Browsing by study line "Konkurrensrätt"

This paper examines the relationship between competition damages and leniency programmes in the EU. The idea of a leniency programme is that a member of a cartel discloses its participation in the cartel and the existence of the cartel to the competition authorities. If the applicant provides sufficient information and cooperates with the authorities, it is granted immunity from fines. However, the immunity recipient remains liable for the damage caused by the cartel through overcharging. There has been a global decline in the number of leniency applications, and it is likely that the introduction of private enforcement in the EU has contributed to this trend. In this study, it was assessed whether private enforcement or leniency programmes should be reformed in a way that would encourage private enforcement while safeguarding the effectiveness of leniency. In order to assess this issue, the EU system was compared to the equivalent US system, as private enforcement of competition law is much more active in the latter. The main finding is that in the US, cooperation between leniency applicants and civil plaintiffs is encouraged by a combination of carrots and sticks. To receive immunity from fines, the leniency applicant must cooperate with private plaintiffs by providing them with all the necessary information. In the EU, Directive 2014/104 on the private enforcement of competition law has harmonised some of the rules of the Member States. Leniency statements cannot be disclosed, and other information provided under the leniency programme can only be disclosed only after the Commission has closed its proceedings. In the light of the US system, it is important to provide for carrots and sticks to ensure the effectiveness of leniency and private enforcement. Directive 2014/104 is based on the principle of full compensation, and under this principle it is not possible to provide for further limitations on the liability of immunity recipients. If a derogation from the principle of full compensation is allowed, it would be possible to simultaneously increase the effectiveness of both leniency and private enforcement. This would require the introduction of class actions in the EU, while the liability of an immunity recipient would be limited by allowing an exemption from joint and several liability. These reforms would increase the deterrence of private enforcement while at the same time incentivising leniency applications.