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Browsing by Author "Laitinen, Klas"

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  • Laitinen, Klas (2014)
    International commercial arbitration is the de facto method of solving disputes between corporations. Multi-party and multi-contract arbitration situations have increased significantly in recent years, which has led to arbitration institutes creating new mechanisms to increase efficiency in such situations. However, these new rules have not been studied in-depth and compared to each other, to ascertain possible similarities, dissimilarities, and common requirements. This thesis examines joinder, intervention, and consolidation mechanisms at five international arbitration institutes ('the FAI' is the Arbitration Institute of the Finland Chamber of Commerce, 'the SCC' is the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 'The ICC' is the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration, 'The HKIAC' is the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, and 'the SCCAM' is the Swiss Chambers of Commerce Association for Arbitration and Mediation) to ascertain common requirements, and effects on the fairness, efficiency, and economy of international commercial arbitration. This thesis finds that the solutions chosen at the studied institutions are largely similar in theory and in practice. There are four common requirements: 1) the consent requirement meaning that party consent is demonstrable both in cases with many agreements, and in cases with non-signatories as potential parties; 2) the timing requirement meaning that the earlier in the process the request is made by a party, the more likely it is to succeed. Different institutions have different deadlines for involuntary consolidation, joinder, and intervention; 3) the connectivity requirement meaning that there needs to be a certain degree of similarity between cases and/or parties. The connectivity requirements in relation to multi-party and multi-contract mechanisms differ among institutions studied; 4) the procedural efficiency requirement meaning that, in addition to fulfilling the other requirements, the request must also enhance procedural efficiency of the process or benefit the institution in some way. Three of five institutions studied have chosen mostly similar rules; the ICC, the FAI and the HKIAC are almost identical in their treatment of multi-party situations. Therefore, they are considered by this thesis to be the new international standard. The SCC is significantly more restrictive than ICC, FAI and HKIAC in allowing involuntary mechanisms. The SCCAM is most liberal of institutes studied, and allows arbitrators a significant amount of freedom, at the cost of party autonomy and confidentiality, to allow third-parties to intervene in arbitration proceedings, whether the third-party is directly involved in the dispute or not. The findings of this thesis show that multi-party and multi-contract mechanisms may increase the effectiveness of international arbitration at a cost to party autonomy. Party autonomy is limited by arbitration institutions nominating all arbitrators in multi-party disputes, and allowing involuntary transformation of bi-party disputes into multi-party disputes through the mechanisms of joinder, intervention, and consolidation. The increased efficiency is however limited to bi-polar multi-party proceedings and is ill equipped to handle multi-polar arbitration proceedings. The choice of an arbitration institution and consequently the process that institution follows involves significant risks, such as longer processes, and additional costs for corporations. Multi-party mechanisms, by themselves, do not significantly enhance the attractiveness of Finland as a seat of arbitration. However, this thesis finds that they are necessary first step. The conclusions in this thesis are that multi-party mechanisms are a good addition to international commercial arbitration and should be readily adopted by institutions?, but the usage of such mechanisms should only be considered when efficiency gains outweigh the costs to party autonomy.