Browsing by master's degree program "Master's Programme in European and Nordic Studies"

This thesis examines the Europeanisation of public spheres. According to the deliberative democratic theory, political decisions need to be based on public consideration. Similarly to the decision-making processes in the nation states, in order for democracy to function also in the European Union, there is a need for a joint European public sphere where the peoples of Europe can discuss common issues of relevance and thereby contribute to the EU decision-making. Research conducted on the gradual Europeanisation of public spheres examines how politicisation of EU issues on the national levels contributes to cross-border communication, creation of joint communities of communication and a strengthening of collective European identity. Drawing on previous research in this field, this study highlights communication flows and discursive frames in the selected national media outlets and examines to what extent these discussions point to the emergence of a collective European identity strong enough to sustain mutualisation of debt and fiscal transfers, justifying ”solidarity among strangers” within the community. Through analysis of media coverage on the EU Recovery Fund – the political and politicised face of the 2020 coronavirus pandemic response on the EU level – this thesis examines to what extent the public spheres in Germany, France and Finland are Europeanised in these debates and whether it is possible to identify a joint community of communication pointing to a collective European identity. The theoretical framework of this study draws largely on Jürgen Habermas’s public sphere theory and its later developments (and criticisms) as well as on the growing body of literature on the gradual Europeanisation of national public spheres in the EU Member States. Contrary to the early studies on the European public sphere, later research points towards increasing politicisation of EU affairs in the national public spheres and the related strengthening of Europeanisation. No consensus, however, exists yet among researchers on whether these developments will lead to enhanced European identity and further integration or renationalisation and further rise of Euroscepticism. This thesis contributes to that discussion through a case study on the Europeanisation of national public spheres in relation to the discussion on the EU Recovery Fund in 2020.

Integration in the field of defence and security policy was long regarded unlikely by integration theorists, but the European Union’s competences in the policy area have gradually expanded. The recent launch of the European Defence Fund (EDF) illustrates an ambitious supranational policy being put forward under the Commission’s political leadership. This study investigates why Member States decided to accept the proposal for establishing the EDF and transfer sovereign powers to a supranational institution. To understand their decision, I analyze the negotiations and decision-making process from the perspective of three different Member States: Germany, Greece, and Sweden. This thesis provides an empirical contribution to the study of EU defence–industrial integration and follows a limited number of studies in addressing the question of why such integration is welcomed by Member States. Prior research has suggested that economic gains were the primary motive for accepting the EDF’s precursor program ─ the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) ─ and building on these findings, I explore whether cost-benefit calculations also led Member States to accept the EDF. The explanatory power of another logic of political action will also be considered, namely that of rule following. This perspective allows for analyzing the significance of the institutional context and rules guiding appropriate behavior. In order to build a case study tracing the decision-making process, I gathered data through semi-structured interviews with government officials involved in the process and researchers familiar with national negotiating positions. Additional material used for this study includes Council meeting documents related to the EDF, European Council conclusions, Commission press releases and communications, as well as other official statements on the EDF. The case study shows that all the studied countries entered the negotiations with different expectations and that their motives for accepting the EDF differed. A key finding of this study is that Member States did not collectively accept the EDF proposal because of an expected economic benefit. In comparison with the PADR, which Member States perceived as ‘extra funding’ given that the funding came from both unallocated and reallocated funds in the EU budget, the EDF’s funding was separately negotiated in connection with the MFF for 2021-27. Economic motives did inarguably constitute an important reason for many countries including Greece and Germany, but economic rationality cannot explain why Sweden decided to accept the initiative despite the possibility that it could create a 'gap' in the state budget. Sweden’s vote in favor of the EDF can rather be explained through its adherence to community norms and self-identification as a pro-European country supportive of joint research efforts. These findings are significant because they point to a need to expand our understanding of the reasons for why Member States support integration in the policy area.

