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Browsing by Subject "government regulation"

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  • Kurki, Niklas (2021)
    Previous research in political economy has emphasized corporate lobbying as a pathway through which businesses influence government policy. This thesis examines a less-studied mode of influence: private regulation, defined as voluntary efforts by firms to restrain their own business, in the context of Finnish private elderly care. The thesis suggests that profits in elderly care is a particularly controversial policy issue that suffers from market repugnance, defined as a situation where there might be willing suppliers and demanders of certain transactions, but an aversion to those transactions by others restrain or even stop the transactions. Now, this thesis assert that elderly care firms can use modest private regulation as a political strategy to decrease market repugnance and in so doing preempt more stringent government regulations that could hinder profit making. To test this hypothesis, this thesis organized a survey experiment, where university students and young professionals participated. The survey experiment revealed that the subjects reacted to a private regulation initiative (PRI) by firms. When subjects were asked whether profits should be allowed in elderly care, they held more positive views towards profits after exposed to the PRI. The same dynamic also materialized when subjects evaluated whether firms should be allowed to independently determine minimum staffing requirement per elderly. Furthermore, subjects were also more trustful in the prospect that elderly care firms prioritize the health of elderly before profits, after informed with the PRI. The findings in this thesis have potentially significant societal implications particularly in the domain of private sector influence on social- and healthcare policy. Private regulation is a political strategy that firms can use to decrease demand for stringent government regulation. In addition, the results suggest that firms needn’t use a lot of resources to decrease demand for regulation. However, the results also suggest that there is a demand among the public for more socially responsible firms. Even those on the Left are ready to reward firms that display a tangible commitment to responsible conduct with greater freedoms and increased legitimacy. This could ideally nudge firms towards a more responsible and a more societally embedded conduct.