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Browsing by Author "Wichmann, Ira Anna Katariina"

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  • Wichmann, Ira Anna Katariina (2011)
    Modern-day economics is increasingly biased towards believing that institutions matter for growth, an argument that has been further enforced by the recent economic crisis. There is also a wide consensus on what these growth-promoting institutions should look like, and countries are periodically ranked depending on how their institutional structure compares with the best-practice institutions, mostly in place in the developing world. In this paper, it is argued that 'non-desirable' or 'second-best' institutions can be beneficial for fostering investment and thus providing a starting point for sustained growth, and that what matters is the appropriateness of institutions to the economy’s distance to the frontier or current phase of development. Anecdotal evidence from Japan and South-Korea is used as a motivation for studying the subject and a model is presented to describe this phenomenon. In the model, the rigidity or non-rigidity of the institutions is described by entrepreneurial selection. It is assumed that entrepreneurs are the ones taking part in the imitation and innovation of technologies, and that decisions on whether or not their projects are refinanced comes from capitalists. The capitalists in turn have no entrepreneurial skills and act merely as financers of projects. The model has two periods, and two kinds of entrepreneurs: those with high skills and those with low skills. The society’s choice of whether an imitation or innovation – based strategy is chosen is modeled as the trade-off between refinancing a low-skill entrepreneur or investing in the selection of the entrepreneurs resulting in a larger fraction of high-skill entrepreneurs with the ability to innovate but less total investment. Finally, a real-world example from India is presented as an initial attempt to test the theory. The data from the example is not included in this paper. It is noted that the model may be lacking explanatory power due to difficulties in testing the predictions, but that this should not be seen as a reason to disregard the theory – the solution might lie in developing better tools, not better just better theories. The conclusion presented is that institutions do matter. There is no one-size-fits-all-solution when it comes to institutional arrangements in different countries, and developing countries should be given space to develop their own institutional structures that cater to their specific needs.