Browsing by Author "Ranta, Jannika"

The study focuses on the rhetoric and political practices that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has used to justify its authoritarian position during the 21st century. In recent decades, China’s social progress has been characterized by a so-called third revolution, which has forced the party to look for new ways to legitimate its rule. The CCP’s initial power justification leaned heavily on socialist revolution and Maoist ideology. Thirty years later, the party initiated a radical change of direction. This period of reform and opening up has commonly been referred to as China’s second revolution. Ideology was swiftly cast aside as the vocal point of interest turned to the rapid modernization of the country. One-party system was generally accepted as a necessary precondition for all the good that the market forces could provide. Yet, in recent years, this faith in government performance and sustained economic growth has slowly decayed: the fruits of reform policies are unevenly distributed and alone not enough to keep the large majority of the people happy. The development has led not only to glaring income inequality issues and other social woes, but also to waves of nostalgic longing for the lost iron rice bowl. Once again, the country faces a tide of social upheaval, which calls into question the regime's political credibility and ability to take care for the wellbeing of its citizens This study examines the recurring themes in the official rhetoric of two of the party’s most recent General-Secretaries, Hu Jintao (2002-2012) and Xi Jinping (2012-). The aim is to indicate possible changes in CCP legitimacy strategies by paying attention to the values and underlying presuppositions that their choice of words and policy initiatives convey. Primary sources include reports, speeches, and other documents reflecting the official party line. The study’s methodological approach combines Chaïm Perelman’s argumentation theory with notions of the special features in Chinese rhetorical tradition. The crumbling of the accustomed legitimacy basis is reflected in the adoption of new rhetorical tactics and changes in the political discourse. Both party leaders have continued to adhere to the principle of economic reforms, but at the same time, their reigns have been plagued with a surprisingly strong revival of red rhetoric. This peculiar phenomenon has raised much concern about the future of the country and its possible decline back to the tumultuous years of Mao’s rule. While there is no denying that ideology is making a comeback in Chinese politics, this does not mean that the CCP is truly embracing a policy line that stands against further reforms and marketization efforts. What is currently underway is an attempt to re-modify the principles of performance-based legitimacy to better respond to the changing expectations of today’s society. The concluding chapter of this study argues that ideology in this context has less to do with orthodox socialism than it has with the idea of a common cultural background and shared values that help make the regime morally legitimate in the eyes of the discontent people. Both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping’s rhetoric is strongly influenced by the Confucian cultural heritage.