The European Union’s (EU) approach towards the Arctic has been labeled incoherent and its actorness in regional governance has been deemed limited. The Arctic Ocean is governed in an institutional complex where global and regional processes intertwine. Institutional interplay that occurs between different levels and across sectors contributes to Arctic maritime governance. Influencing these interactions can provide an avenue to governance, even for an actor beyond the region. This research provides empirical evidence on EU’s aims and ambitions regarding the maritime Arctic, while contributing to the theoretical and methodological development of systematic investigations in complex, interactive governance. This study looks at the discourse and practices through which the EU builds its governing actorness. Using a mix of qualitative data from public documents and statements, interviews and observations, the study uses a multi-method, multiperspectival approach to explore the various dimensions relevant to EU’s actorness. Both discourse and content analytical techniques are used to examine the storylines, actors, policy contexts and strategic practices that enable to discuss actorness in terms of interactive governance. The study finds that the EU builds an image for the future of the Arctic marked by uncertainty and connectivity. Increased knowledge, on the one hand, and enhanced interactions between relevant entities, on the other, are considered crucial to approaching such a future. Necessary actions, however, largely depend on the skillful individuals nested within appropriate institutional contexts. EU’s actorness in Arctic maritime governance is characterized by network-building and entrepreneurial individuals. It remains unclear, however, whether network-actorness or policy entrepreneurs effectively influence the governance arrangement. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the EU and the Arctic Council perform similar governance tasks. Therefore, further mixed-method research focusing on the interplay between the EU and the Arctic Council is essential to understand governance developments in the European part of the Arctic Ocean. Examining causal linkages between entrepreneurial network-building and governance outcomes is also considered relevant for future research.

Blame avoidance research mainly assumes that it is in the interest of people in positions of power to minimize the amount of blame directed at them. But the perspective can be different when it comes to populist leaders. A discourse theoretical analysis focusing on Janez Janša, former Prime Minister of Slovenia, shows how populist rhetoric and conspiracy theories can be used as blame avoidance strategies. The data consists of interviews with Janša, published by the Slovenian government, as well Janša’s participance in the European Parliament during a discussion on media freedom and the rule of law. According to Ernesto Laclau (2005), articulating an antagonistic frontier is an important part of the populist logic. The antagonistic frontier is a central aspect of the rhetoric of Janez Janša, who depicts himself as a victim of a socialist elite controlling large parts of society. Janša’s claims can be understood as a conspiracy theory, fulfilling the criteria by Jovan Byford (2011). This conspiracy theory can also be understood through the framework of populist logic and the antagonistic frontier. This framework of populism can be applied to understand the underlying patterns of the blame avoidance strategies used by Janez Janša, as well as the possible effects on accountability. Blame can play a part in articulating the antagonistic frontier and Janša does not always attempt to minimize blame, but on the contrary sometimes acts in a way that is certain to attract blame. When looking at this through the perspective of populist logic, there is a central difference between two types of blame. It is in the interest of a populist leader to avoid criticism from their own side of the antagonistic frontier in order to keep the chain of equivalence intact. On the other hand, blame from the other side might strengthen the antagonistic frontier and even be beneficial for the populist leader.

