Browsing by Subject "free will"

The aim of this thesis is to evaluate different theories of free will. The starting point of the thesis is that whether we can say that we have free will or not depends on how the theory we choose characterizes the nature of free will and what requirements it sets for having it. We begin by examining the kinds of theories of free will which locate it in the ability to do otherwise. These leeway theories demand that people who possess free will must have the ability to do otherwise than they actually end up doing, so that it can be said that they have free will. The thesis ends up concluding that these theories cannot give us a satisfactory account of free will. Using the work of philosopher Harry Frankfurt, the thesis moves on to sourcehood theories of free will, which locate free will in the processes which form our desires. Sourcehood theories claim that it is the correct functioning of these processes which gives us free will. After going through many sourcehood theories the thesis ends up with Derk Pereboom’s sourcehood theory, which is called hard incompatibilism. Hard incompatibilism demands that people who have free will must be the causa sui i.e. the ultimate cause of their will. The thesis covers what it is like to live without the assumption of free will. The aim of the thesis is to convince the reader that life without assuming free will is possible. The thesis also covers critiques of Pereboom’s theory and tries to answer them. The aim is to convince the reader that Pereboom’s theory is the best characterization of free will and that the criteria it sets should be used when determining whether we have free will or not. The theory should be accepted even if we have to conclude that we do not have free will.