Browsing by Subject "realism"
Now showing items 1-8 of 8
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(2023)This thesis discusses A.S. Byatt’s writing about nature in Possession: A Romance and The Biographer’s Tale. It examines how the duality of nature, symbolic and material, manifests itself in the two novels and how that relates to broader questions about fiction and reality. The purpose of this study is to explore the conceptualisation of nature by humans in conjunction with the physical existence of the natural world. The biographical aspect of the texts is juxtaposed with a discussion of the natural sciences and the evolutionary process, which enables Byatt’s human characters’ existence to be analysed in less anthropocentric terms, against the wider organic context of nature and life. This study draws upon ecocritical perspectives which are applied to explore the complex and intertwined connections between the cultural and physical aspects of nature, the human and the non-human, and the mind and the body. As Byatt’s novels mix realism and fantasy, such approaches enable the duality of the natural world to be analysed as relational instead of being treated as oppositional: the human-nature relationship operates on biological and abstract levels simultaneously. The distinction between language, a product of the human mind, and the embodied physical reality of nature is at the core of the analysis conducted. The body and the mind are examined both in human terms and in relation to the non-human. This thesis argues that there are underlying systemic contexts, both biological and cultural, within which Byatt’s human characters and her narratives operate in Possession and The Biographer’s Tale. Alongside the exploration of human and natural histories, origins and relationality emerge as key themes in the two novels, connecting the fragmented and uncertain existence of postmodern individuals with the more solid and timeless systems of the natural world.
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(2023)This thesis discusses A.S. Byatt’s writing about nature in Possession: A Romance and The Biographer’s Tale. It examines how the duality of nature, symbolic and material, manifests itself in the two novels and how that relates to broader questions about fiction and reality. The purpose of this study is to explore the conceptualisation of nature by humans in conjunction with the physical existence of the natural world. The biographical aspect of the texts is juxtaposed with a discussion of the natural sciences and the evolutionary process, which enables Byatt’s human characters’ existence to be analysed in less anthropocentric terms, against the wider organic context of nature and life. This study draws upon ecocritical perspectives which are applied to explore the complex and intertwined connections between the cultural and physical aspects of nature, the human and the non-human, and the mind and the body. As Byatt’s novels mix realism and fantasy, such approaches enable the duality of the natural world to be analysed as relational instead of being treated as oppositional: the human-nature relationship operates on biological and abstract levels simultaneously. The distinction between language, a product of the human mind, and the embodied physical reality of nature is at the core of the analysis conducted. The body and the mind are examined both in human terms and in relation to the non-human. This thesis argues that there are underlying systemic contexts, both biological and cultural, within which Byatt’s human characters and her narratives operate in Possession and The Biographer’s Tale. Alongside the exploration of human and natural histories, origins and relationality emerge as key themes in the two novels, connecting the fragmented and uncertain existence of postmodern individuals with the more solid and timeless systems of the natural world.
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(2020)Abstrakt Utgångspunkten för denna studie är insikten om att Finlands utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik, i sista hand, bestäms av regeringen, som i sin tur leds av folkvalda representanter för politiska partier. Tre partier – Samlingspartiet, Centern och Socialdemokraterna (SDP) – har lett alla Finlands koalitionsregeringar sedan år 1991. Två av dessa tre har alltid suttit på de tyngsta regeringsposterna medan en lett oppositionen i väntan på sin retur till makten. Därmed väger det som dessa partier säger i hur denna politikdomän – utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken – formas. Utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken har under dessa partiers tid vid makten förändrats i takt med att Finland bland annat gått med i EU, ingått NATO-partnerskap, utvidgat sina handelsrelationer och stadigt förnyat försvarets resurser. Samtidigt skapar den globala säkerhetsmiljön spänningar som inte ens Finland kan undgå. I Europa har detta synts i synnerhet i efterdyningarna av Rysslands annektering av Krimhalvön från Ukraina våren 2014 – den första gången sedan andra världskriget som en europeisk stats gränser omritats med en ensidig militär-backad deklaration. Geopolitiken har därmed otvivelaktigt gjort en återkomst, som otaliga böcker av före detta statstjänstemän skildrat. Därför ter det sig aktuellt att granska vad partiföreträdare på högsta nivå för Finlands del har att säga om säkerhetsmiljön, eftersom det i sin tur påverkar Finlands nuvarande och kommande handlingskraft och -utrymme. Syftet