ‘protected.' Gender therefore has a role in ethnonationalism where “women’s bodies as symbols of the nation, markers of the in-group, and national ‘property’ to be defended and protected by men” (Goldstein, 2001: 371) from the out-group. To dominate and damage them by rape is a declaration of victory over an enemy too weak to protect its most valuable goods—again feminising the enemy, who is metaphorically endangering the nation. In sum, “if symbolic and actual rape encode domination, then misogyny serves as an important motor of male aggression in war” (ibid.).

Because defeat is the ultimate humiliation, hegemonic masculinity is valorised in its role as the ‘protector.’ It links military masculinity with particular values like honour, loyalty, and righteousness and it is this type of masculinity that belongs to heroes and myth making. (Tickner, 2001: 57) Tickner recalls that the “defining moments in collective historical memories are frequently wars of national liberation, great victories in battles against external enemies, or the glories of former imperialist expansion” (2001: 56). Such war tales are often depicted in story telling to mobilise public support for war and rely largely on a celebration of this mythic and heroic masculinity. The myth of a just warrior fighting to ‘protect’ vulnerable women and children continues to prevail despite that everyone loses in war, albeit in somewhat different ways.

The ‘protector-protected’ roles are therefore socio-cultural constructions, and essential for the legitimation of war despite its falsehood. It also disables any possibility of questioning the purpose and negative effects of war by both men and women. Also, women’s role as life-givers, as opposed to life-takers (the role given to soldiers) expects them to mourn and rebuild after the war. Therefore anyone who questions it by asking ‘for whom?’ or ‘for what?’ [is the war fought] is usually considered “ungrateful for the protection courageously delivered by men and states through their military might and actions” (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 123).

Going further back one could suggest that there is a pattern of rugged militaristic hegemonic masculinity in the US at times of dwindling self-confidence. The trauma of the

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12 Enloe says that because of this division that makes rape more about power and sex, “not only the rapist, but the state is culpable” (Enloe, 2000a: 195).

13 This dichotomy is also embedded in the basis for just war theory, and “has to a great extent been codified in international law” (Höglund, 2003: 244).
Vietnam War and the consequent ‘Vietnam-syndrome’ had detrimental consequences on the muscular US masculinity that was prided since the Second World War. After suffering this humiliation in the 1970s, the 1980s saw a remasculinisation of the US. Films like *Rambo*, *The Terminator*, and *Top Gun* venerated the burly independent hero and feminised the ‘feeble’ political administration that had prevented the US military from winning the war. Vietnam veterans became “emblems of masculinity unjustly victimised -- by their government, the war, the Vietnamese, American protesters, and the women’s movement” (Goldstein, 2001: 279). The rebirth of a purified masculinity and the rejection of femininity was central in the neoconservative politics of the 1980s. (Campbell, 2005: 957-962)

The final reclamation can be argued to have been achieved with the success Gulf War. However, it did not result in a complete restoration of the previous post-Second World War hegemonic masculinity. As discussed, hegemonic masculinities fluctuate in time, space and place, and so are never completely identical. The militaristic masculinity that prevailed was one bodily involved. It acquired a technologically polished muscle speedy results and quick victories of smart weapons capable of ‘precision’ bombing. The fantasies of *Robocop* and *The Terminator* were being brought to reality. The soldier was now not only stronger and better equipped, but smarter and faster, heightening his capacity to kill in speed and quantity. Likewise the realities of the war were popularly televised and integrated into the fantasies of the viewers. Judith Butler depicts the home viewing of recent wars as “a form of violent and voyeuristic pornography” (Goldstein, 2001: 355). The euphoric televised consumption of the Gulf War championed the remasculinised US military with the help of advanced technological innovations and feminised its weak and passive Iraqi objects. A small measure of femininity became acceptable too. For example, Goldstein notes how a touch of tender ‘femininity’ was legitimised by the behaviour of US war leaders when they;

> openly articulated a sense of manly vulnerability and human compassion, rather than bravado or stern invincibility, for example, by lavishing attention on their families (Bush and Schwarzkopf) and even weeping in public (Powell)... The new visibility of women in the US military rounded out the construction of the new, more family-oriented masculinity.

(Goldstein, 2001: 279, parentheses original)

Indeed, as Goldstein continues, the power of masculinity was actually expanded by this seeming relaxation by permitting it a broader field of direct involvement, such as the family. Although I will refrain from exploring the masculinities of the 1990s, the new ideal-type hegemonic masculinity that emerged after the crisis of masculinity can be termed, as
discussed by Hooper, the bourgeois-rationalist model \textsuperscript{14} that “idealised competitive individualism, reason, and self-control or self-denial, combining respectability as breadwinner and head of household with calculative rationality in public life” (Hooper 2001: 65-66).

In this thesis I examine the masculinities that emerge from the discourses of the War on Terrorism. This entails, for example, the celebration of killing and destruction caused by fallen soldiers, crowned as ‘war heroes’. It justifies the brutality of war and is dependent on the veneration of a militarised hegemonic masculinity. I will focus on how such identities are produced and sustained, how they are interlinked to notions of honour and righteousness, and intersected with sensitive religious ontologies. The position of George W. Bush and the way he has managed to construct himself not only as a hegemonic leader in wartime, but also as the leader of a mission for a ‘greater’ cause is also interesting. In contrast to these American masculinities are the masculinities of the terrorists, and Afghani and Iraqi men. As male ‘Others,’ I am interested in how their subordination is established through gendering and also why and how this is important for the self-assurance of American masculinities.

Women and War

Femininities are as important as masculinities to understanding the war system. While masculinities are visible, femininities are often less so, and given less attention because they are not perceived as ‘important.’ However, understanding how femininities are activated and constructed in militaristic contexts often brings new dimensions of militarism into focus. While men are either identified as heroes or cowards, women’s roles and functions are often much more fluid and complex, enabling femininities to mould easily into different situations and contexts to support the visible military framework as deemed necessary at a particular time and place. Femininities are indeed militarised both within and outside military institutions to support them. Once again, it crucial to understand that masculinities and femininities are always relational, and as such, always defined in relation to one another.

To begin with, women are visible in their \textit{invisibility} in war. Warfare has been a historically male-dominated business, and apart from a few exceptional cases, women have been largely excluded from fighting. The fraction of women that now participate in the military—politically recruited perhaps for ‘manpower’ shortages (Enloe, 2000b: 237-238)—must adopt ‘masculine’ speech and behaviour in order to be ‘professionals.’ Even so they are

\footnote{\textsuperscript{14} The other ideal types have consisted of the Greek citizen-warrior model, the patriarchal Judeo-Christian model, the honour/patronage model, and a Protestant, bourgeois-rationalist model. See Hooper, 2001: 64-70 for their genealogy.}
not respected as such—being subjected to subordination and sexual harassment—and possibly reinforce the patriarchal structure of the military as a result. This counterproductivity has also been argued to be a feature of women’s peace activism. The mobilisation of women in the armed forces will be returned to after reviewing the nature of their exclusion.

According to Goldstein, their absence is due first of all to the confusing effect female warriors might have on male soldiers not only during training, but also during combat. For example, in 1948 when Israeli women participated in fighting, it has been argued that men found the injury of a female comrade during battle too upsetting to ignore and the mission was forgotten as they hurried to her aid. (Goldstein, 2001: 306) Tickner recalls how the image of women fighting in the Gulf War disturbed the home public. (Tickner, 2001: 58) The sensation caused by the rescue of Private Jessica Lynch in Iraq in 2003, which will be explored later in this study, shows that this is still relevant now during the War on Terrorism. The construction of the feminine territory is mapped outside the military at the home front. They fulfil roles, “incompatible with men’s participation in the ranks, to make the trauma of combat tolerable” while “reinforcing soldier’s masculinity” (Goldstein, 2001: 301). The feminisation of enemies might also cause confusion for soldiers with female co-combatants because of the coding of femininity as subordinate. (Goldstein, 2001: 356)

Joanna Bourke suggests another reason for women’s exclusion from the ranks. She argues that their presence is “demoralising for men: it would disrupt processes of bonding and destroy a self-consciously ‘masculine’ war ethic” and would result in their symbolic castration. (Bourke, 1999: 326) Thus, to maintain the masculinity of the military, a variety of different roles are recognisable amongst women during war. The most obvious of these roles is encouraging their men to go fight. Bourke argues that women who encourage men to fight are gratifying their own aggressiveness by pressuring them to act on their behalf. As a result they eagerly send their husbands, sons and male lovers to risk their lives. (Bourke, 1999: 149, 332-333) Whether or not this argument is valid, it is evident that “women are often active participants in shaming men to try to goad them into fighting wars” (Goldstein, 2001: 272).

Women’s roles as nurturing wives, mothers, sisters, lovers, girlfriends and nurses are thus essential to the survival of militaries. Men’s morale and sanity in wartime is often reliant on an often idealised female relationship ‘back home.’ Not only does it sustain a soldier’s ability to endure his service, but also can serve as a kind of “metaphysical sanctuary for traumatised soldiers, a counterweight to hellish war” (Goldstein, 2001: 304). It also provides some soldiers with a motive to fight—to protect their women and children—physically or metaphorically. (2001: 305) Jean Bethke Elshtain calls these women ‘Beautiful Souls’ who
are non-violent beings representative of an ideal way of life that are mobilised in wartime in times of war on behalf of the ‘Just Warriors’. The famous First World War recruitment poster *Women of Britain Say--GO!* is a example of this. (Elshtain, 1995: 140)

Cynthia Enloe argues that women provide militaries with tangible security around their bases through such roles. Those in roles on military bases as prostitutes, girlfriends, wives, activists and female soldiers see their roles as mutually exclusive, and often regard one another with hostility as sexual and ideological adversaries. The preservation of these imagined distinctions amongst women keeps them in these roles—without which a base could shut down—and thus provides a base with an entire network of female security. (Enloe, 2000: 65-92)

In wartime women’s labour too is mobilised even more intensely because of the need to fill the jobs vacated by men and those created to feed the war machine. Another reason why women cannot become soldiers is precisely because the work they are assigned is central to running the war machine. “In every society at war” Goldstein writes, “women workers help sustain both the war effort and the economy behind it. Most of this work is unpaid, and largely unmeasured” (Goldstein, 2001: 380).

These jobs or roles that women are assigned during war differ from those during peace. Even though if the job might be the same empirically, their meanings and functions are refreshed and redefined according to the circumstances. As mentioned, gender roles are not fixed, but flexible and fluctuating. There are two ‘jobs’ whose chameleonic gendering is of particular interest here: the female soldier and the militarised mother—both of which are introduced well by Cynthia Enloe.

**Militarised Motherhood**

Starting with militarised motherhood, Enloe argues that it “often starts with the conceptualising the womb as a recruiting station… a woman who has more children—sons, preferably—is a woman who is contributing to ‘national security.’” (Enloe, 2000b: 248) She profiles the ideal militarised mother in the following way:

1. A woman who finds it reasonable that her government urges female citizens to have more children to ensure future national security.
2. She believes sons and daughters should be brought up and nurtured differently.
3. Being ‘good mother’ is a confirmation of her national membership, i.e. citizenship.
4. She unchallengeingly conforms to the idea of a ‘patriotic’ mother.

(2000b: 253)

Mothers hardly ever conform to all of these qualities, just as most men do not embody the hegemonic masculinity. The ideal is not required, and often the “internalisation of a few simple militarised maternal beliefs often may be sufficient to provide the military with the manpower it thinks it needs” (ibid.). As a result, the militarised mother is also likely to supportive of his manhood, take pride—often publicly—of her son’s military position and achievements, provide letters, phone calls, and packages for morale, and look after him if he is sent home wounded. Importantly, she trusts the military—“when the military informs her of her son’s death, she will find its explanation credible” (Enloe, 2000b: 253-254). Her duty is to mourn the fallen and then substitute them by reproducing. These gender constructions—where men must act as ‘men’ and women must act as ‘women’—thereby sustain women as ‘life-givers’ to compensate for men’s actions as ‘life-takers.’ (Enloe, 1993: 82) Women supply the nation with citizens and male soldier-citizens, who to go fight and take life (or lose their own) in war. Indeed, it is an expectation shared in quite openly, that “the soldier is expected to sacrifice for his country a mothers are expected to sacrifice for their children” (Elshtain, 1995: 222). Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic describes this “glorification of women as biological regenerators of the nations with a disregard for women as a people as a massive abuse of women’s reproductive rights and maternal emotions” (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996: 360). The irony is that it is usually the women who lose their sons who realise that it is the role of the mother that they suffer the most.

Like their soldier sons, mothers can also be powerfully endowed with myths. Militarised states publicly celebrate mothers as patriots and home front heroes, especially those whose sons were killed in action, for sacrificing their offspring for a ‘higher cause’—the security of the state. Those on the opposite end are the ones who question the war and its purposes. Such behaviour is considered ‘shameful’ and is punished by condemnation and humiliation for their ‘ingratitude’ for the valiant protection provided by their sons and the state. (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 124)

These empirical observations, however, do not suffice to thoroughly explain why motherhood is so important to a state’s conduct of war. The support they provide for their

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15 “The conventional prescriptions for being recognised as a woman-as-patriot are grounded in notions of feminine ‘respectability’… Most militarising states need women… to be patriots, yet need them to do so without stepping over the bounds of ‘proper’ femininity, since that would then dispirit a lot of men, who would feel that their own masculine turf was being challenged. In a patriarchal state a woman can aspire to be a ‘patriotic mother’ but not a ‘patriotic citizen.’” (Enloe, 2004a: 172)
sons is crucial, but the analysis is incomplete without taking into account the ideological gender constructions behind motherhood, state, and nation. As mentioned, it is wartime when the nation is particularly strongly personified as a woman, as mothers constitutive of the ‘motherland’ itself. As such, woman as a mother and the nation become one and the same. The nation becomes a pure and glorified fertile female representing the values and virtues of the nation. When threatened, she is regarded helpless to protect herself, and therefore requires the valour of her male children (citizens) to sacrifice their bodies for her survival. Such descriptions capture powerful protective emotions of national empathy in both male and female citizens, for it is regarded as just and honourable for the strong (hard, muscular male bodies) to sacrifice for the weak (soft, round, life-creating female bodies).

Some of the most tragic and unfortunately common consequences of such depictions are found in wartime rape. As already explained, wartime rape is not only a form of physical but also symbolic violence against women that functions as an act of domination and humiliation of the nation. With regards to motherhood, the acts of wartime rapists seek to signal that the women they rape “are worthless since they gave birth to the enemy's rather than their own children” (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996: 360). The penetration of the pure female body/nation by that of the enemy male gives birth to a national contamination. The nation becomes biologically polluted. Its blood\textsuperscript{16}, its essence, its purpose, is no longer pure, even when the ejaculation of the enemy semen does not result in offspring. An aggressive intrusion and domination of the national body has still taken place in attempt to pervert its reproductive functions, its source of existence.

There are two different discourses on US military mothers in the War on Terrorism. First is the honourable patriotic military mother who is celebrated for supporting the national cause by encouraging and supporting her child/children to join the military and fight to protect her and their homeland. She encourages them to risk their lives and kill others, and if killed, she believes her offspring to have died honourably in performing this defence. The second is the military mother whose child/children died in the service, whose death changed her stance to the war from supportive to oppositional. Cindy Sheehan, the mother who became famous by holding a demonstration outside the ranch of George W. Bush, is an example of this motherhood.

\textsuperscript{16} Blood has historically been a sensitive marker of purity and status. Royalty is supposed to possess ‘blue blood’, whereas interracial marriages have been a cause for fear of ‘dirty blood’.
Female soldiers

When women are allowed ‘life-taker’ roles, feminists are often in disagreement over the reasons why. Some radical feminists argue that the state military is an empowering experience for women as a method of defence or liberation from patriarchy while others argue that it is a tool of patriarchal legitimacy. Liberal feminists, on the other hand, optimistically argue that it is an attempt to promote equality in the armed forces. A third feminist voice opposes both and points to another explanation: one to meet the shortages of manpower. This thesis takes the latter approach. Women in the armed forces are integrated in an all-but-equal manner, in a way that does not challenge the masculinity of the military or threaten the militarised masculine identity of male soldiers. Instead, female soldiers reinforce them while realising a pragmatic strategy of performing basic non-combative yet supportive military jobs. This has meant “using women in ways that have perpetuated a respectable brand of femininity.” (D’Amico, 1996: 380; Enloe, 2000b: 263)

Specifying on this argument, Francine D’Amico (1996) found that women in state militaries have the same grievances that they experience as civilians. Sexual harassment is extremely common, and wife beating tends to be notably high amongst military men. As in the labour market, it is uncommon for women to occupy powerful positions, instead usually performing ‘supportive’ roles for example, as clerical, administrative and medical staff. (Peterson and Runyan, 1993: 84-6) Cynthia Enloe also argues that states allocate such jobs to women so men can fill ‘real’ military posts. Importantly, the recruitment of women may simply be an attempt to give a state ‘modern-and-democratic’ international publicity. (Enloe, 2000a: 280)

Similarly, the training they receive is different from men’s and usually emphasise self-defence methods in case the unimaginable happens: should their male colleagues fail to protect them. (D’Amico, 1996: 382) This is also a reflection of the (US) law’s refusal to recognise female soldiers as legitimate actors of violence, only as victims of it in need of protection—which is also one of the main arguments used against allowing women in combat. (Rycenga and Waller, 2001: 60-61)

D’Amico also argues that the militaries have total control the behaviour of their female recruits, and exploit their skills according to their needs. For example, women who subversively promote women’s issues, report sexual harassment, or are lesbians are seen as troublemakers and are targeted in ‘witch-hunts’ on the grounds that they have a harmful effect on morale and amount to a national security risk. Such justifications hide the homophobic
character of IR and control which women are best suited to participate in the ranks. (D’Amico, 1996: 382-4) According to Cynthia Enloe, many women accept it and view their participation in the military as a feminist mission because they see it as a challenge to endure misogynist subordination to prove that ‘we can do it, too.’ (Enloe, 2000b: 186) In addition as female soldier in Iraq Kayla Williams writes in her memoir;

Even girls don’t like girls who file EO [Equal Opportunity] complaints - they don’t want to rock the boat. Girls don’t want to be perceived as filing a frivolous complaint. There’s still the assumption that girls lie about harassment to get what they want - to advance their careers or to punish somebody they dislike.

(Williams, 2006: 209, italics original)

Closing the question of equality in the forces, there is little evidence that the military has advanced women’s position in society or their ability to acquire power. Instead, women are institutionalised and socialised into military practices and like men, support a destructive war system and foreign policy. States nonetheless have a tendency to frame their admission of women into the ranks as a democratic endeavour for gender equality.

In the War on Terrorism, three discourses of woman soldiers that represent three different perceptions of women in the US military can be identified. The stories and phenomena of soldiers Jessica Lynch, Lynndie England and Kayla Williams will be examined in this context. These two aspects that I have mentioned as examples—military mothers and woman soldiers—are not the only discourses that this thesis will examine. In addition to this, I will also look at the femininities of Laura Bush and Condoleezza Rice as the only prominent and highly publicised female members of the otherwise masculine-dominated Bush Administration. Interesting is not only the roles that they adopt in policy implementation, but in particular how they describe first of all their own sexuality, and subsequently the sexualities of other men and women both in the US and in faraway places. Indeed, this same approach is employed to all the discussed American militarised sexualities, both masculine and feminine, and how they produce militarised gender identities for Afghani and Iraqi men and women, and how these discourses are instrumental to the justification and continuing performance of the War on Terrorism.

**Gendering Terrorism**
The term War on Terrorism is a curious one. In IR, ‘war’ is traditionally the term for violent conflict between two states, each defined as such by their territorial sovereignty, which is commonly described as a codification of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). ‘Terrorism’ by contrast, has no single definition, nor any agreed set of minimal principle features, except that it is an act of aggression. As explained, ‘war’ is already a concept that feminists are eager to problematise. ‘Terrorism’ must therefore also have interesting implications for feminist scholars. I will first explain how feminists have problematised the concept of ‘terrorism’ and then present what kind of arguments have been raised specifically concerning gender and the War on Terrorism. In general, the existing gender-oriented literature on terrorism is interesting, but topically and theoretically limited. There are virtually no thorough feminist theorists on terrorism prior to September 11 apart from Robin Morgan, whose is only marginally useful, as will be explained. The most useful material is written post-9/11 and focuses on the victimisation of women—in Afghanistan in particular—and the demonisation of Islamic men in War on Terrorism narratives. From these articles I extract feminist critique on the concept of terrorism. The narratives their produce will be discussed later.

To being with, one work frequently referred to by feminist scholars discussing sexuality and terrorism is Robin Morgan’s 1989 The Demon Lover, since it is the only extended written work that addresses this relationship. She strives to prove how terrorism is patriarchally constructed, and in doing so produces a series of interesting points, as well as inadequate ones. The first of her useful points is the distinction of state violence against civilian populations as legitimate, but the violence of other political groups as illegitimate; in other words, terrorism;

The scars of officially sanctioned terror deform all periods of history: denial of human rights and civil liberties, preventive detention, raids, torture, corporal and capital punishment, genocide, colonialism, slavery through serfdom through class exploitation, plus, in our town time, concentration camps, the Gulag, apartheid, ‘disappearances’, the arms race, chemical and germ and atomic warfare, nuclear experimentation? If we exclude the activities of established nation-states from our definition of terrorism (as most experts do), then aren’t we settling uncomfortably unto automatic respect for those who already hold power…?

(Morgan, 1989: 35, parentheses original)

Also, Morgan criticises the US State Department’s definition of terrorism where “‘Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence, perpetrated against non-

...
combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents.” Morgan lists rape, battery, homophobia, and educational discrimination among examples that could for some fit this definition yet are not considered as ‘terrorism.’ (Morgan, 1989: 36)

While such observations are useful, the major problem with Morgan’s text is that it first of all empirically recognises terrorism as primarily a patriarchal activity, by men, targeted at men, for men’s causes. While this appears to be true, and indeed women are only portrayed as victims, wives, sisters, lovers, and so forth (Finn, 1989: 392-393), she does not recognise the active and independent role of women in terrorism. As a result, she does not recognise female terrorists as having any motivations other than being the gratifying lovers of male terrorists—they are the victims of the ‘demon lovers’. Morgan’s thesis therefore cannot explain the violence of female leaders like Golda Meir or Margaret Thatcher, account for the increasing number of female terrorists, or acknowledge how men suffer from aggressive constructions of masculinity. The text is dated and very radical in its feminism, and romantically depicts IR as a men’s game that consciously oppresses women—thereby leaving dichotomies like aggressive/passive and protector/protected completely unchallenged. Karen Beckman similarly criticises Morgan saying that “any attempt to rigidly separate violence and non-violence through the idea of gender… would be to fall into the same rhetoric of ‘us’ and ‘them’ that Bush Jr. introduced in his address before Congress” (Beckman, 2002: 29).

More optimistically, later feminists especially post-September 11, have paid more attention to the problematisation of the definition of ‘terrorism.’ While IR scholars still debate over its definition, the word is nonetheless used loosely to refer to specific types of anti-state violence of organised groups, as Morgan notes. Feminist political scientists draw attention to the selectivity of such definitions. Geraldine Finn, for example argues that the term has a biased classification of terrorism, recognising gruesome public spectacles of ‘illegitimate’ political violence as terrorism while ignoring other unacknowledged forms of terrorism such as violence against women that is targeted daily at women and children behind the closed doors of the home, unlike suicide bombings witnessed universally via mass media. (Finn, 1990: 376, 390)

Criticism is voiced concerning this division also because it assumes that no connection exists between domestic violence and ‘terrorist’ violence. Vesna Kesic argues that domestic violence provides male children with role models of violent men that encourage men to “express their masculinity in violent ways, and feel entitled to solve all kinds of problems by ‘quick and efficient’ violent means” (Rycenga and Waller, 2001: 43). Females are provided with submissive female role models that passively accept their roles as targets or victims of
this behaviour. Kesic argues that domestic violence spreads past private borders to public spaces and as this cycle of violence continues and remains unchallenged, “society, as a whole, becomes more and more accustomed to violence and brutalised by its ubiquitous presence” (ibid).

Höglund echoes this view in saying that international terrorism “is rooted in a deeply unjust global situation and will not be overcome through armament and increased defence” (Höglund, 2003: 244). Feminist IR therefore also participates in providing a gender argument against the use of militaristic action to counter terrorism. As Robin May Schott writes, “domestic abuse is also a form of terrorism, though ‘war’ is not the appropriate strategy for fighting either domestic or foreign terrorism” (Schott, 2003: 6).

This section has been an explanation of the gender theory employed in this thesis and how it is capable of tackling and challenging central pillars of IR theory. As war and militarisation are the central theatres of the US War on Terrorism, it is in this context where the heart of the analysis will be carried out.

III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Adopting the theoretical perspective of gender and war outlined above enables an informed approach to the analysis of gender in the War on Terrorism. Here the intention is to explain the set of research questions that this thesis wishes to address. They have been divided into thematic questions that are borne in mind throughout the thesis, and more specific research questions on the cases that are examined.

First of all, generally, the thesis aspires to understand how gender identities are politically activated in the War on Terrorism. How does gender marginalise some groups of people, and privilege others? How do the gender prescriptions of military culture engage in and amplify this determination? How is gender identity nationalised? How are the identities of the ‘US self’ and ‘terrorist Other’ discursively gendered and what kind of hierarchies do they encourage, and with what kinds of psychological and material effects?

The analysis proceeds chronologically starting from the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, to the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. How were the people, both US and terrorist, and events of 11 September gendered? What kind of masculinity and what kind of femininity attained a hegemonic position in the post-11 September environment? How
have US political leaders contributed to the promotion and legitimisation of particular gender identities?

What were the gendered consequences of 11 September and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan? How were the justifications of the invasion of Afghanistan gendered, and with what implications on US-led democratisation? How were Afghan men and women gendered in US discourses? The section *Claiming Bodies* aims to discuss how gender is inextricably involved in colonialist and Orientalist discourses. How does the colonising gaze gender and sexualise Others subjected to its gaze? How is this enacted in US discourses of women’s rights and democratisation in Afghanistan? On the other hand, how is the disciplining of Muslim male bodies gendered? What are the competing masculinities and by what methods are disciplined bodies demeaned for control? How does this define the sexuality of the US self?

Next, turning to Iraq, the thesis asks; How were the identities of Iraqi men and women gendered to support the US invasion of Iraq? How were the femininities of Iraqi women defined by US perceptions of women and child victims, and female terrorists? What were the sexual politics of Abu Ghraib, and how did discourses in its press coverage contribute to defining the gender identity of the US self? How did US soldiers and their stories contribute to the reproduction of a particular gendered militarised identity of the self, and a likewise a gendered perception of the Iraqi Other?

Finally, the examination returns to the US homefront, and examines militarised motherhood in the War on Terrorism. What kind of gender identities does the military mother anti-war movement celebrate? How does Cindy Sheehan gender nationalism and pacifism? Ultimately, what kind of attitude does she have towards the institution of the military, and how is it reflected in discursive opinion on gender roles in war?

Overall, in the concluding section, I wish to cross-examine and compare the identified discourses and representations. I also wish to ask, how harmful are these constructions of gender in militarisation? What might be the counter-productive consequences of such genderings for the goals of the US War on Terrorism? What possibilities are there for change?