Social media was initially viewed as a democratising force that allowed anyone to participate in political discourse, however in recent years there has been a significant increase in the number of state-sponsored cyber troops using these technologies to spread disinformation and computational propaganda with the intent to influence the behaviour and opinions of individuals, sow chaos and confusion and undermine social cohesion. In recent years, Russia has emerged as the global leader in developing and deploying these tactics against foreign nations, conducting operations on an industrial scale through what are colloquially termed ‘troll factories,’ the most famous of which is the Internet Research Agency (IRA). This study examines images produced by Twitter accounts attributed to the IRA and the corresponding account-level metadata, in order to understand how cyber troops are using Twitter to propagate memetic content and in what ways tactics differ based upon Russian strategic culture. This study also looks at how a nation’s perceived geopolitical position can be interpreted through analysing the output of state-sponsored digital actors. Key to the success of these tactics is the dissemination of weaponised information that spreads ‘virally’ from person to person. For this reason, memetics is employed as a theoretical framework. Strategic culture is also used as an analytical tool to interpret the objectives behind Russian cyber troop activity. The research design of this study comprises three phases. First, images that occur in the dataset 5 or more times are computationally clustered, producing 1,346 clusters of visually similar images, representing 11,742 images in total. Qualitative Content Analysis is then used to create a coding framework which categorises the content of each cluster, capturing three primary dimensions: mode of delivery, type of message and country of focus. Finally, account-level metadata is analysed to determine key account characteristics, providing insight into five factors: location, account lifespan (age), language, activity and originality. Each of these factors is then cross tabulated with five regions: Russia, Post-Soviet, Europe, USA and Rest of World. The findings of this study indicate that IRA actors have pursued a multidirectional strategy based upon Russian strategic culture, in which highly political information is distributed to target audiences primarily in Russia, USA, Europe and Ukraine. The type of information spread is predominantly photographic in nature. Images of public figures and other types of political imagery frequently occur in the dataset, as do images that reinforce an insider/outsider dichotomy. Neutral images are also strategically utilised to construct Twitter accounts that appear authentic, thereby maximising the propagation rate of targeted information. When looking at references made to countries, Russia and the USA emerge as the primary centres of focus. However, when geo-visually plotted on a map, the data indicates that, as the space between these two powers, the European region is commensurate in strategic significance. Ukraine is also prioritised as a fulcrum between the Russian and Western spheres of influence, highlighting divergence in interpretations of how to define Europe and its boundaries. These findings suggest that as Russia vies for digital sociopolitical influence in the West, Europe emerges as a key strategic space between the evolving perception of ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Since the rise of the Law and Justice (PiS) party to power in 2015 the PiS government's reforms have led to a deterioration of the rule of law, which has caused growing tensions in Polish-EU relations. Poland has come under scrutiny for its policies undermining the rule of law principle and is perceived to threaten European integration by challenging the EU’s values. PiS’ time in office coincides with the trend of the success of right-wing populist parties in the CEE which has generated increased academic interest in the region. Despite growing interest towards Poland and the topic of shared values in the EU, studies on the perception of the EU in Polish internal debates have received less attention. A recent escalation in the rule of law crisis was seen in the Autumn of 2021, when the Polish Constitutional Tribunal ruled against the primacy of European Union law vis-à-vis the Polish Constitution. The Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling caused public uproar, sparking protests in Poland’s largest cities, and public debate ensued about the potential of Polexit. In analysing the Polexit debate by means of discourse analysis, the thesis examines what meanings the EU and Europe receive in opposition and government rhetoric. The thesis further explores how different meanings surrounding the EU and Europe are used in the construction of political identification of government and opposition sides. The theoretical frame of the thesis is based on social constructivism, post-foundationalism and Laclau’s theory of populism. By focusing on the Polexit debate, the thesis analyses the construction of meanings against an individual event which nevertheless caused debate that directly concerns the relations of Poland and Europe. In the analysis, the thesis finds that the opposition and government sides relate to the notions of Europe and the EU in contrasting ways, which enable them to build identification based on different conceptions of Polishness. Main findings of the analysis point to contrasting logics in government and opposition rhetoric which reflect the sides’ contrasting perceptions of nationhood; whereas the EU is constructed as a threat and an “other” in government rhetoric, the opposition aims to link Poland to the EU and Europe in constructing the opposition’s “us”.

One of the key characteristics of the Nordic sense of affinity and cohesion is the idea of a shared and common language community. The Nordic language community is based on the concept of inter-Nordic language comprehension, meaning that all members of the community ideally rely on the use of a Scandinavian language when in contact with one another, either as a first or a second (foreign) language. Another feature of this sense of community is the common Nordic efforts in language policy and planning, which, since the establishment of the Nordic institutions, have manifested themselves through various political endeavours, all with the aim to preserve and promote the use of Scandinavian as a lingua franca in Norden. Using a motivational, discursive, intertextual and interdiscursive approach to language policy and planning research, the purpose of this study is to uncover the motivation (goals, attitudes and motives) behind as well as the policy discourses (and their potential connections and discrepancies) used in the formulation of two central Nordic language policy agreements: the Nordic Language Convention, signed in 1981 and ratified in 1987, and the Declaration on a Nordic Language Policy, signed in 2006. In doing this, the study relies on the underlying assumption that language policy and planning is a socio-cultural construct of both explicit and implicit character. The analysis further explores how the uncovered motivational and discursive elements might mirror the linguistic complexities and diversities of the Nordic language community. The temporal range of this study is determined by the two selected language policy agreements, dividing the analysis into two historical eras of official Nordic language policy and planning which represent the socio-political, -cultural and -historical context of each respective language policy agreement: the early era of 1971–1987 and the late era of 1988–2006. The analysis suggests that there was no marked motivational or discursive ideological shift between the two language policy agreements. The narrower national language discourse of the Convention, motivated by early era socio-political issues of linguistic integration and freedom of movement, was somewhat expanded upon by the broader multilingual and democratic discourse of the Declaration, in turn motivated by the late era need to define the Nordic language community in and for the 21st century global community. Yet, the power, ideological and normative pendulum of both agreements still shifted towards the Scandinavian languages and the idealistic vision of effortless inter-Scandinavian communication in the region – forming the very basis of the symbolic integration of Norden through the concept of Nordic ideology.

