Browsing by Author "Turkkila, Roosa"

The classical views of Cognitive Science has been challenged by the embodied view of cognition. It rejects traditional views that cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent of the brain’s modal systems for perception and action. Instead it proposes that sensory and motor processes and bodily states underlie cognition. Especially the results in semantic processing has been seen as a clear evidence for embodied cognition. Studies have constantly demonstrated that motor processes are activated during the semantic processing and that stimulating these areas leads to changes in semantic processing. However, there are also results that are inconsistent with the strongest versions of embodiment. There are large parts in the brain far from sensory and motor areas taking part in semantic processing. The theories of secondary embodiment have seen this as a prof for amodal system in semantic processing. However, the relation between action and semantics is not yet fully understood and it could be that partly the same neural systems that contribute to the understanding of action also underlie general semantic processing.