med denna studie att belysa vad Samlingspartiet, SDP:s och Centerns uppfattning om utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken i praktiken är genom att studera deras valprogram inför de senaste riksdagsvalen 2015 och 2019. Detta byggs på genom att kontextuellt presentera utrikes- och säkerhetspolitikens utveckling i allmänhet med avsikten att skapa perspektiv för en samhällsvetenskaplig analys. Genom en kvalitativ innehållsanalys baserad på ett ramverk format utifrån president Niinistös uttalade fyra pelare för utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken, granskas partiernas syn på vissa kärnområden – bland annat försvaret, EU, Norden, NATO, FN, Ryssland, USA och det internationella samfundet. Teoretiskt belyses studien av bärande uppfattningar inom realismen och liberalismen – två centrala tankeskolor inom förståelsen av internationella relationer (och därmed utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik) som ämnar förklara varför stater – i demokratier företrädda av partier i koalition i riksdag och regering – försöker maximera sina intressen utgående från olika sammanhängande realiteter. Genom både beskrivande och jämförande analys visar studien att dessa tre långvariga regeringspartier har både realistiska och liberalistiska tendenser – realism gällande till exempel försvarsfrågor och engagemang med enskilda aktörer; samt liberalism i till exempel transnationella frågor. Utveckling och avveckling av positioner mellan två val exemplifierar också partiernas prioriteringar. Studien belyser avslutningsvis substantiella luckor i partiernas presentation av utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken i sina valprogram och ställer frågan för blivande val i fall det är anmärkningsvärt i förståelsen av valprogrammens betydelse för utrikes- och säkerhetspolitikens del. Nyckelord: Centern, internationella relationer, liberalism, realism, regeringspartier, riksdagsval, Samlingspartiet, Socialdemokraterna, säkerhetspolitik, utrikespolitik, valprogram
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(2020)This thesis examines French political debates related to the founding of the League of Nations in the years 1917-1919 and the political and ideological reasons that led to the oblivion of the French juridical internationalist model for the League. When the League of Nations was created in the Paris Peace Conference that followed the end of World War I, the French delegation presented a model for the League that was based on a specific French current of internationalism (juridical internationalism) largely forgotten today. It was opposed both to the Anglo-American view presented by American President Woodrow Wilson and the British delegation and the view of French Premier Clemenceau. In order to recover the intentions of the participants to the political discussions, this thesis employs Quentin Skinner’s methodological reflections on the history of ideas. The source material consists of the minutes of the French National Assembly, the Senate and the Paris Peace Conference as well as the notes of the most prominent advocate of juridical internationalism, Léon Bourgeois. These records are studied by situating them in their historical context and in relation to relevant intellectual traditions and ongoing political discussions. The formulation of the French policy is explored in three different contexts that capture the national and international levels of discussion: the French parliament, the French Interministerial Commission on the League of Nations and the Paris Peace Conference. The studies of Peter Jackson (2013) and Scott G. Blair (1992) on the French League of Nations policy constitute the main works of secondary literature. The theoretical framework of this study relies on the English School’s pluralistic approach to international relations. Different conceptions of the League of Nations are examined using the concepts of realism and idealism in international relations theory. These concepts help demonstrate the differences and similarities between juridical internationalism, Wilsonian idealism and traditional realist power politics. Historiography of the Paris Peace Conference has often presented the situation as a confrontation between traditional balance of power politics and Wilsonian idealism, but the juridical internationalist conception of the new world order was actually something between these two. By analysing this French current of internationalism through the concepts of realism and idealism, this thesis demonstrates that juridical internationalism represented a third way between the two traditional paradigms that combined elements of both. The juridical internationalists envisaged a League of Nations based on the codification of international law and equipped with a permanent tribunal and powerful systems of legal, economic, diplomatic and military sanctions enforced by an international army and a permanent command structure. This thesis puts forward the interpretation that the merits of this conception of the League were not properly appreciated during the Paris Peace Conference because it was overshadowed by the diplomatic and political calculations of Wilson and Clemenceau. Later, the juridical internationalist model has been disregarded as a result of being misunderstood as idealism and linked to the negative connotations the term carries. In reality, this model combined elements of realism and idealism similar to the rationalist and solidarist inclinations of the English School.
