Browsing by Subject "China"

The anonymity of virtual currency allows for its misuse for criminal purposes. Of particular concern are transnational organized crime users of virtual currency platforms. The global regulatory response to virtual currency has been disparate, far from uniform, and until recently, fairly muted. In 2018, the European Union integrated virtual currency into a robust anti-money laundering legal regime by requiring the registration of all EU-based virtual currency providers to comply with the rules of the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive. The United States has a messier, but equally stringent approach to virtual currency. However, American regulators struggle with fifty state courts issuing wildly varied interpretations, while virtual currency companies meet different conditions for licensing, described as ‘Frankenfinance’ or full of absurd contradictions and incongruities. China took an altogether different approach as it banned all cryptocurrencies in order for the People’s Bank of China to pave way for the introduction of its own cryptocurrency, the digital yuan. This decision was made after recent high profile security breaches, including thefts and fraud, warned the Chinese regulator of increasing risk to the financial market. The responses of these three jurisdictions demonstrate the different ways that regulators have begun to define and limit the use of virtual currency. Permissive and contentious regulators in the EU and the United States are normalizing the trade of virtual currencies if it complies with international anti-money laundering rules. However, the hostile Chinese approach suggests that this Western regulatory approach may not meet the demands of every global jurisdiction. This paper uses a vertical and horizontal comparative approach to identify both legal definitions and approaches to virtual currency regulation to answer the research question: is the harmonization of virtual currency regulation desirable, or even possible?

Far and wide, multilateral cooperation is championed as a principal response to a volatile global landscape characterized by transnational challenges, complexity, and turbulent great power relations. At the same time, many lament multilateralism to be amidst a paramount crisis of identity. New actors and powers are keen and increasingly capable of challenging the norms underpinning the traditionally Western-led, liberal international order and multilateralism adhering to it. Some argue that an era of unipolarity, and thus U.S. hegemony, is drawing to a close. China has come to depict itself as a fundamentally multilateral actor and is actively envisioning the design of multilateralism from its own normative stances. Rising powers, such as India, are increasingly eager to convey their views on how cooperation ought to be compiled and whom it should benefit. This thesis analyses the strategic narratives on multilateralism and the international order as put forth by China’s and India’s foreign policy statements. Three research questions were posed to direct and frame the analysis: How are the concepts of international order and multilateral cooperation described in foreign policy statements delivered by China and India? What kind of values or norms emerge as salient for China’s and India’s strategic narratives on multilateralism and the international order? How are these values and norms connected to China’s and India’s historical narratives of themselves on the international arena? Strategic narratives (Miskimmon et. al, 2013) provide a lens through which to examine how political actors construct shared meanings of the past, present, and future of international politics, in order to sculpt the behaviour of domestic and international actors. Examining the research questions via the lens of strategic narratives enables scrutiny into the themes of intentionality, communication as persuasive power, and the role strategically reconstructed concepts can exert on reality. In the case of China, three strategic narratives were identified: 1) a narrative of China’s origin story, depicted as a basis for both its future glory and its benevolence as a partner 2) a vision of “true” multilateralism, compiled of the three pillars of the existence of distinct civilizations, hegemony as antithetical to multilateralism, and sovereignty as a key value in multilateralism 3) a narrative of China being “ahead of times” and “on the right side of history”. In the case of India, three strategic narratives were identified, as well: 1) the narrative of insiders and outsiders, entailing an interplay of domestic and foreign policy 2) a vision of “temporal balance”, depicted as unique and inherent to the Indian civilization 3) a vision of the desirability of the diffusion of power, viewed to lead to justice and greater democracy in international relations. While the analysis primarily illuminates upon the strategic narratives on multilateralism and the international order as posed by China’s and India’s foreign policy, the results of this thesis also expand into future research themes such as emerging conceptualizations of democracy on the level of international relations, the persuasive power of fuzzy concepts, as well as the manner in which concepts may travel and assume novel, localized versions.

The objective of this thesis is to assess the recreational value (access value) provided by Yuelu Mountain Park in China applying travel cost method (TCM) which is commonly used to estimate non-market benefits. Also, a fee that would maximize the entrance fee income is tentatively calculated. The potential trips to be lost next year are estimated based on local respondents visiting intentions among different age groups. The travel cost demand function is estimated by using basic count data travel cost model-Poisson regression, and survey data collected on-site. Average access values per trip were estimated to be € 0.75 for local and € 64.52 for non-local individuals producing aggregate annual access value of € 20.43 million. Based on the travel cost demand function, an entrance fee of € 5.43 would maximize the revenue collected from the visitors. This would mean more than doubling of the present entrance fee. The result could potentially be utilized when deciding on the entrance fees. It is also suggested that the park management could further study visitors' intentions and reasons either to visit or not to visit the park in the future. Estimated consumer surpluses as well as suggested entrance fee must however, be considered with caution because truncation of the on-site survey data is not accounted for in the Poisson model estimations of this study.