The above questions are formulated in accordance with the theory presented in the previous section about gender and war. This thesis wishes to stress the importance of these questions; the War on Terrorism is an endlessly discussed topic, but gender analyses of it are considerably lacking, especially in the case of Iraq. By providing an overview of gendered discourses and representations, this thesis provides insights into understanding how gender is both constitutive of foreign policy in the War on Terrorism, the consequences of which often
sadly injurious. To feminist IR this analysis contributes not only a new inquiry, but also an innovative way of examining the War on Terrorism that combines discourse analysis with representation, and employs on a wide variety of sources, from media coverage, to photography, and autobiography, for example. The topic of sexuality and IR also is hardly touched in feminist analyses of the War on Terrorism, and this work also aims to contribute to making of this deficit.

To answer this body research questions, I will use discourse analysis, as well as theories of representation. The following section explains the theories and methods by which this will be done.

IV. METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

As stipulated, this thesis is methodologically reliant on poststructuralist discourse analysis of the Foucauldian tradition. This has been the dominant choice of discourse analysis for political scientists, but still continues to be a target of criticism by supporters of more traditional research methods. Critics “accuse it of being trendy jargon that fails to deliver new plausible insights and undermines scientific beliefs in truth and reality” (Torfing, 2005: 3). Lighter criticism is directed at “a number of gaps, theoretically and empirically, areas of benign neglect” (ibid.) that may easily hold some truth. One must bear in mind that poststructuralist discourse analysis is a relatively new and theoretically unfinished project lacking concrete theoretical concepts, research strategies, and methods. However, discourse analysis has certainly made a considerable impact on social science research by reconceptualising and transcending the concepts and biases of rationalism by radical hermeneutic alternatives and alerted the mainstream to a number of neglected issues like values and symbols. Therefore, despite some legitimate criticism concerning its paradigmatic incompletion, poststructuralist discourse analysis has undoubtedly demonstrated its competence, merit, and innovativeness as a serious and rewarding form of political analysis. (Torfing, 2005: 3-5) The following section provides an overview of the discourse theory, after which the discussion will proceed to a more specified explanation of the Foucauldian tradition that is at the heart of this thesis.

Discourse Theory
There are many ways to interpret ‘discourse.’ It can refer to ways in which things are spoken or thought of, discussed or represented. There is no one overarching theory or methodology of discourse analysis, and therefore there is no one ‘correct’ way to do it. Different approaches agree on one feature, however, which is that language and reality interact as one, and that meaning is not in the linguistic repetition of reality, but a product of discourse. They are usually repeated and learned so well that they are not recognised as learned. (Jokinen, 2000: 108; Jokinen in Liljeström 2004: 191) The aim of discourse analysis is therefore not to ‘discover’ universal truths or facts. On the contrary, it seeks to question those truths, because those conducting discourse analysis consider ‘facts’ to be socially constructed. ‘Facts,’ in other words, do not simply exist ‘out there,’ but are constructed in discourses. (Juhila and Suoninen in Jokinen et al., 1999, 234) Discourse theory is therefore “concerned with the role of meaningful social practices and ideas... [and] analyses the way systems of meaning or discourses shape the way people understand their roles in society” (Howarth in Marsh and Stoker, 1995: 115).

While discourses are not tangible material, they have real and material consequences. Discourses always have an object, because they are speaking about ‘something.’ ‘Something’ is always being expressed by ‘someone’ in a certain situation or position. It is how it is being expressed that is of interest. ‘How’ is the key word here, by which we ask how (and therefore also what) do people construct meaning in their spoken, thought and written expressions. They are open and give shape to experiences, phenomena, events, and relationships. Discourses therefore effect the material and practical, give them form and open/shut them to possibilities. (Helén, 1997: 358)

These general assumptions are present in discourse theory. However, discourse theory is not only poststructuralist, or Foucauldian, as in this thesis. It is important to bear in mind that the other possibilities available, constitutive of the progression of discursive thought. Jacob Torfing reviews the literature on discourse theory by dividing it into three general generational categories. For the first generation of discourse theory, discourse is defined in a linguistic sense, as spoken or written text. To this category belong socio-linguistics (Downes, 1984), content analysis (Holsti, 1969), conversation analysis (Schegloff and Sacks, 1993), as well as discourse psychology (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). These methods, however, are not very useful to political scientists because of the unflinching focus on semantic features of discourse, disregarding fundamental areas of political analysis like power or ideology. (Torfing, 2005: 6)
The second generation widens the definition of discourse to include a wider range of social practices. It is defined as “an empirical collection of practices that qualify as discursive in so far as they contain a semiotic element... [such as] speech, writing, images and gestures that social actors draw upon in their production and interpretation of meaning” (Torfing, 2005: 7). Norman Fairclough is a leading developer of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Despite drawing from Foucault the analysis of formative discursive practices, he rejects Foucault’s quasi-transcendental approach (Fairclough, 1992: 38-39). Still, CDA engages with the power effects of discourses by identifying discursive practices as ideological. Its explanatory potential is reduced however by limiting discourse to linguistic processes independent from social structures. (Torfing, 2005: 7)

The third generation identified by Torfing thus expands the understanding of discourse to include all social phenomena, where everything becomes discourse, as theorised by Jacques Derrida (1978), for example. “Social meaning becomes partially fixed in and through discourse” (Torfing, 2005: 8) in a decentred system escaping the idea of fixed realities. There are three shared postmodern themes worth highlighting. They are the critique of meta-narratives, anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism. (Howarth, 1995: 117) The deconstruction of hegemonic discourses is the primary method of such poststructuralist/postmodern theorists, a group whose prominent developers include Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva and Jacques Lacan. (Ibid.) While Foucault forms the centre of this thesis, these theorists have been mutually influential.

Despite the increasing popularity of discourse theory, it has also been subject to criticism. Realist critics argue that discourse theory reduces everything to thought or language, and ignores the repercussions of the material world. Supporters retort that it does not deny “the realist assertion that matter exists independently of our consciousness, thought and language... [but contends] merely that nothing follows from the bare existence of matter” (Torfing, 2005: 18). Because the so-called material world is not understandable or meaningful outside of realm of consciousness, postmodern discourse theory argues that there is no such distinction as material and non-material worlds, or thus, the discursive and non-discursive. (Howarth, 1995: 119, 127) The anti-foundationalist denial of objective truth is also a target of criticism that often results in accusations of nihilism. Just because concepts and identities are dependent on discourses does not mean that they do not hold any meaning within particular discourses. Judgements about empirical and moral claims can made, but they cannot exist outside the discursive. (Howarth, 1995: 128)
I shall not elaborate any further on the general field of postmodern discourse theory, but proceed with clarifying Foucauldian discourse analysis, and subsequently other directly influential contributions useful for the analysis in this thesis.

**Foucauldian Discourse Analysis**

Foucauldian Discourse Analysis is in increasing use amongst IR scholars. David Campbell (1998), Michael Shapiro (2000), and James Der Derian (1989) are among some of the most well known political scientists to apply and develop the postmodern approach in the field. Foucault is not the only theoretical forefather of the approach, and should hardly be taken as such. These scholars indeed draw not only on the founding writers, but also a great deal on each other in cooperation. This thesis, while bearing inspiration from these thinkers, slants the Foucauldian analysis towards a gendered research of IR, and so aforementioned feminist IR theorists like Christine Sylvester (2002) are also key examples of the employment of discourse analysis in IR. This section is an explanation of Foucauldian discourse analysis in this thesis.

Poststructuralist discourse theory assumes, as David Campbell writes, that “the existence of the world is literally inconceivable outside language and our traditions of interpretation” (Campbell, 1998: 6) and therefore any perception of reality is a participation and product of discourse. As mentioned, discourse is understood as extending beyond the domain of the empirical. Because there are ontological realities outside expressed discourses, what is expressed in given discourses is equally significant as what is not expressed. Their exclusion from overt expression does not render them any less real and are equally important in any analysis. It is thus impossible to divorce the discursive from the non-discursive. This impossibility becomes clearer when examining Foucauldian method, whereby it also becomes impossible to distinguish theory from practice.

For Foucault, discursive analysis is a genealogical practice. He writes that “a genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from [scientific] subjection, to render them... capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse” (Foucault, 1980b: 85). In other words, it is an epistemological and ontological exploration and critique that seeks to transcend the absolute boundaries established by scientific inquiry. Genealogies, Foucault writes, are indeed anti-sciences whose main struggle is waged “against the effects of power of
a discourse” (1980: 84). As Gilles Deleuze remarks, genealogy is not only interpretive, but also evaluative. (Deleuze, 1983: 2, 6) The Foucauldian tradition is interested in examining and evaluating discourses located in histories, places and norms, where they are produced, legitimised and normalised. (Jokinen in Liljeström, 2004: 192-193) It is the power produced and exercised in these discourses that is of the highest concern.

Indeed, if Foucauldian discourse analysis is a struggle against the effects power of discourses, then is central to the understanding of discourse. (Suoninen in Jokinen et al., 1999: 18; Jokinen, 2000: 110, 113-115) Adding to what has already been described of power, power relations themselves are established and implemented by the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse as matrices of transformations (Foucault, 1980b: 93, 1978: 99). Power operates through particular truth-producing discourses that Foucault calls discourses of truth. Social functioning is dependent on the submission these truths, which are never fixed, but constantly being moulded and remoulded by power: “Power never ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration of truth: it institutionalises, professionalises and rewards its pursuit” (ibid.). The recognition and understanding of the power/knowledge relation is what enables one to problematise, dislocated and transcend hegemonic discourses by giving priority to power and power struggles. While critics hold deconstruction to mean negative criticism, interpreted as a single, destructive that eliminates subjects and their agency. However, deconstruction must be seen as a promising process of a “sustained critique of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them”. (Campbell, 1998: 223) It is within this project where we can locate the emancipatory goal of freedom from the repressive hold of power. It can never be escaped or conclusively conquered, but because discourses are flexible and changeable, can be positively transformed.

Additional developments in Butlerian gender theory advance the notion of performativity, which makes for an interesting contribution to discourse analysis, and one significant in this thesis. For Judith Butler (1999, 2004b), largely influenced by Foucault, gender is a discursive practice, where the body is the central site on which power is exercised by performance to produce gender norms. Thus, bodily practices also have the potential to challenge and transform norms. David Campbell in Writing Security (1998) uses Butler’s notion of performativity to explain the performative constitution of state identity. Identity, according to Campbell, is constituted by the process of a regulated repetition of boundary-inscribing acts that differentiate the ‘inside’ from the ‘outside’, and ‘self’ from the ‘other’. (1998: 8-10)
The next section will return to the dichotomous practice of othering, but here Campbell served as an example of the possibilities of Bulter’s bodily discourse theory. As discourse is found on not only in speech and writing, but also acts, thoughts, bodies, and so on, the flexibility of such an approach can also be regarded as more of an enriching asset than a complicating impediment. It should also be clear that in this case, theory and practice are inseparable. Since the theory is itself transformative (Butler, 2004b: 204), theory can only be considered as the practice that it espouses. Also, Butlerian theory, to which this thesis adheres, is highly compatible with Foucauldian discourse analysis, mainly due to being largely influenced by Foucault in the first place. These theories, being interlinked, are here regarded as part of the same larger theoretical framework and thereby mutually supportive and enriching.

Before proceeding, it would be fitting and practical to overview three analytical concepts here useful for approaching discourses as discussed by Jokinen and Juhila. These are accounts, meaning systems, and identity and subject positions. Firstly, when people use language, they not only produce description, but also they try to make sense of the object of description in relation to their own activities. This understanding takes discourse analysis beyond simplistic ‘description’ to people’s ‘accounts’ of their perceived world. Secondly, meanings intersect with each other. Therefore one will encounter several meaning systems in constant renewal and reproduction. By identity and subject positions, Jokinen and Juhila mean that people construct themselves and others in their language. Identities are not fixed, but are in constant transformation in many types and combinations. Identity therefore must be understood not as a static, but active category that will change according to time, place and that which it defined against. (Jokinen et al., 1999: 67-68)

To this trilogy I wish to add another concept presented that will be useful in my analysis, that is the concept of narrative. Jokinen and Juhila explain that narratives refer to stories that are shaped by the conferral meaning to their details, features, and events. Many discourse sites in this analysis involve narrativity, such as the stories recounted in media clippings, personal histories divulged in autobiography, or anecdotes in speeches. Stories and storytelling are thus also producers of discourse. Although they usually will express previous events or experiences, they always located within a context, a discourse that constructs its reality in different ways. (1999: 68) Discourse analysis is not concerned with evaluating whether a story or statement is true or not, but rather its implications, meanings and consequences. The non-fiction/fiction divide derives from the scientific divide of true/false and fact/tale, thereby confirming the existence of an objective reality - the approach directly
challenged by postmodernism. It is possible to argue that all that is ever written about ‘reality’ is a kind of fiction. Foucault himself insisted that he has only ever written fictions. Truth is not absent from fictions, for fiction functions in truth. Discourses of truth do not exist until they are created, or, ‘fictioned.’ Fictioning is the construction of reality as ‘true.’ (Foucault, 1980b: 193)

Fictions are being researched and evaluated here too. This research is openly acknowledged to be a political act, whereby the understanding of the presented material is to some extent or another influenced by the disposition of the researcher. Research products are also the production and reproduction of discourse. The researcher is therefore a part of the discourses one engages with and produces, as there is no such thing as perception and assessment ‘from a distance.’ However, this does not automatically leave one trapped within one’s own reality, because one should be aware of the fluidity of reality, that it can be constructed in an array of ways. And finally, one must not only analyse and criticise, but also has the emancipatory potential to think how the realities he/she is deconstructing could be reconstructed differently. (Liljeström, 2004: 193)

Representation

To the above I still wish to add a discussion of representation in discourses. Stuart Hall defines representation as

the production of the meaning of the concepts in our minds through language. It is the link between concepts and language, which enables us to refer to either the ‘real’ world of objects, people or events, or indeed to imaginary worlds of fictional objects, people and events.

(Hall, 1997: 17, italics original)

It is the relationship between and the process linking ‘things,’ concepts and signs (words, sounds, or images that carry meaning) together that is at the core of the production of meaning and what constitutes representation. (1997: 21) The War on Terror discourses are a jungle of representations, in language, events, and images\(^\text{17}\) to deconstruct. Foucauldian theory makes use of representation. Foucault engages with, for example, it in examining Diego Velasquez's 1656 oil painting *Las Meninas* (1980a: 3-16). As representation is in wide

\(^{17}\)Starting with the visual phenomenon of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, to images of American soldiers battling in deserts or engaging in ‘urban warfare,’ and likewise the pictures of Afghan men and women, one can already discern that the War on Terror has a jungle of symbolism and meanings to explore.
and repeated use in this thesis, it is of practical and philosophical value to theorise it a little further, especially regarding the representation of Others. There is no one approach to representation, and is particularly underdeveloped in IR. As a relatively new and innovative tool in IR, it is useful to continue from the observations of others and adapt it to our purposes. Such has been the technique with other political analyses making use of representation, such as in Arto Jokinen’s (2000) *Panssaroitu Maskuliinisuus*. We continue, therefore, with Stuart Hall’s overview.

Hall presents three approaches to representation. First, the reflective approach assumes that an object reflects its true meaning as it exists, fixed, ‘out there.’ The second approach is intentional, which argues that it is the author that forces his/her meaning on the rest of the world. Hall criticises this approach for assuming that language is a private act. Instead, he argues that “language is communication… that depends on shared linguistic conventions and shared codes” and that when we express, we must “enter into the rules, codes, and conventions of language to be shared and understood” (Hall: 1997:25). The third, constructionist approach that this analysis assumes, recognises this. Meanings do not exist in things; they are constructed by the conceptual and representational system used to give meaning to the material world. (ibid.)

Representation is always a question of what is and is not being shown and what is expressed directly, and likewise indirectly. It is not merely showing something, but presenting and representing something or someone in a particular way to someone else. Not only do representations show what we think, but they also effect how we think. (Jokinen, 2000: 117, 124) In this thesis, gender is taken as a central component of these representations. What is presented is always producing a particular type of sexuality, responding to a particular perspective, as well as affecting the perspectives of others. Because sexualities are hierarchically constructed, the status of the ‘different’ person or group being constructed is defined in relation to producer of the expression. It is therefore to the constructions of ‘others’ and ‘difference’ to which the discussion will now turn.

**Representing ‘Others’**

Representation often involves the presentation of ‘different’ people and places, of showing how ‘otherness’ is constructed in different locations of place and time. In explaining why ‘difference’ matters and why there is such a fascination with ‘otherness,’ Hall makes the following observations. First of all, citing Jacques Derrida, meaning is dependent on the
difference between binary opposites such as white/black, upper class/lower class, masculine/feminine, and citizen/alien. These polar dichotomies always have a hierarchical power relationship that subordinate one to the other. Despite it being a crude way of producing meaning, these over-simplifications seem to be found everywhere. (Hall, 1997: 235) Indeed, as Moira Gatens observes, dichotomies “are not a neutral way of dividing up the world into categories [and...] assign a prominence and a dominant value to the term in the position of A at the expense of not-A” (Gatens, 1991: 93). As discussed previously, feminist theory is particularly adept at pointing out dichotomies because of their detrimental effects as dominant metaphors in the thought and construction of gender and sexuality. Raia Prokhovnik, for example, provides an interesting discussion of such problems with dichotomy. Dichotomies offer temptingly simple yet dangerously adversarial styles of reasoning that when used unselfconsciously become seen as natural, although they are harmful and usually self-defeating. (Prokhovnik 1999: 31-38)

The second observation of representation is derived from the theory of language of Mikhail Bakhtin that argues that difference is necessary because meanings are constructed through dialogues with the Other. Meanings are therefore fluid and always being negotiated and renegotiated. No single group can ever be the authority of meaning or their own identity. (Hall, 1997: 235-236). The third is anthropological, where difference is the foundation of the symbolic order known as culture. Binary oppositions give order by classification that in turn sustains the culture’s stability; “Symbolic boundaries keep the categories ‘pure,’ giving cultures their unique meaning and identity” (Hall, 1997: 236)

The fourth and final explanation is psychoanalytic, begun by Sigmund Freud and developed further by Jacques Lacan. Lacan also drew on Hegel’s notion of the dynamics of negation of the other for unity and coherence for the self. For Hegel, in wartime it is the enemy Other that becomes an object of desire—not emotional, but as an object that reflects back to the self. Lacan agrees, adding that, “the Other is fundamental to the constitution of the self, to us as subjects, and to sexual identity” (1997: 237). However, the psychoanalytic angle rejects that there is such a thing as a given ‘self’ or identity. Identities are in constant dialogue with the Other and thereby never complete. Because it is the constant production of signifiers with coded structures, the pursuit of one’s identity is always incomplete and unconsummated. (Hall, 1997: 237; Shapiro, 1997: 41-43).

In addition to this, the Other can be endowed with negative meaning whereby there is a good/bad binary opposition. It is here that racist stereotyping and violence can be
produced. ‘Difference,’ therefore, is arguably positive or negative. (Hall, 1997, 238) Applying Lacan to ontological questions in warfare is appropriate because of the applicability of his theory of individual identity to the larger national collectivity. Individuals symbolically identify with the national group in a way that produces a collective unity that denies or downplays the existence of other social fragmentations, for example, racial antagonisms. Michael Shapiro adds that because the coherent identification of the national self requires strong and explicit boundaries, this can create Others both within and outside the collectivity. Others within the national boundaries become national objects of desire. They “reflect a disorder too unacceptable to be recognised as a part of one’s own order” (Shapiro, 1997: 59). As Shapiro discusses the othering of disorder, warfare relies “on a discourse of danger based on a radical separation of a domestic order versus a disordered world.” (Shapiro, 1997: 57-60)

The above explanations should not be seen as mutually exclusive. Although they come from different academic schools, they all address the same questions of ‘difference’ in representation. A selective use of all ideas is therefore possible as these approaches interweave easily, although I will lean more on the Lacanian interpretation. Although these theories do not discuss gender as such in this context, there is a sufficient body of feminist literature addressing difference, as has already been listed. As mentioned, poststructuralist feminist theory is also compatible with these theories, as it has been heavily influenced by the theories of Foucault, Lacan and Derrida, for example, by gendering their formulations as Butler has done. Therefore because they employ the same epistemological and ontological frameworks, there should be little or no problems in adapting them for my purposes.

Research Material

In a feminist enquiry, where gender and sexuality are the core concepts, cultural representations are observed to continuously produce different ways of what is and what it means to be a man, a woman, transgender, heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian, or anything else (Rossi, 2003: 19). As discussed, these categories also interact with other factors such as race, ethnicity, nationality, or social class. Finding research material to examine these relationships is not difficult. There is no ‘wrong’ place to search for discourses, but there are better sites than others if one is to examine discourses of particular interest. One selects

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18 I will discuss this further when I conduct my analysis in relation to Afghan and Iraqi men and women. Not only is race a ‘oppositional’ identity component interacting with their gender, but also ethnicity and religion.
processes where social reality is considered to be constructed. (Jokinen, 1999: 40-41) Because meaning is not found in just one single place but many or, in fact, anywhere, choices must be made. My choice is to draw from sources where I identify particular prevalent discourses of the War on Terrorism. By particular discourses, I mean the dominant, and therefore assuming the most influential and ‘significant’ discourses. The texts or sites where they can be found include speeches, articles, websites, books (including biographies), and visual images.

As justified in the discussion of representation, discourses can be found in language, writing, images, people and events. These sources will primarily be from the US, as the interest is in how the War on Terrorism is maintained and justified by the dominant discourses in the US for first and foremost American audiences. These discourses construct different gendered identities, for example, what it means to be an American man in contrast to an Iraqi man, or an American woman as opposed to an Afghani woman, by examining how their masculinities and femininities are relationally constructed. Because I am interested in how gender identities are militarised to support war and militaristic activity, this will be the central determinant of what will be studied—which identities give legitimacy to War on Terrorism militarism, and in what ways.

Various sources materials are chosen and put to use with a substantial amount of liberty. There are some predominant sources, however, and as such deserve a degree of recognition and explanation. First of all, in examining the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, feminist academic articles are often referred to. The buzzing feminist discussions of the attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan that continue still were of great interest to this project, and the observations made in these were an asset in demonstrating the variety different interpretations available. However, this does not steer one away from the further development of ideas already published, or their criticism. They provide information and analysis, but should not be taken for granted.

Speeches are another recurring source used in the examination of the early years of the War on Terrorism. George W. Bush, as the president and leading political figure of the US, is the most quoted. Not only do his words produce discourse, but also the self-image he projects in speech making is a significant contribution to the construction of hegemonic US masculinity. These speeches, including those of Laura Bush, are from the War on Terror speech archive of the official White House website. Likewise, the US Department of Defense and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library websites archive the speeches of Donald Rumsfeld and Ronal Reagan, respectively.
As this thesis proceeds chronologically with the War on Terrorism, newspaper and magazine articles become increasingly valuable to understand how sexuality in various places like the detainment camp at Guantánamo Bay, phenomena like female terrorists, and scandals like the torture of Muslim men by US soldiers at Abu Ghraib is discussed, and thus, constructed. Two popular and respected US newspapers, the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, and the also popular *Time* and *Newsweek* magazines are the four dominating textual sources for readings of such discourses. Because these publications are so widely read, they can be expected to participate in the production of popular, hegemonic discourses. Not only are they accorded respect in the US, but also they are also widely internationally distributed, being some of the main bearers of US news abroad.

These publications are also sources for images. As mentioned of the strength of visual cognition, these images are just as powerful producers of discourse as the texts they accompany and support. They construct and reconstruct gendered politico-cultural representations of places and people, both in the US and abroad - of the self and the Other - that have bearings on the value of one group of people over another, of one individual over another. For example, the Orientalist gaze, as shall be discussed, romanticises and demonises, victimises and dehumanises.

For an examination of the identities of US soldiers in Iraq, I have selected two recently published autobiographical works describing personal experiences of soldiering in Iraq in the US Army. Colby Buzzell’s successful autobiography *My War: Killing Time in Iraq* provides a male perspective, and *Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female In The US Army* by Kayla Williams reflects on her Iraq experience explicitly as a woman. While simply one work might suffice to examine gender in soldiering, it is nonetheless probable, in accordance with standpoint feminism, that women experience the world differently due to their different positions. This choice therefore enriches the analysis by demonstrating not only how differently each author, both White and of lower-class origin, sees gender in their respective worlds, but also especially how they construct their own sexual identities, and those of others - of other soldiers, countrymen, and Iraqi men and women.

V. GENDERING THE WAR ON TERRORISM

The War on Terrorism is considered to have begun with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 when commercial airplanes were hijacked by terrorists. Two dramatically
smashed into the World Trade Center (WTC) buildings in New York City, one into a wing of the Pentagon in Washington D.C and a fourth crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. A new foreign policy discourse officially titled the ‘Global War on Terrorism,’ came to dominate American foreign policy narratives.

The phrase is not new. Among other ‘wars’ such as War on Drugs, War on Crime and War on Poverty, the War on Terrorism has existed in US foreign and domestic policy discourse for long. In 1977 for example, the 31 October cover of *Time* magazine featured an image of the hijacked Lufthansa airplane in Mogadishu, with the title *War on Terrorism* written in bold letters above it. A victim giving a peace sign, black-and-white stern male faces and finally a snapshot of a woman holding flowers with a young boy and an old man by her side scrawls the bottom of the cover between lightening bolt-like zigzags. ‘Terrorism’ was already publicised as a dramatic and destructive phenomenon that claims the lives of the innocent and obliges women, children and the elderly (as the vulnerable, peaceful, thus passive members of society) to mourn the victims. The impression was that it required decisive and uncompromising men of solid ‘black-and-white’ fibre to counter this aggression was reinforced for example by Ronald Reagan’s forceful anti-terrorist rhetorical imagery during his presidency19.

Terrorism, however, is by no means new to the United States. Ann Larabee is one amongst many to point out that terrorism in the US is “as old as the nation itself” (Larabee, 2003: 22) and proceeds to examine terrorism in the US since the 1800’s. More recently, however, despite notable terrorist attacks in the 1990s in the United States, such as the 1993 WTC bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, or the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, terrorism did not become a defining national discourse until the attacks of 11 September

19 For example, in his *Message to Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation To Combat International Terrorism* with great rhetorical fervour about the evils of terrorism encouraged Congress to pass four bills to “attack the pressing and urgent problem of international terrorism” (Reagan, 26 Apr. 1984).
2001. As Jacques Derrida comments in an interview with Giovanna Borradori, it was not unthinkable to anticipate the attack on US soil (Derrida in Borradori, 2003: 91).

**11 September 2001**

*Valuable Bodies*

The attacks of September 11 have been endowed with much academic attention. Feminist voices have also participated in the discussion. Although the question of women’s rights in Afghanistan forms the vortex, there have been some fascinating critical feminist insights into September 11. This section therefore draws on them for discourse analysis. The intention however, is not simply to take this ready research for granted, but to approach them critically as well and contribute to the feminist discourse by presenting personal observations and criticisms in conjunction.