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(2020)This thesis examines French political debates related to the founding of the League of Nations in the years 1917-1919 and the political and ideological reasons that led to the oblivion of the French juridical internationalist model for the League. When the League of Nations was created in the Paris Peace Conference that followed the end of World War I, the French delegation presented a model for the League that was based on a specific French current of internationalism (juridical internationalism) largely forgotten today. It was opposed both to the Anglo-American view presented by American President Woodrow Wilson and the British delegation and the view of French Premier Clemenceau. In order to recover the intentions of the participants to the political discussions, this thesis employs Quentin Skinner’s methodological reflections on the history of ideas. The source material consists of the minutes of the French National Assembly, the Senate and the Paris Peace Conference as well as the notes of the most prominent advocate of juridical internationalism, Léon Bourgeois. These records are studied by situating them in their historical context and in relation to relevant intellectual traditions and ongoing political discussions. The formulation of the French policy is explored in three different contexts that capture the national and international levels of discussion: the French parliament, the French Interministerial Commission on the League of Nations and the Paris Peace Conference. The studies of Peter Jackson (2013) and Scott G. Blair (1992) on the French League of Nations policy constitute the main works of secondary literature. The theoretical framework of this study relies on the English School’s pluralistic approach to international relations. Different conceptions of the League of Nations are examined using the concepts of realism and idealism in international relations theory. These concepts help demonstrate the differences and similarities between juridical internationalism, Wilsonian idealism and traditional realist power politics. Historiography of the Paris Peace Conference has often presented the situation as a confrontation between traditional balance of power politics and Wilsonian idealism, but the juridical internationalist conception of the new world order was actually something between these two. By analysing this French current of internationalism through the concepts of realism and idealism, this thesis demonstrates that juridical internationalism represented a third way between the two traditional paradigms that combined elements of both. The juridical internationalists envisaged a League of Nations based on the codification of international law and equipped with a permanent tribunal and powerful systems of legal, economic, diplomatic and military sanctions enforced by an international army and a permanent command structure. This thesis puts forward the interpretation that the merits of this conception of the League were not properly appreciated during the Paris Peace Conference because it was overshadowed by the diplomatic and political calculations of Wilson and Clemenceau. Later, the juridical internationalist model has been disregarded as a result of being misunderstood as idealism and linked to the negative connotations the term carries. In reality, this model combined elements of realism and idealism similar to the rationalist and solidarist inclinations of the English School.
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(2010)The aim of this study is to explore by systematic textual analysis the crucial conceptions of constructive alignment and to reconstruct the concept of constructive alignment and examine the relation between conceptual relationships in John Biggs's texts. In this study, I have also analyzed the presuppositions of the concept of constructive alignment and its possible implications. The research material includes Biggs's (1996b; 2003) article entitled Enhancing Teaching through Constructive Alignment and book entitled Teaching for Quality Learning at University. The primary purpose of the systematic textual analysis is to reconstruct concepts and gain access to a new or more profound understanding of the concepts. The main purpose of the constructive alignment is to design a teaching system that supports and encourages students to adopt a deep approach learning. At the center of the constructive alignment are two concepts: constructivism in learning and alignment in teaching. A tension was detected between these concepts. Biggs assumes that students' learning activities are primed by the teaching. Because of this it is not important what the teacher does. At the same time he emphasizes that teaching interacts with learning. The teacher's task is to support student's appropriate learning activities. On the basis of the analysis, I conclude these conceptions are not mutually exclusive. Interaction between teaching and learning has an effect on student's learning activities. The most essential benefit of the model of constructive alignment is that Biggs brings together and considers teaching at the same level with learning. A weakness of Biggs's model relates to the theoretical basis and positions of the concept of constructive alignment. There are some conflicts between conceptions of epistemology in Biggs's texts. In addition, Biggs writes about constructivism also as conceptions of epistemology, but doesn't consider implications of that position or what follows or doesn't follow from that commitment. On the basis of the analysis, I suggest that constructivism refers in Biggs's texts rather to constructivism in learning than philosophical constructivism. In light of this study, constructive alignment doesn't lead to philosophical constructivism. That's why constructive alignment stays out of idealism. Biggs's way of thinking about teachers possibility to confronting students' misconceptions and evaluate and assess students' constructions support a realist purpose in terms of philosophical stance. Realism does not drift toward general problems of relativism, like lack of criteria for assessing or evaluate these constructions.