This thesis analyses the development of Danish foreign and security policy towards the Arctic ever since the end of the Second World War up until today. It draws primarily on Denmark’s relation to the United States, having been Denmark’s main ally for the last 75 years on all security related matters - but especially since the end of the Cold War. Both Denmark and the US are considered Arctic coastal states, with Denmark accessing the Arctic ocean through its sovereign claim over Greenland, and the US through the state of Alaska. The thesis supports other scholarly studies that argue that a ‘new Cold War’ has been taking place in the years following the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in 2016 between the US, China and Russia, with potentially grave ramifications for Arctic regional security, given its growing importance as a region for resource extraction and commercial passage through the Northern Sea Route. For Denmark, this new Cold War threatens its sovereign claim over Greenland – a crucial geostrategic location for a potential Arctic militarization - being challenged as a small nation by the great power competitions accelerating in the Arctic. The thesis divides the last 75 years into three categorized eras: 1) The Cold War (1945-1991); 2) The post-Cold War era (1991-2017); 3) The ‘new Cold War’ as a developing era (2017 - ; denoted in the thesis), and analyses for each era the fundamentals of Denmark – US relations, first providing a more general overview of their political relations as security partners on non-Arctic related matters, in order to then draw parallels to the development of Denmark – US relations in the Arctic and their roles as state actors in shaping the geopolitical climate of the region. As I show, a lot can be learned from the Cold War to understand what is and may happen in the Arctic in the new Cold War. The thesis makes use of foreign policy analysis, as well as two variations of discourse analysis – poststructuralist discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis – as tools to engage with the empirical data available and answer the thesis’s main research questions: what is the perceived effect of the Trump administration's policy to the position of Denmark in the Arctic? The question is answered on the basis of two main theoretical frameworks: Securitization Theory and Region-Building Theory. These frameworks build the necessary foundation which along with the mentioned methodologies can provide a holistic overview and perspective on the matter with scientific validity. The thesis ends by discussing what can be expected in the near future, based on the knowledge acquired and the answers provided to the research question. A new administration led by president elect Joe Biden took over the White House on January 20st, and with it many new questions are yet to be answered, regarding the future of Denmark – US relations, the future of Arctic governance and the course of the new Cold War. I ponder on what options Denmark might have that could guarantee its security while also maintaining its sovereignty over Greenland – one option being a potential turn towards the EU as its new main security partner. Yet doing so would mean breaking a long-lasting relationship with the US while standing up to the world’s biggest economic and military superpower.

This thesis examined the role of China as a factor in the European Union’s enlargement policy towards Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. In relation to the Belt and Road Initiative, these five Western Balkan countries (WB5) have received substantial investments and other forms of financial input from China in 2013–2021. Characteristic for this is that large parts of this cooperation has been forged away from the public eye. Meanwhile, the relationship between China and the EU has turned dubious, causing the EU to increasingly “riskify” inbound Chinese investments. While the existing academic literature has highlighted the problems that these investments have caused for the region’s enlargement prospects, the extent to which the EU has responded to this phenomenon has received only slight attention. The purpose of this research has been to discover what concerns the EU has expressed over China, to analyze how these concerns are reflected in the EU’s enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans, and uncover the concrete measures through which the EU has mitigated China’s influence in the region. The results have been discussed in conjunction with the theoretical framework to provide new empirical literature on how the EU’s structural foreign policy, arguably the primary form of enlargement policy, functions in a contested setting, and how norms are diffused through the enlargement process. The research problem was addressed by employing framework analysis to an extensive body of official documents that have been produced by the European Union in 2013–2021. The analysis indicated that the EU’s concerns over China, primarily in relation to cooperation causing non-alignment with the EU’s rules, the neglect of economic and environmental sustainability and the distortive effects of state ownership and subsidies, have been reflected in the enlargement policy from 2018 onwards. After this the phenomenon has featured in multiple strategies and other official documents, albeit in an implicit fashion where China has only rarely been mentioned by name. The analysis showed that the EU has sought to re-assert its leadership by focusing especially on increased political steering and engagement, regional integration, connectivity and other infrastructure, public procurement legislation, and the environment and energy. By imposing various conditions to the fields where China-WB5 cooperation has been prevalent, the EU has achieved that the relationship has become largely subordinate to the EU-China relationship and the space for independent Chinese actions has narrowed. From a theoretical point of view, the thesis concludes that the new EU-norm – China and its investment activities constitute a potential risk – was embedded in the EU’s enlargement policy and that the EU has sought to enable the conditions through which alignment with this norm is possible. In a contested setting, the EU’s structural foreign policy appears to have placed emphasis on the structures rather than the sustainability of such. In such a context, it is a rather flexible mode of conducting foreign policy due to its adaptability to new realities. The EU’s structural foreign policy equally demonstrated an absorption capacity due to the successful combining of different objectives into coherent policies.