Gender examinations of the events have first of all highlighted the maleness of the visible actors of the event. Secondly, I focus on the discourses of their masculinities, in other words, what kinds of masculinities were articulated, in what order of hierarchy, and with what effects. Thirdly, a point I wish to develop on, is the performance and location of bodies, and in particular what or whose bodies were in question in the events and how. The focus will mainly concentrate on the World Trade Center (WTC) incident, because this was the most publicised of the three targeted sites. It has also remained the most important one in the popular imagination, which was felt by many to be the event where “the US lost its virginity”, as said by 2001 poet laureate Billy Collins (Puar and Rai, 2002: 124). Indeed, the event was seen as a violation, a penetration of American purity - a rape of the national consciousness. This feminisation was an unbearable humiliation and insult that resulted in the remasculisation of American identity to reclaim its stripped honour.

Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin argue that men were the visible actors of the day, and women were visible only secondarily as victims. Men planned, hijacked and attacked, and a male team in the White House retaliated. Charlesworth and Chinkin emphasise the importance of this by imagining if the all the actors had been women; “A 20

While Condoleezza Rice was in the cabinet as the head of the National Security Council, she “played a relatively limited over role in responding to the hijackings and the war in Afghanistan” (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2002: 600). Also, the positions she has taken on the War on Terror do not diverge from those of her male colleagues, similar to most high-ranking women who must do so to be accepted in a ‘man’s world.’
phenomenon of nineteen women hijackers willing to kill themselves for a cause would very likely be read as a product of women’s instability, excitability, and unreliability. It would confirm the inappropriateness of allowing women into public life” (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2002: 602). The heroes of the day were also men: Major Rudolph Giuliani, the fire fighters, policemen and rescue workers. By contrast, women were victims—often mothers killed in the attacks or mothers of other victims, widows of men killed, and victims in distant Islamic countries like Afghanistan. Höglund points out that the functions of gender in war remains unchanged, where men are the actors and women the victims of their actions. Simultaneously, however, these roles are being broken down and remoulded. (Höglund, 2003: 244)

Lorber notes that, as in most wars, two different categories of masculinities were constructed: “the good-doers and the evil-doers” (Lorber, 2002: 383, italics original). The masculinity of the ‘good-doers,’ however, was a selective type of masculinity—one associated with heroism and strength. As a result, fire fighters were honoured by being crowned as heroes, whereas the “the poorer, non-White, working-class men—the cooks, the dishwashers, the busboys of the World Trade Centre restaurant, the mail handlers and maintenance personnel of the building—the strata in the least desirable jobs, many of whom were immigrants [were forgotten]. Their masculinity was not valued enough to be called heroic” (Lorber, 2002: 385). Indeed, considering the monetary fantasies of the American Dream and historical xenophobia targeted at immigrants, such masculinities have never been held in high esteem. These men were thus overshadowed and silenced in 11 September discourses. They were the “unreal” that suffered the additional double negation of the “violence of derealisation” (Butler, 2004a: 33). The unreal cannot be mourned because they never existed in the national imagination. There cannot be obituaries for lives not worth living.

Instead, the wealthier, often White, heterosexual white-collar workers were given names, faces, personal stories, families, and hobbies, and thus recognised as valuable lives, valuable bodies. Indeed, the destruction of the WTC towers was a representative attack on Western capitalist domination. The target was a pair of enormous symbolic buildings standing erect out of the New York City skyline marking the territory around it as a dominant home to economic liberalism that is central to US national identity. The instantaneous destruction of this icon and the economic professionals that gave it meaning and purpose resulted not only in wounded national pride, but also in a decline of white-collar businessman masculinity. The hegemony of this rationalist-bourgeois masculinity that so dominated the 1990s (Hooper,
2001) suffered a decline with the realisation of its vulnerability. Ahead of it was positioned a new hegemonic masculinity that also embodied American principles, but unlike the latter was capable of physically protecting itself and the community. On September 11, this masculinity was performed by fire fighters of New York City - muscular lower-class White men rescuing other, bourgeois but powerless, White men. Their gadgets, the technological tools of the information age - computers, calculations, and mobile phones - were impotent against the threat of fire and destruction. The failure of top intelligence agencies like the CIA to foresee the attacks also contributed to the loss of confidence in new methods. Hegemonic masculinity circled around confrontation, rather than knowledge. Knowledge was not regarded as sufficiently powerful to assert superiority over the terrorist humiliation and overcome the displayed vulnerability. It appeared as if only brute physical force had sufficient muscle to protect citizens and counter evil after all. Thus, in accordance with the pattern discussed earlier, American masculinity has a tendency to become ruggedly militaristic during crisis periods for masculinity.

The post-September 11 discourse of hegemonic masculinity that emerged was therefore one celebrative of physical force, muscle, determination, emotional control and unwavering courage in traumatic and life-threatening circumstances. It is the strong nationalistic dimension of this masculinity that provides the above qualities with honour and respectability, and a seductive motivation for the individual to practice them. He makes the most unselfish sacrifice for the larger community and the greater idea of ‘America’ by surrendering one’s existence for the largely psychological survival of the nation. The link between this masculinity and nationalism was constantly produced and validated by images such as Image 2 (above), where firefighters venerate the ‘Americanism’ by unfurling an enormous US flag across a building damaged by the terrorist attacks. Hard male bodies are rendered representative of the national security potential. They are transformed to embody the ideological texts that constitute the idea of the American nation while simultaneously in

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I refer to the discursive construction of the idea of ‘America’ as explored by David Campbell (1993), involving particular values and practices considered to constitute the ideal American way of life.
possession of the means to protect it; it’s values, ideals and way of life. The New York Fire Department (NYFD) could be described as an army of heroes because it became an institution of national security in its participation in protecting the security of American citizens. Indeed, the chaos of the WTC was described by many witnesses as a “war zone”, emotionalised with images of the uniformed muscular men of the NYFD struggling in for national survival against the destructive infiltration of the enemy Other (an infiltration that the Bush Administration concluded was a declaration of war\textsuperscript{22}). The masculinity of fire fighters was thereby not only celebrated, but also militarised when they became temporary protectors of the national good.

Indeed the NYFD was not the only group of people to be militarised by the events of September 11, but it accelerated the militarisation of US culture as a whole.\textsuperscript{23} More US flags were flown outside buildings, both public and private, booming the flag-manufacturing industry. Flag pins also became extremely popular as ways of expressing national loyalty and allegiance for the new national cause. As Cynthia Enloe writes, “when something becomes militarised, it appears to rise in value [because] militarisation is seductive” (Enloe, 2004: 145). A social pressure to conform to the patriotic extravaganza accompanied this seductiveness. As widely observed by many critics, public criticism of militarising activities has since been viewed as disloyal and ‘unpatriotic’. Enloe also remarks that waving flags and wearing pins may have been the only socially acceptable expressions of public grief available to individuals, especially those lacking in power. Indeed, pins were donned also by those opposing militarisation, unaware that they were contributing to the beliefs of others that militarised views of the US flag was a bias universally shared, and thus deepening the militarisation of American culture. (Enloe, 2004: 146, 257-258)

All citizens were also subsequently called upon to contribute to the cause. George W. Bush, for example, in his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush calls for every citizen to devote two years of their life to the service of their nation, and introduces the new USA Freedom Corps to “sustain and extend the best that has emerged in America” (Bush, 2002). Although it is not a military unit, its possess a militaristic name that appeals to citizens who wish to volunteer in community action in support of the larger military operations of the War

\textsuperscript{22} This was decided Sept. 12; “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war” (Bush, 2001a) The accompanying picture shows a table full of men, depicting them as rational strategists capable of clear objective problem-solving.

\textsuperscript{23} As Jacques Derrida discusses with Giovanna Borradori, naming of the events “9/11” after the emergency number not only gives it historical, monumentalised stature, but also “alleviates the sense of responsibility for the failure to prevent them as well as the sense of vulnerability that such failure inevitably provokes” (Borradori, 2003: 148). Retaliation and a sense of national pride is thus easier to foster without sentiments of personal (US) responsibility.
on Terrorism. The psychological effect of such a name on its participants is such that they imagine themselves in a civilian ‘army’, ensuring national security at home. It appeals to a nationalism that exalts an aggressive approach to national security at all levels of society in accordance with a robust heterosexual masculinity. It its programmes are such that they penetrate deep into the social fabric - of men, women and children - and partaking in the transformation of their identities, and militarising them, not only in the US but abroad as well. For example, underprivileged children in “troubled schools” and the “Islamic world” will be staffed be USA Freedom Corps volunteer teachers, militarising the educational standards, institutions and the pupils that inhabit them. Here it is appropriate to bear in mind Foucault's discussion of discipline and surveillance (Foucault, 1987) and the treatment of establishments such as prisons, hospitals and schools as examples of institutions that were created and organised in accordance with purpose of disciplining bodies and minds. The attachment of a body such as the USA Freedom Corps to an educational disciplinary institution is likely - as it is intended - to instil youths to aspire to particular ontological foundations that perceive the military as a positive, natural, and necessary establishment. Their bodies are subjected to the surveillance of a militarised organ, and thus its disciplinary mechanisms compel them to submit to its militarising control. And it is thus that individuals are discouraged from certain ‘soft’ or ‘feminine’ reactions and approaches to their national crisis.

Sexualising Monsters

The masculinity of the ‘evil-doers’ was also specially discursively constructed, functioning to demonise and dehumanise Muslim men as the Other, victimising Muslim women and idealising American men and women to legitimise the US military retaliation (Lorber, 2002: 379). This discourse not only constructs a particular the enemy Other, but also to define the righteous self. The terrorists were diagnosed as excessively emotionally to the extent of unpredictability, which substantiated by their irrational and uncivilised Islamic fundamentalist motivation renders them exceptionally dangerous. These qualities are in direct contrast to the qualities of Americans that where the self/Other distinction is defined by oppositional dichotomies of the masculine/feminine division respectively; rational/emotional, civilised/primitive, etc.

Jasbir K. Puar and Amit S. Rai (2002) argue that Muslim men have been Othered into monsters by particular dynamics of feminisation, resulting in an intensification of the heteronormative nature of a militarist, racist and class-specific US nationalism. They draw on
Foucault’s conception of ‘abnormals’ to examine the notion of monstrosity, which has been historically tied to questions of sexuality and race. The terrorists were deemed psychologically dysfunctional, and this was frequently attributed by psychologists and ‘terrorism experts’ to negative childhood or dysfunctional family experiences that resulted in self-resentment and a subsequently debased and sexually frustrated heterosexuality.

Despite being educated individuals, their monstrosity was nonetheless characterised by their lack of civilisation. George W. Bush contributes to this discourse by calling the war a struggle of the “civilised world” against “terrorist parasites” that “operate in remote jungles and deserts, and hide in centres of large cities” (George Bush, 2002). This is reinforced by the vocal condemnation of the treatment of women in Afghanistan under the Taliban, which shall be returned to later. They are not only represented as uncivilised, but also as subhuman, deceitful, perverted. They are outside of ‘civilisation’ and thus ‘rationality,’ therefore their mind-set is inestimable, demented. This mental degeneracy is a cause for fear because of its creative and primitive taste for excessive violence.

The discourse of their masculinity is therefore not simply a failed one. It is a distorted, debauched and corrupt sexuality that defines queerness as sexual deviancy. As Puar and Rai describe, shortly after the attacks, posters began to appear in Manhattan that featured Osama bin Laden being anally penetrated by the Empire State Building, with the caption “The Empire Strikes Back” or “So you like skyscrapers, huh, bitch?” (Puar and Rai, 2002: 126). A website was also posted where one could torture Osama bin Laden to death with a variety of weapons with final one being sodomy (ibid.). This imaginary homosexual rape represents a feminisation of Islamic men, subordinating them to the power of heterosexual American men. If we understand homosexual rape by heterosexual men as a violent act of domination, we can begin to understand how this representative rape homosexualises the terrorist enemy. Homosexual rape in prisons functions in the same way. (O'Donnell, 2004: 243) Male rape is connected to high levels of homophobia. The damage is not only physical, but also significantly psychological. The victim is forced into the ‘feminine’ role by submitting to the penetration of the attacker. The victim is stigmatised with feminisation, lost manhood and rendered queer, and thus is weak, substandard, and abnormal.

The demonisation of queerness not only others terrorists, but also disciplines the heterosexual masculinity of the self; possibly resulting in an increase in violence against homosexuals in US, especially against those of colour. In other words, domestic homosexual bodies are subject to coercive forces upon the body in attempt to compel them to conform to or acquiesce to the rugged heterosexual masculinity of militarisation. In addition, Puar and
Rai argue that September 11 was a symbolic castration of US masculinity (Puar and Rai, 2002: 126), hence its ensuing homophobic narratives and representations could be interpreted as rhetorical reclaims of its crippled manhood.

Homophobic narratives are produced and sustained without much hesitation much due to persisting postcolonial imaginaries that are bound to larger racist discourses. Discourse of prevailing convictions of racial and civilisational inferiority is necessary to identify the racism of statements like “Hijack these fags” written across a bomb on the U.S.S. Enterprise. (Puar and Rai, 2002: 127) Tickner points out that indeed not all others are feminised. She argues that American discourses did not, for example, feminise the Soviet Union to the same extent as they feminise Islamic nations. Non-white nations are more likely to be feminised, and therefore demonstrating a significant racial dimension to the gendering of colonialism. (Tickner, 2004: 54-55) Significantly, it provides a moral alleviation for US military involvement in the War on Terrorism. The “greater good” (George Bush, 2002), that the US military proclaims to serve is the spread of democracy to such uncultivated savages, and in doing so transform their otherness to sameness with the reason and knowledge of men as knowers24 by violently force-feeding them the masculising fruits of the Enlightenment that they have yet to experience. While democracy (in the abstract) is certainly an ideal to strive for, previous attempts to impose the system have frequently fallen short of its promises. Feminists in particular have special cause for scepticism about democratic ‘crusades’, which run the risk of deteriorating women’s suffering even further.

Until now the discussion has largely been one of discussing visible and invisible male bodies. Women, on the other hand, are glaringly absent from 11 September discourses. As Charlesworth and Chinkin observe, the only consistent distinguishable female voices belong to victims, of either the hijackers, or as widows of men killed. (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2002: 600) Women did not feature as actors of that day, nor were their voices granted much attention. Femininities were significant in mobilising the masculinity of the self and Other, but the femininities of women were not yet a matter of concern, only to the extent that they remain passive and supportive of the developing machinations of the War on Terrorism by silently mourning the victims of September 11. Their silence and submission served to bolster the legitimacy of the hegemonic masculinity. It supported the discourse of ‘femininity’ as weak and impotent, thus permitting the construction of masculinities in relation to this

24 “Beginning in the 17th century, scientific reasoning was explicitly constructed as ‘male’ and promoted as superior to and exclusive of that which was marked as ‘female.’ Man, the knower, was identified with science and reason; women were associated with emotion and irrationality.” (Tickner, 1999: 46)
femininity. Women were soon to become a central question, however, when the military gaze was redirected to Afghanistan, when a pitiable femininity became a cause for militarisation.

**Afghanistan**

The US led the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 under the title of Operation Enduring Freedom. It was an impassioned time of demands for revenge and justice, and any form of justice could be accommodated to justify the retaliation. Thus, to reinforce the justifications for the invasion of Afghanistan, a discourse of women’s rights surfaced as one of its leading motivations. Before delving further into the problematisation of these discourses, it is interesting to examine the gender identities of the presidential couple, President George W. Bush and First Lady Laura Bush. Their leadership styles and discourses are very specifically gendered, and this will be discussed much in relation to Afghanistan, where President Bush’s new leadership style was confirmed and Mrs Bush’s sexuality was most publicly activated. Being the leading political couple, their public images are formative of national sexualities by providing gender archetypes, as the national ‘parents’, to which other male and female citizens should aspire. Their bodies too are militarised in support of the violence of the War on Terrorism.

“*Let’s Roll*” - Leading the Crusade

In US politics, there seems to have long been a consensus that the valiant male is an ideal of leadership; he is the ultimate protector of his national family. Valenty and Feldman in their examination of modern American leadership recognise ‘heroic leadership’ in American society as the traditional model. It demands a hierarchical chain of command and functions on the motto ‘decide and command’; “The task of the heroic leader is to convince the public of what it is that he already thinks they must do… The heroic leader stands above, and beyond, his supportive publics” (Valenty and Feldman, 2002: 205). President George W. Bush fits this description, whereas his predecessor Bill Clinton fits the alternative ‘reflective leadership’, a less forceful and more pensive and consensual style of leadership that has since in particular been feminised.

In his analysis of gender in American politics, Mark Kann reflects on the historical heritage of patriarchal leadership in the United States. The founding fathers, he writes, often discussed “the need for strong political leadership… They portrayed great leaders as national
fathers and political father figures” (Kann, 1999: 97). Their ideal of political leadership can be considered to resemble that as described by their contemporary Lord Bolingbroke in *The Idea of the Patriot King*:

He governed like a ‘common father’ and treated the people as a part of his ‘patriarchal family’... A Patriot King also epitomized manhood. He acted with integrity and civility, refused the lure of flattery, resisted factionalism, practiced manly virtues, and avoided unmanly vices

( ibid.).

These qualities—classical as they are in their chivalry—in President Bush became highly visible after the 11 September attacks as he declared war on terrorism and vowed to avenge the victims. Subsequently, success of the war in Afghanistan increased public approval to over 90 percent in polls (Gould, 2003: 235), therefore applauding such behaviour. Charlesworth and Chinkin also discuss the connection between military action and masculinity in leadership perceptions;

To be a leader, it seems, requires displaying masculine qualities, such as decisive military action as opposed to negotiation and compromise, which are coded as feminine. As a result, President Bush’s conduct of the war was praised even by former Democrat adversaries because he was seen as displaying resolute strength, in contrast to his opponent in the presidential election, Al Gore, who was seen as too much of a ‘talker.’

(Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2002, 604)

Cynthia Enloe takes an interesting approach to the topic, albeit briefly. She finds it peculiar that Bush has managed to persuade his public of his militarised masculinity, despite his infamous escape of the Vietnam War draft. The importance of military records of presidential candidates in election campaigns itself shows how admired this form of hegemonic masculinity is in popular American political culture. One only needs to recall the frequent mention of presidential candidate John Kerry’s four Purple Hearts for his injuries from the Vietnam War in the 2004 elections. Enloe therefore argues that Bush exploited the post-September 11 national vulnerability to further cement this masculinity into the presidential office and display himself with this identity. It is thus surprising that a president whose Vietnam ‘dodge’ was publicly investigated by the media managed to achieve a popular position a strong wartime leader of exemplary masculinity. While effective in the short term,
Enloe warns that “this distortion is certain to undermine international stability and to shrink political life by marginalizing women as full citizens and by privileging the narrowest version of masculinity.” (Enloe, 2004a: 152-154)

“Let’s roll,” Bush declared in his 2002 State of the Union Address as the “new ethic and new creed [of America]” instead of an older “If it feels good, do it” (George Bush, 2002). The new motto nationalises an act-don’t-think mentality that calls for firm resolve and quick, forceful action, disapproving of a previously calmer and emotionally sensitive policy. In constructing the identity of others, he also produced discourses articulating his own identity. “Let’s roll,” therefore, produces the impression of a dynamic leader that does not hesitate to employ the power codified in his office. Ruthlessness towards the enemy and the uncompromising resolve to defeat them is essential to protect his citizens; “Whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay.”

His masculinity reaches almost divine proportions as it intersects with the religious, an aspect of othering that has thusfar been left aside from the analysis. The concept of evil that is constantly repeated in reference to the elusive enemy is attributable to a religious heritage, which in Bush’s case is Christian. The idea of an eternal battle between good and evil, God versus Satan, divides moral fabric into two extremes - rationality and enlightenment versus chaos and darkness. These extremes were expressed from the start - states were either “with us or against us” (George Bush, 2001d). “God is near,” (George Bush, 2002) and on his side to conquer “real” evil in a “unique role in human events” by “the greater good” The enemy is essentially non-Christian, immoral, barbaric by sending their children on suicide and murder missions and “embrace tyranny and death as a cause and a creed.” Indeed it is a classic dichotomy, where claim ‘A’ is prioritised at the expense of ‘not-A’: If God is on his side, then he cannot be on the other.

Recalling David Campbell’s (1998) examination of the Christian Puritanism of the American colonisers, one can argue that it is Islam and specifically Islamic fundamentalism that is demonised in War on Terrorism discourse. Indeed, racial violence increased in the US after September 11, often indiscriminately against anyone appearing to be “Muslim.” Many Sikhs stopped wearing their turbans after hearing reports of turban grabbing and the shooting of a turban-wearing Sikh gas station owner in Arizona. Referred to as ‘towelheads,’ such derogatory references have increased in number. US Representative John Cooksey on 17

25 The State of the Union Addresses produce interesting discourse for examination. The annual speeches are globally televised and considered to be the most important of each year as they are intended to articulate the current political situation and a vision for its future. Thus, they can be expected to produce hegemonic discourses that shape and have been shaped by contemporary identities.
September said that anyone “wearing a diaper on his head” should expect to be questioned by police about the terrorist attacks (Puar and Rai, 2002: 137). On the same date, George W. Bush held a speech at the Islamic Center of Washington D.C. condemning violence against Muslims in the US, and declaring, “the face of terror is not the true faith of Islam... Islam is peace. These terrorists don’t represent peace. They represent evil and war” (George Bush, 2001c). Despite also citing from the Koran, Bush’s defence of Islam amounts to little. He does not define it as a faith of America, but one existing within its territory that must be tolerated. Again, the idea of tolerance is derived from the Christian virtue of tolerance for non-Christians. Although tolerance is preferable to intolerance, it is nonetheless a discourse used as a kind of “condescending concession [by the side of those with power]” (Derrida, 2003: 127). It is, he argues, a form of charity that is always on the side of the strongest presenting the “good face of sovereignty” but the limits of hospitality. Tolerance defines the limits of acceptance of the foreign body, therefore conditional hospitality on the terms of the ones with power. (Derrida, 2003: 127-128) Religious difference therefore exists alongside racial and sexual difference as a disparity that is too easily negatively coded to epitomise the perversion of the male Other. While Osama bin Laden embodies these evils to the extreme, Bush, by contrast and in relation, represents himself as a divine warrior messiah, not only sent to vanquish the enemy, but civilise him by bestowing upon him modern “civilisation” that is explicitly Christian in tradition. Thus gender in conjunction with racial and religious imagery in discourses is mutually important in “understanding how first-world countries represent their relation to third-world countries [as a] mythic drama that contains no thinking and acting third-world subjects” (Schott, 2003: 6-7).

Claiming Bodies

Discourses of women’s rights were instrumental in reinforcing the justification of the invasion of Afghanistan. This way the invasion was not just a revenge operation; it was given the additional humanitarian goal of alleviating suffering and delivering freedom to oppressed and helpless women in a faraway godforsaken land ruled by terrorist monsters. Laura Bush engaged in an important role to highlight women’s rights issues in Afghanistan, and thus was explicitly elaborative of the sexualities and gender issues that this “crusade” (George Bush,

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26 As reflected in the controversy to delete the phrase “one Nation under God” from the Pledge of Allegiance, this official disciplinary mantra states and legitimises Christianity as the religion of the United States in practice (albeit not legalistically). In addition, Bush regularly ends his speeches with the words “God bless America” - and it is the Christian God that is summoned in this prayer-like conclusion.
2001c) functioned to discipline. It formed a significant part of a larger hegemonic effort to claim, possess and discipline bodies.

If the President represents the national father, then the First Lady is regarded as the national mother. This is reflected also in the tasks that she is appointed to by her husband and position in general. In addition to numerous ceremonial duties, for Laura Bush these include overseeing youth programmes, educational development, women’s health, and cultural heritage protection and promotion initiatives. Compared to issues of national security, taxation, and so on, these issues are distinctly feminised policy areas that continue to be swept towards the ‘private’ of the public/private divide. As the First Lady, she is the national figurehead of such concerns. She is to be an example of womanhood, which in her performance includes participation in charities, women and children’s issues and providing a sympathetic ear to society’s less fortunate members and mouthpiece to voice their concerns - that are significantly overshadowed by her husband’s news-making politics. She is a warm-hearted, generous and devoted Christian wife of pious morals and chaste virtues, representing strong heterosexual family values.

Indeed, when an interviewer asked her to comment on accusations that the US was trying to impose values of “promiscuity and selfishness on the Arab world,” Mrs Bush vehemently denied the sexual desires of US citizens. “That’s not a real view of what the American people are like,” she replied. “Americans are very religious [and honest]... When you in any part of the world see only American television or listen only to some parts of American music, you get a very unrealistic picture about the way the people of the United States really are” (Laura Bush, 2004). Mrs Bush confirms the prevailing taboo on sex and sexuality. Frequent sexual intercourse, especially with different partners constitutes socially intolerable and condemnable licentiousness. American television and music, which gets worldwide distribution and is regularly explicitly sexual in content may represent parts of America, but it is not the ‘true’ America. ‘True’ Americans do not expose their bodies, for the signification encoded in the forms of the body imply sexuality, and sexuality implies moral and spiritual decadence and degeneracy - as the Bible describes it as “sins of the flesh” (Colossians 2: 11). For the Christian Church, sex has always been hidden in the private as a reproductive function, not a source of pleasure. This forms the basis of the well-known

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27 Recipes for home baking are available on the Laura Bush’s White House website pages, as well as her husband’s pages under the “Holidays” section (http://www.whitehouse.gov/). Cooking and baking has been one of the traditional American housewife chores since the 20th century representing the successful virtues of the nuclear family and a fundamental building block of the ‘good American home.’ Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963) (in)famously criticised this lifestyle, the principles of which have appear not to have eroded over the decades.
Madonna/whore dichotomy (Koivunen, 1995), where a respectable woman is a chaste and virginal mother, or a social outcast due to the greedy promiscuity of her body. As we shall see in the case of Afghanistan, however, there is a permissible extent of physical exposition of the female body, but this is limited to particular norms of respectability. A total covering of the female body is a shocking de-sexualisation. The performance of American femininity therefore requires a degree of bodily exposure enough to make the female body an object of pretty admiration, but modest enough not to cross over to whorishness. Mrs Bush is exemplary of this with disciplined gestures, a endless warm smile, and a neat and modest skirt-and-blazer outfit.

In November 2001, Laura Bush took on a leading role in the White House to promote the ‘rescue’ of Afghani women and children. In a Presidential Radio Address, the first First Lady ever to deliver one, she dedicated the entire speech to connecting terrorism directly to the oppression of women. “The brutal oppression of women is a central goal of the terrorists” she spoke, “The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women” (Laura Bush, 2001). Therefore, not only would the US war in Afghanistan destroy terrorism, but also destroying terrorism would liberate women. Considering the reverence summoned for mothers, the words of Mrs Bush were bound to be taken seriously, as they were from one of the most charitable and honourable of mothers. The descriptions of the suffering of Afghan women, who “face beatings for laughing out loud” and “threaten to pull out women’s fingernails for wearing nail polish”, were emotionally delivered and intended to induce shock and sympathy to justify military action. The rest of the Bush Administration also participated in these descriptions of how the “dreams of the terrorists and the Taliban [as a] waking nightmare for Afghani women and children” (George W. Bush, 2001e).

