Browsing by Author "McGannon, Steven Nathan"

This thesis examines the notion of representational content in philosopher Frances Egan’s deflationary account of mental representation (DAMR) for cognitive neuroscience. In particular, this thesis explores to what extent DAMR’s pragmatic account of representational content answers to the content determinacy constraint. The content determinacy constraint is a constraint on an account of mental representation which holds that an account must provide the basis for attributing determinate content to the posited computational states. For example, the constraint requires that an account must specify the conditions under which a given representational content — such a fly — is attributed to a given representational vehicle — such as some particular structures in a frog’s brain. A variety of naturalistic “tracking theories” — broadly, theories which attempt to answer to such a constraint in terms of a privileged naturalistic relation holding between some object and the inner mental state in question — are often held to have thus far failed to satisfactorily meet this constraint. Egan’s deflationary account promises to address this constraint in a way which departs from naturalistic tracking theories (and from several other theories as well). It promises to do this by proffering a notion of representational content which says that such content is fundamentally pragmatic, and that this ultimately allows the account to avoid the problems typically associated with tracking theories. I will examine how DAMR purports to meet the content determinacy constraint via its pragmatic account of content. To this end, I will raise a content indeterminacy concern for one of the pragmatic functions of content DAMR maintains. I will examine several potential lines of response to this indeterminacy concern, some of which I will evaluate as more or less successful. The first chapter introduces the central research aims, methods, and an ethical research statement. The second chapter consists in the theoretical backdrop against which DAMR is situated, in particular, with regard to how the notions of “representation” and “computation” have been employed in cognitive science historically. The third chapter consists in a detailed explication of the components of DAMR, including a careful differentiation between its realist and computational elements and its pragmatic elements. This is followed by an explication of how DAMR purports to meet the content determinacy constraint. The fourth chapter consists in a theoretical concern which suggests some pragmatic elements of DAMR might be vulnerable to a content indeterminacy concern; and, a variety of potential responses to the indeterminacy concern raised. The fifth chapter consists in setting out the central conclusion of the thesis and suggesting four potential areas for future investigation. The central conclusion of this thesis is that DAMR faces a “limited” content indeterminacy concern for at least one of its pragmatic elements. However, I highlight that there are several ambiguities which require resolution prior to consideration if the concern raised extends to other elements of the account. I propose that the results of this thesis demonstrate the need for further clarification with regard to the way in which DAMR is committed to the content determinacy constraint. Ultimately, the concerns raised along with the ambiguities noted should serve to facilitate further philosophical evaluation of DAMR.