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(2020)One of the most debated areas of metaethics is whether moral beliefs should be understood as descriptive beliefs or as non-cognitive states of mind. If the former is true, then moral beliefs are truth-apt and should be understood to describe facts of the world. Expressivists think that moral beliefs are expressions of non-cognitive states of mind similar to desires and that moral beliefs do not get their meaning from any descriptive facts. Instead, the function of a moral judgement is to avow attitudes, express preferences, or the like. This thesis explores two problems, which arise from the expressivists understanding of moral beliefs. More specifically, the problems investigated are about how uncertainty and certainty in our moral beliefs should be understood by those endorsing expressivism. Expressivism neatly explains why moral beliefs have a motivational force, but faces problems in explaining why our everyday normative talk seems to behave as if moral beliefs are similar to all the descriptive beliefs we have. Quasi-realism is a project aimed to explain and justify everyday moral talk from the expressivist viewpoint. Moral error is one of the concepts our everyday moralizing uses, which quasi-realism aims to justify. Being wrong in moral matters should be possible, as should uncertainty on whether your own moral beliefs are erroneous. If moral beliefs are expressions of desire-like non-cognitive states of mind, it is not obvious how we can be uncertain of them. After all, desires are traditionally thought to be unquestionable. An explanation of moral uncertainty is, in this case, a crucial goal for quasi-realism. Andy Egan claims that quasi-realists cannot provide a good enough explanation of moral uncertainty. In particular, he argues that there are fundamental moral beliefs which quasi-realists are forced to judge as a priori true, while everyone else’s fundamental moral beliefs can be doubted. If so, this asymmetry means that quasi-realists are unpardonably smug and so fail to vindicate our everyday understanding of morality. Michael Smith provides another problem for quasi-realists and expressivists. He claims that moral beliefs have three features, and expressivists can only provide an explanation of two of them. These three features are the importance of a belief versus other beliefs, its stability when new facts and opinions are uncovered, and the certitude that the belief holder has regarding the truthfulness of the belief. From these three features, it is certitude that is widely regarded as the one which expressivists cannot explain, making quasi-realists’ goals once again unattainable. This thesis explores the different ways quasi-realists and expressivists have tried to answer these arguments and failed. I will argue that the two problems presented here are linked, and the solution to Egan’s argument can only be gained if Smith’s argument is also solved. Smith’s understanding of certitude is argued to be erroneous, and that his problem of explaining certitude poses no further problems for expressivists, which everyone else would not face as well. In addition, this thesis will have suggestions of how certitude should be understood regardless of metaethical views. As for Egan’s challenge, I will argue that his definition of fundamental moral beliefs is incomplete. I propose that fundamental moral belief should be understood as completely certain beliefs and that expressions of knowledge accompany those, and that no-one can doubt fundamental beliefs. We are all smug when it comes to our most fundamental moral beliefs.
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(2020)One of the most debated areas of metaethics is whether moral beliefs should be understood as descriptive beliefs or as non-cognitive states of mind. If the former is true, then moral beliefs are truth-apt and should be understood to describe facts of the world. Expressivists think that moral beliefs are expressions of non-cognitive states of mind similar to desires and that moral beliefs do not get their meaning from any descriptive facts. Instead, the function of a moral judgement is to avow attitudes, express preferences, or the like. This thesis explores two problems, which arise from the expressivists understanding of moral beliefs. More specifically, the problems investigated are about how uncertainty and certainty in our moral beliefs should be understood by those endorsing expressivism. Expressivism neatly explains why moral beliefs have a motivational force, but faces problems in explaining why our everyday normative talk seems to behave as if moral beliefs are similar to all the descriptive beliefs we have. Quasi-realism is a project aimed to explain and justify everyday moral talk from the expressivist viewpoint. Moral error is one of the concepts our everyday moralizing uses, which quasi-realism aims to justify. Being wrong in moral matters should be possible, as should uncertainty on whether your own moral beliefs are erroneous. If moral beliefs are expressions of desire-like non-cognitive states of mind, it is not obvious how we can be uncertain of them. After all, desires are traditionally thought to be unquestionable. An explanation of moral uncertainty is, in this case, a crucial goal for quasi-realism. Andy Egan claims that quasi-realists cannot provide a good enough explanation of moral uncertainty. In particular, he argues that there are fundamental moral beliefs which quasi-realists are forced to judge as a priori true, while everyone else’s fundamental moral beliefs can be doubted. If so, this asymmetry means that quasi-realists are unpardonably smug and so fail to vindicate our everyday understanding of morality. Michael Smith provides another problem for quasi-realists and expressivists. He claims that moral beliefs have three features, and expressivists can only provide an explanation of two of them. These three features are the importance of a belief versus other beliefs, its stability when new facts and opinions are uncovered, and the certitude that the belief holder has regarding the truthfulness of the belief. From these three features, it is certitude that is widely regarded as the one which expressivists cannot explain, making quasi-realists’ goals once again unattainable. This thesis explores the different ways quasi-realists and expressivists have tried to answer these arguments and failed. I will argue that the two problems presented here are linked, and the solution to Egan’s argument can only be gained if Smith’s argument is also solved. Smith’s understanding of certitude is argued to be erroneous, and that his problem of explaining certitude poses no further problems for expressivists, which everyone else would not face as well. In addition, this thesis will have suggestions of how certitude should be understood regardless of metaethical views. As for Egan’s challenge, I will argue that his definition of fundamental moral beliefs is incomplete. I propose that fundamental moral belief should be understood as completely certain beliefs and that expressions of knowledge accompany those, and that no-one can doubt fundamental beliefs. We are all smug when it comes to our most fundamental moral beliefs.
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