The aim of this study is to understand the fundamental features of China’s economic transition since 1992. In order to do so, the central features of China’s transition are reviewed, most notably the main economic reforms, the firm-level resource reallocation, productivity differences between state-owned and private enterprises, moderate wage growth and rising income inequality, financial market imperfections and the central macroeconomic indicators: accumulation of foreign surplus and high aggregate investment and savings rates. A growth model consistent with China’s growth experience is built to give a clear qualitative explanation to China’s puzzling phenomena: Why does a country accumulate a foreign surplus despite of high domestic rate of return to capital? Why does a country’s rate of return to capital remain high in spite of a high investment rate? The cornerstones of the model are heterogeneity in productivity, reallocation of resources and asymmetric financial imperfections. The enterprise sector is divided into private and state-owned enterprises. Private enterprises are more productive, but due to the discrimination by the financial sector they must rely on internal savings, while state-owned enterprises are less productive, but survive in equilibrium due to better access to external financing. If the entrepreneurial savings are large enough, private enterprises gradually outgrow state-owned enterprises. Financial integration of state-owned firms and labor mobility sustains the rate of return for both types of firms during the transition. Moreover, the aggregate rate of return to capital increases due to the composition effect. The accumulation of foreign surplus originates from the financial imperfections. The wage earners deposit their savings to the banks, which in turn, can either invest to domestic enterprises or in foreign bonds. As the transition progresses the volume of high-productive financially constrained enterprises increase while the volume of low-productive externally financed enterprises decrease. Hence as the volume of state-owned enterprises decrease, a higher amount of domestic savings is invested into foreign assets by the financial intermediaries causing the foreign surplus to increase. After the transition is over, the economy is dominated by private enterprises and capital accumulation is subject to diminishing return to capital. The main contradictions with China’s experience are frictionless labor market, financial market laissez-faire environment and the prediction that state-owned enterprises fully fades from the economy. Despite of these simplifications, the model gives a clear qualitative explanation to China’s puzzling phenomena of sustained return to capital and growing foreign surplus. The simplifications allow the model to focus on the main differences between E and F firms, that is to say the heterogeneity in productivity and asymmetric financial imperfections.

The objective of the study was to shed light on the Chinese soft power in France, and, in particular, on such a political tool as panda diplomacy. In the following thesis I am answering the research questions of the role the soft power is playing in the Chinese foreign policy aimed at France, what is its image in the news outlets and among readers of those articles, and how and when panda diplomacy is carried out. As the following thesis deals with the role of Chinese soft power in France, the information about the emergence and meaning of the term “soft power” is provided to the reader for a better understanding of the content. Moreover, the theoretical background of the concept of panda diplomacy itself, the development of the concept of “soft power” in China, the France-China Relationship, and the position of Chinese soft power in the world are presented in the paper. For the research, the articles and readers’ comments retrieved from 3 different politically orientated news outlets (Le Monde, France 24, and Le Figaro) were used. A total of 15 newspaper articles and 286 readers’ comments were analyzed. This Master thesis presents the research findings primarily based on the content analysis of reader comments and newspaper articles. The first finding is that soft power and panda diplomacy, as a tool, plays an important role to signify the positive China-France relationship and economic achievements between the two countries. Secondly, panda diplomacy has a controversial image in the French news outlets. Some news outlets are positively evaluating the practice, while others doubt it. The readers are mostly putting in negative comments accusing authorities of the unnecessary expenses of money for pandas. Lastly, Panda diplomacy is carried out to celebrate the economic achievements of its partner country. In France, according to the articles, the rental contracts of pandas were signed following the successful deals and supported by the government, Zoo facilities, foundations, and sponsors.

