Browsing by Subject "EEG"

Models of moral judgment and decision-making are traditionally divided into rationalist and intuitionist models depending on whether moral judgments are thought to be the result of a rational reasoning process or moral intuitions. The social intuitionist model represents intuitionist models of moral judgment and suggests that moral judgments are the result of affectively based moral intuitions and that moral reasoning mainly occurs as a post-hoc rationalization. The objective of this thesis is to review recent neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making and to evaluate the validity of the social intuitionist model in that moral judgments are caused by moral intuitions and not by moral reasoning. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies examining the neural correlates of moral decision-making indicate that affective processing and abstract reasoning can both result in moral judgments. Brain areas associated with emotion become more activated in moral personal dilemmas than in impersonal dilemmas, whereas impersonal dilemmas engage brain regions associated with working memory. In addition, utilitarian judgments made in difficult personal dilemmas depend more on brain areas associated with cognitive conflict monitoring and cognitive control compared with deontological judgments. Electroencephalographic (EEG) studies support the idea that moral intuitions arise early in the decision-making process. However, affective processing may begin even in the later stages of moral decision-making after moral intuitions have been initiated, thus questioning the role of emotion in moral intuitions. The social intuitionist model has both gained support and been criticized. In the light of neuroimaging studies, it appears that moral reasoning has a more significant role in moral judgments than assumed in the model. In addition, moral intuitions may not be affectively based as assumed in the social intuitionist model. It might be necessary to update the model regarding the role of reasoning in moral judgments and the relationship between emotion and moral intuition. In the future, more comparable experimental designs should be employed to make the comparison of the variety of neuroimaging studies more sensible.