Browsing by Author "Böling, Alina"

After a legislative process that lasted nearly a decade, the Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions was adopted in 2014. Although it being proposed by both the Green and White papers preceding the Directive, the Commission decided not to include collective redress as a part of its final proposal. This study focuses on answering the question whether a class action instrument would benefit and ensure the effective application of the Directive on antitrust damages actions. The study outlines what characteristics such an instrument would need to have in order to serve the purposes of the Directive as well private enforcement of EU competition law in general. To answer these questions, the study combines the methods of legal dogmatics and normative theory of regulation. The need for competition law damages actions in the EU has by the ECJ been motivated with the need to ensure full effectiveness of EU law. The Commission has seen actions for damages as a supplementary mean of enforcement. At the same time, there is a right of all harmed individuals to claim compensation and one of the central principles in the Directive on antitrust damages actions is the right to full compensation. Taking into account the principles of effectiveness and equivalence it is motivated that member states undertake measures that grant all victims with the right to claim and obtain full compensation access to court. The fact that all victims, including indirect purchasers and victims of umbrella pricing can claim damages lead to that damages will be widely dispersed and pulverized. This creates a need for class actions. Class actions can be used both for regulatory purposes and creating access for justice for individual claims that would otherwise not end up in front of a court. The study gives an outline of these functions as well as different models of class actions and other collective actions. The study examines collective redress in three member states, where the potential functions of class actions have been made use of in different ways. The potential to use these instruments for competition law damages actions differ. The different conditions in regard to class actions in the EU impede the objective of the Directive to harmonize the conditions for actions for damages. The study assesses whether there is a need for class actions in the field of damages actions for competition law infringements, as well as whether class actions are suitable regulatory instruments for achieving the purposes of private enforcement. Welfare effects, the need for compensating consumers and other potential victims as well as the potential of class actions to create settlements are examined. In addition, the risks of overenforcement and undermining leniency are briefly discussed. The study concludes that a suitable class action instrument for claiming antitrust damages in the EU framework would be an opt-in instrument. In order to enable cases to actually be brought in front of national courts, there is a need for certain flexibility in regard to standing and financing. It is motivated to introduce mechanisms that lower the threshold for individuals themselves to exercise their right to claim and obtain full compensation. At the same time, the competition law enforcement landscape in the EU is not in need of deterrence created by mandatory class actions.