First of all, this discourse is a part of a wider enduring colonial discourse of “white men saving brown women from brown men” (Puar and Rai, 2002: 127). The enemy community’s men may be the villains, but their women and children are their victims just as much, or even more, than the self on September 11. Indeed, the self may be a victim, but the women and children are helpless Others in need of liberation. In this discourse, women’s oppression is the mark of an inferior society. Dana L. Cloud discusses the “paternalistic gaze” adopted by Americans toward Afghani women. (Cloud, 2004: 291) For example, Time magazine’s photo essays offer images of modernity that contrast with images of chaos and backwardness. Numerous biographical and autobiographical books were published and reached bestseller status. These narratives told women’s stories of tragic suffering under an oppressive society ruled by brutal Taliban men. Their covers (see next page, Images 2-5) were
invariably featured women in burqas, representing the denial of their individuality and femininity. The nets in front of their eyes hide their identities. To the Western gaze these nets are reminiscent of nets, or cages, that imprison bodies and identities and rob them completely of their individuality and sexuality. Their bodies are overly modest, and their femininity thus oppressed along with their physical and vocal freedom. The viewer can only see the obscure shape of their eyes through the exotic, perverse embroidery looking straight into the camera lens as if yearningly pleading the viewer for salvation. The sexually repressive cage also has sadomasochistic (S&M) implications. For the Western gaze, the burqa is a permanent Orientalist prop of sexual bondage imposed by Muslim men on their women. The men are in the sadistic role, getting sexual pleasure or gratification from inflicting pain and suffering by caging the women and beating them at will. The interpretation of S&M in the US as a form of sexually perversion and moral sickness renders Afghan men as bodies to be sexually disciplined - either by reform or destruction - to rescue the women from their submissive masochistic positions. These images represent this repression, and simultaneously attempt to give voices to such anonymous ghosts, voices that were intended to generate emotions of pity for these victims, and anger for their oppressors.

These images form binary oppositions with the West and encourage viewers to adopt a paternalistic stance to less fortunate beings. It is a continuation of the colonizer who has the power to subject Others to his/her gaze, thus defining Afghan women as objects of US cultural hegemony (Cloud, 2004: 293). As Enloe discusses, colonised women have been the objects of the colonial gaze for centuries, as demonstrated for example by a series of postcards. (Enloe, 2000a: 42-43) Such images mystify and eroticise female Others. The veiled woman romanticises the Oriental female; it is hidden, forbidden, yet an object of desire - the desire to unveil.

This unveiling, a destruction of the burqa, results in a demolition of Islamic culture and tradition, and aggrandising US cultural assumptions of how sexuality and agency should to be organised and represented. Their possession is achieved only by fighting their current owners, Afghan men, with American men.
Images 2-5: Cover images of post-September 11 books on women in Afghanistan


Image 4: Zoya’s Story: An Afghan Woman’s Struggle For Freedom (2003) Zoya

Image 5: Behind the Burqa: Our Life in Afghanistan and How We Escaped to Freedom (2002) Sulina and Hala, Batya Swift Yasgur
But, such romanticising is controlled by a belief in their inevitable inferiority as a consequence of membership in an uncivilised society. Thus, recollecting Rudyard Kipling, they comprise “The White Man’s Burden,” which is to save women and children from (male) savages, and from their own helplessness. (Cloud, 2004: 293) It is thus that the colonialist gaze militarises women’s bodies by claiming them as objects of possession requiring military aggression for protection and civilisation. As such, it was inconceivable that the burqa, like the veil, had the potential to be manipulated by women to assert their agency by rendering them invisible and permitting them to safely traverse masculine space, public space. (Yeğenoğlu in Lewis and Mills, 2003: 558). After all, there are women who continue to wear the burqa although it is no longer necessary, albeit at the insistence of their masculine relatives.

Laura Bush’s encouragement not only seeks to justify the use of violence to realise women’s rights, but also implies that this is the only possible method to achieve this. It disregards the appeals of women’s rights groups prior to September 11 that endlessly petitioned for the attention and support of world leaders. The pleas continued to be disregarded after September 11, however. Instead, the Bush Administration adopted the women’s rights campaign as its own cause. All the sudden Afghani women, from being “completely absent from media representations and discussion, … were now the [saved] other” (Puar and Rai, 2002: 127). Simultaneously other realities were hidden or altered to support the US ‘saviour’ image. Afghani women were denied agency. Their experiences of 22 years of civil war were limited to victimisation. There was little mention or realisation that as social actors, women “sought alternative ways of surviving and formulating their objectives within a context of restricted resources and restrictive cultural practices” (Povey, 2003: 275). For example, the efforts Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) were downplayed, and then congratulated by Western feminists both as a saviour and one of the saved—and even such portrayals did not receive serious attention. Another contradictory example is the US alliance with the Northern Alliance that has a tarnished women’s rights record itself. Similarly there was no attempt to explain the blind-eye to women’s rights in other allied countries, like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2002: 602) This is explainable in terms of how women’s rights is seen by the larger Bush Administration as an instrumental good. It is not the goal of the Bush Administration to promote women’s rights in Afghanistan, but freedom and democracy. The discourse of women’s rights, therefore, prescribes that women’s rights are not to be protected for their own sake, but
because they are instrumental the democratisation of Afghanistan, which is ultimately beneficial to US national security. (Ferguson, 2005: 25-26)

The assertion of a paternalistic stance towards women’s rights in less developed countries implies the ability to proclaim an ideal or near-ideal situation within the boundaries of the self. This is not the case in the US, or the rest of the idealised liberal West, however, and therefore these discourses disregard and conceal the oppression of women in the US and other democracies. (Cloud, 2004: 289) Violence against women, abortion rights, unequal pay, and maternal rights - a number of structural problems - continue to sustain gender equalities (that also include gay and transgender rights) in the US. Laura Bush may very well believe in her statements, for the suffering of any individual is a cause for compassion. However, her feminist discourse represents a liberal feminist position that is consistent with older colonialist missionary feminist projects such as humanitarian civilising missions used to justify the British Empire (Puar and Rai, 2002: 127; Young, 2003: 19). Chandra Mohanty (1991) argues that Western feminists too often employ an objectified category of third-world women, as passive and victimised by their uncivilised cultures and political regimes. This certainly applies here too. In addition, the liberal feminist predisposition to give priority to legal rights and initiatives assumes that their fulfilment will realise women’s equality to men while remaining unaware of larger social ideologies that sustain structural inequality. In the case of Islamic countries, Western liberal feminists are also frequently unaware of the forms of Islamic feminism that specifically attempts to deal with complex issues such as rights, modernisation, kinship obligations and religious traditions that conflict with Western feminist ideals.28

As suspected by many sceptical feminists, US promises of women’s liberation have fallen short of its pledges. Since US foreign policy began to turn its attention to Iraq in the build-up to the war that began in March 2003, Afghanistan has received less attention as a democracy was established and women’s rights were declared. Problems persist, however. Despite the resumption of female education and the right to practice in professional fields, the realisation of rights into practice is slow and mediocre. It has been more difficult than predicted to shake off misogynistic cultural values that prevail over codified rights. Women are still targets of violence, including widespread rape. Expectations of political participation

28 The issues surrounding Islamic feminism can be summarized in three trends: One that is Islamist, countering Westernisation, and returning to prestate Islam, where Islam and gender equality are believed to have been compatible. The second is secular, participating in modernisation and democratisation. The third trend seeks a middle way as Islamist but also enabling gender equality in public and in the family (Lorber, 2002: 291).
were a disappointment. Female candidates face danger and death. (Off Our Backs, 2005a: 5-6; 2005b: 5) In forming alliances with groups like the Northern Alliance, the invading US military privileged certain forms of local masculinity that cared little if at all for women’s empowerment. The emerging competing masculine groups after the removal of the Taliban regime were described as warlords like Ismail Khan and civil servants in President Hamid Karzai’s cabinet. As such, the political arena remained a masculine space of competing masculinities. As Cynthia Enloe comments, “Men rivalling each other in the arena of politicised masculinity always have needed to ensure that ‘their’ women will play those politically salient feminised roles [of symbols, subordinates, admirers or specators]” (Enloe, 2004: 285). Indeed, what Enloe does not explore further is their shared masculine values that, from women’s perspectives, make the separate groups hardly distinguishable.

This is not to say that there have been no improvements whatsoever in the position of women. As the Bushes and many feminists such as Enloe narrate, there are stories of individual women with success stories (e.g. 2004: 286-289; George W. Bush, 2002). However, these women are fewer in number than imagined, and those who obtained prominent positions in the new government, such as Sima Samar, Minister of Women’s Affairs, were summoned from their prominent lives in exile. But, there are emerging female political figures from within Afghanistan. The Afghan Constitution guarantees 68 seats for women in the Lower House and 2 in each Provincial Council. One of these female Members of Parliament, 28-year old Malalai Joya, has frequently spoken out against the ex-mujahedeens, drug dealers, and warlords holding seats in parliament whom she calls “war criminals.” Her behaviour is undeniably courageous. As articles from the New York Times (18 Dec. 2003) and The Washington Post (17 Mar. 2006) describe how her 17 December 2003 speech in the constitutional council caused uproar amongst male MPs, who rushed forward to the stage to attack her. She frequently refuses to apologise to the assembly for her remarks, and her microphone has been silenced as she continues to describe continuing atrocities against women, such as murder, rape, and kidnapping, acts which warlords are also guilty of. Despite frequent death threats, her audacity has not abated. The discourse of her struggle proclaims it a vigorous one against all odds that has gained the widespread support of the Afghan people, against oppressive male government officials that are really warlords that destroyed the country in the civil war before the establishment of the Taliban regime in 1996.

These discourses, like Enloe’s, distinguish clearly between “the country’s American-backed interim president, Hamid Karzai, and his allies, who support a draft constitution that ensures a strong presidency, in part to check the power of the warlords [and...] the jihadis
[who] give greater weight to Islam [and] are suspicious of Western involvement” (NY Times). The parallel is made between the American-backed officials as enlightened and progressive in support of women’s rights and Westernisation, and the Islamists as Islamic fundamentalist ex-warriors still bloodthirsty and insistent on a backward society that oppresses women. The division between good/bad men divides Afghan masculinities into two opposing groups that sustains the US self-image of democratic liberator used in the humanitarian discourse for additional justification for the war. The US and its Afghani supporters are still characterised as woman-friendly, and any association with the Taliban as woman-repressive. The continued sentimentalisation of Muslim women and demonisation of Muslim men simplifies a more complicated political status quo that threatens to destabilise and delegitimise post-September 11 US identities.

First of all, these news stories in the mainstream US mass media leave out Malalai Joya’s condemnations of US policy. The Orange County Register quoted Joya on 5 March 2006 directly criticising US government policy while visiting a local mosque in Orange, California;

If Americans want to bring real democracy to Afghanistan, then the American government must change their policies... The United States has its own strategic policies in Afghanistan and they do not think about the innocent people. They need to support the real freedom-loving people and stop supporting the warlords.

(Joya in The OC Register)

In addition another smaller US news reportage, Fosters Daily Democrat also published Joya’s criticisms in the sidelines on 12 March 2006, when she appealed to American listeners at the Quaker House Meeting in Dover, USA;

In the name of God, democracy and peace, from my sisters — the women of Afghanistan — Taliban may have gone, but abuses are not over... This democracy brought the Afghani people out of the pan but into the fire. The United States is supporting fundamentalists more than ever. It supports the Northern Alliance — the most brutal and ignorant fundamentalists.

Dear friends... Such a country cannot be free and liberated. My country is not free. The presence of U.S. troops is not to establish democracy: it is only for its own strategic interest. America was never concerned about the establishment of democracy.

(Joya in Fosters Daily Democrat)
Joya accuses the US of hypocrisy and cold self-interest in its treatment of Afghanistan. Democracy is not more an objective of the US-backed Northern Alliance than it was of the Taliban, she argues. She appeals to values like religion, democracy, peace, sisterhood and friendship to gain the empathy of her American listeners. While popular nation-wide media sources like the *NY Times* and *Washington Post* contend that women’s rights have advanced in post-Taliban Afghanistan, with Joya as proof of US success, they nonetheless remain uncritical of the US-backed regime. Turning to smaller local news sources, Joya’s more critical opinions are published, but their reporting still contains anti-Islamic traces in the demonisation of “fundamentalists.” Thus, US discourses of women’s social and political positions in Afghanistan still blames Islamic fundamentalism and demonises brown, bearded Muslim men for women’s suffering and their lack of political progress. The self is preserved as an enlightened and blameless mentor. Joya is represented as its leading righteous activist heroically struggling for rights and democracy. She is presented as if she were the Afghan Joan of Arc of liberal democracy: A woman in a ‘man’s world,’ leading a struggle of liberation for her people.

Non-US sources, like Canadian *CBC News* (Straziuso, 14 May 2006) or indeed Malalai Joya’s own Internet homepage provide different insights to explore. They describe how on 7 May 2006 Joya delivered her first extended speech in parliament since her election in 2003 in which she again attacked the “criminals” in parliament and spoke out on behalf of the sufferings of Afghan women. In the commotion, some former mujahedeen leaders began shouting, walked out, other members threw plastic bottles at her, and shouted insults. Some yelled calling her a prostitute and shouted that they would rape her and stab her. In her speech, she made a distinction between “true” mujahedeens that fought against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and those involved in crime and abuses of power but nonetheless, former mujahedeen leader Alam Khan Ezadi stood up to protest the presence of someone who insults the mujahedeen “who sacrificed their lives to defeat the Soviets, to defeat terrorism.” While this repartee involves an interesting use of religious and nationalistic appeals by both parties - especially how Joya links these to the justification of women’s rights, it shall not be explored further here, as the interest of this analysis is examining the exclusion of these elements from US discourse of Afghanistan.

First of all, the exclusion of the mujahedeen-distinction made by Joya is not present in US discourse. All mujahedeens are considered to be fundamentalists, and thereby dangerous savages of irrepressible aggression. Joya is depicted as a success story of Afghan democratisation; how a young, female former refugee from the Farah Province rose to
popularity, won a seat in the new parliament in ‘free elections,’ and there stands as a pillar of
democracy, seeing through the hypocrisy of male MPs who are secretly dedicated to the
Taliban extremism. This is reminiscent of the Christian teaching of a ‘hidden enemy,’ to
“Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are
ravening wolves” (Matthew 7: 15). But there is no mention of the deep and widespread
nationalistic respect for the mujahedeen that fought for the independence of Afghanistan
against the Soviet Union. Although the CIA funded and armed these mujahedeen in the 1980s
as an anti-Soviet Cold War strategy, such details are not discussed in dominant discourses.
Indeed, an acknowledgement that the US government trained and armed its present enemy
would have disastrous domestic (and possible international) consequences.

Likewise, the distinction between jihadists (ex-mujahedeen) and democratising
officials is a stark division that assumes the latter to be a woman-friendly political force.
Certainly, there are competing masculinities at hand, but even they are not so simply
tyrannical-democratic ones. They also involve dimensions like of former exiles, religious
intensity, pro/anti-Westernisation or modernisation, conceptions of nationalism, or treatment
of women (extent of misogynistic beliefs) that construct one’s masculinity. The hegemonic
masculinity of Taliban Afghanistan has been challenged alternative masculinities empowered
by the US invasion. However, as R.W. Connell writes, although “the dominance of a
particular masculinity [erodes, and] new groups may challenge old solutions and construct a
new hegemony,” all men and hegemonic masculinities nonetheless collectively gain from the
“overall subordination of women” (Connell, 1995: 77, 79). Indeed, Malalai Joya’s male
defenders are few, for it is preferable to appease ex-mujahedeen that become the target of
death threats by defending Joya - as has occurred to those protecting her in parliament from
physical attacks and subsequently organising a press conference for her.

In addition, the female MPs cannot all be classified beautiful, liberated, post-Taliban
empowered female bodies. Of course Malalai Joya enjoys support from female colleagues.
Yet, there were those who participated in her assault, such as MPs Noorzia Atmar, Malalai
Ishaqzai, Parvin Durrani and Safora Niazi. They act as supporters the masculinity of the
angered male MPs by performing a submissive femininity that attempts to silence other
femininities, like Joya’s, that attempt to challenge those prevailing masculinities.

The US discourse of Afghan bodies is disciplinary, distinctly enabled by the simplicity
of their representations. It limits the available Afghan identities to particular gendered
stereotypes consistent with the thematic good/evil characterisations of the War on Terror.
Malalai Joya’s body is not austerely a Central Asian embodiment of Western liberal
feminism. It is too crude to regulate the ‘truth’ about her to an Afghan suffragette. It ignores her definition of her womanhood, which includes strong religious and nationalistic elements that are also strategically politically vital for the successful improvement of women’s lives in Afghanistan. The overall disappointment of the US humanitarian cause in Afghanistan is overwhelmingly so for women, whose lives remain principally unchanged despite legal statures declaring their rights. However, as in the liberal democracies of Europe and North America, such text means little without a change in social attitudes, and the conception of gender itself - which is a long-term process that no military campaign can force, as militarism and misogyny are intimately and necessarily mutually supportive. And therein lies the irony of the US women’s rights discourse on Afghanistan.

**Detaining Bodies**

*Gender and Sexuality at Guantánamo Bay*

While the previous section concentrated on women’s rights and democratisation discourses in Afghanistan, the analysis will now turn to the discourses on punishment. The post-September 11 feminisation and demonisation of Muslim male bodies has already been discussed. As the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan in response to such motivations progressed and the US captured terrorist/Al-Qaeda/Taliban suspects, the US naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba was selected as a destination for their imprisonment. The current detainee figure is 520, plus 234 transfers or releases. However, according to Amnesty International, the US continues to hold about 70,000 detainees outside the US, many locations of which remain secret. (Amnesty International, 2005)

Muslim men - Afghan or not, but terrorist suspects regardless - are bequeathed with a demonisation that necessitates punishment. The punishment comes in the form of death by US military action, or detention in Guantánamo Bay or in some other obscure centre of incarceration. The act of killing is an act of the elimination of existence, a termination of consciousness, a silencing of the sentient body and its reduction to lifeless matter. The lifeless body, although inanimate, is representative of the existential destruction of the enemy. The act of killing does not leave a vacuum, but is constitutive of the discursive power relations. As Joanna Bourke writes, “combat does not terminate social relationship: rather, it restructures them” (Bourke, 1999: xxiii). The process of military combat will be examined more closely in the following section (*Iraq*). However, both killing and imprisonment in the War on
Terrorism engage in the violent dehumanisation of the Other. This violence to Muslim male bodies is deemed essential. It also considered to be rational and natural, just as leniency and pacifism are held as irrational and unnatural, as restraints on human nature. As Hannah Arendt writes:

> The glorifiers of violence can appeal to the undeniable fact that in the household of nature destruction and creation are but two sides of the natural process, so that collective violent action... may appear as natural a prerequisite for the collective life of mankind as the struggle for survival and violent death for continuing life in the animal kingdom. (Arendt, 1970: 75)

The power to destroy and incarcerate bodies is the performance of power on the body, “[power relations] invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs” (Foucault, 1987: 25). Power works on the body and disciplines it. This discipline, recalling Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*, is not a mere function of an institution, but an entire technology of power that controls the physical and psychological performance of the body (Foucault, 1987: 215).

The bodies on which power is exercised in Guantánamo are distinctly all-male, therefore punishing Muslim men as the evil-doers. The conditions of the selection of prisoners, all denied a prisoner-of-war (POW) status, do not appear to have much consistency. As the UN report points out, six of them, of Algerian origin, were captured in October 2001 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the absence of combat. The only confirmable likeness between these men and those captured in other locations of the US reach in Islamic areas is that they are men and that they are Muslim, precisely the discursive criteria constitutive of the terrorist monsters determined to destroy American civilisation. The camp is a branch of the military, an institution that is defined and its very existence sustained by aggressive and misogynist masculinity. The power relations of the camp are thus composed of US militarised masculinity practicing power over and thus asserting its superiority over Muslim masculinity.

The technology of power that disciplines these male bodies is complex. Firstly, the camp’s architectural structures designate spaces to be occupied that control movement. They divide the space between the *dominating* and the *dominated* masculinities. The allocation of space thus involves a gendered hierarchalisation. The dominating masculinity has the ability to intrude in the space of the dominated, where the dominated will always repossess authority within that space, be it the cell of an inmate, the prisoners’ walking grounds, or an
interrogation room. The relevance of Foucault (1987) is clear. The physical structure of the prison controls the activity therein by establishing meaningful barriers between the guards and prisoners. The examining gaze of the guards creates particular individuals out of the imprisoned. Adding a gender perspective to Foucault’s ideas, one could argue that within these empowered spaces, the bodies of the dominating masculinity exercise power on the bodies of the dominated masculinity by the employment of various methods and techniques. Concerned international organisations (Amnesty International, 2005; United Nations, 2006) have reported that brutal interrogation techniques, inconsistent rules, excessive violence such as beatings are systematically employed. Such methods carry out a collective punishment on psychologically constructed enemies. Indeed, as not a single prisoner has been tried or convicted of a crime, their guilt remains legally undetermined, but is nonetheless psychologically established for US soldiers that run the camp.

However, it is not simply the brutal acts of physical torture that constitute violence at Guantánamo Bay, if the spatial architecture is already a tool of repression. Image 7 is an official military handout photographed distributed to media like Reuters, here. Anonymously uniformed and masked bodies are submissively crouched on the ground to the will of their fatigue-wearing captors. Both groups of men are homogenously dressed in the uniforms distributed to each group by US forces (prisoners in orange overalls, guards in military fatigues), and thus eliminating the existence of physically distinct individuals in both groups. However, while the prisoners

![Image 7](image.png)

**Image 7** 11 January 2002 Male prisoners sit in holding area during their processing into the camp, watched by male military police.

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29 *Time* magazine released the report of the interrogation of the suspected “20th hijacker” Mohammed al-Qahtani in its 20 June 2005 issue giving a detailed account of the techniques used to break him down for information. They included the deprivation of sleep, food and water, prayer, intimidation with dogs, telling the prisoner that he will be there forever, that no one cares about him, that his is worthless, etc. Therefore, it is a combination of psychological and physical blackmail. (*Time, 20 June 2005: 18-25*)
are silently lined up and all crouched in the same immobile position, the guards are able to individually roam around them freely, speak to one another and yell and give orders to prisoners. Like dangerous wild animals at a zoo, the prisoners are caged in fencing, and always at the mercy of the gaze of their audience (their US captors).

That at least a fifth of detainees are reported to be on anti-depressant medical treatment, and the first three successful suicides of June 2006 and numerous other attempts exemplify the desperate psychological strain of incarceration. The will to survive a dire existence of the prospect of unending suffering and infinite containment is heavily emotionally burdensome. As prisoner Fawzi al-Odah told the BBC in an interview on 3 March 2003, “the real problem here is not the horrible conditions - the lousy food, no reading materials, bad medical care, being in isolation. The real problem is being here without reason, without hope, without a hearing” (Al-Odah in BBC News, 01/03/2006). The harm is long-term. As the UN report points out, prisoners are at risk of suffering from permanent psychological damage from traumatic experiences at the camp. After their release, whenever that may be, it is also highly probable that their mental instabilities will be adversely felt by their family and others close to them—possibly dangerously so for female relations. The violence done to these minds therefore will be intimately extended to their relations. Crucially, the effects of violence survive. Scars from cuts remain as reminders of their physical helplessness under US military masculinity, while psychological scars leave a more serious and disturbing legacy. Long-term psychological injuries will continue to sustain and propagate deeply engrained disciplinary effects of power.

The only female presence in Guantánamo is the female US military officials. They are visible in Guantánamo discourses only as disciplinary agents of Muslim men. On 10 February 2006 The Washington Post published an article reporting that, “Female interrogators repeatedly used sexually suggestive tactics to try to humiliate and pry information from devout Muslim men” (Leonning and Priest, 2006). Amongst these tactics including rubbing their bodies against the men, revealing clothing, sexually suggestive remarks, and spreading dye on the men’s faces saying it was menstrual blood. This was often done before prayer, because for some Muslims, if touched by a woman before prayer “he is dirty and cannot pray.” Contact with other women other than their wives is also believed to reduce one’s purity. Therefore, first of all, the masculinity of the Other is degraded even further in the hierarchy of masculinities by the bodies of the female self. Their power over Muslim male bodies places their masculinity not only below US masculinities, but also US femininities. Here US femininities are conferred as sexually emancipated female bodies that have
sacrificed their bodies for the national cause. It is ironic that the exposure of the female body and their suggestive promiscuity become acceptable in matters of national security, but condemnable in the larger public sphere (as expressed by Mrs Bush). However, as understood in the theoretical discussion, women’s bodies and their sexuality are frequently militarised for the purposes of national security.

In this case, the bodies of female soldiers also function to heterosexually US male soldiers and desexualise or homosexualise the prisoners. The male-directed sexual attention of US female soldiers eroticises bodies for male consumption, and automatically assumes the heterosexuality of their American male counterparts. In turn, the refusal of Muslim men to respond to this female sexual provocation strengthens the implications of their sexual impotence and lack of heterosexual prowess. Their homosexuality is strengthened even further by US male soldiers who have on several occasions threatened them with homosexual rape. As discussed, homosexual rape serves to homosexualise the rape victim, and inflate the heterosexual masculinity of the rapist.

However, the Washington Post article is written in defence of the prisoners. The tone expresses concern for their well-being and respect for their cultural rights and religious dignity. The stories provided, like Muslim men being unable to pray after being sullied by the touch of a woman, are intended to induce sympathy for the male sufferers. Unlike the dominant discourse on Muslim men, humiliation and insult to their masculinity is a shocking and unacceptable occurrence. Excluded are insights in the sexism of Islamic culture. For example, The Washington Post could have chosen to criticise the Islamic discrimination of the female body, not only how it is “dirty” to a man’s spiritual purity, but also in the eyes of God. Instead, such analyses were excluded, and such views became something to be defended and respected. This contradictory perspective on Islam in the US has existed from the beginning of the War on Terrorism. From 17 September 2001 onwards, responding to suspicious accusations of the War on Terrorism as a specifically anti-Islam policy Bush spoke of the need for Americans to treat Muslims with respect, because “Islam is peace” and that “terrorists violate the fundamental tenants of the Islamic faith” (Bush, 2001c). The respect for US Muslims is necessary for to avoid domestic social unrest and counter accusations of anti-Islamicism. However, the prisoners of Guantánamo Bay are supposedly the very terrorists that violate the Islamic faith, thereby deepening the discursive contradictions of the War on Terrorism. However, the confusion arising from this contradiction is not so disorienting if we consider that the defence of Islamic sexual morality is actually a defence of the sexual purity of the US self.
The comments from American observers provided in the article also provide interesting insights into the sexualities of the self to elaborate this understanding. Michael Ratner, for example of the Center for Constitutional Rights that represents numerous detainees, commented “what they’re doing, it reminds me of a pornographic Web site -- it’s like the fantasy of all these S&M clubs.” Ratner’s disapproval appeals to principals of sexual propriety. He rejects the image of a promiscuous US sexual identity; like Laura Bush, for him it is not “a real view of what the American people are like” (Laura Bush, 2004), or rather, what they should be like. Pornography and S&M clubs equated with sexual perversion resulting from moral deviancy from the Puritanistic self. Like S&M clubs, Guantánamo Bay is regarded to have become a space of reprehensible moral decadence, a sinful space. No differentiation is made between the sexual politics of the prison camp, pornographic media, or sadomasochistic experimentation. The breaking of Puritan moral code justifies the calls for Guantánamo’s closure. Christian morals are allied with Islamic morals of sexual chastity, strengthening particular norms of sexual purity to a universal level, strengthening their claim to ‘truth.’ The Washington Post reproduces the discourse of the Center for Constitutional Rights as the morally acceptable and truthful discourse. The article therefore participates in the hegemonisation of a wholesome US sexuality.

