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Browsing by Subject "security"

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  • Vazvan, Anniina (2024)
    When the global financial market was as its worst in 2008, something new was brought to light, which was to change how the financial market was seen: the Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a digital currency which was published in October 2008 by an unknown person, who represented himself under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto, and it was the first currency that was created using the “blockchain”, one version of the distributed ledger technology. The idea of the currency was that it did not exist anywhere physically, nor was it in any official records, so people could own and transfer bitcoins without anyone knowing it. Thus, bitcoins could be transferred directly from one person to another, without any intermediary in between, and all this would happen far from the reach of governmental authorities. For years the interest towards cryptocurrencies was only nominal, but the closer the 2020’s got, the greater the interest grew. Now, 2024, crypto assets have gone a long way from the 2009 when the Bitcoin currency became active, and currency is not the only digital asset anymore, which exists on the distributed ledger technology. Currently, in addition to multiple currencies, you can buy inter alia securities, smart contracts, insurances, and art, and even companies can be built on the technology. However, even though the crypto market has grown significantly in products and services during recent years, it is still largely unregulated and there is no common framework for how to regulate these markets. Choice of laws has been one unanswered subject, and a common consensus has not been reached how the applicable law should be determined in relation to crypto assets. In this researched I have tried to answer to this question and suggest choice of laws rules for crypto assets, especially concerning assets which are considered to be similar with securities. In this paper I analyse previous choice of laws rules, which are either commonly accepted or which have been enacted for different purposes, to see whether old frameworks could be suitable for new assets, or whether new choice of laws rules could be built on them. Insights have been gathered from traditional choice of laws rules, as well as from certain Regulations and Directives from the European Union and certain principles and Conventions from the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Additionally, I have considered existing suggested choice of laws solutions from different persons and entities to gain new ideas for the potential solution. Choice of laws framework which I will suggest consists of six parts, which of five are designed to certain circumstances and one is a solution which is always available. Final suggestions are Rule of the Intermediary, Rule of the System, Habitual residence of the Consumer, Habitual residence of the Victim and Habitual residence of the Seller. Finally, Choice of the Parties is always allowed, on certain conditions.
  • Ketola, Johannes (2022)
    During recent years, concerns have been expressed about foreign investors, especially state-owned enterprises, acquiring companies in Europe due to strategic motives. In October 2020, Regulation (EU) 2019/452 entered into force, establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. Despite these developments, foreign direct investment screening is largely left to the Member States discretion. In Finland, the Act on the Screening of Foreign Corporate Acquisitions (172/2012) applies to acquisitions of defence industry enterprises, companies that produce or supply critical products or services related to the statutory duties of Finnish authorities essential to the security of society and organisations or business undertakings that are considered critical in terms of securing functions vital to society on the basis of their field, business or commitments. Essentially, the objective of the Act is to screen, and, should a key national interest so require, restrict the transfer of influence to foreigners in the entities subject to screening. The purpose of this study consists of three elements. First, the purpose of the study is to provide a review of the EU framework for the screening of foreign direct investment and the national foreign direct investment screening mechanism. In essence, the review will thoroughly cover the key elements of the applicable EU regulation and the national act, supported by various illustrations and summaries. Secondly, the purpose of the study is to provide an analysis of the legal grounds for the screening and restriction of foreign direct investment. The analysis will cover the grounds 'security or public order' included in the EU framework, as well as the ground 'key national interest' included in the national act. Thirdly, the study will provide observations on the application of the foreign direct investment screening mechanisms. The observations will provide practical information on how the respective mechanisms have been used during recent years, as well as a time-bound account of the types of investments that have been subject to screening.
  • Snellman, Felix (2022)
    Leveraging new satellite communication technology, the European Commission published in February 2022 a proposal for a regulation which would facilitate the creation of a European space-based secure communication system serving EU institutions and agencies, Member States as well as EU citizens. In terms of Member States intra-governmental use, several public and private entities in the EU have expressed interest in supplementing national public authority networks with the technology that the proposed system uses. However, public authority networks are strictly regulated due their critical function in terms of safety and national security. An issue of regulatory and policy compatibility thus arises. After demonstrating why Finland is a relevant object to study, this thesis proceeds to analyse and compare relevant national legislation and policy with the proposed regulation and related documents, in order to assess whether, and to what extent, the proposed system is compatible, particularly in the context of control, security and ownership. While the research identified several issues relating to transparency, procurement, financing, ownership, access and control, the thesis ultimately finds that these concerns do not merit a conclusion of incompatibility.
  • Jaakkola, Kristella (2023)
    The EU integration has been spreading into the area of security. One of the most recent actions by the EU in this area is Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities (the CER Directive). However, the EU’s competence to act in this area has been called into question as the Treaties do not provide an express competence. Similarly to several other security measures, the CER Directive was adopted using Art 114 TFEU as its legal basis. This thesis focuses on the topic of using Art 114 TFEU as a legal basis for security measures. It will be argued that although framed as a market measure, the background, context, and content of the CER Directive point towards a security aim. However, it seems that problems related to other potential legal bases, such as Art 196 TFEU on civil protection, left Art 114 TFEU effectively being the only available option for a measure such as the CER Directive. It is noted that the case law on Art 114 TFEU indicates that there are very few limits to its use, and therefore, it seems that it provides a valid legal basis also for the CER Directive. This thesis argues that while Art 114 TFEU may provide a lucrative shortcut to avoid competence and legal basis problems, its use for security measures is another example of the phenomenon called competence creep and may lead to some negative implications regarding. It will also be argued that the EU’s actions limit Member States' sovereignty, while also noticing that there are signs that the Member States have silently approved this development. In the end, it will be argued that masking security measures as market measures may negatively affect the effectiveness of protection and may send an unfortunate message that markets are regarded as a priority over the well-being of people.