Forest biomass is considered as one of the most important alternative energy sources across the globe. Growing attention has been given to the studies concerning biomass and related bioenergy and biofuel, and their potential for future development. This study takes higher education as unique aspect, focusing on the awareness of Chinese university students of Forest Based Bioenergy (FBB) development and how education background / awareness may influence the FBB development in China. Since FBB is relatively a new concept in China, its development and further utilization are believed to largely relay on the matters of education, social trend and awareness. Students in higher education are considered as a special group: they may be educated related to FBB and will become the future consumers and even decision-makers. This make awareness, attitude and opinions about FBB from the students` point of view significant. A literature review was made for the background study and quantitative research, plus surveys and interviews were conducted as data collection methods. Objectives of the thesis are to study the awareness of and attitudes towards FBB among Chinese university students and if those opinions were influenced by their studies. Results indicate that education strongly affects students´ attitudes. FBB development is seen as a positive signal and students are likely to support FBB development. FBB is believed as a new trend of renewable energy development. However, FBB in China will not see a rapid booming in the near future and it has only limited impact towards the traditional fossil fuel domination, but due to its characteristics, governmental recognition and growing awareness, it certainly shall be seen as strong supporter of China´s sustainable development. It also has to be holistically utilized considering environmental, social and economic aspects, to reach its full potential and to support China´s target of sustainable energy development.

This Master thesis belongs to the project of the HELSUS Co-creation Lab. The project topic is about the circular economy and the challenge given by a HELSUS partner UPM-Kymmene Corporation to find opportunities for the circular economy business model from a legal perspective. As an international forest industry company, UPM has developed innovative ways to reduce its waste and to reuse its side in new products, and to use resources sustainably. Circular economy principles already applied in UPM, and develop and implement the technology and innovation of using wood in various new products. However, UPM wants to know what challenges and possibilities the regulations pose in creating new circular business opportunities? At the same time, this thesis chooses Germany and China for comparative research. Both countries have promulgated special circular economy legislation, established the 3R principles of reduce, reuse and recycle, stipulated extended producer responsibility systems, established waste recycling systems, and so on, aim to promote waste treatment and resource recycling legal system. However, the circular economy legal system of these two countries have apparent differences in legislative models, legislative purposes, and institutional arrangements. So, there are two purposes for writing this essay. First, explaining the historical evolution of the circular economy legal system in Germany and China, the objective is to understand the historical evolution of the circular economy law in two counties. Second, evaluative whether they are under circular economic aims in comparative research, the purpose of the comparison is not to determine which country's laws are more suitable for creating new business opportunities. It is to find out the challenges and possibilities of creating new circular business opportunities for UPM. Therefore, the research question is about: What are the challenges and possibilities of creating new business opportunities for UPM when compares the circular economy legal system between Germany and China?

China has become an important global actor, especially as a partner for countries of the Global South, and it is possible that China will attempt to become a hegemonic world power. This thesis focuses on the possible hegemonic ambitions of the People’s Republic of China and examines the way China frames the international environment and itself as an international actor. Through framing analysis, this thesis seeks to find out what China’s international ambitions are and how they could affect the Global South. A neo-Gramscian framework is utilised to interpret the Chinese rhetoric as an attempt at gathering international support from developing countries for possible pursuit of international hegemony. This thesis features a framing analysis of official Chinese rhetoric. The analysis of a White paper on China’s position in the world and six speeches by high-level Chinese officials concentrates on how China frames international issues and what kind of solutions China proposes. Attention is paid to specific strategies that are used to mobilise support from the developing country audiences and to empower and legitimise China as an international leader. The results reveal two distinct frames presented in the Chinese rhetoric: a frame of global inequality and a frame of common human progress. Blame for current global issues is attributed to the Global North and China is consistently framed as a benevolent, moral actor. The Chinese proposal for a new, more just international order is framed as an expression of the common will of humanity and as a logical result of common human progress. The history of Third World solidarity is employed as a rhetorical tool to convince the Global South of China’s good intentions and trustworthiness. China seems to be trying to gain support from the Global South for its international political agenda. The agenda is presented as advancing the shared interest of the Global South: development. However, when analysing the Chinese rhetoric from a world system theory viewpoint, the promise of development seems empty. The Chinese political programme seems to uphold the existing international system and aims to achieve incremental improvements within it. This could result in some degree of development in some areas, but it does not provide a solution for global poverty and underdevelopment.