Legality, Ethics, and Masculinity

When The Washington Post asked the Pentagon to comment on the allegations concerning the inappropriate interrogation tactics of the female staff at Guantánamo, the Pentagon condemned such behaviour. However, the spokesperson added that “good interrogators ‘take initiative and are a little creative’” and that “‘using things that are culturally repulsive is okay as long as it doesn’t extend to something prohibited by the Geneva Conventions’” (Leonning and Priest, 2006). Therefore, though sexual tactics were declared as unacceptable, the Pentagon nonetheless was prepared to defend and even commend creative tactics on prisoners so long as they do not violate the Geneva Conventions. This statement expresses governmental approval for such methods, which not only legitimises the acceptability of such procedures for those who approve of them, but also has implications on US hegemonic masculinity as one ready to assert its power over all other sexualities to service its will.

The will of its power, however, has fallen under legal scrutiny. Since the opening of the Guantánamo camp, the Bush Administration has been under the pressure of the US (and
international) press and human rights organisations that constantly question the legal and ethical aspects of the camp’s procedures. In the early days of the detention camp, the Pentagon assumed an aloof attitude to legal complications. For example, David Frost of the BBC asked Secretary Rumsfeld in an interview about the legal and ethical limits of torture, the exchange went as follows;

FROST: You can probably understand that’s shocking to think of people trying to widen the definition of what they can do that isn’t torture. It just seems bizarre, or worse.
RUMSFELD: Well, it seems like a bunch of lawyers debating legal points. In fact, that set of debates took place not in the Department of Defence, as I recall, but in the Department of Justice.

( Donald Rumsfeld, 2004)

Frost’s statement gives Rumsfeld the chance to acknowledge the awfulness of attempts to devise forms of torture that fall outside legal definitions of torture. Rumsfeld does not seem to understand, or perhaps he does not care altogether, but his reply dismisses concerns for the well-being of prisoners by saying it is not the job of the Department of Defence, but the Department of Justice, where he demeaning says “a bunch of lawyers” debate such apparently petty things. On another occasion on 22 January 2002, he remarked that he would “leave [legal questions] to the lawyers” who, he joked, “did not drop out of law school, as [he] did” (Rumsfeld, 2002). As Judith Butler comments, such a sarcastic remark, followed by laughter, was “as if some praiseworthy evidence of his own American manhood was suddenly made public” (Butler, 2004: 84).

This “show of strength indifferent to the law” (ibid) that gives the Bush Administration its so-called cowboy masculinity was also summarized by Bush, who wanted Osama bin Laden “dead or alive” (George Bush, 2001f). This masculinity is defined by a refusal to yield to the rules of others (lawyers and international law), an act which is feminised along with its object. Instead, masculine power lies in the independent ability to make unrestrained decisions that harm others in whatever way it sees fit. The indifference to the law is ensued from an indifference to the reasons for their creation and codification, which in turn confirms an indifference towards other human beings and a lack of empathy for their physical and psychological suffering. Of course, leaders can hardly display sympathy for enemies, but this does not mean that leaders cannot display respect for legal statutes. Rumsfeld’s comments also reflect this aloof indifference with a dismissive propensity for debasing mockery; “To be in an eight-by-eight cell in beautiful, sunny Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba, is not a -- inhumane treatment” (Rumsfeld, 2002). Indeed, complete disinterest in the state of the prisoners of Guantánamo Bay characterises the hegemonic discourse of punishment. As Rumsfeld plainly puts it, “I’m not a lawyer and I’m not into that end of the business. The most important thing for us from our standpoint is gathering intelligence” (ibid.). And it is so that governmental actions are masculinised by divorcing them from the law, which is depicted as unrealistic and impractical, compared to the flex of staunch and merciless muscle.

The condemnation of the Guantánamo Bay detention centre has escalated, particularly in 2006, when both the European Parliament (resolution 1.4.19) and the United Nations (15 Feb. 2006) condemned the torture there and called for its immediate closure. The suicides of three detainees on 10 June 2006 demonstrated the increasing conflict over the prison camp, not only by increased foreign pressure for its closure, but in conflicting governmental statements. The first report of the suicides was through a telephone press conference with Prison Camp Commander Harry Harris of the Joint Task Force Guantánamo. “They are smart. They are creative, they are committed,” he said, sustaining the discourse of monstrosity, “This was not an act of desperation, but an act of warfare waged against us” (Harris in Reuters, 10 June 2006). The deliberate interpretation of suicide as an act of war reflects the extreme of militarised masculinity, where the desperation of others is approached with paranoia entrenched in constant preparedness for attack and self-defence. It is not surprising that a masculinity determinedly and systematically trained daily to sustain emotional detachment is incapable of perceiving suffering. This desensitisation in turn is increases the danger posed to the detained bodies at Guantánamo Bay, who, for their guards, are not human.

Colleen Graffy, the U.S. deputy assistant Secretary of State for public diplomacy, supported Harris’ stand and told the BBC World Service the suicides were a “good PR move to draw attention,” and that “this is part of a strategy... a tactic to further their Jihadi cause,” (Graffy in Reuters, 11 June 2006). By contrast however, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs Cully Stimson, speaking to BBC radio on Monday, distanced himself from such comments; “I wouldn’t characterize it as a good PR move... we [as Americans] are always concerned when someone takes his own life” (Stimson in Reuters, 12 June 2006). Likewise, President Bush expressed agreement for the camp’s closure and trials on US soil already before the suicides in a press conference with the Danish Prime Minister Anders Rasmussen the day before (The White House, 9 June 2006).

Whether the machoistic hegemonic masculinity Bush Administration is beginning to change is not possible to say. However, recent events of 2006, such as the suicides at
Guantánamo show conflict with this masculinity. President Bush, in a press conference with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair Bush expressed regret for previous expressions;

Saying ‘bring it on,’ kind of tough talk, you know, that sent the wrong signal to people. I learned some lessons about expressing myself maybe in a little more sophisticated manner -- you know, ‘wanted dead or alive,’ that kind of talk. I think in certain parts of the world it was misinterpreted, and so I learned from that.

(Bush, 25 May 2006)

Bush articulates his awareness of the displeasure of others with his image, and seeks to change it. While the then-Bush could not be imagined to admit regret, it is now expressed. However, the regret is not from shame of his previous expressions, but from a realisation that “more sophisticated” language would avoid misunderstandings of his words. It is a regret of word choice, not intention. While it could be argued that machoistic hegemonic masculinity is being challenged by a liberal-rationalist masculinity, this scenario is unlikely. US foreign policy discourses continue to express faith in its aggressive War on Terrorism policy and interventionist worldview. In the same conference, Bush commended Blair’s leadership style;

You know, the amazing thing about dealing with Prime Minister Blair is never once has he said to me on the phone, we better change our tactics because of the political opinion polls. And I appreciate that steadfast leadership.

(Bush, 25 May 2006)

This statement continues and reiterates a continuing discourse that conveys admiration for strong and resolute leadership as he did in the 2002 State of the Union Address, where he expressed admiration for “the strong leadership of President Musharraf” (Bush, 2002) - the military ruler Pakistan. For the case of Guantánamo, Bush’s expressed intention to close the camp as soon as possible is not presented as a president succumbing to international pressure, but as a noble, conciliatory gesture. Bush’s desire to adopt a more “sophisticated” image includes an awareness to international treaties and statures, and readiness for conciliation. Such apparent readiness for cooperation is no longer demeaned by feminisation. Instead, it is presented as a follow-up to previous severe attitudes that are no longer deemed necessary. It is a change hailing the manifestation of traditionally ‘masculine’ rationality and pragmatism. These in turn are equated with the “sophistication” that constitutes ‘civilisation.’ Meanwhile, the perception of ‘reason’ at work to correct the ‘unsophisticated/uncivilised’ happenings of
both the prisoners and their guards at Guantánamo Bay is meant to be a reassuring signal that the prevailing hegemonic masculinity is still the strong, decisive, Christian American man.

The sexual politics of and surrounding Guantánamo Bay are expressed in a series of contradictory discourses. At times they intersect with each other, producing complex sexualities for the self, the various selves of the self (different masculinities and femininities) and the Other. Muslim men are both murderous demons and pitiable, humiliated men. Regardless, the hate or sympathy is directed at an inferior Other, requiring either discipline or the White Man’s salvation. US masculinities and femininities are always superior, namely due to race and ‘civilisation,’ as well as heterosexuality and being neither ‘over’ or ‘undersexed.’ Even US discourses that defend the rights of the prisoner function to defend Western moral principles of tolerance are also dependent on the articulation of sexual difference that in turn hierarchalise the sexualities of the self. At the top of this hierarchy is the exaggerated expression of the self’s sexual morality and purity that is a part of the wider sexual discourses supporting and justifying militarisation in the War on Terrorism. More specifically, it is a macho masculinity that places its self above the rules of men, and feminises legal practice, undermining it. Important to note is that voices critical about Guantánamo condemn the questionable only the legality of the camp and the human rights violations that occur in it. They do not criticise militarism or the institution of the military as factors that might be inevitably formative of such problems. It is not the military that is blamed, but rather deviants within the military of the self-image of the sexually uncorrupted self. In the end, discourses, even critical ones about Guantánamo Bay remain loyal to the “good ol’ boys of the US military.

Iraq

Hilkka Pietilä writes that “patriarchy needs militarism to say in power, and without patriarchy, militarism has no legitimacy” (Pietilä in Jokinen, 2000: 186). To understand such connections in IR and their continuity, this thesis has examined the War on Terrorism from 11 September 2001, up to the consequences of the war in Afghanistan. Now the focus turns to Iraq, and to a gendering of the discourses on Iraq. Concerning the War on Terrorism, most feminist scholarship centres on September 11 and women’s rights in Afghanistan. The

30 “Patriarkaatti tarvitsee militarismia pysyakseen voimassa ja ilman patriarkaattia militarismilla ei ole mitään legitimiteettä.” Translated by the present author
Iraq War remains a minimally researched area in critical feminist IR. Admittedly, this renders this part of the analysis the most exciting for the author, as originality and creativity are indispensable.

The examination begins from the build-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq to observe its discursive gendered connotations. Discourses surrounding female terrorists in Iraq will be discussed afterwards, followed by the body politics of the Abu Ghraib prison and its sexual discipline. The analysis then turns to the experiences of US soldiers in Iraq, and their discursive contributions to the construction of racialised gender hierarchies. Finally, the analytical gaze turns back to the home front of the US and the discourse on militarised mothers of killed soldiers, focusing on the peace activist mother Cindy Sheehan in particular.

**Gendering the Invasion of Iraq**

The 20 March 2003, US invasion of Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom continues to be an area of heated controversy, but it is not the aim of this analysis to resolve it. Instead, the aim here is to understand how the discourse on militarisation for Iraq in 2003 was gendered, and how its gendering was meaningful, in its constitution and effects. The focus will be on two significant speeches of the Bush Administration, President George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address of 28 January 2003 and Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations Security Council on 5 February 2003. Bush’s speech, first of all, was a part of the hegemonisation of the discourse on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a global threat. Colin Powell’s UN speech, given a month and a half before the invasion, convinced many of the war’s righteousness with its provision of empirical evidence, and demonstrated the determination of the US to go to war. From these, discursive parallels and continuities are perceivable, such as the gendered processes of victimisation and demonisation. In this context however, instead of ‘women and children’ being understood as the only feminised victims, this characterisation is extended to the entire Iraqi population. All citizens are victims of Saddam Hussein’s oppression and in need of a civilising Western protection and remasculinisation. Saddam Hussein, instead, is identified as the ultimate mad and hypermasculine enemy to be defeated by a US superhero-type masculinity.

Bush, in his speech, depicts the world as divided between “a world at peace” and “a world of chaos and constant alarm,” (Bush, 2003) in which the US and its allies are the only forces to sustain the former and thwart the latter to “end [the] terrible threats to the civilised world.” Civilisation is feminised not only in its capacity for reason and rationality, but its
ability to end the chaos by an execution of the primitive and irrational by harming them. Saddam Hussein is singled out as the sole perpetrator of chaos, and thus he, not the Iraqi government, is personally targeted. He is described as a “dictator,” “deceiving,” with the potential to “dominate, intimidate and attack.” The brownness of his skin and the mysteriousness of his powerful persona render him hypermasculine, which implies a sexual perversity combined with a mental insanity that cannot be trusted; “Trust the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option” (Bush, 2003). Saddam Hussein’s hypermasculinity is a masculinity that takes ‘masculine’ qualities of aggression and mercilessness to their extreme, and thus become feminised as masculinity out-of-control. It is thus regarded as a primitive masculinity-lacking civilisation, and thus is threatening to the civilisation development of the Iraqi population. First of all, they are deprived from a decent quality of life by his refusal to disarm and determination to spend money on armaments, instead of the development programmes. While there is no problem with the US and other Western or Westernised and thus ‘civilised’ nations possessing “world’s most dangerous weapons” because of their rational capacity not to use them incorrectly, in the hands of someone like Saddam Hussein, they are used on “whole villages - leaving thousands of his own citizens dead, blind or disfigured.” His deviation from masculine norms renders him unsuitable and untrustworthy to be in possession of weapons. His ‘feminine’ lack of rationality and thus lack of emotional control makes his behaviour unpredictable and deceptive, therefore introducing the threat of chaos to civilisation.

Bush’s use of language is famous for its use of colourful metaphors, making it a treasure trove of rhetorical material for any discourse analyst. Colin Powell is generally understood a more serious figure, and his speeches are relatively less metaphorically creative than Bush’s. His speech to the UN, however, repeats the same understandings of Saddam Hussein as Bush’s, and in no way less drastically. Saddam Hussein’s masculinity is depicted as extreme and uncontrollable - the same hypermasculinity, feminised as it is beyond the limits of what constitutes ‘normal’ rational and ‘civilised’ masculinity. His behaviour, like those of terrorists he purportedly supported, is monstrous. This animalism is described by his “Using the only means he knows, intimidation, coercion and annihilation of all those who might stand in his way” (Powell, 2003). Powell depicts him as a cunning yet pathological madman with delusions of world domination; “For Saddam Hussein, possession of the world’s most deadly weapons is the ultimate trump card, the one he most hold to fulfil his ambition.” Evidence of this ambition to the Security Council was provided by obscure photographs of dusty sites supposedly housing chemical complexes and audio samples of
Arabic men scheming to hide evidence of weapons. The image of vague, murky buildings in sandy, archaic deserted spaces and recordings of Arabic voices helped promote the image of suspiciously secretive and deceptive behaviour in a primitive and faraway land, all as a direct consequence of Saddam Hussein’s insane personal ambitions.

Descriptions of Saddam Hussein’s distorted masculinity indeed are also constitutive of the masculinity of the self. As before, the contrast renders the US self as not-insane, therefore sane, rational, reasonable, civilised, and ordered - qualities coded masculine. The US masculinity is also determined, and unwilling to be dominated by another one. As Colin Powell expresses; “Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at nothing until something stops him” so “We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us” (Powell, 2003) Bush similarly expresses that if Saddam Hussein will not disarm, then the US will disarm him by force. He also expresses a promise of liberation for the Iraqi people “the day he and his regime are removed from power” (Bush, 2003). The US invasion, the penetration of the power of the US military, is therefore depicted as a civilising force, curiously as warfare has never been a reconstructive power, but always a move of destruction which is cleaned up by civilians (often women) and aid agencies, costing them more time and money to rebuild than it did for bombs to destroy.

The assumption that civilisation is established through the introduction of liberal democratic rationality, also aims to remasculinise Iraqi male citizens from their victimhood. The prevailing patriarchal beginnings of democracy continue to function to award men first and foremost with political power. As Cynthia Enloe points out, the political bargaining in Baghdad and its outcome happened in private, therefore its dynamics remain a mystery. But, as Enloe continues “in virtually every political system we know about, the less transparent any process of political bargaining is, the more likely it is to be governed by presumptions of masculinised politics” (Enloe, 2004: 291). Out of the twenty-five members of the 2003 Iraqi Governing Council, only three were women, and they possessed weaker resources than their male colleagues, lacking their own political parties, militias, treasuries or connections to Washington. While the women may have given an impression of gender legitimacy to the Council, they were sidelined and ineffective from participating or influencing any decision-making. Indeed, it appeared that the Bush Administration, US government and Iraqi Governing Council all believed that “women’s future relationships to the state, to the law and to male citizens well cared for in the hands of a small group of ethnically, religiously and ideologically competitive men [....] a highly questionable supposition” (2004: 300).
Bush refers to US demands for Iraqi disarmament as a completion of Saddam Hussein’s promise to disarm after the Gulf War. (Bush, 2003) The Iraq War has often been referred to as the Second Gulf War (e.g. Wrage, 2003). As such, if continuities can be assumed between the two wars, then certainly continuities in masculinities also exist, or at least such a possibility is worth exploring. The US masculinity of the Gulf War has been analysed in feminist IR with interesting results.

Cynthia Enloe argues that the Gulf War was “waged in the shadow of the sexual politics of another war. The Vietnam War left a cultural legacy of gendered guilt: the betrayed male vet” (Enloe, 1993: 176). The post-Second World War US masculinity was instilled with the military victory of the war and subsequent rise to world superpower status that legitimised a militaristic and imperialist US hegemonic masculinity. The mythologisation of this ideal-type was severely shattered by Vietnam defeat. The crisis of US nationalism was also a crisis of US machoistic hegemonic masculinity that fed US patriotism. The psychological damage had physical repercussions in the form of violence against society’s most vulnerable groups as if a punishment for their feminising influence on American men. As Charlotte Hooper explains, “not only did the enemy turn out to be women, old men, youths and children, but US masculinity was shown nightly on television, in a pathological and brutal light” (Hooper, 2001: 87).

This emasculation of American men and the desire to reverse this promoted Reagan’s politics and consequently the Gulf War, in which the US finally itself as remasculinised. Not only did the US regain a lost manhood, but this was further justified and given heroic qualities by the war being fought, in a classical gendered scenario, against ‘evil’ men for the suffering and oppressed “‘womenandchildren’” (Enloe, 1999: 166) of Iraq. The manner in which it was fought was also a demonstration of the newfound US masculinity. It again proved its superiority by its new creative ways of causing destruction and killing people in greater speed and numbers with less effort with ‘smart’ weapons. In addition, this championing was televised, so that US viewers could witness the success of their men by the colourful explosions in a faraway desert land. As Goldstein affirms, the viewing itself can be considered a sexual experience - like pornography from which the viewer is sexually aroused to masturbation, or self-gratification of one’s national sexuality;

The home consumption of distant bombing... can be seen as a form of violent and voyeuristic pornography. Judith Butler argues that the Gulf War bombing - consumed euphorically on
American TV sets - served to champion a masculinised Western subject who determines its world unilaterally. (Goldstein, 2001: 355)

This ecstatic celebration of regained masculinity, however, occurred alongside immense Iraqi civilian casualties referred to as ‘collateral damage’ by the Pentagon and media, and damage to hospitals, schools, and the entire infrastructure. (Vickers, 1993: 50).

Indeed, the War on Terrorism repeats these themes. Both the Afghan and the Iraq Wars involve a reestablishment of US masculinity that was humiliated by the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 - the first attack on US soil since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Iraq was a continuation of the machoistic hegemonic masculinity that invaded Afghanistan. US military expansion is also a territorial expansion of the dominance of US hegemonic masculinity. As mentioned, not only does US hegemonic masculinity condone a particular masculinity with particular values domestically and oppresses inferior masculinities such as homosexuality, this masculinity is also racist and imperialist, and therefore seeks to assert itself also over men of colour elsewhere. Saddam Hussein was the undefeated brown man, already a feminised enemy in the Gulf War (for example by homosexualisation in references to ‘Sodom’ Hussein, (Goldstein, 2001: 356)).

George W. Bush presents himself determined to finish what his father George Bush started, son completing the mission of his father. The bond between father and son is joined by the desire to generationally perpetuate their manhood, and the father ‘properly’ bringing up his son to aspire to a hegemonic norm that enables him to legitimise this masculinity by sufficiently hurting or even killing its enemies. Yet again, this masculinity is regarded as sanctioned by God. At the end of his 2003 State of the Union Address, Bush characteristically emphasises that God is on his side; “The liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity” (Bush, 2003). Incidentally, God therefore appears to sideline with a liberty that justifies the military invasion and social and environmental destruction of unliberated places, namely developing countries with otherwise few means of survival. A degree of detachment is also present. If God is “behind all of life, and all of history,” then wars that occur - which largely constitute the history of history books - are mainly the will of God carried out by men. And Bush certainly depicts himself and other US men as masculine figures worthy of such a mission, and capable of success.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 therefore involved a series of masculinities dependent on the feminisation of other masculinities. Drawing back to the shattering of the illusion of
immortality of hegemonic masculinity after the Vietnam War, and the reassertion of the US superpower status in the Gulf War, the War on Terrorism is dependent on the global projection of an imperialistic hegemonic masculinity that demonises and pathologises Others like Saddam Hussein. It feminises him as an inferior to defeat and discipline his hyperpsychotic sexuality, as his incarceration and trial seek to do.

Female Terrorists

The discussion now turns to the fighting of the Iraq War. While the War on Terrorism in Iraq appears to continue to be a war by men against men, women became involved in 2005 as suicide bombers in Iraq. Until now, only men have been identified as terrorists. In 2005, female Al Qaeda terrorists became a media sensation as suicide bombers. This section is interested in examining the discourses surrounding their coverage. If the demonisation of terrorists has been dependent on a particular understanding their masculinity, it is fascinating to examine the possibly problematic recognition of female terrorists, and how this contradiction is discussed, and with what effects on involved masculinities and femininities. Female terrorists are not new. In recent history, they have been visible in for example the German Baader-Meinhof, the Italian Red Brigades, the Weatherpersons of the US and Palestine. Still, as Elshtain comments, when we think ‘terrorist,’ we do not see ‘woman,’ but instead young men. Despite women’s presence, the public are still shocked when a woman is accused of an unusually dirty deed. (Elshtain, 1995: 178-179)

The cover story of the 12 December 2005 issue of Time magazine was titled Women of Al Qaeda. “Jihad,” wrote Christopher Dickey, “used to have a gender: male... Al Qaeda is using female killers now, and goading the men” (Dickey, 2005: 19). The article was published three months after the first female suicide bomber in Iraq acted in September 2005, whose action was reproduced by three more women by December 2005. It is attributed to a tactical move from Al Qaeda to fill a recruitment shortage in Iraq. Quoting the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi31, the first aim is to goad men into fighting; “Isn’t it a shame for the sons of my won nation that our sisters ask to conduct martyrdom operations while men are preoccupied with life?” (Zarqawi in Dickey, 2005: 23) Secondly, the impression is given that women really are needed to fill this shortage, and are thus hailed by Zarqawi as martyrs. Women, says the article, are his “new weapon of choice” (2005: 20).

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31 Zarqawi was killed 7 June 2006 by US bombing.
The article expresses a disapproving, if not threatened attitude towards this new development. Pictures of female suicide bombers displaying their belts loaded with explosives and veiled women holding enormous rifles accompany the text. They possess a dangerous, mysterious, and sexually hysterical ambience. For example, the security camera image (Image 8) of Wafa Ibrahim trying to (unsuccessfully) set off twenty pounds of explosives hidden in her pants conveys the impression of a hysterical and desperately motivated woman. Female terrorists are a matter of concern, a problem that is also “provoking new and growing concern among US officials” (2005:20). This kind of women’s political participation is understood as illegitimate. While such behaviour can be expected from men, women should have no part in it, and in addition, their participation in it is a cause for worry. The engagement of women in militant suicide missions on behalf of their community or religious/political beliefs threatens to destabilise the gender logic of social frameworks that allocate the roles of the protector to men and the protected to women, respectively. It also endangers the US justification of protecting Muslim women from Muslim men. As Dickey writes, “American soldiers in Iraq may become ever more suspicious about women, particularly pregnant women” (2005:21), thus expressing unease at the prospect of having to suspect women, particularly potential mothers, which are discursively particularly valuable as carriers of life and future political aspirations. Confusion arises from this challenge to the life-giver/life-taker dichotomy.

Such attitudes are not new. Sharon Pickering and Amanda Third, in their examination of female terrorism in Ireland, claim that female terrorists are often believed to be “more radical, more subversive, and more violent than their male counterparts They are constructed as highly motivated, excessively emotional beings with the capacity to commit the most heinous crimes and show no remorse” (Pickering and Third, 2003: 9). In addition, female terrorists are believed to be more difficult to catch or rehabilitate, making them even more dangerous. Because of assumptions of family care and motherhood, they are thought to sacrifice more than male terrorists. They act on emotional instincts, which in the Western imagination are constructed as more determined and impulsive than mere political motivation.
Thus, they are more committed and thus an “excessive threat to both society and the state” (ibid.)

Indeed, the article reports that after the precarious incidents of autumn 2005, US officials are “taking the threat of female Islamic terrorists, particularly suicide bombers, much more seriously” (Dickey, 2005: 21). Dickey calls the new phenomenon a “plague” that US officials are worried will spread to Europe and the United States. Female terrorists are thus depicted as a dangerous and capricious disease, or rather, a treacherous hybrid of male terrorist monsters. This is constitutive of what Frances S. Hasso calls the ‘psychological’ explanation. It assumes that people who carry out such acts do so as a result of their “distorted sense of the world” (Hasso, 2005:44), “They are pathological, brainwashed, barbaric, or sexually deprived.”

Sexual deprivation is provided by Dickey’s article as one of the explanations to the existence of both male and female suicide bombers in Iraq. Dickey writes that Muslim men are sexually frustrated in their mortal life because of the excessive demands for spiritual purity that is sustained by sexual purity. These pressures are alleviated only in the next life after death. So, according to Dickey, these pressures in life and promises of rewards in the next are “exploited as a part of a cynical spiel by jihadist recruiters looking for boys and men to be suicide bombers” (Dickey, 2005: 23). By this reasoning, many male terrorists are victims of religious manipulation of sexuality by the Al Qaeda framework. It de-monsters a fraction of male terrorists, but still feminises their masculinity for being sexually frustrated, weak-willed and easily duped by other smarter and malevolent men. Such men are seen to require the assistance of US masculinities through the continued presence of the US military for their salvation (from terrorists) and guidance (to improve their own masculinities).

Female suicide bombers, however, regarded as persons of desperate sexual perversion and/or deprivation par excellence. Jayne Steel, referring to Irish female terrorists, writes of the perception that “the threatening woman, or the woman who kills, has long been an object of simultaneous horror and fascination” (Steel, 1998: 275). They are fascinating because such apparently inexplicable deviant behaviour in women. But, they are horrifyingly threatening, for their behaviour can only be explained by some kind of unrestrained and unpredictable sexual perversion. They are romanticised as femme fatales - women of fascinating sexual personality, but mercilessly lethal, especially to men. Such lethality is attributed to the ‘feminine’ lack of rationality and excessive emotional command over their decision-making capabilities. As such, the discourse of female terrorists frequently implies that women’s murderousness is derived from their desire to seek vengeance for husbands or other male
relatives killed in battle, or sacrifice their lives for the same cause. After discussing this reasoning, Dickey reaches to the “black widows” of Chechenya to further exemplify this trend. While many women decide to engage in suicide bombing for such reasons, these explanations reduce women’s participation to a generalised continuation of masculine action that does not exist beyond their connection to their male relatives. As such, women are yet again victimised as sufferers of the brutality of their male counterparts, which they escape by their own death. Hasso calls this explanatory framework the ‘gender-cultural’ explanation, which assumes that female suicide bombers “are the dupes of conniving men, doing so to escape lives of patriarchal misery” (Hasso, 2005: 44).