Amid the Covid-19 pandemic, alternative online news media were predominately thought to spread false information on the coronavirus and heavily engage in conspiracy theories. The populist and far-right news outlets especially were said to strategically exploit people’s fears to further their own hate campaigns against migrants, political elites and the established media. This research aims to give a more detailed account of how five German populist far-right digital news outlets framed the ongoing crisis from January to May 2020 and managed to integrate the topic into their established narratives. For this qualitative content analysis, articles from the digital news sites of Compact, Junge Freiheit, Eigentümlich Frei, Deutsche Stimme and Zuerst were analysed regarding the topics, claims, actors and rhetoric devices that they used. The result of the study was that, rather than being swayed by strategic whims to exploit the crisis at all costs, the outlets relied on their established framing habits and were able to incorporate the crisis into all of their usual reporting. They were able to integrate the topic into overarching narratives, which not only confirmed worldviews held by their established reader base, but may also hold significant sway over new readers seeking reassurance in uncertain times. Finally, the thesis directed attention to the importance that language and presentation played in accomplishing this balancing act, establishing the need for further research on the language of the populist far right online.

As the rise of popularity of the Nordic model in academia and through the newspapers reached different kinds of audiences and reached a peak during the mid 2010s, Nordic cooperation passed through an idyllic moment for its expansion and gained strength. The policymaker adopted a discursive element called “Nordic Added Value” to capitalise on the popularisation of the Nordic Model and started to use it for the enhancement of some achievements in different sectors touched by Nordic cooperation. The aim of this thesis is to inquire on the use of Nordic Added Value in the working context of the Nordic Culture Point, institution part of the cooperation framework, that deals with the promotion of culture and artistic and innovative collaborations between the actors living on both coasts of the Baltic Sea. More precisely, the thesis inquires on the rationale and context of birth of Nordic Added Value and its application in the context of Nordic-Baltic cultural cooperation. Finally, the dissertation aims to detect the presence of narratives describing the concept and its endorsement by Nordic cooperation. The thesis makes use of Grounded Theory, and a theoretical framework utilising Soft Power theory and the concept of Added Value coming from Business Studies and European Studies. The method and theoretical framework then apply to the analysis of a dataset of approved applications from the Nordic Culture Point. The results narrate of a concept used as an evaluative tool of the quality and effects of cooperative endeavours for Nordics and Baltics alike. Positive externalities which have affected both the discursive construction of the Nordic and Baltic cultural management models relate to the employment of cultural tools affecting the cohesion as regional block. Positive effects of the uses of Nordic Added Value for Nordic-Baltic relations can translate to the implementation of successful strategies for the creation of work, innovation and revenues for their respective cultural and creative industries. Policymaking gains and learning added value arguably benefit the Baltic block the most.

Political landscapes or the political scene in the Nordic countries is often regarded of being very similar, whether it is the party system, voters’ behaviour, or political discourse. Since the formation of the political party system in Norden, three party types have been the ballast of the Nordic party landscape. These are in each country a social democratic party, a conservative party, and a centre-agrarian party. Those parties were identified by Jan Sundberg as the Nordic “pole parties”. In the last few years these parties’ support has been waning and these parties do not have as much combined electoral support as they once did. In this thesis three different variables will be analysed to determine if they have affected the support towards these pole parties. The variables in question are party identification, trust towards politicians, and voter turnout. National election studies and formal turnout figures will be used to determine whether these variables affect the support of towards Nordic pole parties. The methods used are quantitative binary logistic regression analysis and coefficient correlation analysis. The key findings in this thesis are that all three variables play a certain role in the waning support of pole parties in Norden, however, all in a different way.