Browsing by Subject "quasi-realism"

One of the most debated areas of metaethics is whether moral beliefs should be understood as descriptive beliefs or as non-cognitive states of mind. If the former is true, then moral beliefs are truth-apt and should be understood to describe facts of the world. Expressivists think that moral beliefs are expressions of non-cognitive states of mind similar to desires and that moral beliefs do not get their meaning from any descriptive facts. Instead, the function of a moral judgement is to avow attitudes, express preferences, or the like. This thesis explores two problems, which arise from the expressivists understanding of moral beliefs. More specifically, the problems investigated are about how uncertainty and certainty in our moral beliefs should be understood by those endorsing expressivism. Expressivism neatly explains why moral beliefs have a motivational force, but faces problems in explaining why our everyday normative talk seems to behave as if moral beliefs are similar to all the descriptive beliefs we have. Quasi-realism is a project aimed to explain and justify everyday moral talk from the expressivist viewpoint. Moral error is one of the concepts our everyday moralizing uses, which quasi-realism aims to justify. Being wrong in moral matters should be possible, as should uncertainty on whether your own moral beliefs are erroneous. If moral beliefs are expressions of desire-like non-cognitive states of mind, it is not obvious how we can be uncertain of them. After all, desires are traditionally thought to be unquestionable. An explanation of moral uncertainty is, in this case, a crucial goal for quasi-realism. Andy Egan claims that quasi-realists cannot provide a good enough explanation of moral uncertainty. In particular, he argues that there are fundamental moral beliefs which quasi-realists are forced to judge as a priori true, while everyone else’s fundamental moral beliefs can be doubted. If so, this asymmetry means that quasi-realists are unpardonably smug and so fail to vindicate our everyday understanding of morality. Michael Smith provides another problem for quasi-realists and expressivists. He claims that moral beliefs have three features, and expressivists can only provide an explanation of two of them. These three features are the importance of a belief versus other beliefs, its stability when new facts and opinions are uncovered, and the certitude that the belief holder has regarding the truthfulness of the belief. From these three features, it is certitude that is widely regarded as the one which expressivists cannot explain, making quasi-realists’ goals once again unattainable. This thesis explores the different ways quasi-realists and expressivists have tried to answer these arguments and failed. I will argue that the two problems presented here are linked, and the solution to Egan’s argument can only be gained if Smith’s argument is also solved. Smith’s understanding of certitude is argued to be erroneous, and that his problem of explaining certitude poses no further problems for expressivists, which everyone else would not face as well. In addition, this thesis will have suggestions of how certitude should be understood regardless of metaethical views. As for Egan’s challenge, I will argue that his definition of fundamental moral beliefs is incomplete. I propose that fundamental moral belief should be understood as completely certain beliefs and that expressions of knowledge accompany those, and that no-one can doubt fundamental beliefs. We are all smug when it comes to our most fundamental moral beliefs.