On another level, Dickey describes Al Qaeda’s fighters, wives and widows as “one extended family” (Dickey, 2005: 27) loyal to one another and all dedicated to one mutual cause: terrorism. “Frequently,” writes Dickey “the sisters and daughters of a holy warrior will marry one of his comrades in arms. The widows of slain guerrillas commonly wed one of their late husband jihadist relatives.” Here, the sexual perversion of terrorists is extended to the institution of the family. The incestuously depicted marrying and remarrying within the jihadist community is detached from possible culturally determined matrimonial traditions and understood as a tactic for the reproductive continuation of the terrorist network; “Although these networks appear isolated, they could form the enduring core of Al Qaeda in the future, or a new incarceration of it.” The bodies of women associated with terrorists - either as fighters or relatives - are therefore transformed into vessels continuing the cause of their sexual partners, hence increasing to the US confusion of who they are meant to protect from whom.

Outside familial terrorist networks Dickey gives attention explicitly also to “‘married couples,’ either real long-term partners or couples who have been joined together for no other purpose than a suicide mission” (Dickey, 2005: 21). This is regarded as another manipulation of the institution of marriage. It is not explicitly stated why “agencies are particularly concerned about the threat” of a man and a woman killing themselves together in a suicide bombing. First of all, one could consider the sanctity of the institution of marriage in the US. Civil marriages are still enshrined with the Christian values that formed US marriage laws. Homosexual marriages, for example, continue to be considered morally intolerable, and continue to be illegal. The ideal marriage is an emotionally motivated, lifelong heterosexual union. Suicide bombing couples are heterosexual, but is not conceived as an emotional attachment between two people, nor is the attachment lifelong. In fact, marriage is not even a
necessity. Ultimately, for Dickey, it is another example of Muslim men forcing women to commit murderous acts for and with them.

In his article, Dickey discusses the interesting case of a Belgian female suicide bomber in Iraq that explicitly depicts this manipulation. This case exemplifies not only the ‘gender-cultural’ explanation, but also the racial Otherness involved in such depictions. On 9 November 2005, 38-year-old Muriel Degauque committed a suicide car bomb attack against a US military convoy south of Baghdad. Dickey describes her as a “fair-skinned” Belgian, and thereby making a racial remark explicitly calling attention to her White West European ethnicity. Dickey describes her personal history as one of continual personal and emotional instability. As a young girl she often ran away from home, and as a woman she had “a succession of failed relationships with Muslim men” (Dickey, 2005:20). The last one was a radical Salafist follower, a Belgian of Moroccan decent. They married lived together in Morocco for three years, after which Degauque returned home converted to radical Islamic teachings and fully veiled, “alienated, lonely, in the thrall of a husband who consumed her entire world” (ibid.).

Dickey’s narrative of Degauque paints the picture of a “fair” Western woman whose problematic childhood left her vulnerable to the perversions of Muslim men. The successive Muslim boyfriends fuelled her dependency on dominating men that manipulated her vulnerable emotional state. The last one who became her husband was a radical and thus particularly dangerous, and was instrumental in her succumbing to suicidal terrorism. The process was gradual, like the gradual spread of a disease into her body; first dating Muslim men, converting to Islam, moving to a Muslim country, then wearing a burqa and finally sacrificing her life to Islamic fundamentalism. Her body was gradually not only infected, but physically and mentally transformed by Muslim men. This narrative not only participates in the continuing monstrous Othering of Muslim men, but also has explicit implications for the self. Muslim men are not simply an outside, foreign danger. They are also the enemy within the self. Non-White immigrants bear the racial markings of their skin that label them as potential threats to White Westerners, especially to White Western woman. The example of Degauque is a warning of this inside danger. Western narratives surrounding Degauque promote the reclamtion of Western women by Western men from Muslim men. It is a warning to Western women of the calculating sexual threat of brown men and Islam that will de-sex and brainwash them into their service. It is a warning to Western men to protect their women from their possession by criminal Muslim men. And such protection is believed to be provided by tightening immigration controls and racial profiling, and ultimately, by the use of
military might. However, for the women who are already 'brainwashed,' there appears to be little hope for salvation. It appears to be preferable to kill a female terrorist rather than attempt her rehabilitation if she is considered to be a 'lost' cause, and therefore, a certain threat.

The article concludes by questioning the idea of female violence as empowering. Dickey quotes Mia Bloom’s observation of the increasing popularity of this idea among Palestinian women. Frances S. Hasso also observes how female suicide bombers become feminist heroes for Palestinian girls and women. She writes that when women “inserted themselves - by dying and killing - into a sphere of politics dominated by men, the Palestinian women militants allowed other Arab girls and women to contest their own marginality in national and regional politics” (Hasso, 2005: 35). Dickey, although acknowledging Bloom’s comment, nonetheless considers suicide bombing as “a strange path to liberation for women hidden behind veils and burqas” (Dickey, 2005: 27). Bound with this comment is the belief that solutions to “defuse the explosive anger of jihadist widows bend on vengeance” would be the US provision of equal rights and, education and jobs to women. A warning is nonetheless given to even such “[seemingly] obvious” answers. Dickey quotes the explanation provided by the Belgian director of the federal police for Degauque’s suicide attack, that “perversely, emancipation allows women to aspire to martyrdom” (ibid.). The statement extinguishes the possibility of female suicide bombers as individuals using desperate measures to participate in the struggle for national liberation. They are not women seeking political participation in their communities, and Western democratic solutions might be increasingly detrimental to the problem.

In sum, the discourse on female terrorists is ultimately a continuation of the demonisation of Muslim men, who poison the minds of women into violent suicidal behaviour. These women are depicted as femme fatales, possessing a hypersexuality that renders them excessively violent. The irrationality attributed to Muslim men is amplified in female terrorists, for not only do they possess the assumed female irrationality, but also the psychotic terrorist instincts of Muslim men. Islam is blamed for contributing to the creation of terrorists by sexually frustrating its followers. The partnership suicide bombings they encourage pervert heterosexual partnership and destroy traditional family values. In the institution of marriage, women are meant to procreate, not murder, create families, not break others.

These discourses continue to dehumanise Muslim men and victimise women, both Muslim and Western. They partake in the construction of the US self’s sexuality of ‘good’ as Christian, therefore sexually tame and unmanipulative, and highly respectful of the institution
of marriage, which defines a set of nuclear, heterosexual family values. Women are still the ones to be protected from the ‘evils’ of Muslim men, both in the West and in the Middle East, and the ones to protect them are ‘heroic’ US soldiers. In this case, their heroism is obtained by imprisoning, harming or killing Muslim men and female terrorists. Despite the shocking suggestion of shooting a woman, even a pregnant one, it is justified by the idea that she is brainwashed and beyond salvation, and will stop at nothing to complete the suicide mission. Such narratives keep the gender logics of protector/protected and life-taker/life-giver solidly attributed to masculinity/femininity, thwarting the challenge female terrorists pose to their dissolution.

The Body Politics of Abu Ghraib

The continuity of these discourses extends across space and time, as we have seen. This section returns to the question of torture and its Othering and dehumanising mechanisms from a gender perspective. Guantánamo provided the first hints of detainee torture by the US military. The torture at Abu Ghraib, however, became an immediate “scandal” because of the worldwide-published photographic evidence that confirmed a breech of the Geneva Conventions. This section, does not aim to compare the two prisons, but focuses on Abu Ghraib, which by itself alone is a fascinating case. The aim is to understand the continuity of gender and sexuality in discourses. The sensation caused by the publishing of the photos was unforeseen, as was the condemnation of the scenes performed in them. The gruesome irony was that the prison once known for brutal torture of Iraqis under Saddam Hussein’s regime was still a space for torturing Iraqis - but by the US soldiers that were supposed to be their liberators.

At the release of the photographs, as Jasbir K Puar remarks, suddenly “sexual torture” was discovered to be the worst possible form of torture, somehow more intolerable than for example the deaths of thousands of Iraqi civilians, or the slow starvation of millions from US sanctions on Iraq. The tolerability border for torture is set at the place of a form of violence that mimics sexual acts associated with homosexuality such as sodomy, oral sex, and sadomasochistic practices of bondage, leashing and hooding. (Puar, 2004: 522-523). Homosexuality as the shock-inducing aspect of the photographs can be understood as an affirmation of not only the heteronormativity of US patriotism, but also the heteronormativity of US militarism. As discussed, masculinism, homophobia, misogyny and racism are
intricately mutually constitutive, and are instrumental in the realisation of militaristic national projects. The case of Abu Ghraib is an explicit example of such.

As Neil MacMaster argues, the torture of Abu Ghraib was not an “isolated incident” in the US military (MacMaster, 2004: 38). Indeed, as Rosalind P. Petchesky also writes, racialised, and sexualised torture “have their prototypes throughout the US prison system and in US slavery and the lynching and castration of African-Americans”. Documented precedents of similar methods include the Second World War, the Korean War, Algeria (as discussed extensively by MacMaster), Vietnam, Chile under Pinochet, 1980s El Salvador, and Rwanda in the 1990s. (Petchesky, 2005: 312) No incident, however, can be examined outside its context, as each case is historically and spatially specific, including Abu Ghraib. As mentioned, the homosexuality of the acts was the main cause of concern. Because homosexuality is banned by Islamic law, it is discussed by Americans as socially unacceptable in Islamic societies, the homosexual posing of Abu Ghraib, such as forcing prisoners to simulate oral sex with each other, was recognized as dreadfully shameful for the victims. This Orientalist discourse, assuming the repression of sexuality in Oriental spaces, provided an excellently effective torture tactic from a military security perspective: to manipulate their sexual self-repression for humiliation. (Puar, 2004: 526)

Torture was not used solely for extracting information out of detainees during interrogation, but as the smiling faces of the pictures suggest, appeared to be a source of amusement for the Military Police guards. The photographs had the potential to suggest that Americans took a sadistic pleasure in games of homoeroticisation and sadomasochistic sexual humiliation. Soon after the release of the photos, George W. Bush stated resolutely that “Their treatment does not reflect the nature of the American people” (Bush in New York Times, 1 May 2004), and on another occasion assuring that “That’s not the way we do things” (Bush in The Nation 24 May 2004). This is remarkably reminiscent of words spoken by Mrs Bush quoted earlier, denying American promiscuity and selfishness by saying “That’s not a real view of what the American people are like... Americans are very religious [and honest]” (Laura Bush, 2004). The Military Police in the photographs were depicted as un-American deviants of the norm of American sexuality. This norm was the Christian heterosexual, chaste or at least monogamous model of sexual behaviour represented by White, Christian US citizens, particularly Mr and Mrs Bush. Completing the condemnation was the prompt use of the justice system by the court-martialling, discharging and imprisonment of the soldiers. The

32 As can be determined, for example, from the list of abuses listed in a The Nation article “The Horror of Abu Ghraib,” all of which focus on the “sadistic” and “sodomising” acts. (24 May 2004: 3)
US judicial system based on the masculine Enlightenment values of law and reason prevailed over a Hobbesian state of nature of animalistic sexuality.

The public reaction was similar. The outpour of public sympathy was explicitly for the victims, and condemning of the American perpetrators. Interestingly, as Puar notes, the repression of Iraqi prisoners remained the most highlighted aspect of the scandal, “in order to efface the hypersexual excesses of the US prison guards” (Puar, 2004: 527). Indeed, the focus remained largely on the injustice done to the prisoners, while the doings of the guards were quickly understood as deviant exceptions without any further consideration of their sexuality, or the role of the military institution in condoning and encouraging such behaviour. Puar goes on to note the irony of the US emerging as “more tolerant of homosexuality (and less tainted by misogyny and fundamentalism) than the repressed, modest, nudity-shy ‘Middle East’” (ibid.). As such, the US continues the projection of a self-image of supreme civilisational standards against which the progress of other peoples is measured.

Homosexuality, in turn, is rendered repugnant worldwide. The images of men wearing women’s underwear or piled up in a pyramid naked intentionally demean homosexuality. Although publicly condemned, the toleration of such behaviour allowed it to occur. This underlying toleration and sanctioning of homophobic behaviour has a legitimising effect on its perpetuation into the larger society. Although the US emerged as tolerant of homosexuality, this tolerance does not equate an absence of homophobia. The Abu Ghraib scandal also endangered homosexuals in the US as possible targets of homophobic outrage. Heterosexuality was confirmed as natural and normal at the core of what it meant to be an American.

It is vital to bear in mind, however, that heterosexual masculinities are also hierarchically arranged. The hierarchies of military rank reflect a class-differentiated organisation. Lower-class, lower-ranking male soldiers are endowed with childhoods of street fights and poor education, which contrasts to the ‘civilised’ and educated senior and upper-ranking gentleman officers. As Cynthia Enloe describes, lower-ranking soldiers are expected only to obey the high-ranking officers, and to protect them with their more animalistic and uncivilised masculinity. It is therefore also the lower-ranking soldiers who are imagined to be capable of rape, unlike gentlemanly officers, who may seduce, but do not rape. (Enloe, 2000b: 152) Certainly in the case of Abu Ghraib, it was the lower-ranking military prison guards who were accused of sexual abuse, instead of their superiors, who were relinquished from responsibility for the behaviour of their subordinates.
As discussed, US patriotism is reflected most strongly in the pride in its military. It is therefore not surprising that the heteronormativity of US patriotism should be so explicitly produced and sustained by the US military at Abu Ghraib either. It is a continuation of the self/Other discourses that degrades the Other by the feminisation assumed to occur by homosexualisation. At Abu Ghraib the sites of discourse were the physical flesh of the Arab bodies being photographed and videotaped. Their bodies were the objects of imperialistic domination and demonisation. One photograph shows a man standing on a box with a pointed bag over his head and long black garment over his body, with electrocuting wires attached to his fingers, toes and penis. For Petchesky it is “reminiscent of nothing so much as a (Muslim, Arab) woman in a burqa” (Petchesky, 2005: 313). In addition to its feminising humiliation, the concealment of the identity of Muslim women is metaphorically repeated on a man in punishment for their treatment of women. While this is a likely possibility, the pointed hood and draping clothing is also hauntingly evocative of the uniforms of the Klu Klux Klan (KKK) - the legendary fraternal white supremacy organisation of the US. Now isolated and infamous for its extreme racism and lynchings, the photograph could alternatively be interpreted as the demonisation of the Other, whose evil are compared with that of the hateful KKK - both are regarded as packs of evil men, murderous and religiously fundamentalist. Again we are confronted with the definition of the psychopathic and the pathological that require purifying intervention.

The photograph presents the problem of masculinity gone bad - in other words, weak, irrational and unpredictable- problematic ‘feminine’ attributes. Meanwhile, it also performs a procedural cure for this. While the body may be positioned in such a way to display the electrical wires that send torturous shocks through his body, it is also extremely reminiscent of a crucifixion scene; a scene of slow death. Wearing a single piece of clothing, his feet are together, facing forward, and his arms are stretched out to each side with his palms facing forward, the head slightly tilted. And finally, he is placed on an elevating block like a public display, as in a public execution for the crowds to see. He is not Jesus Christ, but rather, dressed in black, the colour of darkness, the unrepentant sinner beside Jesus destined for hell. The crucifixion is the punishment decided by the hegemonically masculine US male soldiers.
Their masculinity is sufficiently ‘pure’ and ‘untainted’ by femininity to pass judgement on others and be the overseers of correction. Crucifixion punishes by pain, here by electrocution, but with the hope of disciplining the ‘criminal’ into repentance of eventual conformation to behavioural gender norms. We could decide to read the hood as a hood to objectify the enemy for the abusers, and the position simply to display torture tactics, but such an interpretation does not explain the meaning of the contents of the photograph, why they are presented as they are as opposed to another. Indeed, the alternative explanation offered here is that it is form of violence that imposes the dominant masculinity’s religious, sexual, racial and national values on the defenceless enemy, much like the Nazis forced Jews to sew the Yellow Star of David onto their clothes, explicitly exhibiting their enemies for public consumption.

The act photographing itself can be considered a form of violence. The photographs involve intentionality that is tied with an imperialistic gloating of US hegemonic masculine domination. As Puar observes, they have qualities “reminiscent of vacation snapshots, mementos of a good time, victory at last, or even the trophy won at summer camp” (Puar, 2005: 531). They do not only record the violence committed, they enable a constant and endless perpetuation of the violence each time they are viewed. Puar describes their distribution “like pornography on the Internet, the speed of transmission an aphrodisiac in itself [to satisfy the keen ecstatic eye of the voyeur]” (ibid.). She goes on to compare the photographs to photographs taken between 1880 and 1930 of lynched black men and women hanging from a tree in the background with their killers grinning in the foreground. Puar’s comparison is chillingly appropriate.

Until now the analysis has focused on violence between men, which is assumed to be the natural gender norm of violence. The assumed naturalness of violence by men to men was highlighted by the disturbed public reaction to the participation of the female soldier Private Lynndie England. In an interview on Dateline NBC, England explained her presence as the orders of male soldiers who “wanted... females to be there so [the prisoners] knew they were being humiliated by having females see them naked” (England, 2005). As in Guantánamo, the femininity of American women was elevated above the masculinity of Arab men. However, the image of an American woman holding the leash of a naked prisoner, or pointing her fingers like a gun at a prisoner’s exposed genitals was interpreted as sadomasochistic behaviour that is associated with sexual perversion. Although male soldiers received the

33 Indeed there were other women involved in the scandal, but their appearances in photographs were less common, which may explain why they have received less attention. The two other women that received sentences, Sabrina Harman and Megan Ambuhl, also received lighter sentences in accordance with less evidence.
longest convictions\textsuperscript{34}, England received most of the media attention. Her involvement was a horrific contradiction of norms of femininity. As Puar points out, it reflects the failures of liberal feminism to sufficiently “theorise power and gender beyond female-male dichotomies that situate women as less prone toward violence than men and morally superior to them” (Puar, 2004: 528).

For those against women’s membership in military ranks, it was the perfect example to argue their innate unsuitability and incompetence for the military. It also served as a legitimisation and manipulation of the masculine-rational/feminine-irrational assumption. After the scandal, England’s deficient and irrational mental capacity was used by her defence lawyers as well as England herself as an excuse for her behaviour. In her interview with \textit{Dateline NBC}, England explains that her involvement was not her own decision, and blames her lack of judgement on a loss of emotional control; “I was so in love with [Specialist Charles Garner] that I trusted his decisions and did whatever he wanted” (England, 2005). She reproduces the discourse of the man (Garner) as reasonable, and the women (herself) as emotional, and her reliance on the capacities of masculine rationality to make decisions for her, because of her deficiencies. England’s mental weaknesses are even given medical backing by her defence at trial. England’s school psychologist Thomas Denne testified that as a child she suffered oxygen deprivation at birth, speech impairment and dyslexia. Despite her progress in school she continued to need “special attention” (Denn in \textit{Associated Press} 4 May 2005). Thomas Denne, when asked if England knew right from wrong, replied, “She had a compliant personality and tended to listen to authority figures.” Her defence lawyer thus argued for her inferior ability to reason: “She is clearly in a different mental capacity... than any of the others accused,” (Hernandez, ibid.) who were predominantly male.

The emphasis on homosexuality left other abuses at Abu Ghraib in the shadows or completely ignored. Less attention was given to the photographs of dead Iraqi bodies, beside which stood an American soldier giving a ‘thumbs up’ sign. The lack of discussion of these photographs sends the signal of indifference. Returning to Judith Butler’s (2004b) terminology of ‘valuable bodies’ as bodies seen as valuable enough to mourn, the silence surrounding these dead bodies leaves a cold mark of apathy. US soldiers were sent to Iraq to kill, and such photographs merely send a public reassurance of “mission accomplished.” The female soldier Sabrina Harman that occasionally feature in these photographs also a light

\textsuperscript{34} Specialist Charles Garner received the longest sentence of ten years.
sentence, six months in prison and a bad conduct discharge, compared to England’s three years and a dishonourable discharge. Murder was not enough to constitute shock-inducing violence, and the way that they died did not appear to be a cause for concern. Death in war was “business as usual” and did not require unusual alarm.

The completely invisible sufferers of Abu Ghraib are its female prisoners. The pictures that circulated in the press provide no evidence of female prisoners. The existence of their bodies, however, are apparent in the Taguba Report that records the findings of an investigation into the prison’s abusive practices. It reports the photographing and videotaping of both male and female detainees and a male Military Police raping a female detainee. (The American Journal of International Law, 2004: 595) Photographic evidence of female detainees being abused was released, but not distributed among Western audiences as the tabloid news of the other abuses. They include disturbing images of a women being forced to show her breasts at gunpoint, women being forced to perform oral sex on soldiers, and gang rape. (Granma Internacional Digital, 2006) Yet, they have received little publicity and there has been no demand for the men in these photographs to be court-martialled. Their rape, brutalisation and physical and mental torture have occurred in virtual silence, again, implying indifference to matters understood as normal in wartime. It reflects the prevailing understanding that rape is a natural and inevitable consequence of war, despite that war rape is has been declared a war crime.\textsuperscript{35} It demonstrates a continuing lack of insight into the connections between gender and militarism, of the coding of women as embodiments of the nation, of their rape as domination of that nation, and of the larger domination of masculinity over femininity, which is especially important for (male) soldiers and the survival of militarism. Instead, the suffering of women and children in war - those for whom wars are supposedly fought - continues extensively, and silently.

The scandal of Abu Ghraib, therefore revolved around the sexually shaming the men by feminisation and homosexualisation. It was an act of Othering that entailed a homophobic, misogynist, racist and imperialist domination of the Other. Discourses reproduced traditional norms of masculinity as violent but rational, and femininity as peaceful, moral, yet irrational. War as a masculine practice was yet again declared by the shock of Lynndie England’s involvement. Unlike the very visible England, the female Iraqi prisoners remained hidden. Minimal attention was given to photographs of their rape, as well as their rapists. The rape of women and the death of men received indifferent responses, or no responses. They do not

\footnote{\textsuperscript{35} Established in 1998 in the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, which entered into force as international law in 2002.}
constitute the ‘exceptional’ sufferings of Iraqi male prisoners. In war, men rape women and kill men, but they are not meant to get homosexual, sadomasochistic pleasure from forcing other men into submissive homosexual positions. In doing so, the threatened to jeopardise the US heteronormative hegemonic masculinity on which US patriotism and the US military are entirely existentially dependent.

_Soldiering in Iraq_

As the Abu Ghraib scandal demonstrated, there are powerful conceptions of what it means to be a US soldier. As Kayla Williams observed at her homecoming from Iraq in 2004, “even if [people] didn’t support the war, they supported the troops” (Williams, 2006: 281). Specifically, there are sexually oriented understandings of what and who men and women in US military uniforms should represent. This section is interested in further examining how the discourses of US soldiers in the Iraq War are gendered, and how sexuality is involved in the depiction of military life and combat there. A dominant focus will be on women soldiers, as the debate surrounding their appropriateness in the military provides an array of insights into both masculinities and femininities in the US military. Lynddie England, Jessica Lynch and Kayla Williams serve as examples of female soldiers, the latter of which shall be focused on through her autobiographical account of her experience. Male soldier Colby Buzzell’s autobiography contrasts as a male experience. It must be understood that these texts produce discourse of soldiering in Iraq, and that these discourses also participate in reproducing previously existing discourses. Autobiography provides insight into the personal thoughts and experiences of individuals. However, these thoughts cannot be held as original truths or anything of the sort. Their thoughts, like those of any other, have been shaped by other discourses, and thus reproduce them in their own expressionism. Soldier autobiographies are popular reads. Readers are interested in hearing about a war or soldier life from a person who was ‘there’ and therefore ‘knows what it was really like.’ They are often bestsellers. As Jean Bethke Elshtain describes, “the soldier has been to hell and back, and that fascinates” (Elshtain, 1995: 166). From the reader comments available for potential Internet book buyers on Amazon.com, it is also perceivable that US readers have profound respect for such works, and for the military experiences described in them. Reminding of the high esteem that the military possesses in the US as the epitome of nationalism and thus the popularity of such

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36 Elshtain continues to explain that indeed one of the “endlessly rekindled vexations of anti-war activists and peace philosophers is the fact that peace does not enthral as does war” (Elshtain, 1995: 166)
books, it is possible to suppose a generally favourable public acceptance and adoption of the ‘truths’ and identities they express. In this case, the books profess to express truths about the ‘frontlines’ of the War on Terrorism, thus perpetuating particular gendered meanings and identities of war in general and this particular war in the War on Terrorism.

Female Soldiers in the Gulf War

According to Cynthia Enloe “the American image that came out of the Gulf War was of the professionalised, militarised woman patriot” (Enloe, 1993: 222). The Gulf War (1991) was the first US military operation where women were visible actors as soldiers and participated as such in unforeseen numbers. Twelve percent of US military personnel in the Gulf, 37,000 persons, were women. (Feinam, 2000: 160) The Gulf War was a significant point in women’s endeavours for military participation. It created a new discourse that strived to justify women’s assimilation into the forces in acceptable terms in accordance with norms of femininity.

For military planners, it is strategic. After the end of conscription, women were increasingly urged to join the military to make up for the deficit of willing men to join the military. They were useful to the military also as legitimators of the mission. From the Gulf War, it became increasingly common to refer to ‘our boys and girls in the Gulf’ rather than just ‘our boys,’ also reflecting the high point of women’s empowerment during the Gulf war (Yuval-Davis, 2003: 105). Women were also valuable in “boosting the morale of male troops with their ‘nurturant socialisation’ and their availability for sexual service,” (D’Amico, 1996: 382) thus making the war more possible by making the killing machine more efficient.

In the press, however, the stories that centred on female soldiers focused on the parental status of these women. News stories discussed and were critical of the impact on families whose mothers were going to war. There was also worry about how single fathers left behind would manage in the absence of their partners. Apparently not as well as single mothers always do. (Feinman, 2000: 161) The presumptions about sexuality in the US, which depicts female soldiers as mothers, often waving to her children who rest in their fathers’ arms, rendered female soldiers first of all as heterosexual and as mothers. Thus, the classic fears of women soldiers being lesbians or whores were temporarily relieved. Joanna Burke comments on how pacifists would argue that women could not fight because they were mothers, so too explanations were later found to also support their fighter-status by linking it to maternal instincts - in defence of their husbands, lovers, or children. (Bourke, 1999: 309)
Thus, as Feinman ascertains, “In the Persian Gulf War, US military women became the objects of a confused iconography of soldier, good/bad mother, and sex object” (Feinman, 2000: 162).

