Browsing by Subject "logisk möjlighet"

I the present work, I discuss the distinction between sense and nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, starting out from von Wright’s och Emiliani’s modala inter-pretation of the concept of sense that Wittgenstein presents in his book. How is the distinction between sense and nonsense drawn, in the Tractatus, and which are the consequences follow-ing from it? The initial question is also discussed against the background of Frege’s conception of mean-ing, and in relation to Geach’s och Dummett’s views on the doctrine of Saying and Showing in Frege and in Wittgenstein. In addition, I discuss Hacker’s explanation concerning metaphysical and logical necessity, and the logical syntax of language, in the Tractatus This is followed up by a more detailed presentation of the concepts of bipolarity, the meaning-ful proposition and logical necessity in the Tractatus, according to von Wright and Emiliani. Finally, I discuss Diamond’s view of Anscombe’s interpretation of the Tractatus, and the status of the propositions of the Tractatus, in relation to more recent developments of the on-going debate concerning what nonsense is taken to be. In the present work, I thus consider different aspects of the fundamental question in the Trac-tatus concerning the connection between language and reality, and what is meant by the distinc-tion between sense and nonsense, in that book. My investigation stresses the central role of the modal concepts in the Tractatus, and discusses some difficulties, resulting from Wittgen-stein’s narrow concept of sense.