Browsing by Author "Hirvelä, Jaakko"

This thesis examines the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge from the perspective of modal epistemology, and thus attempts to explicate the nature of knowledge. This study aims to answer the question what is knowledge? The main hypothesis is that by excluding those beliefs that are true only in virtue of good epistemic luck outside of knowledge, we might find the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. The structure of the thesis is four folded. The first part defines epistemic luck. After that, two widely discussed modal conditions safety and sensitivity (which aim to define knowledge as essentially as a non-lucky true belief) are evaluated. After critically evaluating both of these conditions and having found them wanting, a novel modal condition is presented which is superior to both safety and sensitivity. The new condition global safety differs from existing modal conditions in terms of what beliefs count as relevant when determining whether a subject has knowledge or not. Global safety is concerned not only about the truth of the belief formed in the actual world, but also about the truth of the beliefs formed in possible worlds. According to global safety a subject has knowledge only if she could not easily have erred. To know is to be safe from error. The condition developed in the study is offered as expressing both the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. The study presents widely contemporary modal epistemology and evaluates different positions critically. The thesis makes also a positive contribution to contemporary discussion and defends a novel view, which the author hopes to be of significance.