At the end of the war, press accounts reported on the “victorious” return of US soldiers to their “wives, newborn babies, and families” (Feinman, 2000: 163). Such reporting rendered invisible those without them. It implied that lesbians, gays and bisexuals were not members (or at least equal members) of the military. Indeed, the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy forces such members into silence, and threatens them with discharge should they ‘come out.’ Proportionally depreciated were the African American female soldiers who constituted over forty percent of the women in the Gulf. As Jeanne Vickers points out, while oil companies, banks and arms manufacturers were the big winners of the war, the fighting itself was another usual case of the “the poor killing the poor,” where most of the frontline soldiers were from the poorest segments of US society.37 (Vickers, 1993: 64)

Nonetheless, the image of the female soldier that emerged was that of a dedicated professional. As Cynthia Enloe describes;

> The ideal American woman soldier of the 1990s still wears lipstick in the Pentagon advertisements. Her eyebrows are neatly plucked, but she isn’t smiling. She doesn’t put up with harassment. Under her... helmet, she is a serious citizen doing her job, she’s a pro.

(Enloe, 1993: 227)

The professional female soldier appears “neither morally loose nor suspiciously manly” (Enloe, 1993: 220), in other words, neither a whore nor a lesbian. Being a “pro” is being someone taken seriously. Their professionalism provides protection from potential sexually implicated slander and functions thus as “a new form of guaranteed respectability” (ibid.).

**Gendered Soldiering in the Iraq War**

The discourses of three female soldiers and one male soldier, Colby Buzzell, in Iraq that are examined here crucially demonstrate how gender is militarised in the War on Terrorism in and by combatants. These examples are Jessica Lynch who was captured and

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37 On the subject of poor in the military, Feinman warns that “feminist antimilitarism cannot afford to dismiss women’s attraction to the armed forces as simply a ‘poor draft.’” She nonetheless admits that indeed “much of the appeal for women seeking to rise in professional status in the forces is certainly tied to economic benefits, at least in part” (Feinman, 2000: 57).
then rescued, Lynndie England of the Abu Ghraib scandal, and Kayla Williams, who wrote an autobiography of her experiences. Each represents a different sort of ‘woman’ and ultimately the discursive judgements surrounding them reflects under what norms women should participate in the military, as well as continuing debates and contradictions concerning female soldiers. In the War on Terrorism, the gender hierarchies of soldiers are constructed as such that US female soldiers, as members of the US military, are along with US male soldiers, ‘saviours’ of Muslim women and children. Within the US, they are regarded as the enlightened and empowered women who have joined their men to rescue Other women, under the protection of the state and their male colleagues. Seen as back-up, they are nonetheless inferior to male soldiers who do the ‘real’ work of frontline combat. This section examines the complex gendered relationships between soldiers, and between soldiers and their Others in Iraq.

Quartermaster Corps Private Jessica Lynch was a supply clerk in Iraq, which as Deepa Kumar points out, is a long-ago established women’s position in war, that of a camp-follower\footnote{38 See Enloe, 2000b for more on camp followers and their history.}. (Kumar, 2004: 299). Her convoy suffered a surprise ambush on 23 March 2003. She was eventually taken to hospital by her apparently torturous Iraqi captors, from where she was rescued by US forces on 1 April 2003. Lynch’s story runs like a fairytale; the meek all-American girl is captured by dark brutes, and the damsel-in-distress is subsequently liberated from their clutches by strong and righteous male rescuers. Despite the controversy over the actual story, Lynch is nonetheless presented as both the hero, as well as the victim.

Lynch was depicted as a “[tough] little thing” (Rather, 2003), “fighting to the death... [and] did not want to be taken alive” (Schmidt and Loeb, 2003: A1). As a victim, she was a meek woman, unintended for battle, but as a hero, she fought aggressively and indifferent to the possibility of losing her own life - as a proper soldier hero should. However, as Kumar writes, “While Lynch is a hero, her heroism is tempered by sexist notions of women’s bravery. Ultimately, despite her courage she is still in need of rescue by her male counterparts, the real heroes” (Kumar, 2004: 301). Therefore, Lynch does not represent the empowerment of women, but rather their continuing second-class membership in the military. They may participate, and participate commendably, but they are no equal to ‘real’ male soldiers, as they intrinsically possess particular sexually determined assets for soldiering that even brave women like Lynch will never possess.
Lynch was nonetheless highly significant in reproducing particular idealised self-conceptions of the US nation. She answered to specific racial beauty standards: White, blonde hair, blue eyes, pretty. She came from the small community of Palestine\textsuperscript{39}, West Virginia, the perfect girl-next-door, a wholesome sweetheart. The angelic portrayal of Jessica Lynch constructs the norm of the national self according to racialised hegemonic idealisations that discriminate coloured, urban, and non-religious persons in the USA. This reaches across the ocean to Iraq. Lynch represented the pure and saintly US under threat from the dark and uncivilised terrorist people of the Middle East. Her rescue was a metaphoric reclamation of this US identity by rescuing it from the dark and degenerate demon-like Islamic villains. In such a way the rescue functioned to justify the war. It demonstrated the need to protect American women from villainous coloured people, and that success in such a task was achievable.

Such a notion discredited Lynch as a soldier and transformed her into the classic female victim in need of protection. As such, her sexual well being in captivity was a matter of discussion. Among other torture she was said to have endured as a prisoner-of-war (POW), she was reported to have been raped. She was commended for resisting well under such treatment. Like Major Rhonda Cornum, who was sexually assaulted by her Iraqi captors in the Gulf War, stories of Lynch also gave the impression of “protecting military information and bolstering the morale of her male [comrades] as more important than worrying about her sexual well-being” (Enloe, 1993: 220). On the other hand, it was a shockingly infuriating matter if the innocent American girl was possessed by sexually brutalisation, even sodomy, by Other men. It was a humiliation of the national self that necessitated rescue and reclamation of national sexual innocence. While Lynch denied any recollection of being raped in an interview with Diane Sawyer on ABC, she nonetheless replies, “I have no memory of that... but you know if it did happen, people need to know that that’s what kind of people that they are, that’s how they treat the female soldiers over there” (Lynch in Sawyer, 2003). She says this despite correcting previous reports and saying that she was in fact treated very well during her captivity. Instead, she invokes “Orientalist fears of the insatiable sexual drives of colonised men of colour” (Kunmar, 2004: 303). There is no mention of the extent to which rape exists within the military, and the implications of this on the harmful masculinism and misogyny of militarism. As this is absent from the discussion, the challenge to militarism presented by gender in feminist discussions remains safely untouched.

\textsuperscript{39}As Kumar remarks, “despite the rhetorical embellishments of name of the town, Palestine, continues to remind us of the reality that is being glossed over” (2004: 311).
Ultimately, the Jessica Lynch story is largely a warning against the inclusion of women in the armed forces, especially in combat. Female soldiers may fight bravely, but they cause more trouble for the real male soldiers if captured. Deemed sexually more valuable possessions, they are deemed more vulnerable to harm and sexual abuse if captured. As POWs, they are no longer soldiers as male POWs are, but female victims requiring male protection. A common argument indeed against women in the military, particularly in combat, is that men will naturally want to protect their female comrades, which distracts them from the ‘real work’ of warfare. In the film Saving Private Ryan (1999), the heroism of the rescue is dependent on the maleness of the private in need of rescue. As Feinman describes, Private Ryan “represents the salvaging of the masculine martial citizen, though he himself raises the humbling question of whether or not he has been worthy. His wife and children surround him with a yes. It would prove the mistake of allowing women to become soldiers if the ‘fellow’ soldier was a gal” (Feinman, 2000: 88). This discomfort is reflected in the TV film Saving Jessica Lynch (2003) released quickly, only seven months after Lynch’s rescue. Capitalising on the title of Ryan, it implies a story of similar unquestionable heroism. This is not to be however, as ultimately Lynch is the ‘good,’ helpless US female in need of rescue from the ‘evil,’ dark Muslim men, whereas Ryan was found alive and fighting Germany, and refused to abandon his post even when the ‘rescuers’ reached him. In contrast to Lynch, Ryan is a ‘real’ soldier - independent, unrelenting, and values the mission more than his life.

This was not the first time that Jessica Lynch’s rescue was mass-broadcasted. The initial occasion was that of the actual rescue in April 2003. That the event was filmed implies a premeditated belief that the rescue was worthy of visual recording, even that it might make news. It was a dramatic rescue. Uniformed US soldiers stormed into the hospital firing their weapons and promptly rushed Lynch out of the hospital on a stretcher, her body blanketed by a US flag, her fair-featured face only visible. The picture-perfect all-American girl was reclaimed and renationalised by US male protectors. Despite the controversy that erupted later over the authenticity of the video, it nonetheless served to valorise US male soldiers, victimise poor “[little] Jessi” (Rather, 2003), and demonise her Iraqi captors.

It is peculiar that warrior women have had mythological or actual historical existence far in the past but have not garnered any normalising acknowledgement. Legendary examples exist of those who even led men into battle such as Boadicea, Joan of Arc, and Queen Elizabeth I who captured the western collective imagination. However, as Nira Yuval-

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40 An A&E documentary Saving Private Lynch (2003) was also released with the same titular wordplay on Ryan.
41 Antonia Fraser reviews this history in The Warrior Queens Boadicea’s Chariot (2002)
Davis writes, “their main function has usually been not to point out that women are capable of warfare heroism like men, but rather to construct them as unnatural if romantic women,” and that since women have become increasingly formally incorporated into militaries in the twentieth century, “romantic images of women heroines have become more common” (Yuval-Davis, 2003: 95). Lynch’s story is a part of this romanticist discourse that, although it appears to applaud Lynch for her strength and bravery against US enemies, relies on patronising assumptions of an innate feminine weakness that render female soldiers unalterably inferior to their male counterparts.

In Iraq this supposition gained a graphic dimension by Lynddie England’s involvement in the Abu Ghraib scandal. England’s involvement has already been discussed in the previous section, that she was depicted as irrational, over-emotional, mentally challenged and sexually distorted. She appeared to be the complete opposite of the angelic and wholesome Lynch. Kumar points out that, in fact, they had much in common. (Kumar, 2004: 310) Both were from small communities in West Virginia, came from rural working class families and joined the military for economic opportunities and benefits. In situations where they were intended to serve the aims of conquest, Kumar suggests that “perhaps the key difference is that one’s image was constructed for public consumption, while the other’s was not” (ibid.). While the Abu Ghraib photographs were indeed destructive to the image of the US military, the question of intention is not as critical here as the power of the discourses the stories of England and Lynch. Both were involved in the definition of appropriate and desired US femininity, and the extent to which such femininity could be appropriated for military postings. England represented the extreme, dark and gruesome dangers of femininity out of control capable of jeopardising the reputation of the entire US military institution, while Lynch portrayed an ideal US femininity in combat at its best. Her patriotism was glorified, but even this did not provide her with the strength and bloodthirstiness that would make her a ‘real’ soldier, not ‘just’ a supply clerk. She was still “Jessi,” a woman, vulnerable and not a natural killer.

Attempting to contrast both of these women is Kayla Williams, who in her autobiography of her time in Iraq Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the US Army (2006) writes, “Don’t count Jessica Lynch. Her story meant nothing to us [female soldiers]. The same goes for Lynddie England. I’m not either of them, and neither are any of the real women I know in the service” (Williams, 2006: 15). Williams’ book therefore attempts to describe to her readers “what it feels like to be a woman soldier in peace and in war” (ibid., italics original). Williams is aware of “a strange sexual allure to being a woman
soldier” (Williams, 2006: 18). The observation that is demonstrated constantly throughout the book is that a female soldier is considered either a “bitch” or a “slut”;

... That whole 15 percent [of the US military that is female] is trying to get past an old joke. ‘What’s the difference between a bitch and a slut? A slut will fuck anyone, a bitch will fuck anyone but you.’ So if she’s nice or friendly, outgoing or chatty - she’s a slut. If she’s distant or reserved or professional - she’s a bitch.

(Williams, 2006: 13)

Williams equates masculine qualities as soldier qualities, as not putting up with harassment, a “a professional,” as remarked previously by Cynthia Enloe. This is reflected in Williams’ remarks on her male comrades. When one cried during a viewing of the film *Black Hawk Down* she commented, “I was freaked because the movie made him cry - in public... It made him look like a big pussy” (Williams, 2006: 51). Fending off male soldiers, her insults are directed at their masculinity, such as “Small, dicks. Unmaly men,” or “Fuck off, peanut prick” (Williams, 2006: 167-168). While a display of sensitivity in men leads to their feminisation or homosexualisation, Williams masculinises women whom she considers to be ‘professionals,’ for example Williams think her tough friend Lauren has “one big pair of balls” (Williams, 2006: 61). Her small “pathetic” Leatherman knife she refers to in front of her colleagues as her “chick Leatherman or fag Leatherman” (Williams, 2006: 127). Her use of language of involves sexualised expressions. On another occasion she wrote that an admirable female lieutenant would “micromanage like a motherfucker” (2006: 92). Far more crammed with sexual swear words is Coblly Buzzell’s *My War: Killing Time in Iraq*, which is also depicts the abundance of sexual jokes, sexual behaviour and pornography that circulate among the soldiers as a normal and everyday part of a military life. For example, Buzzell, in his sarcastic tone, writes that “Spank mags are required reading amongst infantrymen on field problems (the dirtier the better). Everybody jerks off in the field. Masturbating is not looked down upon but instead applauded and is an effective practice to stay awake on guard” (Buzzell, 2006: 51). Williams also describes when she and other soldiers entered a Iraqi training facility. When personnel arrive to gather evidence, Williams found herself “extremely confused when he [one of them] picks up the few unburned files on women and tears off the photographs, leaving the papers behind. He showed no interest in the men’s files” (Williams, 2006: 144). Williams does not elaborate further on this, but it is clear that the women of the
Other, again, are of interest to the men of the self as objects of desire and possession, thus asserting a dominating masculinity.

Soldiers also sexualise their weaponry. One soldier named his M420 machine gun Maxine “after a sexual conquest” (Buzzell, 2006: 101). This is reminiscent of the chant recited by soldiers in training; “This is my rifle [holding up the rifle], this is my gun [pointing to penis], this one’s for killing, this one’s for fun” (Goldstein, 2001: 350). In the film *Full Metal Jacket* (1987) a sergeant yells at recruits that their rifle was “the only pussy you people will ever get... You’re married to this piece, this weapon of iron and wood, and you will be faithful.” These female metaphors reflect first of all the heteronormativity - and homophobia - of militarised masculinity by reference to marriage, and secondly its misogyny by masculine domination. To control one’s weapon is paralleled to controlling a woman, or one’s wife, to fire with it is metaphoric of the sexual domination of her during intercourse, and the pleasure of killing likened to orgasmic pleasure. Buzzell also explains that “Every time we did a raid we’d give the target individual a code name, usually a female name [like Bonnie]” (Buzzell, 2006: 149), thus feminising the victims as weak and unmanly. The notion that these Iraqi victims might actually be defenceless is not an issue, however, but rather that their masculinity is no match for US militarised masculinity.

In addition, Buzzell often references to fears of being seen as a homosexual, or, a “fairy,” or “fruity” (Buzzell, 2006: 138, 139), in normally mundane situations; “I subscribed to magazines that... not a lot of other soldiers read, like *Thrasher, Mad, National Geographic, Time* and *Details*... which brought up a bunch of questions about my sexuality among fellow squad members” (Buzzell, 2006: 134).

Buzzell would also often refer to a female soldier as a “skank” or “bitch” (Buzzell, 2006: 138, 139, 65, 158). Williams too is constantly called “Boobs” by a male soldier (Williams, 2006: 167). She believes that one “woman’s incompetence makes all women in the Army look incompetent,” (Williams, 2006: 269) and thus does not link it to the larger misogynistic culture of the military. Although Williams is comparatively more aware of sexism in the Army, she stops short from delving further into the culture of masculinity and misogyny in the military. Williams participates not only in promoting masculinity and misogyny, but also produces it in two sexual jokes order to bond with her male comrades. The first one goes as follows; “What’s the difference between a hooker and an onion?... No one ever cried when they cut a hooker.” The second one asks “What’s the first thing a woman does when she gets back from a battered women’s shelter?... The dishes, if she’s smart” (Williams, 2006: 168). Williams participates in joking about violence against women, thereby
endorsing the acceptability of directing physical brutality at women. She does not see anything wrong with it, and enjoys how it allows her to join in men’s socialisation. A woman herself, it is a depressing attempt to become ‘one of the boys,’ as in doing so she participates in condoning the very sources of sexism that she claims to oppose, and fails to recognise. In the end, the military is a masculine institution that Williams wishes to join in my masculinisation, and resents traces feminine weakness in it. Buzzell too complains about changing the name of ‘search and destroy’ missions to ‘movement to contact’ missions. His judgement: “‘Pussification’ of the Army is what I call that garbage” (Buzzell, 2006: 1999).

Buzzell relishes in the aggressive machoism of the Army. When he joined the infantry, he was looking forward “shooting guns and blowing shit up like Rambo” (Buzzell, 2006: 49). Training did not disappoint; “[it] was just basically one huge war game,” “a whole lot of fun,” “a pretty cool job... when you’re actually doing something, like blowing shit up, shooting at targets, or out in the field playing ‘war’” (Buzzell, 2006: 55, 61, 64). Training prepared Buzzell’s imaginary conception of his upcoming deployment in Iraq as a time of pleasurable destruction, a place where he could truly live out fantasies of Rambo like he might have imaginatively done as a child on the playground. Enemies were not people, but targets, and this was reflected in soldiers’ descriptions of their Iraqi victims. Williams quotes a Marine at training shouting “‘Kill ’em all! I can’t wait to get those bastards!’” (Marine in Williams, 2006: 53). In Iraq, another soldier told Williams about his experience of killing; “I got a kill last week. Man, I gotta tell you. It was the coolest” (Williams, 2006: 143). Referring to “a kill” hides the point that he killed someone, makes it sound like a cold, unemotional, surgical manoeuvre.

Williams is conscious of the techniques of dehumanisation. In other wars, enemies were nips, chink, gooks, krauts or slopes. In Iraq they were hajjis (someone who has done the hajji pilgrimage to the Mecca), sadiqis (“my friends”), or habibis (“my darlings”). Soldiers rarely knew what the Arabic words meant. They were also called towelheads, ragheads, camel jockeys, and the fucking locals. Williams is aware that these “words that ensured that we didn’t see our enemy as people - as somebody’s father or son or brother or uncle” (Williams, 2006: 200). Buzzell does not attempt to analyse such situationss, and uses the word hajji as a regular word for an Iraqi man in his writing. He admits that he barely knows the difference between a Shiite and a Sunni. (Buzzell, 2006: 208) On another occasion his truck accidentally drove over Iraqi graves. “They kinda felt like subtle speed bumps as we ran over them,” he breezily comments, passively continuing with, “Oops. Our bad” (Buzzell, 2006: 201). Elsewhere he writes, “I hate to say this, because it’s extremely racist, but every
single fucking person there looked like a goddamn terrorist to me. Every single one of them. And dude, they were all over the place” (Buzzell, 2006: 109). Despite the wish to be not sound racist, he cannot help but imagine all Muslims as terrorists. It is undoubtedly a problem for a soldier to fear the entire population of the land his army occupies. The sexist and racist imagery of the War on Terrorism creates problems for soldiers. A soldier may end up killing scores of civilians, if all are perceived as the elusive, invisible terrorists. They have been trained to kill, trained to encourage the adrenaline rush towards pulling a trigger by glorifying battle. Buzzell quotes a lieutenant saying to recruits;

‘Americans traditionally love to fight. All Real Americans love the sting of battle. My God, I actually pity those poor terrorist bastards we’re going up against. We’re not just going to shoot these noncompliant bastards in the face, we’re going to cut out their living guts and use them to grease the gears of our Strykers and the bolts of our weapons… ’

(A lieutenant in Buzzell, 2006: 72)

Williams, as a higher-educated woman and Arabic translator, is better mentally equipped to question linguistic dehumanisation. Her ability to communicate fluently with Iraqis is also to her advantage in the ability to empathise with their sufferings better than other soldiers. When her group is given permission to shoot anyone on a mobile telephone who won’t end the conversation, Williams is shocked; “Can you imagine a foreign power coming to the United States and deciding to drive around and shoot your neighbour because he’s on his cell phone?” (Williams, 2006: 236) Interestingly, these words are used for Iraqi men, not women. Neither Buzzell nor Williams are particularly concerned with describing encounters with women. It is as if Iraq is chiefly populated by men, with a few ‘womenandchildren’ occasionally passing them silently in buses.

On the other hand, Williams sometimes expresses a belief in the simple-mindedness of Iraqis. For example, when a Yezidi man asked her “Will you please tell Mr Bush about the Yedizis?” (Man in Williams, 2006: 186) she finds this ridiculous, and gets frustrated. Towards the end, she admitted, “We all started to hate the fucking locals” (Williams, 2006: 253), and that admitted that sometimes she thought “God, why can’t we just kill everyone - or leave them to fucking kill each other?” (Williams, 2006: 238). She tries hard to see Iraqis as people, but it is increasingly difficult under the strenuous demands of the military in an environment where she begins to feel frustrated, threatened, and exhausted.
Such sensations are strongly resulting from the bodily pressures of powerlessness, which have potentially harmful repercussions outside the body, to other bodies. Williams, for example, is aware of the ability of her and her co-soldiers to harm others, and how suddenly harming others became desirable after intense feelings of powerlessness;

All of us, guys and girls, were in a situation in Iraq where we were powerless much of the time. Powerless to change what we did. Powerless to go home. Powerless to make any real decisions about how we were living our lives while deployed. And then we found ourselves in this situation where we had all this power over another person. And suddenly we could do whatever the fuck we wanted to them.

(Williams, 2006: 206)

The institution of the military holds a promise of power to its members. That promise comes with the condition of complete personal submission to the behavioural codes and norms of the institution. So, in fact, most of the time soldiers are in fact deprived of power, powerless to make simple decisions over their lives. This extends even to simple decisions, for example the shame Buzzell endured for ordering the ‘wrong’ kinds of magazines.

With regards to torture of Iraqi men, however, Williams records an experience where she was ordered to humiliate the enemy by sexual ridicule, and finds herself unable to participate, citing pity, discomfort and horror as reasons for her refrain. When the torture session was over, she confronted the interrogator with the Geneva Conventions, to which he replied “‘Yes... But you have to know that these people are criminals. This is the only way to deal with them... Besides, the terrorists don’t follow the Geneva Conventions - so why should we?’” (Interrogator in Williams, 2006: 249). The idea that there is no other choice but to use torture results from the belief in the unstoppable evil of the Other. International legal frameworks are regarded as insufficient controls for such perverted bodies. Legal justice is a creation of White, civilised male bodies and beyond the mental capacity of the dark and uncivilised ‘terrorist’ barbarians. As the interrogator continues “These people only respect strength, power... They’l never listen to us unless we play rough” (ibid.), reflecting the conviction that only male muscle can discipline out-of-control, primitive, caveman-like Muslim bodies, who only understand violence. Thus, international humanitarian legal codes are depicted as naive. More to the point, they are unnecessary, as humanitarianism is hardly a matter of concern to those who do not regard their victims as human.42

42 In a similar way, the mass victims of the bombings of entire cities in the Second World War, such as Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, were *krauts* and *nips*, not sentient human beings.
As warriors, it is not favourable for soldiers to display emotion, which is coded as feminine, and thus weak. As cases of torture demonstrate, soldiers have been under pressure to do as ordered, and not undermine the team or their own standing in it by questioning situations, often even by moral standards. This pressure ensures first of all the behavioural discipline of their bodies, and later hopefully mental discipline as well. Simultaneously, it disciplines their treatment of the bodies of Others. Words spoken, like those of the interrogator, are given impressions of ‘truth.’ And thus, they do violence to those they demean.

Williams, as a translator - and notably female - is excluded from the front lines. Buzzell, however, is frequently present in combat scenes, and relays them with colourful description. They convey how verbal violence commonly accompanies physical violence. Narrating an attack of a mosque, he recounts another soldier “hysterically throwing up the heavy-metal devil-horn hand signal like it was an Ozzy Osborne concert, yelling, ‘Who hoo! Fuck you, mosque! Fuck you!’ And everybody started engaging the mosque with everything they had” (Buzzell, 2006: 160). Buzzell momentarily wonders, “Like isn’t this against some kind of Geneva Convention thing?” (ibid.), but keeps shooting nonetheless yelling “‘Get some!’ every time I fired a burst (like they do in the movies)” (2006: 161). The soldiers’ gesticulations and exclamations shift their battle into a hyper reality, where they are cheering on heavy metal or in a hyper-masculinist action movie. Their actions are momentarily not real, and they can therefore behave uncontrollably, and imitate the hegemonic masculinity of action movies like Rambo, where the hero is usually the strongest man capable of killing or harming the most people. Their Iraqi enemies are not human, and viewed as demons, enabling the delight they take in the destruction. Indeed, for Buzzell, the “[huge mess] was fucking beautiful” (ibid.). Despite Buzzell’s realisation that they are attacking a religious building, this does not summon enough empathy to cease fighting. After all, it is a building of a faith whose fundamentalist members are their terrorist enemies. The subconscious anti-Islamic outlook permeates combat as another contributing factor to the demonisation and barbarisation of Muslim men. The destruction of the buildings that house their religious institutions is not only a material annihilation, but also a metaphorical act of ideological imperialism of US militarism over the Islamic faith and its followers.

According to Elshtain, “Because women are exterior to war, men interior, men have long been the great war-story tellers, legitimated in that role because they have ‘been there’ or because they have greater entrée into what it ‘must be like’” (Elshtain, 1995: 212). Women’s stories of war and resistance indeed have not been conferred with the great status of men’s
war novels. The competition with popular men’s stories of Iraq like Buzzell’s may explain the different covers of Williams’ books in the US and UK editions. Whose stories are read in part determines the experiences and perspectives of combat in the War on Terrorism that are adopted as truths. Although Williams’ femininity enabled her to see sex in the Army and the power it gives men, this cannot be assumed to be experience of all women, of course. Feminist standpoint, however, is highly useful here, for, examining women’s experiences of the War on Terror militarism highlights how it is gendered and brings to light experiences and thus, power relations, that would otherwise remain hidden if one were to rely solely on male stories.

Assuming as Elshtain writes that women’s stories are less publicly interesting than men’s, especially in a culture like in the US where masculine militarism reigns supreme, it can be supposed that literary promoters would seek methods to sell the woman’s book as effectively as possible. Recalling that the US ideal female soldier presents herself as a serious and dedicated professional, who is neither a whore nor a lesbian and does not put up with harassment, Williams too reaches for legitimacy with such a projection.

On the cover of the US edition of Love My Rifle More Than You, Williams stands in desert fatigues in front of a large Army truck, legs spread apart firmly on the ground, like a serious soldier ready for action. Her hair is open, sunglasses covering her eyes, and a cheerful smile on her face. These convey her femaleness, but yet not too feminine that she is militarily
incompetent - her hair is short, sunglasses plain, and her smile is not sexually suggestive, but rather seeks to suggest that she is enjoying her job in the Army. In her arms, at the centre of the photograph, is an enormous rifle. The word ‘rifle’ in the title beside the photograph of the rifle emphasises its presence, and even might suggest that Williams’ happy expression is her love for her rifle, which she is almost embracing with affection. The image implies that the text is about women’s serious professionalism in the Army - professionalism meaning their repression of undesirable feminine characteristics, their willingness to obey orders, fight and kill, and dedication to their cause, country and co-soldiers.

