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Browsing by Subject "sosiaalisten heuristiikkojen hypoteesi"

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  • Halonen, Juho (2023)
    Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism of cooperation between self-interested agents in which an individual helps another in order to gain a cooperative reputation, and is then rewarded by third-parties who conditionally help those who have helped others. Social Heuristics Hypothesis, an application of dual-process models to cooperation decisions, states that intuitive decision-making defaults to decisions that are typically beneficial in social interactions, whereas deliberative decisions are fitted more accurately to the specific features of the present situation. Drawing on these two models of social behaviour, the present studies hypothesised that promoting intuitive decision-making results in more reciprocal helping and cooperation decisions. Two pre-registered online-studies (total N = 487) did not support the hypothesis. While indirect reciprocity was observed, a time pressure manipulation designed to increase intuitive versus deliberative decision-making processes did not have the predicted effects in a Dictator game or Prisoner’s Dilemma with partners who had been either fair or selfish in an earlier Dictator game with a third-party player. Additionally, Cognitive Reflection Test scores failed to predict the reciprocity observed. Explorative analysis showed that, contrary to hypothesis, contributions to partners who had been selfish were higher in time pressure treatment versus a treatment where participants were made to wait before submitting their decisions. This finding could potentially be explained by social heuristics that promote signalling one’s cooperative qualities instead of indirect reciprocity. The predictions of Social Heuristics Hypothesis have been under active interest and dispute during the last decade, and the present studies contribute to an unstudied field of Social Heuristics Hypothesis in the domain of indirect reciprocity.