Browsing by Author "Tossavainen, Tuuli"

Asymmetric information in insurance markets is the result of policyholders, the buyers of insurance, having more information about their own risk types and preferences than the insurer. Informational asymmetry between the insurer and policyholders can lead to non-optimal insurance prices and quantities which reduce market efficiency. While the presence of asymmetric information has been widely studied in several insurance markets, it has not been empirically studied in the Finnish automobile insurance market before. This thesis aims to fill this gap in literature. The Finnish automobile insurance market consists of two types of insurance. Motor liability insurance is required by law from all vehicles used for driving in traffic. Also, voluntary automobile insurance can be acquired in addition to the mandatory motor liability insurance. In this thesis, the presence of asymmetric information is studied by comparing the occurrence of motor liability insurance claims, conditioned with the pricing variables used by the insurer, between policyholders who only have a motor liability insurance policy and policyholders with an additional automobile insurance policy. The data set used in this thesis is from a single Finnish insurance company. The data set is from the year 2019 and it contains nearly 105,000 motor liability insurance policies. The data include all variables observed by the insurer. Several regression specifications and the widely used positive correlation test are used in this thesis to study the correlation between insurance coverage and motor liability insurance claims. The results of this thesis suggest that signs of asymmetric information are not present at aggregate level in the Finnish automobile insurance market in question. However, different subgroups of policyholders show signs of asymmetric information: After controlling for the pricing variables, policyholders with an automobile insurance policy with the largest coverage show a positive correlation between buying automobile insurance and motor liability insurance claims whereas policyholders with an automobile insurance policy with the third largest coverage show a negative coverage-claims correlation. However, the results from different regression specifications regarding different automobile insurance coverages were not unanimous and thus the results are left ambiguous. In addition, new policyholders considered as experienced drivers show a negative correlation between motor liability insurance claims and having automobile insurance coverage. On the contrary, policyholders considered as experienced drivers with 1–2 years of company experience do not show signs of asymmetric information. The result suggests that the insurer learns from its repeat customers as signs of informational asymmetry disappear over time. Moreover, policyholders considered as unexperienced drivers do not show signs of asymmetric information regardless of the length of their customership in the firm. The results are in line with previous research.