The UK cover, however, contrasts starkly to the US edition. As shown, the UK cover simply displays three pairs of shoes, supposedly Williams’, two of which are distinctly feminine high heels, and the third a pair of worn Army boots. They can be interpreted as representing the different feminine identities of Williams. For example, the heeled sandals represent her on her time off, on vacation, enjoying herself. The second more study pair of high heels are a more serious, smart, yet ‘feminine’ Williams. Finally the large boots represent the serious ‘soldier’ Williams. Imagining a woman in these different shoes sets off the spectator’s imagination of the gender jumps and sexual transformations that one woman might be capable of. For example, how might a woman dance like a princess at a ball one night, and then put on her boots in the morning to fight terrorists? The UK cover is more interested in the transitions in gender and different performances of Williams’ sexual identity, whereas the US cover promotes itself with a promise of a serious glimpse into professional and patriotic female militarism. And, indeed, if marketing strategists assume that the US public is more likely to buy a book with a woman embracing her rifle and military culture, then this also has connotations on the militarisation of US culture. The provision of and desire to consume celebratory images of the US military and militarist culture creates and recreates admiration and support for the institution in everyday society. The happy yet professional female soldier is portrayed as someone worth reading about, as someone who also has a brilliant story about the US in Iraq, but from a different gender perspective.

However, Elshtain’s prophecy concerning the lower status of the novels of female soldiers appears to prevail here too. Although enjoying a degree of success, Williams’ book is given 3 stars out of 5 by Amazon.com readers, and is number 104,552 on the Amazon.com Sales Rank, Buzzell’s book is awarded an average of 4.5 stars by readers and is 6,947 on the Ranking.\textsuperscript{43} Being a popular Internet shopping website, and judging by the enormous gap in

\textsuperscript{43} Amazon.com figures as observed on 14 July 2006.
sales, Buzzell’s is clearly the most read of the two. While these figures merely give a vague idea of sales, they are not of prime interest here. Both Williams and Buzzell are participatory of the production and reproduction of particular discourses. These discourses have power that hierarchalises gender and sexuality in conjunction with militarism and particularly the War on Terrorism. Gender and sexuality shape, motivate, manipulate, upgrade, and degrade individuals in war - which in turn moulds and remoulds understandings of gender and sexuality. The military machine and the men and women that constitute it are also a part of this process, and the discourses that they produce for the ‘folks back home’ help construct particular truths about men and women in war, the nation for which they fight, and the nature of the enemies they wish to kill.

*Military Mothers: Cindy Sheehan*

An important group of those ‘folks back home’ are the mothers of soldiers. As discussed, militarised mothers are mythical figures in war. As Jeanne Vickers writes, the family is one of the main contributing sources to militarism, especially mothers, by the early education of children;

Militarism as a way of thinking and responding to problems at home begins at an early age, socialised into the behaviour of small children through their relationships in the home and violent messages in the media. Boys learn to resolve conflict through force, domination and control. Girls, taught that they belong to the weaker sex, learn the arts of compromise, accommodation and submission; later as mothers, they continue to exhort their sons to ‘be men,’ thus perpetuating a societal pattern of violence.

(Vickers, 1993: 43)

As men, mothers continue to be significant figures encouraging their sons them to become soldiers and fight and provide them with emotional support when they go to war. For example, Kayla Williams recounts the story of a mother collecting a great sum of money to ship her son’s unit in Iraq “something like a hundred air conditioners she’d bought at Wal-Mart” (Williams, 2006: 125). In the War on Terrorism they also become particularly visible as the mourners of soldiers killed in Iraq. When President George W. Bush meets with grieving families, it is invariably mothers (and also often husbands) who are under the spotlight. A *Newsweek* article (22 August 2005) describes such tearful encounters with Bush, where several mothers as questions him like one “How could you let this happen? Why is my
son gone?” (Bailey and Thomas, 2005: 37). After this, however, both the mother and president begin to cry and continue crying together in a long embrace. The meetings often end with the president, the patriarchal national leader paternally reassuring these women that their sons did not die in vain, and therefore their motherhood has honourably contributed to the national security. According to the article, most mothers encourage the president to continue the war in Iraq, and remain as faithful as possible to the idea-type femininity of militarised motherhood (see Enloe, 2000b). Cindy Sheehan, however, is an example of a militarised mother who adopted a staunch anti-war stance, and was consequently perceived by many as a traitor.

In the summer of 2005, Cindy Sheehan became an anti-war celebrity. She camped outside President Bush’s Crawford ranch in protest, waiting for him to come and speak to her. She soon acquired hundreds of followers, many of which shared her experience or empathised with her sufferings. It was the death of her son Casey in Iraq that motivated her to protest against the war. Reported in Time in August 2005, she said that she had always been uneasy about the war, but after the death of her son she became convinced that the Bush Administration lied about the reasons to go to war, and felt betrayed. (Ripley, 2005: 25)

Cindy Sheehan is the only mother to have attracted such widespread publicity. Her protests and statements have in turn given voices to mothers speaking both for and against Sheehan. Sheehan’s case divides the discourse on military mothers into two different narratives. One is the Sheehan-like anti-war mother suffering from feelings of governmental betrayal, and the other is the statist mother defending the war unconditionally. US media shades the relationship between them as conflictive, and as a difficult question of recognising the ‘good,’ loyal patriots from the ‘bad’ and dishonourable ones. Either way, both discourses of military mothers engage in the veneration and mythologisation of the mothers of soldiers as the valuable producers of the male bodies that are sacrificed for the security of the collectivity.

Cindy Sheehan is described as a “peace activist,” “the symbol of the anti-war movement,” and “the spiritual leader of the anti-war camp.” Journalist Karen Houppert in The Nation applauds her for having “swung [public opinion] against the war” as the “grand dame of the peace movement who declines to niggle over the details and simply urges all the various factions to get along” (Houppert, 2006:11). She is represents the ideal peacefulness of

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44 The president, in such occasions, displays a sensitive, ‘feminine’ side to his strong patriarchal image. This display of emotion is not considered to be contradictory with his masculinity. Rather, he is awarded with respect for having the courage and decorum to respect the loss of hegemonic masculinity so profoundly.
women, and their supposedly superior skills for cooperation and conciliation. Neither is she a privileged film star like Jane Fonda who demonstrated against the Vietnam War. Houppert emphasises with praise that she is “a middle-aged, middle-class Everymom,” precisely what constitutes an average respectable American mother.

Such writing elevates Sheehan to not only a leader, but to a status of divine motherhood. As a “grand dame” who oversees the movement, she stands above as a matriarch embodying the principles of the movement community - the Gold Star Families for Peace - and as their guardian angel, defending it, nurturing it and bestowing it with a celestial aura of righteousness. Soldiers opposing her protest stopped to speak to her. Their conversations often ended in mutual tears and hugs (a description which cannot help remind one of the ‘hugging saint’ Mata Amritanandamayi, also known as Amma). As a mother and promoter of peace, she is thus able to disarm and bring even her opponents to tears with calm conversation and loving motherly physical contact.

Critics of Sheehan mainly attack her for being unpatriotic and manipulative. In Time magazine, Casey Sheehan’s aunt said that she was “promoting her own personal agenda at the expense of her son’s good name” (Ripley, 2005: 24). Others express their disgust with her more explicitly. Jennifer Harting, whose husband was killed at an Iraqi checkpoint, “thinks that instead of protesting, Sheehan should take solace in knowing that a soldier’s job is to follow the President no matter what. ‘Her son’s life could never have been in vain... it’s sad that she can’t see that’” (Harting in ibid.). A similar view is taking by a Ronald R. Griffin, mourning father, who believes that Sheehan is “dishonouring all soldiers” (Griffin, 2005: A10). She has a right to protest, but Griffin would instead “be protesting the very thing that [his deceased daughter] believed in and died for.” Mourning mother Jeanette Urbina, who empathises with Sheehan’s grief, but wants to believe that her son eventually died protecting his country, takes a slightly different view. She does not believe that the ending the war will alleviate Sheehan’s sorrow, but still believes the war should continue; “The mothers have paid so much for this war... I just want it to be a success now, so all this pain will be worth it” (Urbina in Ripley, 2005: 25). That so many women criticise Sheehan is demonstrative of the powerful part that women play in sustaining particular war-supporting performances of both a particular masculinity as well as a particular femininity.

In these discourses anti-war is equated with anti-Americanism. None of the critics question the reasons why the war is fought, and believe that questioning the president or military deployment is unpatriotic. Patriotism for them is an unconditional obedience of the President and government, and an unconditional trust in their ability to make judgements for
citizens. A lack of patriotism involves ingratitude for this protection provided by the state, and such individuals like Sheehan are hounded and shunned for their lack of faith in a chauvinistic state. The protest of mothers contradicts “the nationalistic interests of their leaders and the historically deep-rooted patriarchal model of the proud mother and the soldier son” (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996: 359). Thus it is no surprise that Sheehan and her followers are described as traitors. Indeed there have been even more severe voices of opposition. Charles Krauthammer of The Washington Post wrote that Sheehan as a “political radical” who was “exploiting the media’s hunger for political news... by wrapping herself in the courage of her son Casey” (Krauthammer, 2005). He interprets the divisions over the war in the Bush-like ‘with us or against us’ approach, that if one is not for the US, one is for the enemy. Sheehan, according to Krauthammer, is exactly like that “hard left in the Vietnam War” who thinks that “the good guys are the ‘freedom fighters’ - the very ones who besides killing thousands of Iraqi innocents, killed her son, too.” He then points out the involvement of the Workers World Party (WWP) in the anti-war movement and by doing so says that Sheehan cannot imagine to successfully advance her cause in the US with former murderous dictatorial and imperialist Soviet allies. Indeed she is not merely allied with them, but she is one of them. She is hence not one of ‘us’ but ‘them,’ who are distinctly understood as un-American.

Some critics voice Cindy Sheehan as ‘evil,’ but for many it is also a matter of foolishness and gullibility. *Time* commented on her “naive politics and ideology” (Klein, 2005: 23) in one article, and in another, Amanda Ripley describes her voice as “high, almost childlike, [S]he says like as often as any teenager” (Ripley, 2005: 23; italics original). Her naivety and irrationality are consistent with polar gender dichotomies that endow masculinities with the values of reason and wisdom. Sheehan, instead, is irrational, even child-like in her self-expression and capacity for logical analysis and judgement. She is, however, given masculine qualities by supporters. Her friends call her “Attila the Honey” as a pun on warrior king Attila the Hun. The masculine-coded qualities of a brave warrior, aggressive, determined and skilful are given to Sheehan to ironically metaphorise her own battle for peace. They are understood as positive qualities that bring success, credibility and legitimacy to Sheehan and her entourage. The division between public and private spaces that depoliticises the private space in which women and children are regularly located, and

45 Krauthammer lists quite a repertoire: “Thus a rally ostensibly against war is run by a group that supported the Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the massacre in Tiananmen Square, and a litany of the very worst mass murderers of our time, including Slobodan Milosevic, Hussein and Kim Jong II. You don’t seize moral high ground in America with fellow travellers such as these” (Krauthammer, 2005).
46 See Campbell’s *Writing Security* for an excellent discussion about the continuity of the us/them, American/un-American discourse.
politicises public space, which is taken thus as masculine. Indeed, political public action from the Boston Tea Party to the Civil Rights movement has been historically depicted as masculine struggles. Struggles for women’s rights, however, such as the suffragette or pro-choice abortion movements have consistently faced controversy if not overwhelming opposition from both contemporary men and women. Movements of men and women such as the Vietnam anti-war movement, continue to be delegitimised by feminisation - as Krauthammer’s article shows. It is not surprising therefore, that Sheehan’s movement promotes itself in masculinised terms, as this affords itself a higher degree of legitimacy and credibility. At the end of 2005, Cindy Sheehan was on Time’s list of “People That Mattered - 2005” (26 September 2005) beside other masculine figures such as George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Pope Benedict XVI, John McCain, the Google inventors, Tony Blair, and Darth Vader. Some severe critics, in turn, according to The Nation, scold her deviation from the classical feminine housewife, “for protesting the war instead of staying home to cook her family dinner” (Houppert, 2006: 11).

At closer examination, it becomes apparent that the masculinity Sheehan’s movement relies on a militarised shell and structure. The name of Sheehan’s anti-war group is the Gold Star Families for Peace. The title names the men and women of these families as heroes by the reference to their personification as ‘gold stars.’ The heroism implied is of a firmly nationalistic sort. Stars are present in US national insignia, in the flag, in institutional emblems and so on. Stars are also traditional in Western military decorations, to which the reference here is most likely because of the military background of these families. Such medals, such as the Congressional Medal of Honour in the US (the highest military decoration possible), are bestowed for exceptional demonstrations of valour and bravery during battle. They legitimise the militaristic hegemonic masculine ideal-type that celebrates the thoughtless, unemotional, and mercilessly aggressive warrior who loyally serves the state unquestioningly with these qualities. By honouring a type of bravery that is defined by the ability to dehumanise others and kill them, the Gold Star Families for Peace cannot be considered to be anti-war, but anti-war in Iraq. It does not condemn the military, merely authority figures like President Bush with the power to employ it for wars that cannot be won. Wars are acceptable, so long as they are winnable and their reasons uncontroversial.

47 There were three other women included: Geena Davis for her role as the first female president in the television programme Commander and Chief, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and golf player Michelle Wie – all women showing masculine-coded qualities to be considered a success in their roles that have traditionally been performed by men.
As mentioned, Cindy Sheehan herself has been militarised by others by, for example, calling her “Attila the Honey.” Another example of the militarisation of the movement is the naming of the camp-out protest outside Bush’s ranch as Camp Casey, after her dead son. First of all it militarises the group by depicting its space as a military garrison, which in turn depicts the people in that space as soldiers. The protest is a siege of Bush’s ranch, where the families adopt the identities of their dead soldier sons as if they are continuing their battle for them. Mothers like Sheehan are the most visible actors there. Although men are equally active members, their presence is not made felt by the media like the women’s’. Sheehan’s husband, for example, with Cindy herself, is one of three male founding members, which make half of that board. Despite the militarisation of the movement and the masculinities that it summons, the women are nonetheless the bodies that are given presence. Again, this emphasises the esteemed position of military mothers. Motherhood is a station so respected nationalistically because of the understanding of mothers as vessels of national continuation, the perpetuators of its blood, and therefore its physical existence and meaningful substance. The reproductive contribution of fathers, in turn, is to provide their semen, but otherwise to ensure that their sons are brought up as patriots, as precisely the ‘brave’ warriors capable of killing for their country. Fathers in the movement are not depicted like the caring mother figures, but rather as feminised men and therefore neither is their presence in a peace movement appropriate, not is the coverage of an ‘inferior’ masculinity interesting.

And finally, it is significant to mention a further aspect of the spatial militarised gendering of Camp Casey, that also has religious implications. Photographs of Camp Casey often feature the white crosses planted into the ground, imitating a cemetery. On each cross is the name of a soldier killed in Iraq. These images are remarkably reminiscent of for example

![Image 10 Crosses at Camp Casey](crosses_at_cam_casey.jpg) ![Image 11 Crosses at Normandy American Cemetery](crosses_at_normandy_american_cemetery.jpg)
the military graveyard of Normandy where soldiers killed on D-Day are buried, The Normandy American Cemetery St Laurent (Omaha Beach Cemetery). A large area of space is used to erect this monument that is explicitly to mourn and honour the dead. It is a simple construction, white crosses in rows, yet effective precisely for this reason. The cross in the Christian tradition is a symbol of faith, as well as suffering and death. Jesus Christ died on the cross and suffered for well-being of mankind. While millions have been buried under crosses, implying the spiritual peace of the deceased, the combination of crosses with the military merges religion with war. Soldiers are transformed into crusaders. God is claimed to be on their side, by the belief that they will go to heaven if killed in battle because of the nobility of their cause. The state and its current condition, and thus its masculinist formations, are given the ultimate divine legitimation. Indeed, as David Campbell describes, the supposed Westphalian division of church/religion and state was never complete. The masculinist state implies a masculinist religion, which are mutually reinforcing. Indeed, as the photograph of Camp Casey shows, dozens of US flags are planted alongside the crosses. The dead male bodies they symbolise are metaphorical subjects of possession by masculinist religious conversion and nationalisation.

The crosses also imply a spiritual purity. White being the colour of purity and virginity, their death represents an extinction of ‘goodness.’ The irony of the display is that contrary to what is suggests, as soldier’s job is killing, in the Christian faith murderers cannot reach eternal paradise. The crosses represent an eternalisation of a hegemonic masculinity for the deceased men after death. The post-mortem idealisation therefore calls for the mourning of the loss of this imagined exemplary masculinity, but simultaneously encourages its continuation in other men by setting an example of the desired ideal-type.

In the case of the Iraq war, as other wars, the participation of women in the role of mothers is a source of great pride, but ironically also their most tragic suffering. Cindy Sheehan’s motherly grief motivated her to call for the end of the Iraq war. However, although the temptation to celebrate her as a pacifist hero, it is imperative to understand that her anti-war stance is not anti-military. She has very much in common with the mothers that criticise her by ultimately being a supporter of the soldiers of the US military, which is precisely the role of the ideal militarised mother. In accordance with the defining criteria of Cynthia Enloe (2000b: 253-254), Sheehan for example takes motherly pride in her son’s military career, trusts the military, believes he is worthy of public attention and believes by being a good mother she is enhancing national security and confirming her own citizenship rights through
her son. She accepts that it is the job of sons to fight and “feels that it is their duty to their country to support an operation, which will decimate the population and destroy the very bases of civilised society” (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996: 363). For Sheehan, however, the reasons to cause social and environmental destruction in Iraq were not sufficiently justified for the national security, and therefore regarded the military deployment of men, including her son, as a waste of idealised masculine bodies. Her opposition is to the US government that launched the war, particularly the executive branch, the Bush Administration. However, as demonstrated by the nationalistic display of flags and crosses, the Sheehan is staunchly supportive of a patriarchal statist, Christian and pro-military social status quo. She does not make the connection between masculinism and soldiering, and she is a continuation of a motherhood femininity that supports the hegemonic ideal-type masculinity that militarisation glorifies.

Sheehan is not the ideal-type mother especially because of her lack of complete submissiveness and refusal to remain uncritical about the war. However, as Enloe writes, “the military does not usually require the ideal” (Enloe, 2000b: 253), and the ideal is a rarity. Nonetheless, “it is a rare mother of a son who can resist absorbing several parts of the ideal into her own maternal values” (Enloe, 2000b: 254), and Sheehan is no exception. Her anti-war stance may catalyse public opposition to the Iraq war, but this opposition is exclusive and does not extend to other past, present and future wars. The military survives in tact through Sheehan’s movement as the correct place for men to enhance their manhood, for women to mourn the loss of it, and for the state to celebrate it.

VI. FINAL REMARKS

The case of Cindy Sheehan exemplifies a popular faction of the US anti-war movement that retains patriarchal assumptions about masculinity and femininity, instead of challenging warfare from its rigid gendered structures. As Cynthia Enloe warns, as long as such assumptions “shape people’s beliefs and identities and their relationships with one another, militarisation, however, temporarily stanch, lies dormant, capable of rising again, and yet again” (Enloe, 1993: 70) The recognition and acknowledgement that wars rely on particular disciplinary gender hierarchies and sexually discriminative acts and attitudes, is the first vital step to bring about change. As we have seen from the discourses of the War on Terrorism, gender hierarchies prioritise the needs of particular individuals. The events of 11
September bestowed visibility and instant celebration to strong, ‘heroic,’ white American men, like fire fighters, who toppled the previous rationalist-bourgeois hegemonic masculinity of the WTC victims. The escalation towards militarisation also reflected the continuing eager desire for the remasculinisation of US identity begun in the Gulf War to make up for its humiliation in the Vietnam War.

This new hegemonic US masculinity was confirmed in discourses on the militarisation of the War on Terrorism, first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq. Throughout, its prioritisation has been dependent on the Othering of the enemy. The masculinity of most Muslim men is demeaned by their representation as evil, homosexual and/or sexually perverted, uncivilised monsters. These misogynistic, homophobic, racist, and anti-Islamic US discourses of Muslim men are targeted at terrorists, Afghani men, Saddam Hussein, or at times at any Muslim person, usually male. Sometimes discourses of the same people change, from representing them as monsters to victims instead, as is the case in Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. The sexual abuse endured by the prisoners reflects a homophobic and sadistic US colonialism, as demonstrated also in the autobiographies of Kayla Williams and Colby Buzzell. Nonetheless, their captivity and powerlessness continues to feminise the prisoners. Their pitiable conditions revealed by the US mass media produce discourses of mercy for the unfortunate, uncivilised men captive in US military detention centres. If they cannot be killed, the must be saved, exorcised of their sexual perversion and wickedness and Islamic paganism that encourages it, in order to redeem them as valuable bodies. Until then, they remain sinful, worthless brown male bodies to be killed by nationally celebrated and technologically equipped White men.

Demonising discourses are accompanied by and articulated at the expense of the victimisation of remaining Others. These remaining Others are in most cases the women or ‘womenandchildren’ in the Other country in question. The tragic treatment of women under the Taliban regime became a fervently publicised additional justification to the invasion of Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s regime was a danger to both women and its children, as well as many men whose powerless victimhood demasculinised them in US eyes. In both cases, the discourse of Bush’s militant hegemonic masculinity depicted the invasions as crusades to ‘liberate’ these unfortunate and oppressed Muslim women from the uncivilised and sexist clutches of their monstrous men. In Afghanistan in particular, the US women’s rights discourse emphasised the connection between women’s rights and democratisation. This connection contained Orientalist desires to unveil the Islamic woman and discipline the Islamic faith and hence its followers. The Bush Administration and US media, while uncritical of women’s rights issues in the US, was quick to proclaim personal
success in the Afghan women’s rights issue, as demonstrated by the discourses on Malalai Joya. Discourses reflected little understanding of forms of Islamic feminism or concern for the experiences of women in post-invasion Afghanistan. Western liberal feminist demands of a selection of written rights (and not necessarily enforced) and franchise sufficed for the US government to declare they had ‘liberated’ Afghani women.

The presentation of women as victims in US discourses also confirmed a prevailing preconception, that women do not, or rather should not participate in warfare. Women were not present among the doers of 11 September. Rather, male terrorists and male US politicians, military strategists and rescue workers were made visible in the events of the day. Should the terrorists had been women, it could have been used as a warning of the dangers of ‘irrational’ feminine behaviour in power. Indeed, the discourse on female terrorists reflects the fear of female violence. The acts of violence carried out by female terrorists are in contradiction with classic dichotomies of male-violent-lifetaker/female-peaceful-lifegiver. Their bodies are represented as mentally pathological and sexually hyper-sexualised, amounting to a particular dangers body. Terrorist women, as the bearers and carers of children, are a danger to Western/Christian family values, as represented by Cindy Sheehan for example, thus social organisation, also because of their seduction by and relationships with Muslim men. Once again, therefore, Muslim men are presented as the criminals, who beguile, seduce and brainwash unsuspecting women. As discourse on Muriel Degauque demonstrated, the danger presented by Muslim men is not only to Muslim women, but also to Western women, thus victimising women on both ‘sides’ as a valuable and vulnerable species to be protected by US men.

The soldiers involved in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were, of course, not only men, but women were also members of the forces stationed there. The writings of Williams and Buzzell nonetheless contribute to the discourse that continues to regard the military as a boy’s club. Buzzell’s popular text confirms the military male as a macho, White, and heterosexual experience. Williams partakes in misogynistic remarks and behaviour, therefore it is difficult to suppose that women’s participation in the military would transform the institution into a woman and/or gay friendly establishment. As Williams’ writings demonstrate, women in the military must conform to a particular femininity that does not threaten the masculinity of the male soldiers, but rather, support it by actively accepting misogyny, and never challenging their masculinity, for example by issuing complaints about sexual harassment.
Indeed the other source of support for soldiers was strongly at the homefront. Immediately after 11 September, the fervent display of US flags from windows and flag pins on chests expressed an eagerness, albeit sometimes unknown to its wearer, for US militarism. Despite the reservations of some and the anti-war stance of many, the support for US troops nonetheless prevails in anti-war discourses. Politicians may be wrong, but the ‘good guys’ are always ‘our boys’ as demonstrated in Cindy Sheehan’s movement.

Indeed, this accounts for the deep shock and shame of US citizens regarding the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. It was inconceivable that the heroes - the most idealised and celebrated national representations of the US self - were secretly involved in gruesome torture that had implications on the homosexual and sadomasochistic desires of the US Military Police guards. Although the reaction could be interpreted as a realisation of problems of the military institution, instead it was construed as an exceptional deviancy within the self. The sexual acts of Abu Ghraib were characterised as something foreign, from and performed in an uncivilised space and culture, and was to be left there while the guilty soldiers carried out their purifying and disciplinary sentences. It was discussed as a pathological sexuality to be extricated and punished, thereby preserving the sexually chaste, and undesiring Christian heterosexual US “true” self-image, as described by Laura Bush, for example.

Instead of trivialising and ignoring gender in International Relations, this thesis has made it the centre of its analysis, and contributed to understanding how constructions of femininities and masculinities function and fluctuate to uphold military values and agendas, and hence here, support and justify the militarisation of the War on Terror. These dominant discourses are present in continuities. Some are momentary, some continue throughout, and some disappear and re-emerge at a different time and place. All are intertwined and necessary to develop one’s ability to analyse and criticise gender in War on Terrorism discourses. Of course, the discourses discussed here are not the only significant ones. Others could have been explored and gendered, for example discourses between Afghan and Western feminists, Afghan and Iraqi refugees, or the post-US invasion descriptions of Iraqi civilians, of their ‘liberation,’ or their sufferings in wartime. Even the further individual exploration of any of the discourses discussed here is easily possible in another research project. Here, nonetheless, the aim was to provide a discussion in the attempt to understand gendered continuities and power structures in War on Terrorism discourses.

It is necessary not only to criticise and analyse, but also to ponder the potential for change. Recalling Foucault, it must be kept in mind that where there is power there is also resistance, which is never exterior in relation to power (Foucault, 1978: 95). Resistance is
possible at a variety of points in power relations, and in many forms. Current dominant discourses can be replaced with counter discourses that offer alternative interpretations of politics, events, people, and places. New ones can also be introduced. For example, instead of lamenting the US abuse of heterosexual, brown Muslims, in the future it might be possible to discuss their experiences as humans, and even make visible the bodies of and give voices to women, homosexual Muslim men and women, transvestites, and transgenders, who continue to be invisible. The absence of women in discourses, geographical location and sexuality aside, is a particularly troubling. Empowering discourses of gender equality are crucial points of resistance to dissolve the misogyny that militarism feeds on, as well as to amplify the voices, needs and experiences of women who currently exist in a silent vacuum. In addition it is necessary for feminists to vilify patriarchy and the patriarchal structure of privilege and control.

The understanding of gender as malleable is vital to gendered resistance. For, it is the very ability to mould gender that enables the displacement of harmful hegemonic gender identities and the breaking of gender hierarchies themselves that endow gender privileges. The masculinity that encourages and sustains a desire to fight in war would no longer be able to award its possessor a privileged social status. Likewise, no longer would the state, citizens, wives, mothers, or other men be pressured to manipulate men into mobilisation by such notions of masculinity. Resistance and transformation are indeed possible, and capable of challenging the existence of war itself, which is dependent on these so-called ‘rational’ gendered perceptions of human worthiness, and unworthiness.
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